 We're pleased to have with us today Rania Abouzade. She's based in Lebanon and many of us have read her work on Syria. She's been reporting, though, on the Middle East and South Asia for 15 years, now working as a freelance journalist. She's won several awards for her Syria coverage. She is one of the few reporters that has been inside Syria throughout the conflict. And I think your last visit inside Syria was in August, late August. So since the uprising began in 2011 until almost presently, she's been working inside Syria. So we're delighted to have you with us here in the U.S. in Washington and to be able to benefit from your insights into Syria. I think that there could be two strands of discussion with Rania. One, of course, is about the challenges of covering violent conflict and what that takes as a person, as a journalist. But then there's the other part of what's happening inside Syria. There was recently an interview with Rania by a Jadaliya. It's a very good interview, and it's about the issue of covering conflict media women and coverage. So I'm going to let that stand as one opportunity for people to learn about the challenges of reporting on Syria and use this time really to focus on trying to get a handle on what's happening inside the country. And I want to start off with a discussion, a little bit of a discussion about sort of the trajectory of the conflict. Originally Syria started off as a popular revolt around the time of Egypt and Tunisia. You were covering both places. So there was, of course, this triumph of people rising up against an authoritarian regime. And then there was the armed insurgency. And now what we're seeing is a multi-front battle, a very complicated one with different armed actors, continued regime activity. And I'll just ask you, Rania, to maybe reflect a bit on what you witnessed in terms of conflict transformations and sort of some of the benchmarks for you and that process. That's a big question. Thank you very much for being here. Thank you for the invitation to New America Foundation. As you mentioned, I covered the uprising in Tunisia and then in Egypt. And it was in late February 2011. My editor asked me if I wanted to go to Benghazi, which at the time had just opened up. And I told them that I wanted to go to Damascus and see how this state was reacting, if at all, to the changes that were happening in the region. I was in Damascus in late February 2011, and I saw the first sort of rumblings of discontent in the capital. And they were small, candlelit vigils, and they were in solidarity with the Libyan people. They had nothing to do with requesting the fall of the regime or anything like that. And I saw how the regime reacted to them, how its various security forces were out in great force trying to intimidate. And these very small gatherings, there were only about 200 people, the first one, in Damascus. And from then, things started to progress. I remember walking in nighttime demonstrations in the areas around Damascus and how there was a liveliness, a cadence. There was an energy to the Syrian protests that I hadn't seen in Tunis or in Egypt. There was this incredible energy. And the chants, it was in the chants, they were very musical. The cadence would sort of shift with the chants. And I remember that when I was walking with those demonstrators, very few of them flinched when the bullets started to fly in those early days. I remember that clearly. There were men, women, children out in force on the streets. That was the early days, a very different picture now. But it's very interesting to think that they were steadfast so early on. I think it was clear from the beginning that it was going to be existential for both sides. I remember speaking to some of the people who were out in the streets in those early days and they said, listen, when we leave our homes, we know that this is it. If we don't continue on our path, we may be hunted down. They knew from the beginning that this was going to be existential on both sides and the regime from the beginning was also, I mean, this was a fight for survival, for both elements. So then when it turned into an armed rebellion, it probably wasn't surprising given the violence that the regime used against the demonstrators and the determination and the feeling of it's all or nothing in a sense. When it started to militarize in the summer of 2011, and there was a town in the north, a town called Yisra Shaboor and that's where we saw the first real sort of organized pushback and they were civilians at the time. The people of the town who fought back basically and they attacked the security and military installations in their town. This was a town that also had a long history with the regime back in the 80s, along with Hama. There was a bit of an Islamist sort of uprising in this town and it was crushed. So the people who took part were the sons, the grandsons of the people who remember what happened in Yisra Shaboor in the 80s. But after that, there was a civilian side, but for the most part they were defectors. And I remember being with some of the earliest groups of defectors and they were adamant that they didn't want civilians with them at the time. They wanted it to remain, they wanted to maintain some form of military discipline if you like and they didn't want civilians to join them. But after a while as the killing continued, as the bloodshed continued, they started actively requesting civilians, civilian assistance and that request was made over musk loudspeakers. It was made in amateur clips uploaded to YouTube and we started to see more and more people take arms and in the beginning they were just locals. They formed what was called a Katiba battalion although it didn't correlate to the military definition of the word. They were basically a guy, his cousins, his sons, his neighbors, local men who formed these groups. And with time some of these battalions started to coalesce into larger groups and they started to coalesce around geography or around ideology in some cases both. And then we started to see the multiple groups acting and still fighting for the regime and when did it turn into what we think now is a battle between armed groups? You know, let me step back a second. In the summer of 2011 the so-called Free Syrian Army was announced. The formation of this group was announced. It was a group of defectors who announced this. It was never an army in any sort of organized sense. There was never any commanded control and this is something that I and many people have stressed in our reports. It was just sort of a loose franchise outfit, an umbrella term under which these groups could organize without being seen to be unregulated militias, if you like. So people started to identify themselves as Free Syrian Army. There were other groups as well, even from the very beginning, who were outside of this umbrella term. And they tended to have a more stridently Islamist ideology, although there were groups that identified themselves as Free Syrian Army who were also Islamist by nature. That's a very broad term. I just want to say it's a very broad term. There's an entire spectrum within Islamism, so they're not all the same. I want to stress that. So we started to see other groups as well forming. In January 2012 we saw a group called Jabhat al-Nusra, which announced its presence inside Syria. It's also widely known now that it is an