 Hello, and welcome everyone. My name is Jeevan Polanyandi. I'm a junior studying IR in history, and welcome to the South Asian regional committees, resistance in the NMR panel. So before I introduce the top is a discussion, a little bit more about or our organization. I'm a member of South Asian regional committee or SART is a student run academic discourse and research group. And our main goal is to promote student engagement with the subcontinent and social and political and economic history of the subcontinent. Over today, we're going to hope to have an interdisciplinary interdisciplinary panel that covers historical context in the geopolitical realities for Myanmar today. There's going to be discussion about civil military relations, the fight for democracy and contacts to South Asia as a whole. So let me first introduce our two speakers. Jock later is a historian specializing in Southeast Asian studies focusing on the early, the early modern colonial and contemporary history of Myanmar. He published widely in the history of our con and rock on state, and pre colonial Myanmar. Since 2012 he has participated in interviews, and with a scientific production to the international bait on Virginia issues and rock on state crises. Mr. is an ISES fellow and co-coordinator of the IES Myanmar studies program. She was previously a lead researcher at the ASEAN study center ISEES. She joined ICS in 2008 after 10 years of leading the ASEAN Secretary of leading the human development unit. She has contributed to several volumes on ASEAN and Myanmar research. As a former diplomat she is researching the social cultural underpinnings of Burma's Cold War foreign policy for PhD dissertation. Yes, this is where we can begin with opening remarks. Well, good evening from Singapore. Thank you for that kind introduction, Javan. And it's, it's a pleasure and an honor to be able to share my views on from this platform to the audiences of the Tufts, South Asia Research Center. I'm interested in the developments in Myanmar. In terms of, well, introductory remarks, I mean, what can I say, Myanmar is facing the bleakest outlook ever, I think, in its contemporary history for decades. In February the first 2021, the military coup, the military that sees power in a coup has basically catalyzed many crises in the country, also compounded by the ongoing concerns over COVID-19. The pandemic that still has the world in its grips to a certain extent. And so when we look at Myanmar, the situation in the country after the first of February 2021, the type of very spontaneous mass resistance to what many people in Myanmar view as yet another imposition of authoritarian military rule. I think, you know, sitting from where I'm sitting, we could say that it's both with precedent and unprecedented. It's both expected and unexpected. And as, and it has definitely given birth I think to many new ways of understanding or interpreting the developments in Myanmar as well as you know capturing the imaginations of many. I'll just spend the next couple of minutes for the introductory remarks by just trying to unpack a bit about what I mean that it has both precedent and is unprecedented. Well, this is not the first military coup from Myanmar. Of course, you know, if we count the constitutional coup in 1958, what happened in 2021 is actually the fourth time that the military has tried to take control of the organs of state power. So it is not without precedent, but this unprecedented is that, you know, never in the past has there been such this, you know, naked display of a power graph, which was the February 2021 coup. And it is also unprecedented in the way that people in Myanmar across townships, across ethnic and class lines have risen up in protest, resisting the military rule, the junta that is now in, you know, sitting in the seat of power in the state administration council regime. So, so this is this is what I mean, and being expected and unexpected. Of course, I think when there were noises being made by the military, since August 2020 in connection with the general elections that were to be held in November 2020 and in the aftermath of those November 2020 general elections, in which the incumbent National League for Democracy government actually won another resounding, you know, second landslide. The kind of noises and grumblings that we would be hearing from the side of the military, I think, led to many analysts expecting something big, something bad might happen, but at the same time trying to apply logic to the situation and hoping that the worst might not happen. As we have seen on the February the first logic did not apply logic certainly did not apply in the case of the people who who staged the coup. And so perhaps that was also the unexpected factor the other unexpected factor I think in the calculations of the military, as well as I think also in the psyche and of the nations of communities across Myanmar is the very strong resistance, which the people have demonstrated rejecting military rule, and the the volume, the intensity and the sustained impact of that resistance, I think is is also unexpected and unprecedented and that is what I meant by now I think with that we have now many new ways of trying to understand and interpret the developments in Myanmar what's happening in Myanmar as well as the the spring revolution as the resistance movement has named itself has also seized the imaginations of many inside and outside the country I'll stop there for introductory remarks. Thank you for that and Mr later. Thank you as well for the invitation for having me, I say good afternoon from from Europe. And for me, it's also a pleasure and really great honor to join you here today. And G1 again and he just said he wanted to have me because I'm a historian maybe I would like to say just a word on that. Thanks so much because I think history is very much disregarded today. I think the contemporary issues I talked about and India crisis, for example, is one one example in particular. I myself I used to work on the early modern history, because we're kind of stayed on our car because that's a region that they haven't been much research but after 2012 