 the topic for ours, which is given the security environment, what exactly is it that we ought to be aiming for in terms of the prospects for a federated approach or a series of federated approaches. And I could not ask for three better panelists to join me today. We're going to run this a little differently than the first panel. They are not going to be making opening statements per se. This is more of a conversation. But let me introduce all three of them at the beginning, and then we'll get going with the conversation and, of course, leave time at the end for all of you to ask questions. Let me begin to my immediate right with Dr. Matt Spence, who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy. And you can imagine he's very busy these days, so we're grateful that he was able to take time out of his schedule to be here with us. Matt serves as the Principal Advisor to Secretary of Defense Hagel and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Christine Wormuth on the security aspects of the region, which includes oversight for security cooperation, and specifically that also includes, of course, foreign military sales. Dr. Spence previously served on the NSC staff in a couple of variety of positions, I guess I would say, and also on President-elect Obama's NSC transition team. And notably, he's a co-founder of the Truman National Security Project. As to Matt, we have Christian Brose, Chris is the Principal National Security Advisor to Senator John McCain. He was previously a senior editor at Foreign Policy Magazine, where he helped create the Shadow Government Blog, which continues to this day. And he was a Chief Speech Writer for Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and a Speech Writer for Secretary of State Colin Powell. And all the way to my right, I have Tom Vecchiolla, who is the President for International Business for Raytheon. Tom has been with Raytheon since 2002. He previously served as Principal Advisor for National Security to Senator Olympia Snow. There's a theme here for Principal Advisors, I think. And he's served for 22 years in the U.S. Navy retiring as a captain. So thank you, all three of you, for being here today. Again, I think you each bring a really important perspective, the administration, the Congress, loyal opposition in Congress as well, and of course industry. But I want to begin first with Matt. Matt, I think the question on the minds of everyone after listening to that first panel, which really ran through the number of enduring security challenges, state and non-state based, is whether there's, you've seen a real interest in willingness in there being a collaborative approach to security cooperation in the region. We all have heard and many of us have lived through concerns about lack of trust, whether it's between Arab states and Israel, whether it's among the Arab states themselves, whether it's about working with the U.S. and working with one another. What do you think the prospects are for greater involvement in security cooperation and what we like to call federated defense in the Middle East? Well, first, Kath, thanks very much for the opportunity to talk about this. I think, as you know, working on closer cooperation with the Gulf states, particularly in the region, it's been a top priority of Secretary Hagel. I think something I've been spending a lot of time on actually looking around the room, I know there are people in the room here who really played a key constructive role, both serving within the government when you're here and also with our partners elsewhere. I think that the main point is I think there is an appetite, and it's an appetite where I think you need to look very deliberately about starting in the right areas and the right issues and have the right type of patience and calibrate your ambitions given the realities of the region. And let me just give a sense of the flavor of I think what Secretary Hagel's been doing about this. I think starting a year ago, Secretary Hagel gave us a direction to really look at some long-term projects we could take about working for closer Gulf interaction. And there's really been an arc of things that the Secretary has directed us to do. Last year at the UN General Assembly, Secretary Hagel and Secretary Kerry co-chaired the Gulf Strategic Cooperation Forum. It was a meeting of all the Gulf foreign ministers at the same time to really talk about two things. Not only just what are the wolves at the door, the key issues, but what are the longer-term issues that we can start working together for interoperability and cooperation to try to get ahead of. With the explicit recognition that it's a long-term project, but unless we start now to try to build some of these platforms, we aren't going to make the progress we need. Secretary Hagel then went out to Bahrain in December, gave a policy address about the Middle East policy, then went on to Saudi in UAE with the purpose of continue to have these very high-level conversations with other leaders about the important role the United States saw this playing. And then he proposed hosting a meeting of the GCC defense ministers, which he convened in Jeddah in May. It was the first time the U.S. Secretary of Defense had had such a meeting in over five years with their counterparts. And his logic was if he is meeting with his NATO counterparts two or three times a year, given all that's going on, this was an important role for the United States to play. And then finally, the wrap-up has been. Last week on Thursday, I attended with Secretary Kerry chairing another meeting of the Strachita Cooperation Forum, which really was in the context of what we're doing with ISIL, but also talked about some of the important cooperation we're still trying to build. And we can talk about it more, but I would throw out three areas that I think are right for greater