 Good morning, everyone. We're now going to start our second panel. And we're going to turn to contemporary US-Taiwan relations. I'm Bonnie Glazer. I'm a senior advisor for Asia in the Freeman Chair at CSIS. And very pleased to be chairing this very important panel as we have talked about history. We're going to look at the nature of the US-Taiwan relationship today. And as you all know, economic, political, security ties between the US and Taiwan are very extensive. And we are going to focus on a discussion of the successes and the challenges in the US-Taiwan relationship and address, I think, broadly the question, are we living up to the hopes and expectations of the creators of the Taiwan Relations Act? I'm going to ask both of our panelists to speak for about 10 minutes. And then we'll have a discussion amongst the three of us. And then we will open it up to all of you to join the conversation. On my left is Randy Schreiber, who is a founding partner of Armitage International and CEO and president of the Project 2049 Institute. He is also a senior associate here with us at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. And Randy Schreiber served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs under President George W. Bush. He also served as Chief of Staff and Senior Policy Advisor to Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. Prior to that, Randy Schreiber worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was Senior Country Director for the PRC Taiwan and Mongolia. To my right is Dr. Andrew Young, who is now a professor at National Sun Yat-sen University. Prior to that, he served in President Ma Ying-jo's administration as the Deputy Minister for Policy in Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense and an advisor to the ministry and briefly as Minister of Defense. He also served as an advisor for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Mainland Affairs Council, and was a research associate prior to that at National Sun Yat-sen University. Many of you may have read Dr. Andrew Young's writings. He has published a great deal on the issues pertaining to the PLA and cross-strait military mutual trust building. So with that, I'm going to have Mr. Randy Schreiber open up first with his approximately 10 minutes and then we'll have Dr. Andrew Young. Randy? Thank you very much. I could probably spend the entire 10 minutes just recognizing people in this room who it's been my tremendous honor to work with in the past. This is really an impressive collection of folks who have their fingerprints over this relationship and the management of US policy. I might just mention my State Department colleagues who I worked with. Joe Donovan, who is now in the managing director position of the LSU, but also a couple of folks who are involved in managing the relationship. Dave Keegan and Mike Mazzerve and just tremendous colleagues who poured a lot into this relationship. And let me also say what an honor it is to share the podium with Bonnie and with Andrew, a good friend, and a terrific colleague over the years. So we're talking about the contemporary relationship and I guess sort of grading it. And I want to give very high marks to the Obama administration for the management of the relationship. Depending on your metrics, you can point to several things that I think we can feel very good about. And we do have a very strong team in the administration, I should add. I already mentioned Joe, but Ray's very steady hand staying involved. And I think Evan Medeiros at NSC is stepping up and becoming one of the strongest folks we've had in that position. And hopefully, we'll get Dave Shear confirmed unless there's some news this morning that I missed. But Dave will be a great addition to that team. So I think we've got a very strong team in place. And they're doing, I think, a very good job. And so depending on the metrics, you can look at things like high level visits. When I was in Taiwan a few weeks ago, we learned that overlapping our visit, there was three deputy assistant secretaries in Taiwan all at the same time. Now we all know deputy assistant secretaries are extremely high level, extremely important and influential people. But that actually was quite a remarkable thing. I don't think we saw that level of attention when I was in government. And of course, shortly thereafter, I think it was the EPA administrator was out there. So this is very good. I think we should continue this. Of course, the standard was set, in my view, in the Clinton administration. Bob has his hands on that. But three cabinet secretaries in eight years was, I think, a good standard. So high level visits. The mill to mill relationship, I think, is one that we don't talk about publicly a lot. But the statistics that we've seen just on the number of US military visits, individual visitors to Taiwan is extremely impressive. And it shows that arm sales notwithstanding, which I'll get to, that there continues to be a very robust security and military relationship between the United States and Taiwan. And this is vastly, vastly different from the early 90s when I think a lot of the initiatives were started. And then I think the resumption of TIFA, I guess I could nitpick and say, I don't know why it was ever cut off. Usually when you have a trade dispute, you use negotiations to address that. You don't cancel negotiations when you have a dispute or a problem. But it's good that they've been resumed. And I think it puts us on a track where we can not only make bilateral progress, but perhaps a pathway for Taiwan into TPP or multi or many lateral organizations. So overall, I would give very good marks. That being said, of course, what do they say? The biggest room in the world is the room for improvement. I think there are some things going forward, some things that I think are in the here and now and things that I'd like to see the administration do. And then some challenges that are, I think, right around the corner. And let me just mention a few here. I would put one category, sort of generally, I would describe as reassurance, the need for reassurance. Now part of this is not Taiwan specific. It's amazing to me traveling around Asia as I do almost every month, going to Tokyo, going to Australia. I was just in Myanmar and all over. How much you hear about Ukraine and Crimea? How much you hear about the Syria red line? It's remarkable. And folks in Asia, they can watch our congressional debate and they can see where defense budgets are going. They can look at this very bizarre trade effort to negotiate as if we actually can negotiate a TPP without TPA, TPA not even in sight. I mean, after the 2014 elections at the very earliest. So there is a lot of anxiety about the so-called pivot and is there any there there? But I think you put Taiwan into the equation. It's sort of all this and on steroids, right? Because Taiwan does have, I think, sort of a longstanding fear of abandonment that's qualitatively different than our other security partners and friends in Asia. And so I think the general category of doing more to reassure I think would be important. And you can do that through a variety of means. I think the high level visits should continue. But I think, again, we should have actual cabinet secretaries visit. This is the 35th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. This is actually also another anniversary year. It's the 20th anniversary of the Taiwan policy review. Some in this room I know weren't involved in that. And I don't think we should necessarily open up for another full scale review because I'd be a little concerned how it might come out. But certainly there were some points in that review that I don't think have been fully implemented and fully honored, and I think we could do more to sort of raise the level of our contact and our interactions. And on this point, I mentioned on the mill to mill and the need to keep it low profile. I think