that was more and more to provide some kind of input on the historical background of the region to understand these problems and basically over the last 10 years I've been basically doing that. Now, I won't repeat what was I just said because she put it out very clearly and I totally subscribed to what she just said. And I would like to underscore and it's kind of a compliment also to the organizers because when the economist just a couple of weeks ago said that Myanmar is about to be forgotten now, and nobody will talk about it anymore. You put Rohingya crisis in the title because that's what actually a global audience remember just talking about Myanmar for nearly 10 years. It was all in making the headlines for so many years already and now that's also something that that's kind of disappeared because it's not there anymore because the focus of the media has turned to the to the streets of Yangon and Mandalay and other places where the the democratic opposition is trying to oppose the coup currently. As for myself I put in another biographical element I was in in Thailand in 2014 when there was a military coup I remember the coup in Thailand of 2006. I'm sufficiently old to have memories of 1988 as well from a distance I wasn't there. But then again, each each of these situations of breakup of rapture of protest of violence and say is something like something really new. I mean, people tend to say that we history is repeating itself but at the moment we are really at as as motors are just said it's the biggest moment ever. And I think it's unpredictable what's going to happen we barely can say what's going to be the outcome of the developments now but what we see is, and I think you've got that the important point already. That's resistance that's widespread resistance to the military have to do last year. Okay, I think that's basically all that I would like to say as opening remarks to add to what has been the analysis that has been made. And I think from this basis, we might get into the questions. Yep, that was phenomenal. Thank you both. And now I'd like to hand it over to Argent to begin the moderate discussion. Hello everybody. Um, I think without much to do let's jump into the moderated section. Professor like Dr. Lider you prefer you mentioned that those the situation in Myanmar is unpredictable, but at least for now, do you foresee the military maintaining maintaining control over the central government at least. Mr. is up feel free to take this question as well. Well, I think they, if you ask the question, do they have control of power I mean they they still very strong I mean it's, it's, it's quite obvious. I mean the situation the current moment, as it is shows that they are still strong. They've been keeping on power despite the opposition and they're not ready to compromise but I wonder if that's really the most important issue that we should talk about. We need to make up our mind if the current moment is a revolutionary moment, or if this is something like a power contest where in the end there would be some kind of negotiation. When one of the parties is too weak to go on fighting personally, I, I think that we are in a revolutionary moment, meaning that the resistance is out to fight the army because there's no more trust in the army. Society has lost trust so it's not just political resistance actually it's it's really the masses. The majority are resisting, widely resisting this group, the majority wants an end to military rule in in Yama. And, and then when you ask in question about the means, I mean we all know that with almost as a G of a very long time they have been the option of non nonviolent means, and now we're in a situation and that's also something that is totally different. But violent means are kind of widely accepted as the only way of proceeding so that people are ready, are ready to die people are ready to fight you know to really because they want to win they want to put an end to this experience this nightmare that has been going on for decades. If I could jump in, I think I think Professor Lider has put it so eloquently and elegantly on, I agree with with what you have said Jack. And I would just like to add to this question right because there's no really black and white answer about does the military have a strong hold on power. Maybe a yes and no kind of answer because, as, as you know Professor Lider has highlighted the military does not have total control, even though they dominate or try to control the organs of state power, the channels of communication and information flows and of course, most of the the Myanmar diplomatic missions abroad. So in a sense they are trying to hold on to that kind of control and of course contest that, you know the legitimacy space but they also do not have control. If you look at again what has what Professor Lider has described, you know on the ground in Myanmar, local administration has completely broken down. These are, you know, these these so called a pacification type of efforts very heavy handed violent violent ways of trying to so called restore law and order have have failed because again, we see this very strong resistance on the part of the people really voicing out that they want to put an end to, you know, decades and decades of the military, having been in this privileged position in the country's political life. So so they're very I think I'm adamant that this this kind of very imbalanced type of political privilege that the military has always taken for itself in in in Myanmar must end and that I think reinforces what Professor Lider has described as you being much more in that revolutionary moment. Of course, I think the international community, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN neighboring countries would want to try and find where there could be mediated political moments because that is how diplomacy works and functions and the appetite right now globally also, I think is tending more towards this kind of dialogue and diplomacy rather than, you know, sort of military interventionist responses and that's the the moment that Myanmar is in now where initially, I think in the early months following