cooperation to answer your question, Katharine. What is their appetite for? And I think those three are ones that are collective action issues, but they're good collective action reasons we should be acting together, just given sheer geography and the nature of the goods. And those three are first, maritime security, second, integrated air and missile defense, and third, cyber security. I think we can talk about them more as things unfold, but the one thing I would say for maritime security to take one example is people in this room know well, if the Strait of Hormuz were closed, or if there were issues there, it poses a common problem to the United States and to the other countries in the region. And next month we're gonna have the largest international counter-mine maritime exercise ever in history. Those are the types of things that we need to start by building the slow and steady work of finding common interests, look at capabilities that these countries can add, and continue to have these conversations in addition to what we're doing with the immediate needs of countering ISIL, Syria, Iraq, and those other types of issues. Great, thanks very much. Chris, what is your sense from your time on the hill and working with staff and members across the board about how the risks and rewards are viewed in terms of security cooperation in the Middle East? We obviously had, for instance, in the case of Egypt most recently, I think that's the most recent example I can think of, an issue arise around whether or not there was a coup there, what the conditionality ought to be that links to U.S. security systems. A lot of those decisions have been made up on the hill in terms of statutory guidance. What's your sense about how Congress views security cooperation in the Middle East and the U.S. in particular in its role as leading the right sets of behavior for the region? Sure, thanks, Ken. Yeah, I think what I would say, first of all, in terms of how the hill thinks about this, I think the place where we should start is just a recognition that when we talk about sort of the congressional view of security cooperation in the Middle East, particularly on arms sales, we're talking about a very small number of people on the hill who are really tracking this closely in terms of specific sales, specific capabilities, what to whom, et cetera. And look, I'm not even sure I would necessarily count myself among that elite group who are really looking at this in a level of granularity. What I would say more broadly is, I think what your average member of Congress, when he gets or she gets involved in these sorts of issues or looks at them, typically it's coming from the perspective of, one, there's a local equity involved. There's a state or a district equity. There's a Raytheon plant in my state or there's a Boeing plant in my district. Second, perhaps it's a special interest. I mean, Israel, obviously, but also there were Kurdish concerns with F-16 and Apache sales to Egypt. Other concerns with regard to, I'm sorry, to Iraq, other concerns with Egypt, as you mentioned. And then finally, it's the sort of broad spectrum of human rights concerns. And I think from these three different vantage points is typically how Congress will engage on these issues. So I think you can look at it and say that Congress is sort of a limited actor to a certain extent, or there may be limitations for sort of strategic action on the part of Congress. That being said, I also think Congress actually has and has played a really significant role in terms of the strategic shaping, I guess I would call it, of the environment, because there are limitations on all of the other actors as well. I mean, from the foreign partners standpoint, it's not exactly been the historical track record that our foreign partners have been always purchasing capabilities that they need to advance sort of strategic challenges or to respond to strategic challenges that they have. You know, in industry, I think there's always going to be a desire to sell. There's rarely going to be a time where industry will say, no, we really would prefer you not by this particular capability from us because it doesn't really aggregate into a federated defense concept. And I think with the executive branch as well, I mean, there's the limitation on strategic action because they too are managing these relationships. And they have a desire to be responsive to partners who are being helpful in other areas. You know, there may be a degree of clientitis. And then there's always the pressure of, well, if we don't do it, someone else will. And that'll limit our influence and we'd be better off providing a capability even if it's not necessarily sort of fitting into a concept of collective action or collective security because we'd be better off having the influence and the business and the things that come along with that. You know, and I think where Congress can fit into this is from the strategic standpoint. Because you have a relatively small number of people who are really thinking and focusing on this, you have more flexibility and more ability to really think about this from a strategic vantage point rather than sort of falling down into the seams that may affect the other stakeholders. And I think that you've seen that. You've seen Congress provide the President with authority to do a lot of the good missile defense cooperation and exercising that they're doing currently. You know, in terms of shaping the environment for how the administration is thinking about responding to these different sets of actors and how these capabilities integrate together. Yeah, I think there's a real opportunity if Congress is thinking about this from the federated defense perspective of not how we can tell the administration or industry how to do their business, but how to sort of set limitations and how to provide a