there's a lot that we do that we're sort of reflexively secretive, quiet, low profile. I think perhaps that should change a little bit and address this need for reassurance and be a little bit more public. Certainly the increased interactions between the two sides of the strait, actually meeting government to government using official titles should give us some leeway to do that. And my colleague, Sabrina Tsai, wrote a very good piece on this that perhaps it's time to be a bit more vocal and public about some of these contacts to include our military to military ties, which I think we can be proud of and actually are something noteworthy. I did want to mention arms sales. I think given what's happening on the other side of the strait, there's still a need for security assistance and arms sales. And we have reached a period where we're talking about anniversaries, we're talking about the history of the relationship. We're now at a period of the longest gap in a congressional notification for an arms sale in the history of the relationship since 79. I think given the buildup opposite Taiwan, given the continuing needs, this is a problem. Congressional notifications would not only facilitate needed weapon systems and the arms, but I think also it would also contribute and underscore that reassurance. It's a political statement and a political signal. And there are things on the table. I think two administrations in a row have handled the F-16 in a very poor way. And I think in many ways disingenuous. I mean, people talk about a system that would be too vulnerable or they don't need, but we don't apply that standard to anybody else. I don't see how we can sell F-35s to Japan. And yet we won't consider selling F-16 CDs to Taiwan because it's too vulnerable, given PRC ballistic and cruise missiles. Taiwan has done much more in terms of hardening and shelters and rapid runway repair, much more. And of course we're talking about a vulnerability that would only come into play in the most catastrophic scenario anyways. This is a multi-mission platform that could be used in a variety of ways, short of full combat. But I don't have any strong views on that at all. But I think the one that's really on the table is the submarine program. And I think there's an opportunity with Taiwan's pursuit of an indigenous program for the administration very easily to reconfirm the commitment made by the United States in 2001 that we would assist Taiwan in the acquisition of diesel electric submarines. And to engage, it could initially be private, but I think over time more public, engaged people who are in a position to do exactly that, assist Taiwan in the acquisition of diesel electric submarines. That could be the US defense industry, that could be contractors. There will be a trigger sooner or later. Somebody's gonna put in a license. And rather than act shocked and surprised, I think the administration could get out in front of this and be a very positive part of a Taiwan indigenous submarine program. And I think these are badly needed systems as we felt in 2001. And of course, the problem has only gotten more serious. Now, oh, trade. I didn't wanna mention trade. When you grade an administration's policy statements, sometimes you can say good, but not quite good enough. And here I think the formulation where we welcome Taiwan's interest in TPP is a bit of an odd formulation to me at least. We welcome their interest in it, okay. I think we can be a little bit more forward-leaning and talk more openly about a pathway to TPP. I suppose we're in a position through our own creation of suspending Tifa for so long that we should just be glad that this is resumed. But I think the big game in town is TPP and we need to be talking about a roadmap and specific things for Taiwan. And by the way, if we're really serious about this being open to China, this wouldn't be the worst thing to do either to talk about Taiwan's inclusion. I remember in the WTO negotiation it was Taiwan that actually qualified first. Of course we froze them in place until the PRC came around and qualified and got the PRC into WTO first. But it wouldn't be the worst thing to get Taiwan on a path to TPP, to incentivize China in the right way. There's a couple things, I'll just conclude with a couple things around the corner here. There will be another election in Taiwan, so I'm told, so I hear in 2016. I think it's important that the administration not repeat what I view as a mistake in the last election of looking as though they were putting their thumbs on the scale or trying to put their thumbs on the scale in favor of one party. I know there are plenty of people in this room who would push back on that characterization. But I think it's going to be competitive election. We might very well be in a position where we have to deal with the DPP government. I think it would behoove us to be truly neutral in words and deeds and actions and support the democracy in Taiwan, support the electoral process and not try to put our fingers on the scale. I think that's an important challenge for this administration, particularly given the experiences in 2012. I also think there's a lot of talk about a possible Ma Xi Jinping meeting. I don't think it's entirely out of the question. I think it's possible we could see this. But I also think it would be a failure of U.S. policy if President Ma were to see or talk to Xi Jinping before he saw or talked to our president. This may seem like an outlandish statement. I don't think it is. Our Secretary of State has had phone calls with the president of Taiwan. It wouldn't be out of the question in my mind for our president to have a phone call or something with Mind Joe before a Ma Xi meeting. If the cross-strait high-level meeting happens first, again, I think it's a failure on our part and we should be that close friend and supporter of Taiwan and have that reassurance before the fact, not after the fact. So with that all, conclude and turn it over to my friend, Andrew. Great set of comments, Randy. Thank you very much. And much to dig into when we turn to our discussion period. But first, Andrew, over to you. Thank you, Bonnie. As always, being a challenge, great challenge for my good friend, Randy's comments is so articulate in terms of explaining and putting a very precise analysis over the issues is truly good at. I wanted, and sometimes I consider whether our government in Taipei should invite Randy to join the cabinet so that he can explain our policy much better than our policy today. But the way the Republicans are going, it might be my only chance to go on an administration. But first of all, you have to learn of Mandarin because the audience difference. But anyway, I want to thank Bonnie and Richard for their gracious invitation because I really feel very good to be academic again so that I can travel to Washington DC in my current capacity. So for that, I truly appreciate for your invitation. Since I joined my university and from last August, 2013, it's really enjoying my stay with my students, particularly when I resume my lecture on the US Taiwan, China triangular relations and Taiwan Strait security. I have over 100 students, undergrads, pick up my class, try to pick my brain for my previous experiences in official capacity. But I said no, because I won't say anything about my previous experiences. This sort of a curious, but they were asking my difficult questions. For example, two weeks ago, Western asked me, why China want to swaddle Taiwan? And my answer to this question is that, well put yourself in the Chinese communist standing community, put yourself in the shoes of Chairman Xi Jinping, put yourself in the position of the proverbial members. They cannot abandon the mission of unification either by peaceful means or by force, or so that's the reality of the day. This sort of a reluctantly accept my answer. But this is the question always repeatedly asked by domestic audiences. And for some