al-Qaeda affiliate, but it didn't announce its presence until January 2012. And even from the early days, after Jabhat al-Nusra announced its presence, there were groups within the armed Syrian opposition who made it clear that they didn't agree with its ideology. They didn't agree with the type of Syria that this group wanted, but that they needed them. And I often heard that from many fighting men they would say, listen, we don't agree with the kind of Syria that these guys want, but we need them now because these were the men who came and said, you know, not only will we support you, but we will support you by fighting and bleeding and dying with you, which is more than any sort of assistance that they got from other groups, other people, other sides. So, you know, they were never sort of united. It wasn't as if they were united, but it was like a marriage of convenience, if you like, for many people. Not for all. Many of them warmly welcomed them. They agreed with their ideology and they appreciated the assistance. But the fighting, like, all of this came out into the open more than a year ago, actually. It's, you know, it's become deeper now over the last, I'd say, six months, but it's been more than a year. And it was, the rivalry was played out on low-level sort of things, like the assassination of a particular commander. One group would overrun the checkpoint of another. There were these small sort of things that we would see, and with the declaration of ISIS, the Islamic State of Iraq in a sham, which was another al-Qaeda affiliate, it identified itself as Jabhat al-Nusra's parent organization in April of this year. When that came to the fore, that's when we really started to see the very intense intra-arrival rivalry. So you witnessed this first hand, is it, I mean, how do people, how do Syrians on the ground now, the ones who took up arms originally to fight for their town, their village, their country, how do they see the presence of these foreign fighters or these radical elements? How are they relating to them? Do we have any sort of sense of what their future is in Syria? Well, first of all, I just want to say that the foreign elements, the foreign fighters weren't only with Jabhat al-Nusra or with the Islamic State of Iraq in a sham, they also fought with some groups that identified themselves as free Syrian army. So they've been there for a while. So with the fall of Syrian territory around the Turkish border, with the fall of those areas to the opposition, then obviously that helped facilitate the entry of more foreign fighters into the country, became easier for them to get in. The men I know from the beginning, the ones who were still alive, of course, who first took up arms, many of them are disillusioned, they feel like they're caught between the regime on one side and the Islamic State of Iraq in a sham on the other. Some of them are sitting out this period of the fight because they feel that it's, quote, unquote, too dirty in the sense that these radical Islamist elements seem to be very dominant in some areas. So there's a real sense of disillusionment, the sense of abandonment which was always there has deepened resentment for the situation now, the feeling that nobody helped them and that's why northern Syria in particular is in the state that it's in. And so one question that I sort of struggled with is the issue of moral clarity in Syria. I was traveling the other day and I overheard someone saying randomly, you know, I can't believe in Syria, the extent to which people will go to fight each other, there's just these radical extremists that are killing each other and this is sort of the dominant narrative through which people who don't know Syria well are concluding the situation. And so, you know, but that is not, that can't be the end of the story and I'm wondering if you can help us sort of find that moral clarity in Syria and the context of such a chaotic situation. I mean, is it with the civilians that are caught between the fighting forces? Is it with the fighting forces but certain types of fighting forces, the moderate elements? Is it just taking a stand against the regime? I mean, where is it that we can say we have moral clarity on what's right and what's wrong in Syria? Well, that's not for me to say. I'll just tell you what I saw but I won't tell you what's right or wrong. That's for you to make up your own minds. I'm just going to tell you what I saw. Maybe some examples or stories of moments when you sort of were compelled by the situation. Well, I mean, you know, it's complicated as it is. Yeah, it's complicated. I mean, I'm a journalist. I'm just reporting what I see. I'm not, you know, taking sides. I don't, I'm not going to say what's right and what's wrong. But I can say that there are millions and millions of Syrian civilians who are suffering. There are areas in Syria that have been without electricity for more than a year that have water shortages. This in a country that is water rich, mainly because with the electricity being cut off, it's harder to pump water out and basic infrastructure like this. It's very, very difficult for a lot of people. Inflation to rampant. Many have been out of work, obviously, for years. The randomness of shelling is terrifying. It is terrifying to be, to feel so passive when you're just simply sitting in your home and you just don't know it's sheer luck whether or not a artillery or rocket or something is going to land on your home. It's a terrifying experience and it's one that millions of Syrian families face every day. And this artillery fire is coming from the regime. It's coming from the regime, yes. It's, you know, there are war planes, there are helicopters that are disgorging barrel bombs, which are improvised explosives devices that are full of bits of metal and what have you, things like that. On the other side, of course, the rebels also have weapons. They have anti-aircraft guns of various calibers. They're making their own. They're getting supplies smuggled in from neighboring countries. And there are, of course, certain governments that are backing various elements. And so talk a little bit about your interaction with the civilians. You know, as a journalist that goes into Syria, as I understand the situation, you can't go in un-escorted. You have to go in under armed protection. I don't know. Well, I don't know about it. Or under the regime, with a regime visa, which means that you're then minded and... Yeah, well, I can't go in on a regime visa because I've been blacklisted since about three months into the uprising. So that area sadly blocked to me and I can't report on that. I wish that I could. It depends also who you are. You know, I look a certain way. I speak the language so I can obviously pass. And I travel alone in the sense that I don't use fixes, translators, security, anything like that. And I can't do my work, basically, without the extreme generosity of Syrians who helped me. They welcome me. You know, they open their homes to me. They open their bases. They help me get from A to B. And my work would not be possible without that generosity. And I thank and acknowledge that very deeply. But, you know, I think it depends on who you are. You know, if I were blonde and male and six foot four, I think I'd have a very different experience of reporting in Syria than I do. You know, I can physically blend in as much or as little