 Question 64 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of justice. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde, triates on the cardinal virtues, the virtue of justice. By St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 64 of Murder, in eight articles. In due sequence, we must consider the vices opposed to commutative justice. We must consider, one, those sins that are committed in relation to involuntary commutations. Two, those that are committed with regard to voluntary commutations. Sins are committed in relation to involuntary commutations, by doing an injury to one's neighbor against his will, and this can be done in two ways, namely by deed or by word. By deed, when one's neighbor is injured either in his own person or in a person connected with him or in his possessions. We must therefore consider these points in due order, and in the first place, we shall consider murder whereby a man inflicts the greatest injury on his neighbor. Under this head, there are eight points of inquiry. First, whether it is a sin to kill dumb animals or even plants. Second, whether it is lawful to kill a sinner. Third, whether this is lawful to a private individual or to a public person only. Fourth, whether this is lawful to a cleric. Fifth, whether it is lawful to kill oneself. Sixth, whether it is lawful to kill a just man. Seventh, whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense. Eighth, whether accidental homicide is a mortal sin. First article, whether it is unlawful to kill any living thing. Objection one, you would seem unlawful to kill any living thing. For the Apostle says in Romans 13 to, They that resist the ordinance of God, Purchase to themselves damnation. Now divine providence has ordained that all living things should be preserved according to Psalm 146 verses 8 and 9, Who maketh grass to grow on the mountains, Who giveth to beasts their food. Therefore, it seems unlawful to take the life of any living thing. Objection two, further. Murder is a sin because it deprives a man of life. Now life is common to all animals and plants. Hence, for the same reason, it is apparently a sin to slay dumb animals and plants. Objection three, further. In the divine law, a special punishment is not appointed save for a sin. Now a special punishment had to be inflicted according to the divine law on one who killed another man's ox or sheep. Confer Exodus 22 verse 1. Therefore, the slaying of dumb animals is a sin. On the contrary, Augustine says in On the City of God 120, When we hear it said, Thou shalt not kill. We do not take it as referring to trees, for they have no sense, nor to irrational animals, because they have no fellowship with us. Hence it follows that the words, Thou shalt not kill, refer to the killing of a man. I answer that there is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are for the perfect. Even as in the process of generation, nature proceeds from imperfection to perfection. Hence it is that just as in the generation of a man there is first a living thing, then an animal, and lastly a man, so too things like the plants, which merely have life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for man. Wherefore it is not unlawful if man use plants for the good of animals, and animals for the good of man, as the philosopher states in politics 13. Now the most necessary use would seem to consist in the fact that animals use plants, and men use animals for food, and this cannot be done unless these be deprived of life. Wherefore it is lawful both to take life from plants for the use of animals, and from animals for the use of men. In fact, this is in keeping with the commandment of God himself, for it is written in Genesis 1, verses 29 and 30. Behold, I have given you every herb and all the trees, to be your meat, and to all beasts of the earth. And again in Genesis 9.3. Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat to you. Reply to Objection 1. According to the Divine Ordinance, the life of animals and plants is preserved not for themselves, but for man. Hence, as Augustine says in On the City of God 120, By a most just ordinance of the Creator, both their life and their death are subject to our use. Reply to Objection 2. Dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life of reason whereby to set themselves in motion. They are moved, as it were, by another, by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is that they are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others. Reply to Objection 3. He that kills another's ox, sins not through killing the ox, but through injuring another man in his property. Wherefore, this is not a species of the sin of murder, but of the sin of theft or robbery. Second Article Whether it is lawful to kill sinners Objection 1. You would seem unlawful to kill men who have sinned. For our Lord in the parable, found in Matthew 13, forbade the uprooting of the cockle which denotes wicked men according to a gloss. Now whatever is forbidden by God is a sin. Therefore it is a sin to kill a sinner. Objection 2. Further. Human justice is conformed to divine justice. Now according to divine justice, sinners are kept back for repentance according to Execule 3311. I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live. Therefore, it seems altogether unjust to kill sinners. Objection 3. Further. It is not lawful, for any good and whatever, to do that which is evil in itself, according to Augustine in Against Lying 7, and the Philosopher in Ethics 2.6. Now to kill a man is evil in itself. Since we are bound to have charity towards all men, and we wish our friends to live and to exist, according to Ethics 9.4. Therefore it is no wise lawful to kill a man who has sinned. On the contrary, it is written in Exodus 2218. Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live. And in Psalm 100 verse 8. In the morning I put to death all the wicked of the land. I answer that as stated above in Article 1. It is lawful to kill dumb animals, insofar as they are naturally directed to man's use, as the imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now every part is directed to the whole as imperfect to perfect. Wherefore every part is natural for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual person is compared to the whole community as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good, since a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump, according to 1 Corinthians 5.6. Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord commanded them to forbear from uprooting the cockle in order to spare the wheat, that is, the good. This occurs when the wicked cannot be slain without the good being killed with them, either because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because they have many followers so that they cannot be killed without danger to the good, as Augustine says. In against Parmenias 3.2. Wherefore, our Lord teaches that we should rather allow the wicked to live, and that vengeance is to be delayed until the last judgment, rather than that the good be put to death together with the wicked. When, however, the good incur no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the latter may be lawfully put to death. Reply to Objection 2. According to the order of his wisdom, God sometimes slays sinners forthwith in order to deliver the good, whereas sometimes he allows them time to repent, according as he knows what is expedient for his elect. This also does human justice imitate according to its powers, for it puts to death those who are dangerous to others, while it allows time for repentance to those who sin without grievously harming others. Reply to Objection 3. By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, insofar as he is naturally free and exists for himself, and he falls into the slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is useful to others. This is expressed in Psalm 4821. Man, when he was in honor, did not understand. He hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them. And in Proverbs 1129, Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast, and is more harmful, as the philosopher states in Politics 11 as well as in Ethics 7.6. Third Article Whether it is lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned. Objection 1. It would seem lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned. For nothing unlawful is commanded in the Divine Law. Yet, on account of the sin of the molten calf, Moses commanded in Exodus 32.27 Let every man kill his brother and friend and neighbor. Therefore it is lawful for private individuals to kill a sinner. Objection 2. Further, as stated above in Article 2, Third Reply. Man, on account of sin, is compared to the beasts. Now, it is lawful for any private individual to kill a wild beast, especially if it be harmful. Therefore, for the same reason, it is lawful for any private individual to kill a man who has sinned. Objection 3. Further, a man, though a private individual, deserves praise for doing what is useful for the common good. Now, the slaying of evildoers is useful for the common good, as stated above in Article 2. Therefore, it is deserving of praise, even if private individuals kill evildoers. On the contrary, Augustine says, and on the city of God one, A man who, without exercising public authority, kills an evildoer, shall be judged guilty of murder, and all the more, since he has dared to usurp a power which God has not given him. I answer that, as stated above in Article 2. It is lawful to kill an evildoer insofar as it is directed to the welfare of the whole community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the community's welfare. Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a decay to limb, when he has been entrusted with the care of the health of the whole body. Now, the care of the common good is entrusted to persons of rank having public authority. Wherefore, they alone, and not private individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death. Reply to Objection 1, the person by whose authority a thing is done really does the thing as Dionysius declares, and on the Divine Hierarchy 3. Hence, according to Augustine, and on the City of God 121, he slays not who owes his service to one who commands him, even as a sword is merely the instrument to him that wields it, wherefore those who, at the Lord's command, slew their neighbours and friends, would seem not to have done this themselves, but rather he by whose authority they acted thus. Just as a soldier slays the foe by the authority of his sovereign, and the executioner slays the robber by the authority of the judge. Reply to Objection 2, a beast is by nature distinct from man, wherefore in the case of a wild beast, there is no need for an authority to kill it. Whereas, in the case of domestic animals, such authority is required, not for their sake, but on account of the owner's loss. On the other hand, a man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from good men. Hence, a public authority is requisite in order to condemn him to death for the common good. Reply to Objection 3, it is lawful for any private individual to do anything for the common good, provided it harm nobody. But if it be harmful to some other, it cannot be done, except by virtue of the judgment of the person to whom it pertains to decide what is to be taken from the parts for the welfare of the whole. Fourth article, whether it is lawful for clerics to kill evildoers. Objection 1, it would seem lawful for clerics to kill evildoers, for clerics, especially, should fulfill the precept of the apostle in 1 Corinthians 4.16. Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ, whereby we are called upon to imitate God and His saints. Now the very God whom we worship puts evildoers to death, according to Psalm 135 verse 10, who smote Egypt with their firstborn. Again, Moses made the Levites slay 23,000 men on a count of the worship of the calf, as is stated in Exodus 32. The priest Fines slew the Israelite who went into the woman of Median in Numbers 25. Samuel killed Agag, king of Amalek, in 1 Kings 15. Elias slew the priests of Baal in 3 Kings 18. Matatias killed the man who went up to the altar to sacrifice in 1 Maccabees 2, and in the New Testament Peter killed Ananias and Sapphira in Acts 5. Therefore it seems that even clerics may kill evildoers. Objection 2, further, spiritual power is greater than the secular and is more united to God. Now the secular power, as God's minister, lawfully puts evildoers to death, according to Romans 13.4. Much more therefore may clerics, who are God's ministers, have spiritual power to put evildoers to death. Objection 3, further, whosoever lawfully accepts an office may lawfully exercise the functions of that office. Now it belongs to the princely office to slay evildoers, as stated above in Article 3. Therefore those clerics, who are earthly princes, may lawfully slay malefactors. On the contrary, it is written in 1 Timothy 3, Verses 2 and 3. It be Huveth a bishop to be without crime, not given to wine, no striker. I answer that it is unlawful for clerics to kill for two reasons. First, because they are chosen for the ministry of the altar, whereon is represented the passion of Christ slain, who, when he was struck, did not strike, according to 1 Peter 2.23. Therefore it becomes not clerics to strike or kill, for ministers should imitate their master, according to Ecclesiasticus 10.2. As the judge of the people is himself, so also are his ministers. The other reason is because clerics are entrusted with the ministry of the new law, wherein no punishment of death or of bodily maiming is appointed. Therefore they should abstain from such things in order that they may be fitting ministers of the New Testament. Reply to Objection 1. God works in all things without exception whatever is right, yet in each one according to its mode. Therefore everyone should imitate God in that which is especially becoming to him. Hence, though God slaves evildoers even corporally, it does not follow that all should imitate him in this. As regards Peter, he did not put Ananias and Sapphira to death by his own authority or with his own hand, but published their death sentence pronounced by God. The priests or Levites of the Old Testament were the ministers of the Old Law which appointed corporal penalties, so that it was fitting for them to slay with their own hands. Reply to Objection 2. The ministry of clerics is concerned with better things than corporal slayings, namely with things pertaining to spiritual welfare, and so it is not fitting for them to meddle with minor matters. Reply to Objection 3. Ecclesiastical prelates accept the office of earthly princes, not that they may inflect capital punishment themselves, but that this may be carried into effect by others in virtue of their authority. Fifth article. Whether it is lawful to kill oneself. Objection 1. You would seem lawful for a man to kill himself. For murder is a sin insofar as it is contrary to justice. But no man can do an injustice to himself as proved in Ethics 5.11. Therefore no man sins by killing himself. Objection 2. Further it is lawful for one who exercises public authority to kill evildoers. Now he who exercises public authority is sometimes an evildoer. Therefore he may lawfully kill himself. Objection 3. Further it is lawful for a man to suffer spontaneously a lesser danger that he may avoid a greater. Thus it is lawful for a man to cut off a decayed limb even from himself that he may save his whole body. Now sometimes a man by killing himself avoids a greater evil, for example an unhappy life for the shame of sin. Therefore a man may kill himself. Objection 4. Further Samson killed himself as related in Judges 16, and yet he is numbered among the saints in Hebrews 11. Therefore it is lawful for a man to kill himself. Objection 5. Further it is related in 2 Maccabees 1442 that a certain Resias killed himself, choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into the hands of the wicked and to suffer abuses on becoming his noble birth. Now nothing that is done nobly and bravely is unlawful. Therefore suicide is not unlawful. On the contrary, Augustine says in On the City of God 120, hence it follows that the words Thou shalt not kill refer to the killing of a man not another man. Therefore not even thyself. For he who kills himself kills nothing else than a man. I answer that it is altogether unlawful to kill oneself for three reasons. First, because everything naturally loves itself, the result being that everything naturally keeps itself in being and resists corruptions so far as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the inclination of nature and to charity whereby every man should love himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin as being contrary to the natural law and to charity. Secondly, because every part as such belongs to the whole. Now every man is part of the community and so as such he belongs to the community. Hence by killing himself he injures the community as the philosopher declares in Ethics 511. Thirdly, because life is God's gift to man and is subject to his power who kills and makes to live. Hence whoever takes his own life sins against God even as he who kills another slave sins against that slave's master and as he who usurps to himself judgment of a matter not entrusted to him. For it belongs to God alone to pronounce sentence of death and life according to Deuteronomy 32 39. I will kill and I will make to live. Reply to Objection 1. Murder is a sin not only because it is contrary to justice but also because it is opposed to charity which a man should have towards himself. In this respect suicide is a sin in relation to oneself. In relation to the community and to God it is sinful by reason also of its opposition to justice. Reply to Objection 2. One who exercises public authority may lawfully put to death an evildoer since he can pass judgment on him but no man is judge of himself. Wherefore it is not lawful for one who exercises public authority to put himself to death for any sin whatever although he may lawfully commit himself to the judgment of others. Reply to Objection 3. Man is made master of himself through