months, I also tried to ask the questions, which I currently very much try to provide my own interpretation. I wanna emphasize, I only express my individual comments, not from my previous capacity. I sort of tried to figure out two issues. Actually, two statements made by, one is made by a former president, George Bush. He stated that Taiwan is a success story. And I tried to figure out, what does he mean Taiwan is a success story, to what extent that he got the impression that Taiwan is a success story? Second question, which I come into my mind is, Secretary Hillary Clinton made a remark, that Taiwan is an important economic and security partner to the United States. I tried to figure out, what does she mean about that? And I tried to come up with some interpretation from different perspective. My interpretation, many derived from the experience I had in my previous official capacity. For the nearly four years I spent with the Ministry of National Defense, it's a 24-7 job to stare at the map which is directly in front of me, a very big map. It's two pieces of this graph together. That map actually draws the Taiwan ADIs in here, it's a blue square here. And I realized for the last 62 years, at least starting from 1952, when this ADI, Taiwan ADIs came up, that became our national security focus. Yes, by interpretation for the US role, in terms of assisting Taiwan to defend this ADIs, it's very much related to the defense treaty signed in 1954, December 1954. At that time, US was providing its assistance and services, actually working side by side with our armed forces to uphold the security of this region. That has been continued until 1979. And Taiwan Relations Act has been approved. So the answer lies in the statements, the wording and also the sentences provided by the TRA. If you look into section two, paragraph B and article five, under the section two, article B, paragraph five, and also section three, there is a series of statements. A lot of people only focus on the armed forces itself. However, if you read between the lines, actually from my first interpretation is that United States consider Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait area a great concern of US interest. And also urging at least by law, United States should maintain the capacity to respond any coercion to jeopardize the security and economic system and social systems in Taiwan. So actually, if you read between the lines, the TRA has provided the US commitment to assist Taiwan, not just providing defense articles. It's comprehensive security concerns. It's not just military security. It also includes economic and social security. So it comprises both conventional and unconventional security mindsets. So I really want to command the original members of Congress and make great efforts to work with the executive branch to put those words and sentences into the TRA. That provides a foundation for United States and Taiwan to work together, not just to provide arms, cells, for Taiwan to defend the territories, the islands, but also defending the ADIZ, which is 10 times larger than the Taiwan Island itself. What does it mean for us? It means that whether United States and Taiwan still share this common security pictures in the West Pacific Ocean. In the course of deliberating or implementing US Asia pivot. I think this is very important. That's the reason why I consider this is a very critical moment for United States and Taiwan to start the process of improving the mutual communication and dialogues to look into the regional security needs, not just defending Taiwan by Taiwan armed forces. Because for the last six to two years, the armed forces in Taiwan, their commitment and responsibility is to defend the ADIZ, which is vitally important for our survival. It's a matter of life and death for the people in Taiwan. It is the foundation for Taiwanese people to achieve democracy, to establish institutions, to perform democratic system, and certainly to provide the foundation and confidence, not only defend ourselves, but also to revitalize our economy. So I think I want to urge United States to conduct a different perspective, to work along with colleagues in Taiwan, to establish more comprehensive and the integrative discussions regarding how to go from this point in terms of defending the West Pacific security and peace. And Taiwan does have a role in the US redact screen. I'd like to stop here now and ask a question. Great, terrific, thank you so much, Andrew. I would like to perhaps ask you the first question. Landy talked a little bit about how the Obama administration is handling the US-Taiwan relationship. And I wonder if I could ask for your opinions about how President Ma Ying-jeo has handled the US-Taiwan relationship since he has been in office. President Ma considered US-Taiwan ties as a very important pillar to support his approach and policies regarding managing cross-strait relations and also making efforts to extend Taiwan's international meaningful participation. So he put great emphasis on US-Taiwan ties and communications, not just to put forward surprise-free, but genuinely making efforts to discuss our policies, our implementations with colleagues in the United States. And in the course of developing and making efforts for both sides to have the same or similar mindsets in terms of our policy implementation, I think over the years we have established multiple channels of communication, direct communication, and dialogues, mechanisms. I think that's very helpful. And it is very useful and also established collegial relations between two sides in terms of enhancing US-Taiwan relations. Do you think that President Ma has struck the right balance between improving the cross-strait relationship and advancing the US-Taiwan relationship? I will not use the word balance. How are you going to quantitize this to compare this to? It's difficult. I think President Ma's approach clearly distinguished different interests in terms of his ways of conducting cross-strait relations at the same time conducting US-Taiwan relations. And I can see that he was more on the US-Taiwan side because it is critically important to bring US on the Taiwan side in order to support his efforts to managing peaceful relations between Taiwan and Beijing. He always emphasized, if you want to cultivate peace across the Taiwan Strait, you need to demonstrate you have the confidence and strength to support this process. And US certainly is a major factor here. And of course, domestic consensus is also important and critical in terms of managing cross-strait relations and also at the same time managing US-Taiwan relations. Okay, we heard this morning from Ambassador Shun, thank you. That the United States, that Taiwan plays a very important role in the US pivot to Asia. And I wonder, Randy, if you could comment on how you see Taiwan's role and what it should be going forward, and specifically if it should be implicit or explicit, what role can Taiwan play in advancing our shared interests that we have with Taiwan in the Asia Pacific? I think there's a great deal of potential here, but I'm not sure that it's being fully realized or tapped into. First of all, you'd have to clearly define the pivot for me before I could give a good and specific answer to that. But I think what I've heard people say when questioned what's Taiwan's role in the pivot, they basically focus on things that Taiwan would do in any case anyway. Ensure that you have sufficient self-defense so that the PRC isn't tempted to resort to coercion or military action. Be a responsible regional citizen without any specificity. But I think there's more potential. I think some of the defense issues you were getting to, Andrew, when you look at the challenges from the PRC, it really requires integrated networked approaches, whether that's air defense and anti-submarine warfare. And if you take Taiwan out of that picture, there's a glaring gap. And some of