as I want to. And that's a spectrum that I move across depending on where I am, who I'm with, security situation in any particular area. And it differs from place to place. In some places, on my last trip in, for example, it was in late August. And sadly, I've been out of Syria now for since then, which is my longest period ever outside of the country. And I went into those areas with Jabhat al-Nusra and some Salafi-Ahrar al-Sham. And because I felt that I needed that level of protection, I guess, is the word. But it's more a case of if I'm with them, then other groups will know that I'm with them. I'm referring, of course, to the kidnapping of journalists and aid workers and what have you in Syria. It's an unprecedented amount according to the various press watchdogs. I think the figure is 40-something in the span of two and a half years, which is an incredible figure if you think about it. Many of those who are picked up simply disappear. We don't hear who has them. There's no ransom demand or anything like that. So that's what I meant when I said that in certain areas, I would have to go in with somebody like that. And oddly enough, the Jabhat al-Nusra men who were there with me told me, listen, you know, if the Islamic State of Iraq and the Shem comes for you, even we can't do anything for you. So that's just an indication of some of the... It's an indication of the interaction, actually, between these groups in some areas. It's a very complicated picture. And so you've been around the scary men with beards. Scary is relative. But there is a lot of... The perception is in the U.S. and in the West that these are fighters that are enemies of the free world, if you will. But I think you're telling a more complicated story that, in part, they're caught up in a game that is perhaps not one of their own making. But what are the dimensions of these different fighters? And do they talk about what and if Syria still means something to them as a place, as a country? What are they fighting for? Well, I said before that Islamism is a spectrum, so there are a wide variety of views. In the beginning, when we started seeing these battalions, these Khatibas being formed, many of them adopted names, Islamic names. They were either names of historical figures or important battles in Islamic history. They did that for a number of reasons. Some of them did it because they were trying to attract the funding of donors in the Gulf, Gulf sheikhs, the guys with the big pockets and the massive fundraising abilities. Others did it because they were true believers, because they were either Salafi Islamists or other types of Islamists. There were others who also did it almost like a Sunni identifier, to mark them as Sunnis. In Arabic, we say that everything that is forbidden is desired. So even something like wearing a beard was an act of defiance against a regime that viewed an outward manifestation of religiosity like a beard as a sign, if you like, of a potential Islamist and therefore a potential threat. So even having a beard was like an act of defiance, so you have to view it like that. But as time went on, people's attitudes changed. I remember talking to a fighter in Ma'aritan Amman, which is a city in Idlib province. I think he put it to me best. He said, listen, he was with the Salafi Ahlara Shamburgates at the time. He said, listen, we weren't always like this. I didn't have this Islamist ideology. But he said, with time, our feeling that the only person, the only thing that could get us out of this was God. They used to chant, God, you are the only one who is with us. And with time, many of them really came to believe that. And there's also the old saying that there are no atheists in foxholes. That also plays a part. These are people who are under constant danger. It's a very dangerous environment. In dangerous environments, people can often turn to religion. And you can see a growing religiosity. And with time, that religiosity can become radicalized. There is a sentiment that can be reinforced, if you like, when the only assistance that these people got was the guys with the long beards and the short pants, other foreign fighters, other Islamists. And when they came in, that idea was also reinforced. I was telling you earlier that I know men who participated in protests initially. I know one guy who then went on to do relief work. And while he felt that that wasn't getting him anywhere, he picked up a gun and he's now with Jabhat al-Nusra. So, you know, this is... We're two and a half years into a conflict now that is very bloody. It's very ugly. There are a few signs that anything is going to end at any time soon. And people can get desperate and they can turn to whatever form of support they feel they have in abundance and often that is religion. And where do women fit in this story? Women have always been there. Women are not absent from the Middle East in general and the Syrian uprising in particular. You know, I remember walking in protest and there were women... There were women who were smuggling weapons past government checkpoints. There were women who were cooking for the rebel fighters. There were women who simply remained in their homes and did not want to leave them. And that in itself was an act of defiance. They refused to leave their country. There, I met a woman who was a fighter. You know, so women are there and then they're not just... I'm just thinking now of one of my trips. I went to Raqqa city which is the only one of Syria's 14 provincial capitals to have fallen from the regime's grip. And that happened, I think it was in March of this year. It was earlier this year. And it is now an ISIS stronghold. It is now a stronghold of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Shem. But there are still women and men, but especially women, who are resisting the ISIS in their city. I remember being there a couple of weeks after it fell and Jabhat al-Nusra at the time. There was no ISIS that hadn't declared itself yet. But Jabhat al-Nusra was handing out pamphlets about what they considered appropriate female attire. And it was extremely conservative. It wasn't even Hajab and Abay. They wanted the face covered and everything. And I remember handing this around to women and they just tossed it aside. And I said, what is this? Who do they think they are if they think they're going to make us wear something like this? There is a woman now in Raqqa city. Her name is Suad Naufal. And she protests every day in front of the headquarters of the Islamic State of Iraq and Shem on her own. So, you know, don't discount the participation of Syrian women in their uprising in Arab women in particular. And I'm just wondering though, how do you access women if you're trying to tell a story and learn about a place and do your reporting? Is it as easy to speak to women as to men? Well, you know, the fact that I am a woman helps because many of these towns and villages are rather conservative. So, you know, men often can't get into, they can't, you know, the gender segregated in many of these places. So, I mean, I can sit with the women and I can also sit with the men but some male colleagues can't sit with the women. So, you know, and I speak the language and so I have those advantages. So it's, you know, and there are many people who are still in their homes, like I said. So I don't, it's not an issue for me. And have you done much of