certain degree of guidance about what we would hope to see in terms of leadership and knitting together these countries into something that looks like a collection of partners capable of strategic and cooperative action. So Tom, for you, as we look strategically from the vantage point of the US government at how to create capabilities we think are important in the region, at the end of that pointy spear comes industry and you certainly are at that vantage point having the international business side for Raytheon to think about the way in which you can talk to customers in the region to try to drive them into solutions that seem to make sense for national security, but you're also at the end of all these various constraints, if you will, that exist in terms of your ability to operate to be able to make sales in the region. Can you talk a little bit, how do you think industry sort of views this world of security cooperation, its role in it and the willingness of both partner nations and the US government to work with industry to find solutions? Well, first off, thanks, Kath, for the opportunity to provide an industry perspective in the dialogue. And so it's a great question, because I think industry views itself and certainly I view myself as an enabler of our foreign policy and defense policies. We create the opportunity for close collaboration from a military perspective. And if you look at capacity building as a building block for a federated defense or towards greater interoperability, I think that's where we start at. And so we start with shared common equipment, shared training, if we look at integrated air defense as an example of where this works, US forces were significantly deployed in the Gulf for decades with US equipment. Now that equipment is being sold under FMS cases, for example, in many of the GCC countries. Those international partners are being trained in the United States. So we now have the capability to rely on them from a common defense perspective. There are integrated architectures that are being developed for shared information across the GCC. There's already systems in place, for example, for situational awareness from an air perspective where they're controlling their air environment. Common architecture to provide it to all the GCC countries with discrete applications within each country. But again, that's shared operational perspective is there. And we have to work very closely with state and defense and the hill on the release and transfer of technologies. But that's, I think, all very workable within the constraints of the policy decisions that get made that we, again, help enable from that perspective. I'm gonna come back to Matt. There's something that Chris said that very much resonates with the question I was playing GTF for you, which is it's very difficult to be purely strategic when it comes to convincing sovereign nations who do not report to the United States to develop the kinds of capabilities that the U.S. might believe are in their best interest. So can you explain a little bit about how you are approaching this issue of you mentioned, for instance, the countermind exercise, which I think from a U.S. perspective is an incredibly important capability set, yet is not as maybe as appealing to some countries as flying advanced fifth generation aircraft as an example, how do you approach this issue of the U.S. having particular capabilities it wants to grow in the region and the region and countries in the region have their own ideas about what makes sense for their security? I think that's a great question. I mean, and I think you're right. I mean, these are conversations that happen in partnership and that's the only way that'll work. I think what we try to do and pretty deliberately is to start with a strategic framework about what the nature of the threats are. So let me give you an example. In Jeddah in May, Secretary Hagel started the conversation by bringing in General Austin. So rather than going right to a conversation about what are the capabilities, what are the advanced fighter aircraft, what are precision munitions, what are other things, let's first start with a conversation about how we each see the region. And it was very deliberately to start with the issue of what are the near term threats that we have? And those are the threats that we read about on the headlines that should be no surprise to anyone here. But also what are the longer term threats so we really need to start the hard work now together? Because if we don't build the capabilities five, 10, more years out, those are really what are gonna get the issues for us. And I think what we try to do is if you start from that perspective, ideally, and I say ideally, that is from which you get a conversation about what are the capabilities that we together? And there are two types of capabilities. There are capabilities which the United States can bring unique assets to bring to bear, which that is the place we'll always be. There are issues that we need to be working on together. And there are issues that it just does not make sense for either the United States to provide the sole assets or for countries to acquire their assets on their own. And one of those, for example, is integrated air missile defense. Recognizing where the political integration that GCC is right now, we just wanna take some basic steps to make sure that we are not closing any doors. So we aren't at a place to have interoperability to full spectrum right now. And the GCC is its own entity and we will encourage, but the GCC and these leaders of the sovereign countries make their own decisions as they should. What we feel like we can play an enabling role is, let us not make decisions on purchasing that will close doors. So as our cooperation evolves at the appropriate pace, we will allow them to do more. So it's intended to be a