these challenges, you can't have gaps. You lose a submarine, you've lost it. So we could do a better job of sort of envisioning a more integrated approach to the defense challenges and Taiwan would be in the center of that in a lot of ways. I also think there are probably opportunity costs associated with Taiwan's isolation and regional diplomacy. And what I mean by that, President Ma is the only one out there solving problems and putting forward initiatives. And the administration's response to the East China Sea peace initiative initially, I found quite odd. They wanted to pretend that it wasn't existing. It was an inconvenience that Taiwan is somehow budding into these problems when Secretary Clinton tapped my business partner and a few others to conduct supportive diplomacy. They didn't go to Taiwan. They went to Japan and China. Taiwan was a claimant. But despite all this, President Ma is out there solving problems. The fisheries agreement with Japan, the agreement or the resolution of the legal issues with the Philippines. And I think that sort of creative and entrepreneurial approach to the diplomatic challenges is something we could leverage better. And then of course, I already mentioned the trade issues. I think getting Taiwan on a path to regional trade liberalization, of course we have to be on that path. And I'm not sure we fully are, but I think Taiwan and the state of its economy and how it could contribute to economic growth through increased trade. I think as a key partner and that's pretty much untapped at this point. Great. Okay, Andrew. With the expansion of US-China relations, there is clearly a growing need that the US has to be working with Beijing at a broad range of bilateral, regional and global issues. I wonder, what is the sentiment in Taiwan about the reliability of the United States? About the likelihood that the United States will continue to abide by the Taiwan Relations Act? That if necessary, that we would come to Taiwan's defense, which is not explicitly written in the TRA, but I think many people in Taiwan would hope that the United States would. Although I don't have the figures off the top of my head, my sense is that polls show that there are many in Taiwan that are quite concerned about the US commitment going forward as China rises. And of course, Randy talked earlier about the need for reassurance to Taiwan and to the rest of the region. So what is the sentiment in Taiwan? And if there are doubts, what more could the United States do to ease those doubts? It's mixed feelings in terms of domestic perception. Regarding US-China relations and in the course of enhancing mutual relations. I always quoted a survey conducted by Taiwanese Business Week that was in the year 2005, which was a survey which I myself and Zhu Yinhuan was jointly conducted. We asked actually three questions. One, can Taiwan defend itself across the different age around 75% say no, we cannot, in terms of, you know, fend off Chinese threats. Second question. Yes, United States will come to Taiwan's rescue in case China attacks Taiwan. Almost 85% say yes, United States will come. And the third question is, do you believe China will resort it to the use of force against Taiwan? Over 75% say no, they are crazy, they use force. So you can see, I don't know what the kind of opinions of today if the same question will pull forward. I believe you're more or less the same. So you can see there's a conflicting mindset and mixed feelings there. What I can say to you is that within the armed forces, the military, we always prepare the worst case scenario. We don't say our U.S. that well, we will fight for certain days that United States will come to us. We don't do that in Taiwan. We will always prepare ourselves meeting imminent threats all the time, 24 seven. So you have the armed forces coming from the society. So whenever I say to my colleagues, we have to share the same threat pictures. It is very uniform. So when you recruit, for example, the old volunteer system, the young people join the armed forces. You have to share the responsibility and create the same mindset. Otherwise it is impossible to come up with the reliable self-defense. So as far as the armed forces is concerned, we don't consider that United States is a factor in terms of defending Taiwan. We don't consider that we are not able to defend ourselves because we were decided to go for it. So this is the way that the armed forces of the Republic of China face the threats, fend off the deterrence, protecting our people. So this is why I want to say to the audience and to the U.S. as well. Well, you have to understand, when you decide it, you want to provide the assistance to provide defensive articles. I always say to my students, look at Devils is in the details. Quote-unquote, defensive articles is not U.S. made articles. It's tailor made for Taiwan. So there are a lot of different interpretations in those words. But anyway, regardless what kind of weapons systems are acquired, security interests between U.S. and Taiwan certainly require a lot of political muscle to get it right. So I really agree with Mr. Niels and some remarks says that TRA doesn't provide Taiwan with good decisions or right decisions. However, it provides the framework to do so. So I think it's time for my government and my people to come up with a different perspective in terms of our national security and have a genuine understand what the United States can play and what TRA can actually provide the foundation for both sides to work closer and to enhance the mutual interests together. Great. Let's talk a little bit about the cross-strait relationship and how that affects U.S. interests. I think that the tension, of course, that existed in the cross-strait relationship when you were in government, Randy, was very challenging for the United States to manage. And I think that when President Ma came to power and created a more predictable, stable cross-strait relationship that was very much welcomed by the United States. I think there continues to be some differences of opinion in the United States about whether there are aspects of the cross-strait relationship that are harmful potentially to U.S. interests or whether they're beneficial to U.S. interests. So we can talk, for example, about Taiwan's economic dependence on the mainland, which I think is about 40% of Taiwan's trade that goes to the mainland. Certainly Taiwan's vulnerability that it has toward the growing military threat from the mainland. So are there aspects of the cross-strait relationship that the United States should worry about? I know Andrew and I have worked a little bit on the potential for military confidence-building measures with something like that be in U.S. interests. I think there are, in fact, many doubts among people in the mainland that the United States would support, for example, military CBMs or a meeting between, as you mentioned earlier, President Ma and Xi Jinping. So can you assess the cross-strait relationship and what it means for U.S. interests going forward? I think to date it's been overwhelmingly positive and we've benefited greatly from being able to have some confidence that there'll be stability in the Taiwan Strait and then have then the luxury to turn our attention to other issues in the region and not have to spend so much time on tactical management. The thing that concerns me the most, well, there's a couple. One is the security environment because you don't fall behind in sort of a linear fashion. This can be quite accelerated if you're not investing in the right things and keeping pace with the military developments. And look, China, it's not that they've kind of frozen in place and not reduced anything, it's that they continue to build and grow and increase capability and capacity to affect the Taiwan Strait situation through the use of military force should they choose to do so. To me, that makes force ultimately more attractive to the