reporting on the civilian activists? You talked about Iraq, which was the first liberated provincial capital and the only one that was liberated, meaning the regime is not present. And I met some of the civilian, young civilian activists from Iraq in Turkey and they were talking about how they had the dual fight against the ISIS and the regime. Having lived through great trauma in the course of their activism in the course of the two years of the uprising. And, you know, I found them to be sort of a source of hope about Syria and for Syria because their struggle was one for values, a certain set of values as opposed to taking up arms and fighting what may be a very long and hard battle to actually win. And I'm just wondering if you, how much coverage you've done of these civilian activists and where are they today in Syria? I covered the civilian activists when they were the major force. Unfortunately, it's now the time of the guys with the guns. The civilian activists are still there, however, and with regard to Raqqa in particular, when I was there it was, I remember going into the headquarters of where all the civilian activists were and they were, you know, very excitedly coming up with logos for their Raqqa media center and things like that and exchanging ideas and there was an energy about what they were doing. Many of those people now have fled Raqqa city because of the Islamic State of Iraq and Hashem. They feel like they're caught between the regime and the Islamic State of Iraq and Hashem. When I speak to the few people who I know are still there and who are still undertake this kind of work, they won't speak to me, if I talk to them over Skype, they won't speak to me voice to voice. If there are other people around there, they don't want people to know that they're speaking to a female. One of them spoke to me in the masculine because of the fear of the Islamic State of Iraq and Hashem. They will text me instead. Some of them have invited me to come back and I think about it, but then others tell me, listen, you can't walk on the street with a man who isn't your relative now because of the Islamic State of Iraq and Hashem. This is a place where earlier this year I could walk freely. The Islamic State of Iraq and Hashem obviously hadn't been formed yet, but Jabhat al-Nusra was there. I saw Jabhat al-Nusra fighters protecting the city's two churches. They had people stationed in all sorts of areas. They said that looting was not permitted, they and others because there was an Islamist coalition. There was order, the bakeries were running, and I want to stress that I saw them protecting the churches, but when the Islamic State of Iraq and Hashem came into Raqqa city, they removed the crosses from the churches. I saw it on a snippet of video and I recognized the church. It was the Armenian church, it was near a public garden, not too far from the governor's house. I've been there before. They removed the crosses from the church and they put the black flags up, but later that same evening, a group of young Syrian activists from Raqqa city went back and the cover of darkness to the church and they carried the cross and they chanted the Syrian people are one. So even in a city like Raqqa, there are the forces that are still present. So there are guys with guns, but do not discount A, the moderation of Syrians, and B, the desire to not replace one authoritarian system with another. One more question before I open it to the audience, and that's just about the perception of the role of the U.S. in Syria. We've gone through ups and downs here, debating for a long time what to do. Then, when chemical weapons were fired, suggesting that we may be ready to intervene militarily, which I think raised expectations on some side, maybe trepidation on other parts. And now we're sitting back and hoping that negotiations in Geneva will produce some sort of solution in this very complicated situation. What is the perception of the U.S. that you hear? Is there any understanding of the complications that the people of the U.S. would be thinking about in terms of intervention, the complications and thinking about forms of intervention, or is it just anger? Well, to start with the Syrian population was not pro-American. It really wasn't the same page as the regime. Unlike, say, many quarters in Iran where the people are pro-American, but the regime is anti-American. So that's the baseline that we're starting with. There was a resentment of the U.S. for a number of reasons, mainly its foreign policy in the Middle East with regard to Israel, the invasion of Iraq and other things like that. That's the baseline that you're starting with. Certainly many elements of the Syrian opposition looked and hoped that the U.S. would do something. They wanted something to stop this bloodbath. We've got more than 120,000 people killed in the span of a couple of years. It's a very bad situation for them. There is resentment. There is anger at what is perceived as inaction. There is a growing idea that the U.S. really does want Bashar al-Assad to stay. There is confusion in some parts about what exactly the U.S. wants, but mainly there's this idea that the U.S. wants Bashar al-Assad to stay, that it doesn't care about Syrian lives, Syrian blood, that with the chemical weapons deal in particular, for example, it was like the death of however many people it was, horrendous, horrific, horrible as it was. It was a small percentage, a very small incident and much bigger conflict that has seen well over 100,000 people dead, and yet those were the deaths that counted more than any others. So there's a cynicism as well. And there is just a sense of abandonment, not just from the U.S., but from the world, but particularly from a U.S. that talks about freedom and democracy and the value of human life, and that they think is sitting by and watching as their blood is shed in the streets. Okay. So just to note for people who may have questions, Rania, I think you were also recently in Jordan, and you live in Lebanon, so you can also comment on the situation of the refugees as well. Okay. Please go ahead. Can you identify yourself? Yes, my name is Didi Kuttler. Should I repeat? I'm Didi Kuttler. I've lived in Saudi Arabia and Tunisia. And shortly before all the events happened in Syria, I was invited by the Syrian government as a photographer to photograph all over Syria. That was when Syria was hot. It was everybody wanted to go. And so I went. And I would just be very interested now how the daily life is. The boutique hotels which were flourishing, are they still going? And the damage I've gone online to see the damage in the souks and the crock de chevalier. Give a little update as to the daily life and the damage to the historical monuments. Well, thank you very much for a wonderful presentation. Thank you. I wish I could give you an update about Damascus, but I haven't been able to go there for a long time. And that's a great regret. I wish that I could. So I can't speak about the souk in Damascus. I haven't seen it. If I haven't seen it, I can't tell you about it. But I can't tell you about the situation in the north. I mean, the level of devastation is incredible in cities like Aleppo and in many small towns and villages. These are... In some areas there is no building that is unscathed. Many are shorn open. It's like they're just sliced open. The rubble pours out into the