the coup last year, there were calls there were expectations by the people in Myanmar. So for some kind of, you know, responsibility to protect intervention. But right now, and you know what I've been observing all these months, I think really the shift has taken place that the realization is that you know the people are realizing much that they have to do this themselves, you know, and really make sure that the future for for their children for their grandchildren will be one where voice and accountability issues freedom of expression can can be there, rather than always trying to I think live in silence and and always in fear of your survival. I've lived through the 1988 military takeover. I lost years of my education due to the disruptions that happened then. So I think I can relate to and feel very much what has been going on through the hearts and minds of the young people who really have been at the fall of the protests because they've had about 10 brief years of being in a situation where they had access to information they could interact with their peers across borders across you know, any kind of barriers, just by means of the improved access to communication flows, they could travel, they could really see you know and and experience for themselves what was going on. And you know from that kind of atmosphere where they could see, you know their future, full of potential and being able to I think, you know, find ways and means to realize that potential that that future held all of that seeing that all of that suddenly somehow snatched away on the 1st of February 2021 is something that the young people generations that as we refer to them in in the Spring Revolution context are really, I think the voice and the inspiration that have also of course you know, I think, brought about many other generations and the whole of the nation to come out in support of what was started as the Spring Revolution movement, the civil disobedience movement in February 2021 after the coup. You spoke about young people spearheading this movement for democracy do you foresee a sort of connection of solidarity between the urban or the movement for democracy, which is led by urbanized young people and armed ethnic movements fighting for autonomy or even independence. Well, there have been communications and I think a few months into the coup, especially when the the military forces were trying to really crack down brutally on the protests and you know all these nighttime arrest and taking place in most of the urban and other centers. Many of these, you know, the young protesters well, mostly young protesters but really it's it's across all ages and generations majority of course is is that generations that that I was referring to, and they went to the areas under control of the ethnic armed organizations to seek training on on you know urban guerrilla tactics and to to really learn, learn, I guess to to resist the military in its own game so to speak you know they they sought to really learn that arms dimension of the resistance. So that's what we observed happening in a few months, following the coup last year. And that's how I think we have also seen many of these local defense chapters also springing up and trying to have some kind of communication. And again this has historical parallels in 1988 many of the student protesters the student leaders also sought refuge and shelter with ethnic armed organizations in the the border areas fleet when when they fled for their safety from then the military forces trying to track down the difference being of course is that in 1988 the military's justification for the crew was the nationwide protests that led to what the military defined as a breakdown in law and order. And then, you know, so called justifying why the military intervened in a coup, but really the big difference in 2021 is there were no protests there were no, there was no breakdown in law and order that actually called for or justified a military take over, and all the protests that happened happened after the first of February 2021 in protest against the military coup. And I would add that there is a generational dimension here that's extremely important. And what was that just referred to all these young people that we saw on TV in the streets protesting. TV over the last 10 years since Mima opened foreign journalists criticized a lot about the deficiency, or the failures to know the democratic process at the opening and legal change, you know, being slow and so on. But now last year we saw that all these young people have been going through this, their own revolution in terms of opening up to the rest of the world that was internet there was material technical educational social change, all together. And, and we saw all this, we see all this now playing out on in this kind of terrific resistance and the readiness to fight for what they risk to lose. So I think that's a very important element. And it's, it's, it's also important indeed to refer to 1988 and the backing that the ethnic organizations gave the democratic resistance at that time. But we also see if they broadly support today there's still interest may still diverge. So it's, it's leading us to more complexity. What what would be the ultimate outcome of this obviously fighting the army, fighting the army in these days is playing in the interest of the ethnic art organizations as well. So they have an interest to support and their difference among these different organizations as well. For sure, but what we see for the moment is that says a greater coalition that ever existed opposing the army. It's not just because we see this tremendous enthusiasm of the political resistance but what we see it's, it's really building up, you know, it's like ring fencing actually the army in the center of the country at the moment. Right. So, so I think that what you're trying to say is that Myanmar is on the precipice of this revolutionary moment. And it's interesting to see where we go from here. And could you, Dr. Leiter and Mr. Tsar speak to the reactions of nearby countries to the coup, specifically, South Asian countries and ASEAN countries. Well, I had jotted down a few