two-part conversation and one that evolves. For example, Admiral Miller, the head of NAVSENT, has conversations with his NAVSENT counterparts. General Hesterman, the head of NAVSENT in Central Command, meets regularly with the air and air defense chiefs to have these very types of conversations to do. And that's things that we're trying to encourage to make sure that you have an operational on one side but informed by the strategic capability side on the other. That's great. And Chris, I think one of the things people think of and they think about issues of helping, the US helping allies and partners, they think about burden sharing and they think about the US maybe spending too much time and energy and certainly resources and trying to provide foreign assistance, whether it's in any kind of form but particularly the security assistance. How do you set forward a positive way of framing the issue of helping allies and partners? And in this case in the Middle East, where there's so much turmoil, there's I think the American public maybe has less familiarity with the various actors and the level of non-state and state based threats that exist, what is the convincing case that can be made to the American people for investing ourselves in this area given concerns about the US spending too much abroad? Yeah, thanks for the question. You know, look, I think that the sort of what we're watching unfold right now with ISIL is a very helpful example. That people turn on their television and they don't just see American airplanes in the sky, they also see coalition partner airplanes and I think you can extend this to other counterterrorism threats and you can certainly make the argument when it comes to other strategic challenges in the region that we're better off having partners that are capable who are able to operate together with us, who we have a degree of familiarity with and a degree of influence with so that we can pursue common objectives and it's not just falling on the United States at the end of the day. Now that being said, I think we also need to be honest about the role that the United States is still gonna have to play here. I mean, I don't really think that any of this cooperation is gonna be possible without us. I mean, you have a series of countries who don't exactly have well-established patterns of dialogue and cooperation and we're right now, I think, sort of playing the integrating role, whether it's Missile Defense as Matt put it or the air operations in Iraq and Syria right now. I mean, I think it's something that the Congress is gonna have to continue to remember as we look at questions of budget, et cetera, that more capable partners doesn't mean that we can ratchet back on what we're doing on what we're spending, et cetera, because we're enabling them and we're enabling the kind of cooperation between them that we'd like to see and without us, I don't currently think that it's possible. This is gonna be a real long-term challenge for us. And coming back to something that Matt said, Tom, it would be interesting to hear your thoughts on any promising areas or certainly any areas that concern you where you've seen the actors in the region evolve in their willingness to cooperate with one another to work with the US on growing capabilities. Are there either capability areas or shifts in attitude more generally that you would point to as indicating that prospects are either better or worse than they may have been, say, five to 10 years ago with regard to cooperating on-screen? Thanks, Kathy. So there's two aspects, I think, that I'd like to address in this. So one is every country is a little bit unique where they have different internal demands and requirements. And if we look at Saudi as an example, there's 100,000 Saudi students in the United States every year for advanced education. When they graduate, they go back and they're looking for jobs. So one of the unique aspects in dealing with Saudi, for example, is it goes beyond just providing them equipment and training, but it also creates the opportunity for production of equipment in Saudi, development of new equipment in Saudi. And again, that cooperative approach, which is significantly enhanced over the years. And that's where, again, our partnership with the US government and our partner government plays a big role, because we do want to create this industrial base because, again, it's good for diversifying their economy. It's great for employment because of the high unemployment that they're experiencing. Let's face it, they're all not gonna be in oil and gas forever, and so there is a significant interest by the current leadership in Saudi to help develop it. And we can, again, from an industrial perspective, help build that capability. The other aspect is we are seeing shifts within GCC countries as they realign their procurements and buying more towards US capabilities. If we use a guitar as an example, they mostly bought European and very recently over the last year, year and a half, have made significant investments in US technologies, US capabilities. And again, I think that's a shift from their prior buying habits. And I think that goes a long way to demonstrate where the administration has worked very diligently with many of these countries with regard to the bilateral relationships between our two nations. So I think those are two examples of different, what exemplars of the shifts that we're seeing over the last couple of years. That last comment from Tom makes me think about the changes in the arms market overall where you have, frankly, much more competitive international arms market. There are other places these countries can go than the US. Excuse me, and the US can, at times, seem to be difficult because we are principled. So for both Chris and Matt in that order, if you don't mind, we talk a bit about the areas that come