streets. There are some areas where there's ankle-high rubble and they just remove it enough so that cars can pass. There are electricity blackouts, like I said. There are some groups that are providing electricity and they tend to be more Islamist militias as well that are trying to provide basic services. Electricity shortages, water shortages. Many farmers haven't been able to plant their crops, especially in... It's a very rich, serious, very rich agricultural country. Many farmers haven't been able to plant their crops, rampant inflation in the markets. There are people who... There's a lot of internal displacement. There are people who have... There are families now that have taken in extended families that are taking in other families. It's a really, really dire situation for civilians. There are many, many millions of children who haven't been to school for years as well. Of course, the vaccination issue is a big thing because in areas that have fallen out of government control, there is no vaccination. People can't vaccinate their children in these places because a lot of these international aid organizations only deal with governments, of course, in these areas. There is no government, hence there are problems with things like that. With hospitals, there are a lot of... In rebel-held areas, a lot of the hospitals have been hit. People have to rely on field clinics which are often insufficiently supplied. I have seen children being operated on without an aesthetic in lots of places. So we're talking massive, really massive changes to a country that was... They used to export to agricultural produce around the region to a country that is water-rich to a country that is rich in so many different ways, and you see the complete destruction of these areas and the lives and the livelihoods as well. Do you know about the DT Hotel in Aleppo? Oh, Aleppo has been hit. There have been fires. It's the looting as well. Lots of things have been looted. It's a very dire situation. Yes, please, up front here. A little more, perhaps, about... Can you just say... I'm sorry, I'm Marianne Stein. I'm with the Mariah Fund. You said that the international aid agencies cannot work in the non-government... They have to work with the government. Are any of them reaching into the areas that are rebel-held? I did see some reports that there were attempts to get some vaccinations down in Deir ez-Zor in the east, but I'd have to check that. I have understood that some local aid agencies were getting supplies and assistance somehow from outside, and I just wondered if you knew anything about that. There are Syrian NGOs, of course, that are trying to fundraise and to get assistance and to do what they can, but the need is absolutely massive. I mean, we're talking about more than 6 million people who are either refugees or internally displaced. This is not something that a local Syrian NGO can deal with. This is a huge... I think the UN said that it was one of the biggest... The biggest, if not the biggest ones. We're a humanitarian disaster in the modern era, but just to sort of take that line of questioning just a bit further, I mean, have you witnessed aid deliveries, the food baskets, the blankets? The only deliveries I have seen are deliveries that were literally carried on the backs of Syrians who carried them into their own country. I haven't seen anybody else assisting them. Okay, I'm going to take some questions back here. Woman in the back. I'm a Syrian nation collusion. Actually, I came very simply from Syria five months ago, and I wasn't in the north side. I was in Damascus and the regime side area. When you're talking about the north side and you're talking about the Islamic groups and civil activists, I missed a part about Hezbollah fighters and Iran's fighters. They really exist in the north and they're really part of this war in the north. So I would like to know what did you see from them? I haven't seen any Hezbollah fighters, but of course the foreign fighters are on both sides. They're assisting the rebels, but we also have Hezbollah very openly fighting with the regime. We also have reports about Iranians, about Iraqi Shi'as, about others as well who are fighting for the regime. So Syria is a proxy battle, it's a proxy war, and it is drawing in foreigners from all different areas on both sides, definitely. In the back. Hi, I'm Mark Sybel with McClatchy Newspapers. I'm curious about the comment when you were with the Nusra escorts, where they said, you know, if ISIS shows up we really can't protect you. What were they telling you? Why was that? And then let me ask another question, which is regarding ISIS, there's a theory, I'm sure you've heard it, that ISIS is really working with the regime and doing the regime's work. I wonder what you think about that, and I wonder if you have any insight into why ISIS aggressively moved against the FSA in a place like Assad's. Okay, so in April of this year, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who's an Iraqi, announced that his organization was the parent organization of Jabat al-Nusra, and he said that the two would merge and that they would form the Islamic State of Iraq in a sham. A few days later, the leader of al-Nusra, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, who is a Syrian, rejected this. He said, we weren't, listen, we didn't know about this declaration before it was made. We rejected it, and we will remain Jabat al-Nusra. Al-Qaeda Central, if you like, the leader of al-Qaeda Central, Ayman al-Zawahri, weighed in, and he said that the two groups should remain separate. His ruling was ignored by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. So when this happened in April, I know guys in Jabat al-Nusra who didn't know which way to go. They started saying, do we go with Baghdadi? Do we go with Jolani? Many of the hardcore foreign elements went with ISIS. So by default, Jabat al-Nusra became more Syrian. There have been differences. Jabat al-Nusra was always careful not to antagonize the communities in which it based itself. It seemed to have learned the lessons of Iraq, and it didn't want to, you know, they would suggest the Hajjab, for example, they would suggest certain means to dress, especially for women, but they wouldn't impose it. ISIS is a very different creature. They very aggressively antagonize the local populations, both the military units that are present, including Jabat al-Nusra in some areas, as well as civilians. They are basically the Islamic State of Iraq, and they're doing everything that that group did in Iraq. So in some areas, like in Raqqa, for example, the Islamic State of Iraq and Jabat al-Nusra, the animosity is such that the Islamic State kidnapped the Emir of Jabat al-Nusra in that city. So, I mean, you know, that's the level of animosity in some areas. Of course, that differs. In other areas, they work together quite happily. So it's a very localized thing. That's the other thing about the Syrian War, is that, you know, I'm loath to sort of generalize about it, because I don't think that you can. It's very localized. The dynamics are very different in different areas, and that's something that we also have to keep in mind. And I can't remember if I answered all your questions or if there was something else. Describing a relationship with ISIS that didn't permit them to respond, should they attempt to... No, that was very