his free will wherefore he can lawfully dispose of himself as to those matters which pertain to this life which is ruled by man's free will. But the passage from this life to another and happier one is subject not to man's free will but to the power of God. Hence it is not lawful for man to take his own life that he may pass to a happier life nor that he may escape any unhappiness whatsoever of the present life because the ultimate and most fearsome evil of this life is death as the philosopher states in Ethics 3.6. Therefore to bring death upon oneself in order to escape the other afflictions of this life is to adopt a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser. In like manner it is unlawful to take one's own life on account of ones having committed a sin both because by so doing one doesn't oneself a very great injury by depriving oneself of the time needful for repentance and because it is not lawful to slay an evildoer except by the sentence of the public authority. Again it is unlawful for a woman to kill herself lest she be violated because she ought not to commit on herself the very great sin of suicide to avoid the lesser sin of another. For she commits no sin in being violated by force provided she does not consent since without consent of the mind there is no stain on the body as the Blessed Lucy declared. Now it is evident that fornication and adultery are less grievous sins than taking a man's life especially one's own life. Since the latter is most grievous because one injures oneself to whom one owes the greatest love. Moreover it is most dangerous since no time is left wherein to expiate it by repentance. Again it is not lawful for anyone to take his own life for fear he should consent to sin because evil must not be done that good may come according to Romans 3.8 or that evil may be avoided especially if the evil be of small account and an uncertain event. For it is uncertain whether one will at some future time consent to sin since God is able to deliver man from sin under any temptation whatever. Reply to Objection 4 as Augustine says in On the City of God 121 Not even Sampson is to be excused that he crushed himself together with his enemies under the ruins of the house except the Holy Ghost who had wrought many wonders through him had secretly commanded him to do this. He assigns the same reason in the case of certain holy women who at the time of persecution took their own lives and who are commemorated by the church. Reply to Objection 5. It belongs to fortitude that a man does not shrink from being slain by another for the sake of the good of virtue that he may avoid sin. But that a man take his own life in order to avoid penal evils has indeed an appearance of fortitude for which reason some among whom it was racists have killed themselves thinking to act from fortitude. Yet it is not true fortitude but rather a weakness of soul unable to bear penal evils as the philosopher in Ethics 3.7 and Augustine in On the City of God 22 and 23 declare 6th article whether it is lawful to kill the innocent Objection 1. It would seem that in some cases it is lawful to kill the innocent. The fear of God is never manifested by sin. Since on the contrary, the fear of the Lord driveeth out sin according to Ecclesiasticus 1.27. Now Abraham was commanded in that he feared the Lord since he was willing to slay his innocent son. Therefore one may, without sin, kill an innocent person. Objection 2. Among those sins that are committed against one's neighbour, the more grievous seems to be those whereby a more grievous injury is inflicted on the person sinned against. Now to be killed is a greater injury to a sinful man than to an innocent person, because the latter by death passes forthwith from the unhappiness of this life to the glory of heaven. Since then it is lawful in certain cases to kill a sinful man, much more is it lawful to slay an innocent or a righteous person. Objection 3. Further, what is done in keeping with the order of justice is not a sin. Objection 4. But sometimes a man is forced, according to the order of justice, to slay an innocent person. For instance, when a judge, who is bound to judge according to the evidence, condemns to death a man whom he knows to be innocent, but who is convicted by false witnesses. And again the executioner, who, in obedience to the judge, puts to death the man who has been unjustly sentenced. On the contrary, it is written in Exodus 23 verse 7. The innocent and just person thou shalt not put to death. I answer that an individual man may be considered in two ways. First, in himself. Secondly, in relation to something else. If we consider a man in himself, it is unlawful to kill any man. Since in every man, though he be sinful, we ought to love the nature which God has made, and which is destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as stated above in article 2, the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in relation to the common good which is corrupted by sin. On the other hand, the life of righteous men preserves and forwards the common good, since they are the chief part of the community. Therefore it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent. Reply to Objection 1. God is Lord of death and life, for by his decree both the sinful and the righteous die. Hence he who at God's command kills an innocent man does not sin, as neither does God whose behest he executes. Indeed, his obedience to God's commands is a proof that he fears him. Reply to Objection 2. In weighing the gravity of a sin, we must consider the essential rather than the accidental, wherefore he who kills a just man sins more grievously than he who slays a sinful man. First, because he injures one whom he should love more, and so acts more in opposition to charity. Secondly, because he inflicts an injury on a man who is less deserving of one, and so acts more in opposition to justice. Thirdly, because he deprives the community of a greater good. Fourthly, because he despises God more, according to Luke 10.16. He that despiseth you despiseth me. On the other hand, it