PRC because it looks like an easier option if Taiwan doesn't have the capacity to defend itself. But the other thing that concerns me, it's not so much the trade or the contact, it's that there seems to be assumptions in US policy making that I think are fundamentally flawed. I'll just name a couple. One is there's an assumption that we know how this is all gonna come out. I don't think we know how it's all gonna come out and if you look at the polling in Taiwan, the people who say status quo now independence later continues to grow. The people who say status quo now unification later continues to shrink, even undermine Joe. So the notion that this is on a glide path that we can all have great confidence and there'll be a soft landing, I don't agree with that. And so I think we need to be vigilant on the security issues but also the other aspects of reassurance. I think also there was a promise or at least a theory that working through China and improving the cross-strait relationship would also give Taiwan the opportunity to diversify its relationships in Asia. And I think we've seen a little bit of that. An FTA with Singapore, an FTA with New Zealand. But I don't think we've seen a lot. And I think that's another, it's related to the cross-strait relationship. It's not the contact per se that's a concern. It's that it hasn't wildly changed the international environment where Taiwan has a great deal more participation in international organizations, it doesn't. Nor the latitude and the flexibility to have stronger bilateral relationships in the region. It just hasn't manifest in that way. Absolutely, I agree very much. We did a study last year at CSIS and Taiwan's role in the international community and there's been very limited progress and a lot more that could be done. And certainly that the United States and other countries could support. I think now I'm going to turn the floor open for questions so that we can all include all of you in the conversation. I would appreciate if when you ask your question that you wait for the microphone and you please identify yourself and please do keep your question to relatively brief and with a question mark at the end. Okay, Nadia Tsau, over there please. Hi, Nadia Tsau with the Liberty Times. Thanks Bonnie and the panelists for Andrew. Because you mentioned ADIC, I'm just wondering after China's announced their ADIC in the East China Sea. Did you see any impact on Taiwan? Because we know it definitely raised tension with Japan. And China is a claimant in the Diao Yutai and also South China Sea. And we see the neighboring country increase their attention with China. So for Taiwan, we are in a very delicate situation. You don't want to alien your neighbor, but on the other hand, making some clarification might hurt our Taiwan's relationship with China. So what will be the best option for Taiwan? Maybe Randy can also answer this question on the South China Sea. Like a line dash line, many people push Taiwan to clarify that. But they're well, you know, there might be a setback for Taiwan's relationship with China as well. Thank you. Nadia, you're asking two questions or just one question. Well, the official response to the Beijing's draw in the era of ADIC in East China Sea was we regret and consider this as an unfortunate decision. For the armed forces, as I mentioned repeatedly, it's our 24-7 responsibility and duty to guard our ADIC regardless where the Beijing has drawn their ADIC or open acting with us. We want to make sure they don't make mistakes or try to take advantage of this ADIC issue to make attempts to proceed with their objectives. We consider we have the capability to shake the Beijing, don't make mistakes, and you will get a bloody nose. And this is how we demonstrate in terms of guarding our ADIC as well as sending a signal to Beijing in terms of their operations. Can I just comment on the South China Sea because there's a suggestion out there that if Taiwan were to unilaterally drop its claim or its recognition of the nine-dash line, that would make China's position more difficult because it's a legacy claim from the old ROC and that would put China in a somewhat awkward position to continue to defend it. But I don't think Taiwan should do that unilaterally and do that without being invited into the broader diplomacy. As I said, the only one out there solving problems and putting forward initiatives, he should be, or his administration, should be included in the regional diplomacy or the multilateral discussions about the South China Sea, bring somebody in who's actually succeeding. The primary vehicle for talking about these things, Taiwan's not included if that's the ASEAN regional forum or other track two largely excluded. So I think Taiwan should be brought into the multilateral diplomacy. And then this discussion about dropping the claim is a reasonable thing because it's such a nonsense claim with no standing in international law to speak of. I agree with Randy's comments on this issue. Since I've written on this issue recently, I'll just add a word or two. I have advocated that Taiwan actually dig into its archives and tell the world what the origin is of the original 11 dash line that was drawn in 1947. And I do not think that Taiwan should renounce its claims but should clarify what that claim is. I do think that that would put pressure on the mainland to perhaps do the same, bring its claim in line with international law and particularly the U.N. convention on the law of the sea. And I think that this would be a good way to achieve the goal that you mentioned. That is that other claimants would then see perhaps a value in bringing Taiwan into the discussions and particularly on the code of conduct, which of course Taiwan is excluded from. But that remains to be seen whether or not Taiwan's government would do that. But I certainly think renouncing the claim would not be in Taiwan's interest. Next question, Joe Bosco. Thank you. Joe Bosco, formerly Defense Department. Bonnie asked a very pertinent question of Andrew regarding the sentiment on Taiwan vis-a-vis the U.S. commitment to Taiwan, whether they feel that they might be abandoned or whether the U.S. would honor the implicit commitments in the TRA. As Andrew said, there's masterful ambiguity in the TRA. And of course for 35 years there has been a policy of strategic ambiguity in the executive branch. My question to both Andrew and Randy is, what's the sentiment in the PRC? What do they think the U.S. will do in the event of an attack on Taiwan? And do you think that area denial and anti-access and the ambiguity policy has weakened the U.S. commitment in Chinese eyes? Who wants to go first? Randy? I don't know the answer to that. I suspect there's enough doubt left in their minds that we would intervene and we would do so in a muscular way that there's probably some deterrent effect there. However, they can, again the things I was saying earlier, looking at our defense budgets, looking at our posture, looking at perhaps that our scenarios which we use to do our force planning are excluding Taiwan. All these things are sort of floating out there, all these abandoned Taiwan type arguments. So you want that doubt to be a little stronger, a little more of a certainty in their mind. I mean that's sort of the idea of dual deterrences. You've got each side convinced in the way you want them convinced and persuaded. And so I think that the needle is moving slightly in the direction we don't want it to in the minds of the PRC, but who knows what they think? Andrew? Well, if you ask different departments such as Mova, Yemen, China or the PRA departments, of course their position is very much abundantly clear that they oppose the armed cells from beginning to the end. But there was a science that there are pluralistic discussions among academics. They probably pose different angles of looking at this issue, but I don't know how much they can affect government's