particular. I was in the countryside of Ladiyeh, Latakia, and I have never seen that many foreign fighters there, and I've been in just about everywhere, except for a couple of places. They were really drawn to that battle. I saw units that were comprised solely of Chechens. There were men from many, many different places. So that was a very particular kind of dynamic in that area. So in that area, those Rabat al-Nusra guys had that relationship with the elements of ISIS. It's very particular. It depends. Now, this was the last time you were in Syria, right? In August. And you're saying that that was particular to Latakia. Are we sure it's not something similar in other areas? No, I mean, it is like in Raqqa. It's the same sort of thing in some parts of Aleppo. So it depends. It really does depend on where you are. So I won't generalize and say this is a situation everywhere, because it's not the case. What about ISIS doing the work of the regime? Oh, yes, sorry. You know, when Rabat al-Nusra was first formed, the same allegations were made that Rabat al-Nusra is part of the regime, or it's part of regime propaganda or it plays into regime propaganda. And certainly the same claims have been made of ISIS. And, you know, this is something that comes up, this has come up before. I will tell you that in Raqqa, for example, everybody knows where the ISIS headquarters are. Quite clear. They're in the governorate and they're in the former governor's mansion. Oddly enough, those two places haven't been hit and all the airstrikes on the city. Ryan, did you have a question right here up front? I was wondering if you could talk more about the structure of ISIS, how both in terms of where precisely the money comes from and how it's determined, like, which areas will get that money and if they're sort of fighting between those regional groups. And also the structure in terms of how they conduct local governance and how the decisions are made. Is it in different places, Syrians that are making the decision that they'll provide electricity or force women to wear niqab? Or is it foreign elements that are making those decisions? And does that differ across regions? I can't speak to where ISIS gets its money from, I don't know. But I know that when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi made his statement about the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq in a sham, he said that almost half of Jabhat al-Nusrah's money was coming from the Islamic State of Iraq. So that much is known. In terms of the foreigners, there are also Syrians within the Islamic State of Iraq in a sham. So it's not just a foreign thing. And it differs in different areas. In some places they have foreign emirs and in other places they have Syrian emirs. So it differs. When a lot of these places fell out of regime control, obviously other forms of order needed to sort of be imposed. In many cases, so in many areas we started to see Sharia courts come to the fore simply because, you know, this was a means to try and impose some form of order and to settle disputes and what have you. After a time we saw them in some of these areas, they started to form Haia Sharia, legislative association if you like. And this was comprised of representatives from the different military units as well as civilians. And often they were elected to this kind of a board in many of the cities and the towns. So they would be elected to this sort of Haia Sharia, which would be responsible for trying to secure some of these services, for example. They'd try and negotiate this kind of stuff. In many places ISIS sort of just took over now in the past six months and just took over and imposed its own views. With regard to the services, for example, particular brigades or battalions or military units, whatever you want to call them, would take it upon themselves to provide electricity via generators to certain areas. So it really does depend on the area. Adnan, in the back here. Adnan Zulfikar from the Truman National Security Project. I had a question about there. You talked about geographic identity, some groups coalescing around that and then ideological as well. There have been some people who've thrown out this suggestion that sort of tribal affiliations may be a route similar to Iraq to create sort of another force that may challenge ISIS and some of these other groups. To what extent have you found people coalescing around tribal identity in your travels? I wrote a story about this earlier this year. The Ba'ath system sort of broke the tribal structure. It broke the traditional pyramidal tribal structure with the sheikh at the apex because it was an alternative source of power. It was a potential threat. So they sort of broke that traditional structure unlike in Iraq, for example, and they would pick other sheikhs, other leaders who didn't have much clout in terms of the traditional tribal hierarchy but who could get things done with the regime, with the system. So their clout increased. This is pre-revolution. Yeah, this is pre-revolution. So their clout sort of increased because they were the guys who could get things done with the regime, leaving the traditional tribal leaders sort of sidelined. In some areas, we're talking about the east mainly because there is some talk about reconstituting if you like this traditional tribal, the traditional power of the tribal leader. It remains to be seen whether or not the Sahawat will come from the tribes or whether they'll simply come from FSA groups and others who are angry at what ISIS is doing in their country. So it doesn't necessarily have to come from tribes because we're talking about a regime, a system of governance that over 40 years changed the structure of the tribes and the power dynamics within it. So it doesn't necessarily have to come from that, replicate the Iraqi model. But are the people falling back into old patterns or we're just seeing new leaders emerging? Well, that's the sad thing about civil wars is that especially ones that take on increasingly sectarian hue is that people are sort of being driven into their base identity. People are being identified as Sunni or Alawi or from this clan or from whatever. And tribal affiliation can often mean the difference between whether or not you can freely enter an area, whether you can pass a checkpoint, things like that. So people are sort of retreating into this identity and they're also being forced back into it at the same time. Okay, back here. Hi, my name is Tandy. I'm from the Madill School of Journalism. I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about the refugees. We know there's a crisis in neighboring nations in Jordan and Lebanon and they're kind of buckling under just the burden of that. But also Iraqi nationals who are stuck in Syria at the moment or people from other countries who are kind of stuck in the midst of this proxy war really and have no means of getting out. And so if you could just, if you'd seen something or if you know anything about that if you could maybe talk a little bit about that. Yeah, the situation for Syrian refugees in neighboring countries is it's very different in different countries. In Turkey, for example, the government run camps and they were established very early on in the summer of 2011 when we started to see the first camps in Turkey. In Lebanon, of course, the country doesn't allow official refugee camps. There's