notes on this. And when you were talking about India in particular, I mean, you're talking not about one India or one Indian voice, they're different India's when we talk about India towards Myanmar that a capital to capital relations and there we have seen what we seen from other countries of the region be Bangladesh, Pakistan or Sri Lanka like sitting on the fence and waiting and seeing what's going to happen. There has been talk about military being part and being dominant in the country for always in a way. So they were like kind of waiting what is going to what is going to happen but then you have a different Indian perspective as I said like India's interest. Look East policy was heavily focusing on Indian interest in the Northeast, as you know, and then you have along the border phenomena similar to what we see on the side of Thailand. Refugees crossing the border, but there has been cross border trade. There has been local frictions or conflicts or ethnic groups that live on both sides. Chin Mizoram is one example that people know Naga another example. And obviously here India has been pragmatic and make a local governments must be pragmatic. And it's a little bit the same when we look at much experience. Thailand facing this current current situation. But maybe I would hand over to Murtaza say something on the Thailand Burma Burma contacts because that's something that's a long story in itself. Thank you. Thank you, Prof Leiter. Yes, indeed. It is a long story in itself but it's very true. You know, and I, and I endorse and agree with what what you've said about the different perspectives I think within India from India when it comes to the Myanmar question obviously Delhi has its own strategic and strategic concerns, but along the border areas of course you know they are dealing more with the humanitarian impact of refugee outflows I think in the early months after the coup. We did see some members of the police force actually cross the border to India. And of course, was something that the local government there had to deal with and also have have discussions and interlocute with New Delhi. But yes, pragmatism I think is something that most of the countries that share long enough borders with Myanmar would have on the tops of the policy makers mind on, you know, Thailand. It is both a member of ASEAN and also a neighboring country so so they are dual concerns you know I mean they are the concerns that Thailand would have as a member of ASEAN with regard to how the situation in Myanmar would also impinge on or affect the whole regional security and the regional integration project that's going on in ASEAN and as a bilateral neighbor. And of course, you know the refugee outflow eastwards, and the rising humanitarian needs along the border, coupled with COVID concerns would very much be something that Thai policymakers the Thai government would be thinking about. Yet, I mean, they have always been this this kind of, I think, interest or the, you know, traditional mindset, if you will, for for many of the economic migrants who are seeking better economic opportunities elsewhere. You know they tend to think of neighboring countries in the region in Southeast Asia, and of course Thailand, because of its proximity. I think it's one of those that has been one of those, you know that the prior the, the foremost destinations. And there is there is also, I think, that kind of situation going on. And, and again coupled with COVID as I was mentioning, you know, every country, every economy also wants to look at when they can reopen. So I think the refugee has been concerned with domestic challenges with with with regards to managing and being on top of the COVID-19 pandemic response domestically. So I think the kind of, you know, the refugee outflow the people along the Thai Myanmar border as a result of people fleeing conflict in Myanmar. I think these are all going to have an impact on how I think a country like Thailand tries to view and manage the situation and again I mentioned the Asian dimension. At the Asian level, of course, the interest there is to look at how can ASEAN help to minimize the spillover effect, because we've seen with the experience of the response to a natural disaster in 2008 Cyclone Nargis. The justification for ASEAN to really intervene in a member state is when regional security, when the situation in a particular member state threatens or affects regional security overall. So that's what we're seeing. I'm looking about the reactions of neighboring countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia, but do you see a shift in the perception of the international community towards Myanmar after the coup? And in addition, do you think that the military's close relations with China have provoked suspicion or even hostility? Can I ask you to clarify, what do you mean by a shift in the international community's perception of Myanmar? If you can clarify that a bit more. Of course, you and Dr. Leider spoke about how there was this nascent democracy in Myanmar short lived though it was. It seemed to, there was genuine hope of progress, but now it's been stopped short by the coup. Do you think that you mentioned that neighboring countries have interests in mind going to their shared borders and humanitarian issues. What about countries that are more removed from the immediate material effects? Have they been more hardline on the condemnation of the coup or have they taken a similar stance? I would say that the international community has a bit of a problem because it tended to be very critical of the government of Aung San Suu Kyi that had been democratically legitimized. And on the other hand it was always criticizing and opposed to the military. And now suddenly it's a military again that makes a coup and the government that has legitimacy actually and there were just the elections the year before. It's a bit with the international community got a little bit stuck because it was used, it could use to this mode of criticizing on a daily basis what the government was doing. And now suddenly it would have to switch totally and fully support this government, NLD, Aung San Suu Kyi, all these