 I am going to move from the sublime to the mundane to give you a sense of how Asia has transformed itself in the wider context of the world economy during the past 50 years. I will begin with a historical perspective to pick up where Ron left off, the beginning of the decline and fall of Asia in starting 1820 and until about 1960 when Mirdal was writing, and then turn to what I call, for one, to forbid a phrase, the rise of Asia, beginning circa 1970, and that continues. But this rise has been associated with a development that is most uneven between regions in Asia, just as it has been associated with outcomes that are most unequal between countries within regions, between regions within countries, between people within countries. And the most important lesson that emerges from this is the diversity in the development of Asia. And what I might say in conclusion is to learn from that experience. Now, let me begin with the historical perspective. On the decline and fall of Asia in the world economy, beginning 1820, and if you were to see this picture on the shares of the West and the rest in world GDP, you would see that the share of Asia, which was 56.5% in 1820, had declined to less than 15% in 1962. And this decline and fall was concentrated largely in China and India, which together made up 50% of world GDP in 1820, but less than 8% in 1962. Indonesia stayed at a little bit over 1% through this era. Now, what is striking is the asymmetry in the share of population and of GDP. So if you see the share of Asia in world population and world GDP, you see an asymmetry that rises dramatically in a period of 130 years. But in sharp contrast, you see Latin America, where GDP, its share in GDP rises faster than its share in population. So this was in a sense the golden age for Latin America. And for Africa, where the share in both income and GDP is low and population is low, but the asymmetry is not very high. Now, the contrast is striking if you look at the three big countries in Asia. You can see that the share of China in world population declines, but its share in world income collapses. Just as the share of India in world population declines just a little, but its share in world income collapses just as much. Indonesia remains roughly symmetrical, but much smaller than both. Now, this period was associated with what has been called the great divergence in per capita incomes. So if you take Western Europe and North America as the benchmark, as a hundred, you would see that every part of the world experienced a divergence with respect to the West, but that in Asia, much more than in Africa, much more than in Latin America, there was a massive divergence. So Asia's GDP per capita was one-half that in the West in 1820, but less than one-tenth that in 1962, and you see that mirror image, particularly in China and in India. Now, in sharp contrast, the period beginning circa 1970 shows a dramatic reversal of the trends that we witness in the preceding 130 years, and you see a catching up process that gathers momentum beginning 1990, and it continues. So if we look at Asia in the world economy, in terms of its GDP and GDP per capita, you would see that the share of Asia in world GDP, not in PPP terms, but in current prices and market exchange rates, goes from less than 9% in 1970 to almost 30% in 2016, while its share in the GDP of developing countries goes from one-half to more than three-fourths. Now, this is mirrored to some extent in GDP per capita, as the GDP per capita in Asia as a percentage of that in developing countries goes from two-thirds to more than 100%, and in the world from one-sixth to one-half, although the income gap between Asia and the western world, or industrialized countries, is still very large. And a bird's-eye view of how the rising significance of Asia in the world economy, in terms of population, GDP, and GDP per capita, if we look at the period 1970 to 2016, this comes through. Now, underlying this transformation that we see of Asia's significance in the world economy is differences in growth rates. So if you see, take the entire period, you can look at it by decades, it gathers momentum after 1990, but GDP in Asia grew at almost 6% per annum over these five decades, okay, or four-and-a-half decades, as compared with industrialized countries that grew at 2.5% per annum or the world that grew at 3% per annum. And as population growth rates in Asia slowed down, you would see that GDP per capita over this entire period grew by 4% per annum in Asia, as compared with less than 2% per annum in industrialized countries and about 1% in the world as a whole, because both Latin America and Africa did badly, particularly during their lost decades. Now, there is also a concentration, there is also a remarkable, what I call the great leap in industrialization on the part of Asia. You know, as a percentage of world manufacturing value added, Asia's contribution in 1970 was less than 4%. And even in 2000, it was a little over 10%, but by 2016, it was more than 40%. Now, that was to a significant extent attributable to China, but by no means only to China. Now, this remarkable development of Asia has been very uneven. If we were to disaggregate by some regions, East, Southeast, South and West Asia, if we were to look at the GDP and GDP per capita of these regions in comparison with the world, or if we could look at the growth rates in GDP or GDP per capita in these subregions, or the concentration of industrialization, manufacturing value added, it is actually quite stunning how unequal it has been. This is Asia disaggregated by subregions. If we look at GDP and GDP per capita in comparison with the world, so for Asia, as I said, it rises from 9% to 30%, but East Asia goes from 3.3 to almost 18%, South East