some talk that now they're allowing some to be formed, but for a number of reasons. Mainly it's the historical, you know, Lebanon's history with refugees starting with the Palestinians. It's a political football. It's a very touchy issue, of setting up camps for refugees. But having said that, you know, there are more than a million Syrians, not all of them refugees, in a country of about four million people. And they're entering a society that has long been polarized over the issue of Syria. There have long been Lebanese who are pro-Assad and there have long been Lebanese who are anti-Assad. And they have their own issues. So into this kind of volatile mix you can add a million Syrians who are coming with their own traumas and experience of war. So that's a very, very delicate situation. In Jordan as well, I think the number is, I don't know, 700, 800,000 people. And there are camps for Syrians. There is, of course, the famous Zatar camp, but only about 100,000 people are there. Most of the Syrians are finding homes in urban centers. They're everywhere, you know, and resentment is growing as well towards the Syrian population which is perceived as taking jobs away from Jordanians and also putting a huge stress on a country that is very water poor, which is a very big deal and which has its own economic issues that it's trying to deal with. And in Iraq, of course, we saw this summer a massive influx of Syrians who basically walked into Iraq. So each country has its own challenges with regard to the Syrian population. In addition to the Iraqis who you mentioned who were living in Syria, we also have the Palestinians who have become, many of them have become refugees, either a second or a third time now in neighboring states. And they have a particular, you know, issue as well. So you were just in Jordan. What is the situation with Syrians? We've heard a lot about the hospitality of Jordan. We've also heard recently that there may be some border closures. Is it a free flow for refugees? What's the status of the situation? Is Jordan stretched too far? Well, Jordan is definitely stretched. And my understanding is that there are tens of thousands of Syrians now stranded on the Syrian side of the Jordanian border waiting to get in. The Jordanians have built a bigger camp. It's bigger than Zaatari. And they're hoping that they can get... On the Syrian side of the border? No, it's on the Jordanian side of the border. And it's much bigger than Zaatari. So, I mean, nobody thinks that these people are going to go home anytime soon. Thank you. I'd like your reaction or your comment on where we, the U.S. and the Western community should be going from this point. It's clear that the opposition is highly fragmented. I suspect that that is a result in part of an ideology, but also in a part also because, you know, our reticence to provide support, you know, has led some to gravitate towards more extreme elements which, in fact, were gaining support. And that is a result, you know, trying to... At this point, trying to visualize an opposition, you know, which is strong enough to negotiate a final outcome which is, in some way, an improvement over the pre-war situation may not be realistic. At this point, therefore, should we be essentially trying to do that, or should we basically say, well, there's very little we can do to influence the final outcome and should be focusing our attention just on the huge humanitarian crisis both within Syria and in neighboring countries which has which has taken place in the last couple of years. Well, once again, it's not my job to say what you should or should not do, but, you know, I will say that a lot of people, you know, looked at Syria and they thought, oh, it's very complicated. Well, the thing is, is that it's not going to get any easier. So if it was too hard two years ago and you weren't sure who to pick, it's not going to get any easier. It's only going to get more complicated. You haven't been inside Syria for a few months, but you've been to the camps in Jordan, you're living in Lebanon, you're talking to Syrians who are inside. Are people saying what they want to happen? I mean, are they, what attitudes are they expressing towards the war nowadays? What are they saying about the prospect of negotiations in Geneva next month? I mean, what, what are you here being? Well, many people are just sick and tired. They're just tired. You know, this is an incredibly brutal conflict. There are more than 20,000 people who have been killed. There are cities that have been leveled. There are, you know, children of the difference between a sniper's bullet and other forms of of weaponry. This is what has happened to Syria. A lot of people just want to get on with their lives. They want to be able to send their children to school. They just want some semblance of peace. So whether that comes through negotiations or whether it comes through something else, there are a lot of Syrians who simply you know, they're traumatized. They've lost family members. It's a very it's a really, really dire situation. I mean, I don't know if I can describe just how difficult it is to live in some of these places. It's, um, they just want the basics. They just want to be able to stand in line at a bakery and know that they're not going to be hit by a war plane. They just want, you know, the things that everybody here wants. Hi. My name is Julie Blum. I'm just a person who's interested. I spent some time in the Middle East helping journalists do things. And now I'm a psychotherapist. I work across the street. I follow things very closely. And I want to ask you if you and I were having coffee, like not your job, right? Um, what in your opinion, which is better informed than most, is the best possible way that other things could go if you could wave a magic wand on the ground now in your opinion what could be done by anyone, whoever, whatever. Secondly, as a therapist, I'm just curious in refugee camps around the Middle East where people are, is there treatment for people that are obviously suffering from PTSD? Are people treating people's mental health at all, as far as you know? Um, and finally, if someone wanted in the United States as citizens here, not the government, to help a particular group inside Syria, such as Jabhat-e-Nusrah, would that be possible? If so, how do you know? You know, there are aid organizations that are trying to, um, to assist, especially children. Some of which are in the audience, so they see care as present and to laugh. Yeah, I mean, there are definitely organizations and they try through various therapies, um, you know, I've seen, uh, kids who are receiving like painting therapies where they try and just paint their feelings and things like this. So there are groups that are focusing specifically on this area of the trauma that many, many Syrians have experienced. Um, waving a magic wand, I just say, you know, if you want to help, help the people. Just help the people. The UN says that it's very short. The pledges of assistance for the Syrian appeal. You know, money still hasn't come in. They need money. They need help. You know, regardless of the politics, whether you're on one side or the other, there are people in the middle who are suffering and, you know, the priority I think always has to be them. Why don't I suggest that we have a side conversation after the meeting because there are people