decision in many China. I do find some interesting phenomena is that nowadays we have university students exchanges between two sides. And in my university we have quite a number of our many students, college students and graduate students too. It will be interesting to see their perspectives regarding US Tower Regions. I would say it's different from the perspective we get from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in many China or from the People's Liberation Army. So you can see in different generations you can see gradually these changes and perspectives, perceptions has been evolving. That's the most I can say. Okay, over here. Don't worry. Thank you very much. My name is Donghui Yu, with China Review News Agency of Hong Kong. My question is for Mr. Andrew. And the chief sub-stop of PLA, General Fang Feng Hui, will visit Pentagon this Thursday. So my question for you is, are you concerned that this time the armed cells to Taiwan, the issue will be raised again? Because last year when the Chinese leader, military leader visited Pentagon, the Chinese side said that they proposed to set up the working group to discuss the major issues that affect the meal-to-meal relations between the two countries, including the armed cells to Taiwan. Of course, the United States denied that saying. So how are you concerned about that? This time, this issue may be raised again. Thank you. To my understanding, the armed cells issue always brought up in the occasion of high-level official meeting between two sides. Either US high officials visiting Beijing, this issue was brought up, or the PLA senior officials visited with the Pentagon. Again, they brought up the issue. It's becoming a habitual event. Armed cell issues will be brought up, and TRA issue will be brought up as well. So we are not typically concerned about what issues being brought up in terms of this kind of encounter. If it becomes habitual to me, it's becoming more rhetorical events in terms of US Chinese high-level meetings. Can I add a comment? I think Taiwan needs to be concerned in two scenarios when the Chinese raise it and push hard on arms sales, and when they don't. I've been in meetings where Taiwan was virtually not even discussed, and it was a reflection of their confidence and reflection of their belief in a certain US approach to Taiwan that I didn't think was particularly healthy. But more to the point, again, this idea of reassurance, it was outrageous what the Chinese said after the meeting that you're recalling. For me, going to the podium and doing a clarification is insufficient. We wouldn't tolerate that from any other country to go in and deliberately mischaracterize what was agreed to and deliberately include these meetings as a part of a perception management campaign. We should refuse to meet with them at that level until they themselves clarify what was agreed to in a way that we're comfortable with and confident in. I mean, it's just outrageous that we tolerate that. In that blue shirt over here. Thanks very much. Eugene Kogan, I'm a postdoctoral scholar at Harvard. Both of you have emphasized the importance of reassurance and credibility of US commitment. And I wonder, what focuses the mind quite well in these kinds of situations is to go through real scenarios of what would happen if, in fact, such reassurance and such credibility was not shown. And I know I'm gonna anger Yogi Berra because he said predictions are hard, especially about the future, but I would like to ask, in fact, for a couple of scenarios, because by 2016, it will have been 50 years since Tom Schelling has written his book, Arms and Influence, where he argued about the interdependence of commitments. And I would argue that there is a broader alliance argument that can be made that supporting Taiwan is, in fact, good for a broader system of alliances that the United States has in Asia. I would wonder what you thought about that and whether there are other scenarios that we should keep in mind if, in fact, that credibility is not maintained. Thank you. I agree with that statement that our commitment and how we implement our policy speaks to the entire region, including other treaty allies who want to have confidence in our commitment to them. And I think from time to time, there's the temptation to say Taiwan is sui generis, it's different and therefore out of this equation. I don't think that's the case at all. I think if there was a serious move toward abandoning Taiwan in whatever form that might take, revising the TRA in a downward way or making more explicit end of our commitment to security assistance, I think this would all be received very poorly by the region and particularly by our treaty allies. Because again, there's context to it and right now the context is a lot of uncertainty about the future in our security commitments. Next question, over here. Hi, my name is Annie Chan. I'm an undergrad at Georgetown University. My question is for Professor Yang. I like to contrast your earlier comment that you asked your students to put themselves in the shoes of PRC that it's impossible for them to relinquish their claim on reunification. And I like to contrast that with the opening remarks by representation that he doesn't believe neither unification nor independence is a solution. He believes integration is the solution. I was wondering if I could interpret your comment as a direct opposition to his belief that integration could be the status quo. In your opinion, you believe reunification is, it seems to me that it's the ultimate claim that PRC will not give up on. I only emphasize that nobody in the PRC or PRC's loading party or governments will unilaterally abandon this political objective. The unification of Taiwan to the motherland will not be their political agenda. That seems to me is quite impossible. So that's the reason why when students ask me the question and I encourage them to put themselves into Chairman Xi Jinping's shoes, to put themselves in the standing committee members' shoes and the political shoes because they don't understand why China wants to embrace Taiwan. I mean, why becoming their primary objective? And they simply don't understand it. But I tried, I don't consider my answer to them, they still don't understand it. They still don't understand it. But I think this is the gap of perception and the gap of the sort of responsibility on the leaderships. Of course, if you ask the ordinary Chinese, they may express different comments, but for the loading party, for the leadership, I mean, this is certainly their almost important objective. Yes, my name is Bill Sharp and I teach at Hawaii Pacific University and the University of Hawaii, Manoa. There weren't so many, so much commentary involved around about how reliable a partner is the US. But if I put the shoe on the other foot, sometimes one has to wonder just how reliable is Taiwan in this partnership, especially when it comes to defense issues. We know that the defense expenditure has been frozen more or less at 2.3%, far below what President Mao said it was gonna be at 3%. The volunteer system, the administration of the new volunteer system for the army, the military, is not going ahead very well. The attitudes in Taiwan about military service generally quite negative and I think a matter of concern. And as a previous speaker mentioned today, even when the United States agrees to the sale of a weapons system, the L.Y. ultimately shoots down the expenditure. And then again, on the other hand, Taiwan is far more protectionist than it probably should be, especially if it wants to be in the TPP and also in other FTA agreements. So I'm wondering what either speaker's view as might be on that. My view is it's actually complicated. The discussion about defense spending and is it sufficient? And I think we're working off numbers that don't necessarily reflect the true story and my colleague Mark Stokes has done a lot of work on this and would