people who have been under fire for a number of years notably because of the Rohingya issue. And then the interest of the international community was on economic development where you're talking about China. China was looking for its interest, Japanese investments, it was the same. India has also infrastructure projects that it views in the perspective of its own interest and so on and so forth. And within ASEAN they wanted to have a gentle, well-behaving Myanmar and Myanmar was still like kind of a dirty kid within the community because it had all these problems that it didn't sort out the way that ASEAN would expect it to do. Now the international community got a little bit stuck because it always been along this principle, either the interest or a very principled stance on development of Myanmar. And now we're in a totally different situation which asks for very clear political expressions of where you stand. And I think that's still not really clear on which way they will go and how they will follow up. And that's quite clear in the sometimes weak support that they gave to NUG to the ASEAN government. That was really waiting for getting more boost, much stronger support from the democratic countries that had always been, had a lot of wishful thinking about the development of the country. And now it's actually a situation where they should be very clear that they really are ready to also materially support this resistance. That's the point I would make. Oh, I completely agree. And I think it's really important here also about, you see, when we look at the criticisms leveled on the National League for Democracy government, it was all in the context of, again, you know, the the Rohingya crisis, Ong San Suu Kyi and her NLD government seen as, you know, being very accommodating towards the military, where I think for those of us really studying following Myanmar are very much aware of the the constraints that the civilian government faced with very type of, I think unequal, the unequal power type of balance there because, you know, the military under the military drafted 2008 Constitution controlled the appointment of Defense Minister, Home Affairs Minister, under which immigration also falls under, and Minister for Border Affairs. And of course, the Rohingya crisis that erupted with, again, a very the highest number of people fleeing the country across the Bangladesh. That was also something that was catalyzed by the military's disproportionate, you know, armed response clearance operations as they call it, to the Rohingya communities in Northern Rakhine. And the NLD government sort of bore the brunt of that and you know there is still the case now at the International Court of Justice. And what Professor Leider has highlighted is very pertinent in that context because the National Unity government, the government in hiding, the parallel government trying to present that, you know, the loose broad based representational type of a voice for the people resisting military rule, resisting the military regime and, you know, act as one of the main interlocutors of the people's aspirations in Myanmar with the international community. I think very early on also had to contend with this. Questions about the NUG's I think commitment to a more inclusive and federal type of future. I think, you know, it was tied also with how the NUG stood on the question of the treatment of the Rohingya. And I think this Rohingya question, this Rohingya topic has also been something that the military tried to somehow manipulate or capitalize on very early after the February 1 coup last year. The military, I think was somehow reaching out to Bangladesh to talk about repatriating the Rohingya refugees still in camps in Bangladesh. And of course here, the question is, you know, are their conditions conducive enough for safe and voluntary return for the Rohingya. And that was a big question mark. In fact, ASEAN had put that on its discussion agenda, the Rohingya topic on its discussion agenda since 2016-2017 and was actually trying to work with the NLD government on facilitating the repatriation of Rohingya refugees when COVID disrupted whatever the discussions and preparations were going on and of course, you know, further compounded by the coup last year. So there is, I think, that awareness, if you will, that the State Administration Council regime is also, I guess, you know, looking to how the international community views or would view its actions and they tried to take up that Rohingya topic. But I think Senior General Min Ang Lai also qualified in an interview, if I'm not mistaken, with Phoenix Television last year too, that again, he did not agree with the term Rohingya as a community, as a population. Whereas the NUD has come up with a very forward-looking, inclusive policy that acknowledges the treatment, the very appalling treatment that the Rohingya communities have suffered at the hands of the military for decades and also undertaking to facilitate citizenship and legalization. Basically, acknowledging that the Rohingya communities who have lived, who have resided in Myanmar need to have that legal visibility. Of course, you know, right now, this is a commitment that the NUD has made. It does not have access to the organs of state power. But, you know, it is a policy groundwork I would like to think that has been laid that, you know, if future governments elected or otherwise can take it up, it would signal quite a big thing. I think it's an important issue that you and Dr. Leider raise about the Rohingya, because Dr. Leider mentioned that Western criticism of Myanmar has been centered around the treatment of that ethnic minority. And the Western media has been inundated with news of the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya since 2014. Dr. Leider, could you speak to how the Rohingya in particular have been affected by recent events, including the coup and the spring revolution? Well, I think Motu Zah already mentioned key, key points, and I will just pick up again with them. First of all, as she said, the SAC, the military jumped on this opportunity of the repatriation issue, and it's quite clear it's like a