 Thanks for being involved and I'm delighted to see that our friends in Tokyo are having an earlier start than I am, so I have nothing to complain about. Look, I think it's been a great discussion so far and my congratulations to the team on a really, really important report. I really would emphasise that from Australia we are watching these issues very closely, the tensions in the Indo-Pacific, but especially the East China Sea and the South China Sea. In fact, the Australian Prime Minister is going to North Asia early next month and I'm sure these issues will be on the agenda when he goes to Beijing, to Tokyo or to Seoul. It's not only that these countries are our largest trading partners and of course Japan is our, as the Prime Minister would say, our closest friend in Asia, as others have said, our most successful relationship in Asia, but Japan is also the ally of our ally and any confrontation in that region will affect us. I think it's worth emphasising that from where Australia perceives this, this is not just about supporting partners, but as I think a few of the participants have emphasised this morning or today, it's about principles. Principles of non-coercion and freedom of navigation and I think that's where the Australian diplomatic contribution to all of this has been very pointed in the past six months. You may be aware that our relatively new government, which was elected last September, has come under quite strong pressure from China since then because of statements we have repeatedly made opposing coercion and opposing coercive changes to the status quo, particularly in the East China Sea. Now I don't think Australia is going to change its position on that. I think it was the right position. Perhaps we expressed it a bit less diplomatically than we ought, but I think we got the right place. What's important in this conversation is to know that the first Australian statement on that issue actually came out of the trilateral dialogue with the United States and Japan late last year and I want to emphasise the value of the trilateral mechanism that we have with Japan and the United States. I think to help understand and influence strategy in response to Chinese coercion. Now I fully endorse the two of the messages that I've heard today and I think the Australian policy community would fully endorse some. One is the absolute need for serious communication crisis management mechanisms and protocols in the East China Sea. It's extraordinary and frustrating that this is not happening and I fully appreciate that Japan has made repeated requests for this, especially in recent times. From our own research on this issue, which is ongoing, the basic principles still seem to apply and that is that it's precisely because there is a lack of strategic trust in the East China Sea for understandable reasons, I guess, that we need crisis management mechanisms. Yet every conversation I have with Chinese analysts on these issues, including recently during a multi-lateral event that we posted here in Sydney, we get the message there will be no crisis management mechanisms while there is strategic mistrust, while there is a dispute with Japan. Now, I think even our Chinese interlocutors are beginning to realise how hollow that sounds, how really unsustainable that position sounds. I like to think there is some degree of debate within China about whether its strategy of no CDMs is the right approach. They are obviously using risk as a tactic and I guess the worry for us all is that it may well take a crisis, a confrontation with some degree of escalation before that issue starts to shift in China and of course that is at one level what we don't want. A quick word about our Japanese friends before I close. I fully agree with former Minister Morimoto that it's important not to give China excuses to escalate and I think observers in Australia certainly appreciate the restraint and professionalism of Japanese forces on the water and in the air. We are also aware that there is a need to manage the political signaling that Japan sends and we all know that China has seized upon the Asakuni Shrine visit for its propaganda purposes and I guess we have to ask to what extent that is in the interest of our Japanese friends. But finally, when it comes to the principles of non-coercion, freedom of navigation and the other principles that we've heard emphasised today, I would stress that Australia strongly supports those principles, strongly supports the stance that is being taken on those principles and I guess what we would like to see as we've seen in the South China Sea or certainly what I personally would like to see, I think the Australian government may be a little bit shy about expressing this, that we would like to see the kind of approach we've seen in the South China Sea where the Philippines has in fact appealed to the umpire, the only state I think in China's maritime disputes that has appealed to a rules-based outcome, at least a law-based outcome internationally under the international tribunal on the law of the sea and it is a pity that the Philippines is not getting as much international diplomatic support as it ought to be on that. I'll leave my remarks there but congratulations on an important report that will certainly help to publicise it.