commend his work to you. The way that other countries count defense budgets, you can get at a much higher figure. Issues associated with military service in Taiwan. Look, there's a very complex history there that affects the image and the perception of the institution that has nothing to do whether or not you think there's a real threat. So I think it's all complicated but what I focus on is not so much the Taiwan side, although it's part of the equation, it's the US side. Look, I mean whether or not the L.Y. buys is able to come up with funding in a timeframe that makes us happy. It doesn't relieve us of the obligation. I mean there are many people who are authors and contributors to the legislation but the way I read it, it says make systems available to Taiwan. So where we see a threat, where we see a need, it's our obligation to make that system available. Taiwan at the end of the day is gonna make the decisions it makes. But the act of making those systems available also contributes to deterrence and contributes to reassurance and so this is not a cycle you wanna sort of endlessly find yourself in where we make things available and they don't buy it but it's part of I think our responsibility and it speaks to how we're going to be perceived in the region as well as the previous question implied. So I think Taiwan doesn't always get a fair shake and again look at some of the work that we've done at my institute and you'll see that there are ways you can count this figure. In Taiwan, because defense spending isn't that popular, they've managed to keep those numbers lower for domestic purposes. Not because of how they view the threat from the other side of the street and how they think they need to prepare themselves. So again, complicated picture. I wouldn't be so hard on our friends in Taiwan. I would put the onus on us to do our part in this equation. I just wanna make a quick response. For the last couple of years, I sort of will discuss with my colleagues at Panagong. The number is not only indicator to assess the wilderness or determination or our commitment to the national defense. There are many areas to be taken into account as well. So we come up with the position that we want to urge the U.S. that we have to create mechanisms of meaningful and useful consultation between two sides to identify the areas that will be beneficial for Taiwan's security and our national defense. I think that is very important in terms of managing U.S.-Taiwan's security relations. As I recall from Mr. Nielsen's comments that the TRA, in Senator's perspective, that requires consultation between the Congress and the executive branch. Same goes for the both sides. I think that based upon the TRA, it requires consultation between DOD and our departments in terms of identifying the needs for Taiwan. I think that's important. We don't just count on the figures, numbers or statistics. That doesn't really work out in terms of benefiting our defense. Okay, next question. Chris, you've been very patient. I know. Wait for the microphone. Sorry, I had a burning question. Randy used a word that really resonated with me earlier. He said, you know, Taiwan is often treated as an irritant. And I think we've all felt that over the years. Lots of different reasons for it. We certainly remember during some of the height of the tensions of the DPP period, what might be going on. But I've always been struck by that sense of it. And it's difficult to talk about without getting too personal, too critical sometimes. But what has worried me from that is that often when we talk about what needs to be done, we end up giving Taiwan sort of a false sense of what's possible and what's gonna be done. Because whatever might be irritating between Washington and Taipei, anything we do, we know is gonna irritate the hell out of Beijing. And we have to always factor that. So yeah, we're always tracing our tail. What am I saying? What I really liked about some of the discussion today was you specified the sorts of information and intelligence and other integration that really should be implemented in the US defense and strategic net out there if the pivot is to work. And I mentioned back during my talk that Dave Kagan's paper, that was his principal recommendation that the US had to integrate security planning for China's maritime periphery into its relations with Taipei. Well, yeah, but boy, you talk about it irritant in US-China relations. How could we do that? What would the situation have to be where we would have to do that? How do you get around this irritant problem sort of retarding things that we, well, nobody probably should be doing? Well, I think the whole issue stems from the tendency to see Taiwan only as a subset of US-China relations and yet another issue to manage rather than a relationship that is worthy of investment and growth in and of itself. And everybody's been guilty of that in the past, but I think there are real opportunity costs with viewing Taiwan as only a subset of US-China relations and you're touching on one of the areas. The short answer is you can't prevent China from being irritated or put off by this. But then I would quickly hasten to add, but how will we know? So they'll suspend the mil-to-mil relationship again. I mean, there's a very predictable pattern of responding to these things. And I think we can, if you weigh cost benefits, I think we can bear those costs. And China is so heavily invested in the relationship with the United States that I don't think, I think there's a place they're not willing to go or a price they're not willing to pay to show their peak or their irritation. And I think we just have to weigh those. And I think from where I sit, the security challenges are such that we need Taiwan as part of the equation, as part of the response, and we'll bear the price. A lot can be done quietly and a lot probably wouldn't draw too much ire or attention, but some of it would. And I think we just have to deal with that fallout. I think there's a tendency to overcompensate and believe that the fallout's gonna be much worse than it ultimately proves to be. There's a volume issue. Sometimes the Dimarshes are a little louder, a little harsher, but at the end of the day, a lot of times the response is very predictable, very compartmentalized, and there's a rhythm and a pattern to these things that we can recover from. I agree with you, fine-tuning. Great, okay, let's go to the back. The woman's standing over there. Hi, my name is Tracy Huang, I work at the CMA International. In recent years in President Ma's policies, one of his military policies is scaling back on the mandatory military service and making it into voluntary. So I'm curious from your perspective, how would that will or will not change the equation and sort of the security aspect Taiwan can do on its own from the US point of view? Thank you. Are you putting this question to me or to Renny? For both. I just want to make this more clear, is that a lot of people emphasizing that we sort of replace the conscriptions with the old volunteer system in Taiwan. That's not the truth. 