device, you know, to get some kind of legitimacy, you know, to reconnect with the international community and say, look, we are still not the bad guys that you think us to be. We really try to mend our ways, and we keep on working on repatriation, but the conditions, simply speaking, the conditions are not there. As I mentioned earlier, I think with a loss of attention from the international community for Myanmar affairs, there will also be a loss of attention for the Rohingya and the terrible situation in which all these refugees who are stuck in Bangladesh. So it's like putting more pressure on Bangladesh, and Bangladesh will have to move on with the issue without much support also, because Bangladesh could also only put some pressure on this issue towards its neighbor country when the international community was ready to prioritize this issue. It has been doing so, but there's obviously a risk now that we are going to hang on the Rohingyas themselves with their hope that repatriation is going to get underway will be very much disappointed. But then there is something extremely positive that has happened, which is that many people on the streets last year showed solidarity with those who have been victims of the military regime of the ruthless campaigns of the army and the Rohingyas. And so many people showed their sympathy and empathy for the Rohingyas last year, and there's beyond what NUG, and Mutluzad just referred it at what NUG said, there has been from young people a show of sympathy, sympathy maybe not a term strong enough to qualify this, but clearly showing that they were ready to acknowledge that these people have been terribly suffering and just like others. So there's been something I think that has been changing in the minds. And then there's something that I like to get back now when people ask me to comment on the situation in Myanmar, which is this generational change that attitudes are changing and that young people think differently today, differently today from their generation of their parents. And some of those things that they say, well, these are met member attitudes and some of these things are really changing. But then I also think that Rohingyas on their side, they will have to adapt also to this new situation bear in mind that Rohingyas have been basically building up international alliances to make some progress on domestic issues. And what they need, what they need is obviously that they get understanding and support from inside the country. And here I think there will be new opportunities. I mean, we all know that they are talking now to NUG and they have been clearly doing advocacy for their cause with those who are now invested in the democratic resistance. So there are some kind of positive elements I think that come out from the current situation as well. But this is all like a matter of patience for the moment and see forward to what's going to happen on the ground in Myanmar itself. I'm curious given the current situation in Rakhine state with the Buddhist Arakhan insurgency, the militant insurgency, do you foresee repatriation happening anytime soon? Or is it more likely that we'll see another exodus of refugees given the severity of the conflict? Well, first of all, I need to correct the mistake or misunderstanding. We should not call them Buddhist Arakhan army because they rejected that term Buddhist a number of times. With their allies in northern Myanmar, they've been clearly stressed that religion was not part of political identity and they rejected to be called Buddhist rebels or the like. They even have an understanding just like their allies, MNDAT and LA, Kachin independence army and also the United States army. They all agree on secular understanding of the state and for them it's Buddhism, but for these groups like Kachin it's Christianity, Catholics or Baptists. Religion should not be a part of this because they're very suspicious of this, of religion being constantly abused. And they've made that very clear in those territories that Arakhan army has been able to control and that's now extending to up to 60% of the mostly rural countryside. They've been inclusive, they're trying to include Muslims within their vaccination campaign and they've been very clear that they want to have a society where those people who have a right for citizenship will get citizenship. So there are some positive things to be taken out from that but it's true that they as they didn't make much less headlines than the issues linked to the Rohingya crisis. So there's still some misunderstanding, I think so maybe it's helpful to clarify this. I think Professor Lider's clarification is very important because it was not the Arakhan army that drove out the Rohingya, let's be clear about that. And I think in pronouncements made by the Arakhan army's leader, Tuan Murad Nain, he is talking about this inclusive future of Rakhine state, which includes the Rohingya. And also let's not forget, you know, there are this sub-ethnic group in Rakhine called the commands who are also predominantly Muslim. So I don't think it's a question of, you know, Buddhist versus the rest and as Professor Lider has highlighted the Arakhan army's whole overall thinking really is, you know, to look at their way of Rakhita is protecting their own, in this case people in Rakhine state, which I think that the recognition is people who live and reside in Rakhine state. And of course we need to also consider that in conjunction with the overall awakening that's been happening across the country. There's this realisation that, you know, if the military forces can inflict such violence upon, you know, Berman communities, for example, how much have those in the ethnic peripheries how much of the, the minority groups communities or the marginalized communities have suffered. I think that was an important awakening that the kind of the brutal repression of peaceful protests after the coup I think catalyzed. I think it's important to remember those. And if anyone has used religion as a political kind of means, I think it's very clear it's been the armed forces, the military that really tried to, I think, use that to privilege that. Thank