into play, whether it's the human rights point that came up earlier, adherence to norms such as missile technology control regime, other issues that arise that cause us to pause in sales and consider them in ways that maybe other actors in the international marketplace wouldn't. And how we think about that for the future. How do we position ourselves to maintain the qualitative edge that we want for the United States and its allies, but also to make sure that our sales are able to be made in regions where we may have some concerns about those issues. So let me start with Chris. Sure, thanks. You know, I think that we certainly hear this from our foreign partners, how frustrating the process is, all of the other bells and whistles that come along with it. You know, the simple realities is just not going to change, you know. Members of Congress are gonna continue to have concerns, whether it's parochial, whether it's human rights. And these are things that, you know, will continue to make Matt's life difficult. But look, I also think that it provides leverage of a kind. You know, I think having the hill there to sort of play a bad cop role to some extent allows the administration to get into a gap of a foreign country that we may be having challenges with. And it creates a little bit of diplomatic space for them. The other thing though, I would say, you know, is we can't underestimate, or rather overestimate the amount of leverage that we have here. And I think this is something that, you know, the hill has consistently seen, you know, we think we provide all the security cooperation, security assistance, we sell and authorize the sale of, you know, billions of dollars worth of technology. And we think that that provides us a healthy degree of leverage and influence. And I think certainly what I've seen is that it's far more limited than most people assume. It's far harder to wield than most people assume. And particularly to get to your point about the increasingly competitive international market. You know, when you have partners who can very credibly say, well, you won't provide me this, I'll go, you know, acquire it from country X. You know, you very quickly run into an argument, you know, from the congressional standpoint, which is, look, are we better off moving forward with this despite concerns and continuing to retain some degree of influence and connectivity? You know, or do we really believe that us saying no is ultimately going to shut down the concern that we have? And I think that, you know, I think increasingly over the past few years, the answer to that has been, you know, it's simply not. The one final point that I'd make, though, is I think, you know, certainly the argument that we make to foreign countries, and I'm sure the administration and industry does as well. You know, it's not just the particular capability that the country is acquiring. You know, so when they are, you know, gnashing their teeth about all the process that they have to go through and all the concerns that they get from a Congress, you know, what they're also getting beyond a particular capability is, you know, the unique enabling capability that comes with working with the U.S. military, the ability of the United States to help them form connectivity with regional partners that, you know, perhaps hasn't really existed. You know, so that's something that I think is a unique sort of exceptional role that the United States can play, that, you know, the Russia's and the China's and other sort of potential arms sellers, you know, just can't do right now, and hopefully will not do. No, I think, Chris, you hit on exactly some of the key things we're trying to do. I mean, I would just add two things. I think first, the way that I approach this and that we've tried to do very deliberately is make sure that this is an ongoing conversation with the key stakeholders. So if you look around this room, the key people are here. There's an executive branch piece, there's a foreign government piece, there's a key congressional piece, and there's an industry piece. And I think we've tried to move as away from the come and ask for approval right when the big sale happens. You know, then you have a big lead-up that people aren't informed and there's a lot of coordination. Rather than, this is an ongoing dialogue. I mean, their countries are not interested in buying the F-16 or the F-15. They are, but they're interested in providing a platform and a relationship that allows them to take forward against their concerns. And that should be an ongoing conversation that is happening as much when we seek Gulf contributions in the Isolaire strikes as it when there's something relatively downturn. When there is not as much on our front plates and we need to make sure that we have the discipline to continue that conversation, which we try to do. And I think the other piece is, especially in this incredibly competitive environment. And I know I feel it, I'm sure you feel it much more being being out there on the front lines as well. You know, I'm in the region about a week a month and having these conversations and the reason why we talk about why these capabilities are important are not as Chris said, the actual platform themselves. You know, there's a reason when you buy some of the most sophisticated military weaponry that the world has created. You have a training component, a maintenance component, a tail that ties your countries together. And I think from our perspective, the virtue is to have Saudi pilots training with American pilots, UAE pilots training with some of the best American fighter pilots. Doing those types of things build the relationships that we need because it's not, the reason why these countries have these capabilities is we don't envision individual countries really necessarily, often their own action. The reason we wanna do