is accidental to the slaying that the just man whose life is taken be received by God into glory. Reply to Objection 3. If the judge knows that a man who has been convicted by false witnesses is innocent, he must, like Daniel, examine the witnesses with great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting the innocent. But if he cannot do this, he should remit him for judgment by a higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if he pronounce sentence in accordance with the evidence, for it is not he that puts the innocent man to death, but they who stated him to be guilty. He that carries out the sentence of the judge who has condemned an innocent man, if the sentence contains an inexcusable error, he should not obey, else there would be an excuse for the executions of the martyrs. If, however, it contain no manifest injustice, he does not sin by carrying out the sentence, because he has no right to discuss the judgment of his superior. Nor is it he who slays the innocent man, but the judge whose minister he is. Seventh article. Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense? Objection one. It would seem that nobody may lawfully kill a man in self-defense, for Augustine says to Publicala in his letter 47, I do not agree with the opinion that one may kill a man, lest one be killed by him, unless one be a soldier, exercise a public office, so that one does it not for oneself, but for others, having the power to do so provided it be in keeping with one's person. Now he who kills a man in self-defense kills him lest he be killed by him. Therefore this would seem to be unlawful. Objection two, further, he says in unfree will five. How are they free from sin in sight of divine providence, who are guilty of taking a man's life for the sake of these contemptible things? Now among contemptible things he reckons, those which men may forfeit unwillingly, as appears from the context in unfree will five, and the chief of these is the life of the body. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to take another's life for the sake of the life of his own body. Objection three, further, Pope Nicholas says in the decretals, Concerning the clerics about whom you have consulted us, those namely who have killed a pagan in self-defense, as to whether, after making amends by repenting, they may return to their former state, or rise to a higher degree. Know that in no case is it lawful for them to kill any man under any circumstances whatever. Now clerics and laymen are like bound to observe the moral precepts. Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen to kill anyone in self-defense. Objection four, further, murder is a more grievous sin than fornication or adultery. Now nobody may lawfully commit simple fornication or adultery, or any other mortal sin in order to save his own life, since the spiritual life is to be preferred to the life of the body. Therefore no man may lawfully take another's life in self-defense in order to save his own life. Objection five, further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit according to Matthew 7.17. Now self-defense itself seems to be unlawful according to Romans 12.19. Not defending yourselves, my dearly beloved. Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man, is also unlawful. On the contrary, it is written in Exodus 22 verse 2. If a thief be found breaking into a house or undermining it and be wounded so as to die, he that slew him shall not be guilty of blood. Now it is much more lawful to defend one's life than one's house. Therefore neither is a man guilty of murder if he kill another in defense of his own life. I answer that nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained above in question 43 article 3 as well as in the Par's Prima Secunde question 12 article 1. Accordingly, the act of self-defense may have two effects. One is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life, is not unlawful seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in being as far as possible. And yet though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore, if a man in self-defense uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful. Whereas if you repel force with moderation, his defense will be lawful because according to the jurists, it is lawful to repel force by force provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless defense. Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one's own life than of another's. But as it is unlawful to take a man's life, except for the public authority acting for the common good as stated above in Article III, it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity. Reply to Objection 1. The words quoted from Augustine refer to the case when one man intends to kill another to save himself from death. The passage quoted in the second objection is to be understood in the same sense. Hence he says pointedly, for the sake of these things whereby he indicates the intention. This suffices for the reply to the second objection. Reply to Objection 3. Irregularity results from the act though sinless of taking a man's life, as appears in the case of a judge who justly condemns a man to death. For this reason a cleric, though he kill a man in self-defense, is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him, but to defend himself. Reply to Objection 4. The act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily directed to the preservation of one's own life, as is the act whence sometimes results the taking of a man's life. Reply to Objection 5. Reply to Objection 5. The defense forbidden in this passage is that which comes from revengeful spite. Hence a gloss says, not defending yourselves, that is, not striking your enemy back. Eighth article. Whether one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance. Objection 1. It would seem that one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance. For we read in Genesis 4 verses 23 and 24 that Lamech slew a man in mistake for a wild beast, and that he was accounted guilty of murder. Therefore one incurs the guilt of murder through killing a man by chance. Objection 2. Further it is written in Exodus 21 verse 22. If one strike a woman with child and she miscarry, indeed if her death ensue thereupon he shall render life for life. Yet this may happen without any intention of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance. Objection 3. Further the decretals contain several canons prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now penalty is not due, say, for guilt. Therefore he who kills a man by chance incurs the guilt of murder. On the contrary, Augustine says to Pubicula in his letter 47. When we do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed to us. Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is killed as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore the person who did it is not accounted guilty. I answer that according to the philosopher in Physics 2.6. Chance is a cause that acts beside one's intention. Hence chance happenings, strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary. And since every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine, and on True Religion 14, it follows that chance happenings as such are not sins. Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly voluntary and intended is voluntary and intended accidentally, according as that which removes an obstacle is called an accidental cause. Therefore he who does not remove something when homicide results, whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of voluntary homicide. This happens in two ways. First, when a man causes another's death through occupying himself with unlawful things which he ought to avoid. Secondly, when he does not take sufficient care. Hence according to jurists, if a man pursue a lawful occupation and take due care, the result being that a person loses his life, he is not guilty of that person's death. Whereas if he be occupied with something unlawful or even with something lawful but with undue care, he does not escape being guilty of murder, if his action results in someone's death. Reply to Objection 1. Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid taking a man's life, and so he was not excused from being guilty of homicide. Reply to Objection 2. He that strikes a woman with child does something unlawful. Wherefore, if there results the death either of the woman or of the animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide, especially seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow. Reply to Objection 3. According to the canons, a penalty is inflicted on those who cause death unintentionally through doing something unlawful or failing to take sufficient care. End of Question 64. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 65 of Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triaties on the Cardinal of Virtues. The Virtue of Justice. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Secunda Secunde. Triaties on the Cardinal of Virtues. The Virtue of Justice by St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 65 of other injuries committed on the person in four articles. We must now consider other sinful injuries committed on the person. Under this head, there are four points of inquiry. First, the mutilation of members. Second, blows. Third, imprisonment. Fourth, whether the sins that consist in inflicting such like injuries are aggravated through being perpetrated on persons connected with others. First, article. Whether in some cases it may be lawful to maim anyone. Objection one. You would seem that in no case can it be lawful to maim anyone. For Damascene says, and on the true faith, 420, that sin consists in departing from what is according to nature, towards that which is contrary to nature. Now according to nature, it is appointed by God that a man's body should be entire in its members, and it is contrary to nature that it should be deprived of a member. Therefore, it seems that it is always a sin to maim a person. Objection two, further. As the whole soul is to the whole body, so are the parts of the soul to the parts of the body, according to on the soul to one. But it is unlawful to deprive a man of his soul by killing him, except by public authority. Therefore, neither is it lawful to maim anyone, except perhaps by public authority. Objection three, further. The welfare of the soul is to be preferred to the welfare of the body. Now it is not lawful for a man to maim himself for the sake of the soul's welfare, since the Council of Nicaea punished those who castrated themselves that they might preserve chastity. Therefore it is not lawful for any other reason to maim a person. On the contrary, it is written in Exodus 21-24. Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot. I answer that, since a member is part of the whole human body, it is for the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence a member of the human body is to be disposed of according as it is expedient for the body. Now a member of the human body is of itself useful to the good of the whole body, yet accidentally it may happen to be hurtful, as when a decayed member is a source of corruption to the whole body. Accordingly, so long as a member is healthy and retains its natural disposition, it cannot be cut off without injury to the whole body, but as the whole of man is directed as to his end to the whole of the community of which he is a part, as stated above in Question 61, Article 1, as well as in Question 64, Articles 2 and 5, it may happen that although the removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole body, it may nevertheless be directed to the good of the community insofar as it is applied to a person as a punishment for the purpose of restraining sin. Hence, just as by public authority, a person is lawfully deprived of life altogether on account of certain more heinous sins, so is he deprived of a member on account of certain lesser sins. But this is not lawful for a private individual, even with the consent of the owner of the member, because this would involve an injury to the community to whom