presence that are doing aid work. Um, we have a question here. Good morning. Thank you very much for your work. Um, I work for the embassy of Brazil and I was posted to Syria between 2009 and 2012, so I couldn't relate to your testimony. Uh, I was wondering if you could comment on the role of the Kurdish movements, if you had a chance to witness their, um, role in northern Syria? I haven't done much reporting from the Kurdish areas because, um, I don't speak Kurdish and I like to be in a place where I can understand everything that's happening, especially because I go and bomb myself, so that's for my own security, I need to know, you know, what's happening. Um, but, you know, even the Kurds are split. There are so many different factions. There is a faction, for example, of the Kurdish, um, Syrian opposition that is, uh, just joined this Islamic front, which is not FSA, not Free Syrian Army, not an al-Qaeda affiliated to separate sort of entity. There are some who have called for autonomy in the Kurdish areas and there are others still who are believed to still be with the regime, so it's a very fragmented picture in the Kurdish areas, but I can't really say more than that because I haven't physically been there and I won't comment on something I haven't seen. We're going to take one question in the back and then ask you the last one and close it. Thank you. Hello, thank you. Uh, it's been a great presentation. Chris Looney, CSIS. I was hoping to go back to Raqqa and when ISIS took over in May. Raqqa? Yes, Raqqa, yeah. When ISIS took over on May 14th, um, Was it May? Yeah. You saw the decimation of a lot of rebel groups that had been instrumental in taking the city in the first place, most particular, Afar al-Rasool, which was, um, its leadership was taken out by a car bomb. Um, but there are groups, especially Jabhat al-Nusra and Arar al-Sham that still have a presence in the city. Um, some reporting has said that Arar al-Sham has, um, has a role in the administration of the city and holding up everyday life. And I was just wondering if you could comment on those two groups and what they're actually doing in Raqqa? Because they are there. They don't have much strength because of ISIS, but they definitely still are there. So what is their relationship with ISIS and what are they doing independently? And then also, um, maybe close, I was hoping you would close possibly with just talking about the Islamic front and how that is going to change the trajectory of the conflict. Thank you. When Raqqa first fell, it was led by an Islamist coalition of about 6 groups and it was spearheaded by Jabhat al-Nusra and Arar al-Sham. It was a particular unit of Arar Arar al-Sham called Umana al-Raqqa. And they were, they were the group that were involved. And, um, I remember meeting their leader a couple of weeks after it fell and, um, you know, he was very proud of the fact that he had men outside the wheat silos who were protecting it and that they were trying to, um, organize the day-to-day running of the city and they did do that. Um, you know, so that they were, they were doing that. That man has now gone missing. Uh, believed to be abducted by ISIS. His fate is unknown. And, uh, the Jabhat al-Nusra Amir has also been picked up by ISIS because he refused to pledge, uh, allegiance to them. So that might give you an idea of the kind of relationship that those two groups now have with ISIS in the city. No, they're, you know, I, I, I don't think so because, you know, when I talk to, uh, to guys who I still know who are in Jabhat al-Nusra, they're still very, uh, very wary of this group. I mean, you know, it's, it's a huge deal. They picked up the Amir. That's, uh, not something that you, uh, that you do without, that doesn't have very serious consequences. And that's also an indication of just how powerful they are in the city. Oh, and the Islamic Front, the, um, earlier this month, uh, let me go back. So I was talking about the battalions, how we, we saw the formation of battalions with time. They started to coalesce and organize into, uh, brigades. They called them brigades. And then, um, in, I think it was, uh, the summer of last year, we started to see the formation of coalitions, multi-brigade units. And some of these brigades were present nationwide. They had units everywhere. But we saw big coalition groups. One of them was the Syrian Liberation Front. The other one was the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front. And, um, some of them, like the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, which was largely outside of the FSA, other, the other one had groups that were inside the FSA. Earlier this month, we saw the basic dissolution of these two groups and the formation of a new one called the Islamic Front. Which, uh, consists of some of the strongest, um, groups on the ground inside Syria. And they're, um, all outside of the FSA. So this is a, uh, new development. I think that it's not merely an alliance. That it's a real sort of merger. That it's not, um, and that it's a complete sort of program. That it's going to be, uh, military, political and social as well. So it's in the early days of this yet, and we'll wait and see what comes of it on the ground. So, sort of following up on that, my, my question for you would be, um, you know, part of what we're seeing, I think, all over the, the region is that you're having uprisings where there hasn't been a history of activism or organization. And so there's a leadership vacuum amongst the opposition. And, um, and I know the Syrian opposition has been faulted for its fragmentation and so forth. But I'm wondering in, on the ground, and amongst fighters in particular, whether or not you've seen any, um, any potential leadership emerge. Um, and what the profile of that leadership may be? That's a very broad question. But, um, you know, I want to say that on, on the ground, um, there is coordination. You may not have this massive command and control that's coming from, you know, FSA leadership. But there was always coordination on a local level, either in a particular area, in a town, or a city or something like that, or ahead of a particular battle, uh, you know, that they would, they would coordinate to take out a particular airport, for example, or something like that. So you did see this, um, local level coordination. And sometimes that would be more, um, sometimes it would even be province-wide. And within a group, like a Harada Shem, for example, there is organization, a discipline, and, and that's a nationwide group. So, you know, it depends on, on the particular area. I would say that, um, you know, you talk about the, the, the leadership opposition, and certainly many, uh, people have faulted it for that. But many in the opposition would also say, listen, you know, this is a country that didn't have any form of civil society for more than four, four decades. And, uh, you know, so they sort of had to learn how to, how to be activists, how to, how to, how to establish themselves as civil society movements. And, uh, many in the opposition will also say, well, you know, people say we're not united. Is the west united on Syria? Is Europe united on Syria? Is the international community united on Syria? And they would sort of throw that back on, on the world, basically. Okay, well, thank you very much, Rania, for chatting with us. It's been very enlightening. Thank you.