Asia 1 to 3.5%, South Asia 2.5 to almost 4%. All of them go up, but East Asia makes the bulk of the increase, and if we look at GDP per capita, it is even more striking because East Asia had a GDP per capita in 1970. That was about one-eighths, a little more than one-eighth that in the world, and it is now about nine-tenth that in the world. There was a catch-up similarly in GDP per capita for Southeast Asia, which is quite significant from 15% to 40% of world GDP per capita, but South Asia remained the laggard in the story. So there is a huge disparity in the rising shares of GDP of Asia subregions and in GDP per capita levels in these subregions, and it is no surprise that the answer lies in the disparity in growth rates, in GDP and in GDP per capita. So in these 45 years, East Asia grows at more than 8% per annum, South East Asia and South Asia both at 5.5% per annum, West Asia much less, and in per capita income East Asia at 7% per annum, South East Asia and South Asia both at 3.5% per annum, which is unprecedented as it were in human history. If you look at the period in which Western Europe and North America grew. Now, what is striking, of course, as I said, is the concentration in industrialization. So you see East Asia going from less than 1% in 1970, a world manufacturing added, to almost 30%. South East Asia from less than 1% to 4.5%, South Asia from 1.5% to about 4%. So it is mostly East Asia and that's China, Korea, Taiwan. But it is clear that outcomes have been most unequal. Between subregions in Asia, you have a leading East Asia and a lagging South Asia with South Asia somewhere in the middle. There are growing inequalities between countries within regions, so that there are emerging divergences in Asia in each of its regions. And if you compare the fate of the least developed countries, there is a massive divergence ongoing. So when Francois Bourguignon was sizing about diminishing inequality between countries, we need to recognize that this catch-up in Asia is producing some equalization but a lot of unequalization too. Now, this is just a striking between regions within countries, Java in Indonesia, the Eastern coast in China compared with the West in hinterland, the East, the West and the South of India compared with the North and the East. There is a growing disparity between regions and among people within countries, poverty as we saw in the morning session is falling everywhere in terms of headcount measures, but inequality is rising everywhere. Now, this is just to give you an idea of how I focused on regions so far, but what is striking is the concentration in a few countries. Now, you can see the share of China and world in Asia's GDP was 30% in 1970, 50% in 2016. By contrast, the share of India in Asia's GDP was 20% in 1970, but only 10% in 2016. Nevertheless, China and India are giants in this story. Now, in conclusion, I want to say that what characterizes this economic and social transformation in Asia, I situated it in the context of the world, but if you look at it within countries, whether it's demographic indicators, social indicators, economic indicators, the transformation is phenomenal. But there is a diversity. A, it is clear that there are alternatives in development. There are no unique parts. Asian countries have followed different parts to development. This has been shaped in part by their size, population, geography, partly by their resource natural endowments, partly by their history, partly by their context. The relationship between the state and the market in the process of development has not only evolved over time in each of these countries, but has been markedly different across these countries. So that one size does not fit all. You know, for countries that stress markets and openness, it was about minimizing market failure. The emphasis was on getting prices right and buying the skills and technologies needed for industrialization. For countries that stress state intervention with different degrees of moderated, calibrated or controlled openness, it was about minimizing government failure. But the degree and nature of openness also varied very significantly. There were a few that were largely open, but in many this openness was restricted, calibrated or in fact very carefully managed as in the large countries in India and China. The relative importance of the domestic and external in terms of markets, resources and technology was amazing. So that your countries like Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, which relied on foreign markets, foreign resources, foreign technologies, you had South Korea and Taiwan that relied on external markets but domestic resources and technologies. And you had China and India, which for a long period relied on domestic markets, domestic resources and domestic technologies. And the diversity was just as striking in the governments and in the politics of Asia, which ranged from socialist countries on the one hand to near-lacifer economies on the other, but with a few democratic regimes, mostly authoritarian regimes, one party states, one family states, and that diversity too is amazing. And yet contrary to Middhal's expectations, almost everywhere the state played an important role in catalyzing development. And the questions we want to ask in this study is what can the leaders, what can the laggards learn from the leaders in Asia in terms of catching up or being caught in middle-income tracks? What can leaders learn from their own past in terms of sustaining development? And indeed, last but not least, I don't have time to develop this idea on the importance of unlearning from experience, which has been quite critical to the success stories in Asia. Let me stop here and invite Will Martin to comment on what we have said.