you for clearing that up. And as we were constrained by time, I'd love to follow up, but we do have to move on to the Q&A section so I'll hand it over to Jiwa here. Thank you for that invigorating discussion. Adding on that, thank you both for those very informative. First up is Injin's question. Address to both, what are your perspectives on the Funtas' brutal fighting with the people's defence forces? Is this leading to perpetual civil war in Myanmar? Or is this a brave, selfless form of political resistance? Perhaps Professor Latter, you could begin. I think there's no more question that we are in a situation of civil war now. It's true. When you're contacting someone who is in Yangon currently, they would say, well, there's some normalcy on the roads and that's the case in other places as well. But basically, if we take a theoretical approach to the current situation, it's quite clear that we are in a situation of civil war. And that's a way to look at the current situation. Yeah, I mean, that's a great question that Injin raised and yes, you know, it's heartbreaking to see the country spiralling into this state of civil war in that sense. But if we look at what the PDFs are doing, what the young people are trying to do is really to, I think to put an end to this perpetual state of being in conflict. I think we need to look at it that way. You know, we see and hear of these young people saying, you know, we're going to go back to what we were doing, playing video games, going back to our classrooms, speaking up life, but we feel the need to make sure that we have that future where we can pursue our dreams and aspirations in a peaceful context. And the only way that they see is is of course you know now participating in that violent action reaction cycle of violence which the military has has started and is perpetuating by continue by continuing to commit acts of violence which again have provoked these responses and and you know, reactions that are violent. Building on that. Mr. Sir, could you describe how social media in particular has been mobilized by young people in the role of group. When you talk about social media, are you talking about platforms like Facebook, Twitter. You know, most of the most of the people who use social media who have access to the internet and information flows mainly do so through the medium of Facebook so I think Facebook has been I think one of those powerful mediums or platforms, but you know, there are there are pluses and minuses to that of course as as you know right. Very early on I think the protesters trying to, you know, to gather groups together for targeted protests sit in and so on. So the kind of messaging that they used via Facebook the kind of information that they shared via Facebook I think they learned very on also very early on that the military could also get onto Facebook to try and track where they were going to do so I think there has been also this this learning curve of you know, knowing how not to reveal your location and not to unnecessarily get your your your fellow protesters into any kind of danger, while at the same time trying to mobilize at the same time I've also seen the the protest you know pictures and images sometimes even short live video clips of the protest being being shown being shared, and that also I think serves as a kind of both inspiration as well as information update on what's going on in other parts of the country. And of course, many have also, you know, used these this social media to, to do I think, you know, promote the kind of messages they want to give me. On in the coup, there were many who would, you know, bring up the songs, the kind of resistance songs that was sang during 1988 but you know we we've seen actually 21st century updates of of you know the spring revolution type of songs and movement and so I think it's that kind of I think power that Facebook has but we also need to see how I guess the other side you know the military or the pro military supporters also tried to use Facebook early on. But now I think most of them have either been blocked on Facebook or Facebook has blocked them and so on so they've migrated off Facebook. And I think also early on, after the coup and the military was trying to clamp down on the internet and the information flows on Facebook, many social media users also migrated to Twitter. So I think we need to kind of see how that's going on but one interesting phenomenon that I've observed is that whenever there is some some discussion going on about Myanmar, or when there is a topic, or something that's discussed that people want to chime in and give their view. We've seen many, many, many social media users, you know, flood those posts with the with their comment threats and so on. I think, yes, it's, it's being effective, but it's also I think something that we need to look at in terms of not just its inspiring informative qualities but the inherent destructive qualities that also come, come with it, you know. And in large, I think this is how it is, of course, everybody is aware about the the the information safety of communications on Facebook so a lot of also migrated to more secure messaging apps. Thank you for that fascinating analysis. Professor Leiter, Rohan asked, do you see a place for Myanmar and great power competition, or do you see a lapsing to isolationism. I China vs US China vs India. Do you have any comments. Could you, could you rephrase the question please I think I didn't get it. Is this place for me and one great power competition, or instead you see it lapsing into isolationism. Oh, you mean with isolation you mean that me and I would fall back into this kind of condition that it used to have. And so, because since it's been member of ASEAN and since it's more economically embedded in the region, since it's people have been outgoing and are now present in many countries of the region in Asia in in the west. And all this doesn't predicate this kind of isolation, and it's quite clear that the military will try everything by every way to to keep the machine going on working in their own interest, obviously, but they really craving to find any any occasion ASEAN