this is when there's a shared threat as there is with ISIL, which happened to the last month, that we are ready to actually take action together which we can and those are the types of things we're trying to do. So there's an enormous economic benefit for selling this type of American equipment to the Gulf allies, but I see it as much more a strategic partnership. And I think that's something that people in this room probably understand well, but I think that's part of the story that is often missed, which I think we can emphasize more. It's like when we want to have partners and we want to act as partners, you need to do steps and do things years before to make that possible. And if we don't do it, it's just not possible when we need our friends and partners most. Matt, I'm gonna ask you a question that hasn't come up. It didn't come up much in the first panel either, but for anyone who works in this region on this issue set, it is the literal elephant in the room, and that is Israel. Talk to me a little bit about how you think the US-Israeli relationship has evolved in a way that either has helped to facilitate more cooperation, so for instance, you mentioned earlier the Strategic Cooperation Forum that the GCC has. We have these venues now where the US is very clearly working with actors other than Israel to grow security capability, and yet that has to be, I imagine, a concern for Israel. How have the US and Israel progressed in their relationship to make these advances possible elsewhere in the region? Now I think that's a great question, and one of the concerns that I think about much. We have, the Defense Department, the broad administration, a very deep and intense security in military dialogue with the Israelis, as you know. As I was tying up, I think I've been to Israel 25 times since I've been in this position, and I think at a variety of levels, at much more senior levels and at operational, military levels, that conversation continues. And it's for a reason that there's a commitment, both written to congressional law, but that the administration believes strongly is to make sure that we take steps to protect Israel's qualitative military edge. That Israel's able to able to defend itself against the significant threats in the region. One example I think about you as to what we do to it, I think is the weapons deal which resulted in the sale of precision-guided standoff weapons to UAE and Saudi, as well as advanced Ospreys, as well as other munitions to Israel. It was very deliberate strategically that that came in partnership. And I think what happened is there was a shared strategic sense that there are threats that both Saudi and UAE as well as Israel faced in the region, that it made sense for both countries to be capable to work in partnership with US coalition operations. And rather than seeing this as a one-off trade-off, we try to see it as a sense of rising the security capabilities of all countries. So last year, the United States gave Israel more FMF than ever in US history. And by releasing some of these even more advanced capabilities to Israel to increase Israel's capability to deal with its enemies, I think gave the confidence in the Israeli government to allow the support and provision of additional capabilities to other partners which then could be used in coalition operations. So it's a key part of what we're doing, but I think in a sense now as if you look and have these types of conversations to look for strategic opportunities, where it's in both countries' interests to have the capabilities to participate and join operations with the United States. Chris, I'll open that up if you want to comment on just sort of the congressional viewpoint on Israeli capability and the relative attention that's paid to that in terms of these other deals that may be made. There we go. Just make one point quickly. And I think that the pace of the increase of our security cooperation with the Gulf countries has begun to change how Congress thinks about Q and A. And I think increasingly there's the question of what people are calling sort of collective Q and A. That when Q and A is evaluated, it's sort of on a sale by sale basis. Will this affect the relative countries, military balance vis-a-vis Israel? And I think as sort of collective capabilities grow, I think Congress is increasingly interested to have regular assessments of how particular arms sales security cooperation fits into the possibility of sort of a collective Q and A assessment. And it's something that is currently in legislation that's pending within the Senate. And I don't think the idea is to limit the security cooperation that we're doing with the Gulf partners. And I think that the Israelis would probably be the first to say that they want the United States to have that connectivity because of the influence and the levers that it does provide limited though it is. But I think we also need to sort of step back particularly in the sort of environment of uncertainty that we're living in, in the sense of who knows what five years we'll bring here. To be looking not just in sort of stove pipes of one off sale to sale bilateral Q and A questions, but looking collectively at the capabilities that are out there in the region and how that may affect the security balance with Israel. I wanna switch now into the set of capabilities that we think are most promising. It came up a little bit in the last panel. I think Nora Bensahel did a nice job of starting us down that path and Matt has brought a few up here. So Tom, let me begin with you. Are there particular issue areas? Obviously you're not an unbiased source from given that you'll have particular areas that are important to Raytheon. Are there areas as you go out and talk to folks in the region that you think they look to US industry or the US in general in particular for? And can you