the man and all his parts belong. If, however, the member be decayed and therefore a source of corruption to the whole body, then it is lawful with the consent of the owner of the member to cut away the member for the welfare of the whole body, since each one is entrusted with the care of his own welfare. The same applies if it be done with the consent of the person whose business it is to care for the welfare of the person who has a decayed member, otherwise it is altogether unlawful to maim anyone. Reply to Objection 1. Nothing prevents that which is contrary to a particular nature from being in harmony with universal nature. Thus, death and corruption, in the physical order, are contrary to the particular nature of the thing corrupted, although they are in keeping with universal nature. In like manner, to maim anyone, though contrary to the particular nature of the body of the person maimed, is nevertheless in keeping with natural reason in relation to the common good. Reply to Objection 2. The life of the entire man is not directed to something belonging to man. On the contrary, whatever belongs to man is directed to his life. Hence, in no case does it pertain to a person to take anyone's life, except to the public authority to whom is entrusted the procuring of the common good. But the removal of a member can be directed to the good of one man, and consequently, in certain cases, can pertain to him. Reply to Objection 3. A member should not be removed for the sake of the bodily health of the whole, unless otherwise nothing can be done to further the good of the whole. Now, it is always possible to further one's spiritual welfare otherwise than by cutting off a member, because sin is always subject to the will. And consequently, in no case is it allowable to maim oneself even to avoid any sin whatever. Hence, Chrysostom, in his exposition on Matthew 1912, in his homily 42 on the Gospel of Matthew, there are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven, says, not by maiming themselves, but by destroying evil thoughts, for a man is a cursed who maims himself since they are murderers who do such things. And further on, he says, nor is lust tamed thereby. On the contrary, it becomes more important for the seed springs in us from other sources, and chiefly from an incontinent purpose and a careless mind, and temptation is curbed not so much by cutting off a member as by curbing one's thoughts. Second article. Whether it is lawful for parents to strike their children or masters their slaves. Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for parents to strike their children or masters their slaves. For the apostle says in Ephesians 6.4, You fathers, provoke not your children to anger. And further on, in Ephesians 9.6, And you, masters, do the same thing to your slaves for bearing threatenings. Now some are provoked to anger by blows and become more troublesome when threatened. Therefore, neither should parents strike their children nor masters their slaves. Objection 2. Further, the philosopher says in Ephesians 10.9 that A father's words are admonitory and not coercive. Now blows are a kind of coercion. Therefore, it is unlawful for parents to strike their children. Objection 3. Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction. For this belongs to the spiritual alms deeds, as stated above in question 32 article 2. If, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children for the sake of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for any person to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore, the same conclusion follows. On the contrary, it is written in Proverbs 13.24, He that spareth the rod, hateeth his son. And further on, in Proverbs 23.13, Withhold not correction from a child. For if thou strike him with the rod, he shall not die. Thou shalt beat him with the rod and deliver his soul from hell. Again, it is written in Ecclesiasticus 33.28. Torture and fetters are for a malicious slave. I answer that. Harm is done a body by striking it. Yet not so when it is maimed, since maiming destroys the body's integrity. While a blow merely affects the sense with pain, therefore it causes much less harm than cutting off a member. Now, it is unlawful to do a person a harm, except by way of punishment in the cause of justice. Again, no man justly punishes another, except one who is subject to his jurisdiction. Therefore, it is not lawful for a man to strike another, unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction. Reply to Objection 1. Since anger is a desire for vengeance, it is aroused chiefly when a man deems himself unjustly injured, as the philosopher states in Drederech 2. Hence when parents are forbidden to provoke their children to anger, they are not prohibited from striking their children for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting blows on them without moderation. The command that masters should forbear from threatening their slaves may be understood in two ways. First, that they should be slow to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation of correction. Secondly, that they should not always carry out their threats, that is, that they should sometimes, by a merciful forgiveness, temper the judgment whereby they threatened punishment. Reply to Objection 2. The greater power should exercise the greater coercion. Now just as a city is a perfect community, so the governor of a city has perfect coercive power, wherefor he can inflict irreparable punishments such as death and mutilation. On the other hand, the father and the master who preside over the family household, which is an imperfect community, have imperfect coercive power which is exercised by inflicting lesser punishments, for instance by blows which do not inflict irreparable harm. Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a willing subject, but to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by blows. Third article. Whether it is lawful to imprison a man, Objection 1. It would seem unlawful to imprison a man. An act which deals with undue matter is evil in its genus, as stated above in the Paris Prima Secundae, Question 18, Article 2. Now man, having a free will, is undue matter for imprisonment which is inconsistent with free will. Therefore it is unlawful to imprison a man. Objection 2. Further, human justice should be ruled by divine justice. Now according to Ecclesiasticus 1514, God left a man in the hand of his own counsel. Therefore it seems that a man ought not to be coerced by chains or prisons. Objection 3. Further, no man should be forcibly prevented except from doing an evil deed. And any man can lawfully prevent another from doing this. If therefore it were lawful to imprison a man in order to restrain him from evil deeds, it would be lawful for anyone to put a man in prison. And this is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion follows. On the contrary, we read in Leviticus 24 that a man was imprisoned for the sin of blasphemy. I answer that. In the goods of the body three things may be considered in due order. First, the substantial integrity of the body and this is injured by death or maiming. Secondly, pleasure or rest of the senses and to this striking or anything causing a sense of pain is opposed. Thirdly, the movement or use of the members and this is hindered by binding or imprisoning or any kind of detention. Therefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way detain a man unless it be done according to the order of justice, either in punishment or as a measure of precaution against some evil. Reply to Objection 1. A man who abuses the power entrusted to him deserves to lose it, and therefore when a man by sinning abuses the free use of his members, he becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment. Reply to Objection 2. According to the order of his wisdom, God sometimes restrains a sinner from accomplishing a sin according to Job 512, who bringeth to not the designs of the malignant, so that their hand cannot accomplish what they had begun, while sometimes he allows them to do what they will. In like manner, according to human justice, men are imprisoned not for every sin, but for certain ones. Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a time from doing some unlawful deed there and then, as when a man prevents another from throwing himself over a precipice or from striking another. But to him alone who has the right of disposing in general of the actions and of the life of another, does it belong primarily to imprison or fetter? Because by so doing, he hinders him from doing not only an evil, but also good deeds. 4. Whether the sin is aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are connected with others. Objection 1. You would seem that the sin is not aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are connected with others. Such like injuries take their sinful character from inflicting an injury on another against his will. Now the evil inflicted on a man's own person is more against his will than that which is inflicted on a person connected with him. Therefore an injury inflicted on a person connected with another is less grievous. Objection 2. Further, holy writ reproves those especially who do injuries to orphans and widows. Hence it is written in Ecclesiasticus 3517. He will not despise the prayers of the fatherless, nor the widow when she poureth out her complaint. Now the widow and the orphan are not connected with other persons. Therefore the sin is not aggravated through an injury being inflicted on one who is connected with others. Objection 3. Further, the person who is connected has a will of his own, just as the principal person has, so that something may be voluntary for him and yet against the will of the principal person, as in the case of adultery, which pleases the woman, but not the husband. Now these injuries are sinful insofar as they consist in an involuntary commutation. Therefore such like injuries are of a less sinful nature. On the contrary, it is written in Deuteronomy 28 verse 32, as though indicating an aggravating circumstance. Thy sons and thy daughters shall be given to another people, thy eyes looking on. I answer that, other things being equal. An injury is a more grievous sin according as it affects more persons, and hence it is that it is a more grievous sin to strike or injure a person in authority than a private individual, because it conduces to the injury of the whole community, as stated above in Parse Primasukunde question 73 article 9. Now when an injury is inflicted on one who is connected in any way with another? That injury affects two persons so that, other things being equal, the sin is aggravated by this very fact. It may happen however that in view of certain circumstances, a sin committed against one who is not connected with any other person is more grievous on account of either the dignity of the person or the greatness of the injury. Reply to Objection 1. An injury inflicted on a person connected with others is less harmful to the persons with whom he is connected than if it were perpetrated immediately on them, and from this point of view it is a less grievous sin. But all that belongs to the injury of the person with whom he is connected is added to the sin of which a man is guilty through injuring the other one in himself. Reply to Objection 2. Injuries done to widows and orphans are more insisted upon both through being more opposed to mercy, and because the same injury done to such persons is more grievous to them since they have no one to turn to for relief. Reply to Objection 3. The fact that the wife voluntarily consents to the adultery lessens the sin and injury so far as the woman is concerned, for it would be more grievous if the adulterer oppressed her by violence. But this does not remove the injury as affecting her husband since the wife hath not power of her own body but the husband, according to 1 Corinthians 7.4. Reply to Objection 4. The same applies to similar cases. Of adultery, however, as it is opposed not only to justice but also to chastity, we shall speak in the triates on temperance, in Question 154, Article 8.