the ICJ will be one way, you know, getting some kind of legitimacy, you know, they will be happy for anyone talking to them on the one hand and on the other hand obviously the the opposition is keen, obviously to mobilize as much support over over the next over the next years that it will need to move the political situation on. And now I would add a little bit just a short comment on what Moutou just mentioned with regard to to the internet. People have been criticizing and rightly so what's been going on in terms of hate speech in Myanmar and the abuse of Facebook and so on. At the same time, I think what has been forgotten is what that this that this society that has been learning a lot over the last years and also takes its own conclusions from the way it has been discredited and being disreputed in this because of this, the lack in the society of public intellectuals. If you compare with India in India you will, you know, nobody could say that all the old all the Hindus anti Muslim or something like that and the reason is that you have public intellectuals that we have people who take a mic people who take a pen people who will speak up in TV shows, and there will be some kind of reaction. I mean, I don't think and I think nobody will will claim that there's more Islamophobia in Myanmar than anywhere else. But simply, the moderate voices, it seems like they don't get out, you know that and this is something that in other more balanced social situations in other countries. We will see it we consider it as normal that people would say hey, this is extremist we can do that and you know think about it again. We've been talking with Rakhine people who in 2013 deeply regretted what they said and what they wrote against the Rohingyas. You see, but that's never been out in any article of any journalist because journalists have left because they went off with the message of the extremist. And so I think give this country a chance and it will find its way but it will take a long time but what we we see also a number of elements of positive elements the seeds of a better future. And that's what we absolutely need to take down as well. Thank you. Thank you so much for that Professor Leiter. Mr. Sir, if you could comment on the same question. Do you see a place for Myanmar and great power competition or do you see lapsing into isolation so Well, you know, Professor Leiter has really highlighted the important nuances of that I have a small addition in the sense that look, you know, look at what what happened with regard to Myanmar's credentials at the United Nations. And that's where the US and China actually came to a common type of understanding or agreement on on, you know, status quo on maintaining status quo in keeping the ambassador appointed by the National League for democracy. Continuing in the Myanmar in Myanmar seat at the United Nations. So I think we need to look at it in that kind of commonality of interest rather than, you know, versus or either all, or you know, each pulling on, you know, the each basically using the country as as a kind of you know, a tool or a pawn. I think we need to look at it in that context I mean instability in Myanmar does not serve anyone's interest least of all, the regional organization to which the country belongs to but neither to the countries, which it never shares borders with. And, and of course, you know, the US being an important interlocutor, a key dialogue partner of ASEAN is also interested in the kind of regional stability that ASEAN is trying to and balance. So I think we need to look at all of that in consideration rather than just you know, looking at it as an yes no either or position about, you know, Myanmar's place in great power competition because as I mentioned, yes, there are areas that obviously there's areas of competition, but there are also areas where on I think important geopolitical considerations, the US and China can and have as illustrated by that UN credentials committee decision, found commonalities of interest and I think we have to hope to see where those kinds of constructive commonalities of interest can be found further for the sake of Myanmar, the country and Myanmar, the people. Thank you so much, Mr. And up next is going to be our final question for today. And I think both of you will have great answers for this. So, what can students at Tufts do to stand in solidarity with the young people in Myanmar in PDF, in jails and those who continue to protest. Professor Leiter, if you'd like to begin. Oh, for this question I would like more to speak first. Okay. Well, I'll speak from my heart. Don't forget your peers in Myanmar and the challenges that they face. And if you can help tell the story of what your peers in Myanmar are facing and the type of education challenges that they are facing I think with with that understanding the awareness from, from, you know, peer groups all around the world would mean a lot to the young people who have you know suddenly seen the continuation of their, you know their educational aspirations their employment opportunities snatched away. That's important. So, the kind of event that you've done today in an effort not to, you know, let people forget about what's happening in Myanmar, in particular, what's happening to the young people in Myanmar, I think is important and do think of that maybe at the same time, you can try to pull together a panel of these young people from various backgrounds and strengths and skills, who can also tell and share the story of what they've gone through with this struggle since February last year. I would humbly confirm what was said because there's nothing to add to this. I think many of us when you're going to ask our teachers as well. We're not just researchers, we're also teaching. And what we need to do is explain and, and keep information flowing. As I said, I was shocked when the economist concluded that Myanmar would be forgot. I mean, if we keep on having events like today, it won't be forgot. Thank you so much. Those are both beautiful comments. Thank you for your time. We really appreciate having you speak today. On behalf of SAR, well wish you all the best. Thank you.