65% of our current armed forces, I mean in terms of personnel, are all sort of a professional enlisted, including officers from the cadet school, they're all going up, going through their career in the military. Including the NCOs, they also join the armed forces. Those personnel has occupied around 65% of our total force population. So what we need is only about 35% of the full soldiers, which very much a result of a continuous reduction of the natural services over the years. And it is difficult to have those conscriptions to be put into responsibilities in operation and also waste of money in terms of receiving the conscriptions. So the decision to go gradually to volunteer system is to replace those 35% of conscriptions, only serving about 10 months, which is certainly not very adaptable to our force requirements. So the decision is to meet with those contingencies and also the situations. We are not sort of implementing the all volunteer systems in a limited timetable. And also we also review the process to correct some of the measures in terms of enhancing the quality and opportunities to attract young and talented people to join our force. So we're sort of extending this process. Of course, compared with other countries' experiences, it takes much longer and require more resources, a contribution to support it as well. And we are doing our best to do so. It doesn't really damage our force structure or readiness. Certainly we are reviewing the capability and enhancing our capability in the course of conducting this new policy. Thank you. Several years ago, there was a remarkable trip called The Journey of Peace by former Premier Lietzane, but in his capacity as head of the Kuomintang. And given the historical significance of that party, not so much as a political party, but as an organizational structure, the main most important structure since the end of the imperial period, what could be the significance in terms of US-Taiwan relations by having a reprise of that where the new or the current party chairman meets with Xi Jinping. I want to specifically for the benefit of this audience mention that at that time, Hu Jintao received the Kuomintang party chairman in a ceremony that signaled equality between the two leaders. And since in mainland China, the head of the party is the head of the government is the head of everything, the significance of that historically was rather much larger than was covered here. The dignity accorded Lietzane, which many of us were both surprised and pleased to see, I think ought to be mentioned here in terms of its possible echo in what may occur or could occur or what the cost might be or lost be if it doesn't occur in such a meeting between the two heads of the party now. You identify yourself? Michael Coloby. Do you want Michael Coloby's on this? I think it's all part of the fabric that's what's going on between the two sides of the street. And I think it's an important piece. And it was certainly a historic visit and a lot of what was discussed and then later made public appears to be a bit of a roadmap in some senses of what was accomplished after the fact. But it's only part. And I think, for example, the meetings between the Taiwan Affairs Office and the Mainland Affairs Council is also extremely significant because that's government to government, minister to minister. And to use a rather crude phrase, I don't know how you can be a little bit pregnant. We've had government to government contact now and Taiwan would have, I think, every right to say that there should be more of that. And they should be recognized on equal footing, not just parties, but government to government. So I think all of this is contributing to the dynamic and the quality of the cross-strait relationship. What could be achieved in the future, I think, will probably, the vehicle will probably veer more towards the official channel over time rather than through the party channel. I think that was a necessary but insufficient first step to open the dialogue and create an agenda. But I think, ultimately, it's going to move more into the government channels, would be my guess. I just wanna make a quick comment that in party or party chairman in the eyes of Beijing, it's quite different from in the eyes of Taipei because there's a difference of the political systems. Maybe Beijing considered party chairman meeting or high-level meeting as critically important, but to the students in Taipei or in Taiwan, party doesn't mean a lot in terms of people's mindset. They consider politicians should keep their ears to the ground. And this is what the constitution says, but it doesn't happen in many China. Mike Fonte. Mike Fonte, I'm the director of the DBB mission here. Andrew, I wonder if you, maybe you didn't have a chance to read it, but the DBB put out defense papers called for 3%, which, again, is a figure that's not important, but what I thought was important about those papers was the emphasis on Zhongshan Institute and the continued research and development it can do, including subs and et cetera. I wonder what your thoughts are on that because I really want to pick up on what Randy made as a point that is that Taiwan can begin to do a lot of indigenous weapons development, but it will need help. Wonder what your thoughts are? I just want to make sure that I only emphasize number is not only index. It's not number is not important. I just want to make a correction that. Sure, I think indigenous effort is vitally important for our armed forces modernization, and I think that there will be a continuous input into this indigenous effort. Certainly looking forward to possible collaborations, technological cooperations in order to make our indigenous process more suitable for our requirements. We'll take one last question over here. Gregory Ho from Radio Free Asia. The question to Randy is that since we see the Chinese military have so-called provocations in the Vietnam so-called China seas, so under those conditions that especially there are so many predictions about China will have a hot landing, especially they are experiencing the American's 2008 Lehman's bubble or the poverty market bubble, and even some Chinese military leaders, even Global Shun, they have a serious trouble now because of corruption, reportedly corruption. Do you see more high chances that the Chinese military will be more active in some conflict zones, in building up their confidence, and the political leader would allow that happen to elevate their domestic instability? Do you see more chance that would happen? This is for you. For Andrew, my question is in balancing the US-Taiwan relation and the Taiwan-China relation, do you see Ma Ying-ju use the Taiwan-US relation as a means to achieve the end that he might hold in someday? He would have a better legacy in settled down the Taiwan-China relationship. Would you see Ma Ying-ju use American as a means to achieve his own personal ends? Thank you. I think what you described is what we are seeing, what we can observe and measure. I think the PLA has been much more active. It's been on sort of an upward trajectory, and whether or not that continues, that's a difficult question to answer, but I think it relates to how we collectively respond, how the individual countries and the US respond, and I think so far the lessons learned aren't good lessons for them. I think the seizing, essentially seizing the island from the Philippines with virtually no response didn't send a good signal, and I think I'm not saying we need to be so robust that we risk conflict, but I think a response that suggests there are consequences and a price to be paid for these things. AIDIS, for example, I think that announcement that there's been virtually no consequence for the PRC, and the consequence doesn't have to be tit for tat direct. It could be elsewhere. I mean, it could be a new program with Taiwan, and they could see we've done X, they've done Y, we're worse off for it. My concern is that there seems to be no consequence to any of these actions, and therefore, they're drawing the wrong or bad conclusions from our perspective, which suggests to me that the activity will continue, and I think there are probably a lot of reasons complicated, some of which are internal, and you were touching upon that, but I think trying to be predictive, I would say at this point there's no sense that it's going to recede. The quick answer is no, I don't think President Ma is for the purpose of his personal interest. His deliberation or calculation is mainly serving the national interest. Okay, lunch is going to be outside. I'm going to please ask everybody to be back in about 15 minutes so that we can begin with our luncheon speaker, but before we break, please join me in thanking Andrew Young and Randy Pryton. Thank you very much.