describe some of the attributes that they're really looking, the capability areas or attributes that they're looking to the US for? Yes, so I think in general, when I'm meeting with our international customers and this is really at the minister of defense level and the chief of staff levels, they clearly see the US relationship as extraordinarily valuable to them. They are investing and they'll tell you upfront, they are investing in their defense. And most of them will be upfront and say we're investing in our defense because we are concerned about our neighborhood. They're concerned about what's happening outside their borders, even though they're obviously focused within their borders for their national security perspective. So they also want to have that bilateral relationship with our military. So common equipment, things like common situational awareness, common C2 command and control systems, interoperability of platforms, whether they be jets or weapons. We mentioned earlier about integrated air and missile defense and the commonality of equipment, whether it's a FAD system or a Patriot system. But those capabilities that again, provide that defensive shield. Matt mentioned maritime and maritime situational awareness. If you look at the GCC countries, Saudi, Qatar, the Emirates specifically, most of their natural resources, most of their revenue generation is offshore. So significant interest in protecting those areas would be a vision to have all of that from a connectivity perspective, have those all tied together, but right now they're very stovepiped. And actually, the military, most of the militaries aren't investing in those areas. That's actually, investments are being made by the oil and gas companies there. And then finally, another high-interest item is cyber and protecting their networks and their commercial infrastructures. And that's a significant demand signal as well. And they see the US being very responsive and forward-leaning in cyber and them wanting to take advantage of those capabilities as well. Matt, you mentioned cyber as well. Can you talk a little bit about the types of cooperation or approaches that you're hearing most often? I'm assuming this is largely the gold states, but beyond that, if it's coming up more broadly. Yeah, cyber was a significant part of the discussion at the GCC Defense Ministerial. And it's an important thing to do because in both our system and other country systems, cyber is not exclusive in the purview of the defense ministries, nor should it be. The types of things that we wanna encourage though to start both the conversation at the DOD levels, but also at the interagency levels. So one were discussions about what increasingly we can do for cyber defenses. That's a significant issue. Lessons learned from what we have, what we can do, what we can talk about for them. And I think that is the sense of the type of thing that we're trying to get ahead of. That we're both very focused on the issue. Something happens in a country in the Gulf. It impacts in a very direct way, of course. So that's one of the significant issues. And then I think I would agree with everything Tom said as we look towards the capabilities on maritime and air missile defense in the future. It's looking for those issues where if you just look at geography or just the nature of the threat, it just makes sense to work together. And if you lay out the strategic case, it actually isn't that hard. So that's what we're trying to start with. And then from that, we can work what specific capabilities, work the approval processes, work the technology transfer issues. But we're starting the issue and taking a step back. If we could, I design a system, where does it just make sense for us to be working together because the nature of the threats just don't stop at a border? One last question, then we'll open it up to the audience. And so, Chris, you get the last question from me, which is we focus most of this conversation, perhaps partially by intent, but I think just by the nature of the way the world is right now on the Gulf. And the higher end, if you will, capability sets that are desired in the Gulf. But there are other parts of the Middle East, and certainly the greater Middle East to include North Africa, where there may be less or qualitatively, less complex types of military capabilities that we might seek to have with our partners and allies. And in that space, you get into this area of the responsibility of the Defense Department versus the responsibility of the State Department and others, the authorities that we have, the roles of ministries of defense versus ministries of interior. And I wonder if you can just say a word about how we think about that issue space. CT is certainly inside, much of CT is inside that issue space, where we have prescribed authorities for defense and state and others, but there's a lot of, I think it's fair to say, a general feeling that we have not maximized our U.S. capability in those areas. So I welcome your thoughts on that. No, thanks. Look, it's a great question, and I think it's something that the Hill has paid a lot of attention to, but frankly needs to pay more attention to. And what we've seen over the past several years is the sort of so-called proliferation of authorities, that security cooperation wasn't moving quick enough, so 1206 was created, 1206 was not moving quick enough, 1208 was created. There's frustration with all of these different authorities, so the Global Security Contingency Fund was created. And I think look, I think we're at a point where these sorts of challenges of, whether it's training a regular forces, training counter-terrorism partners, whether it's M-O-D-M-O-I, I think we need to do a hard scrub of what this has all been getting us, because I think we've seen on a number of instances, there have been very good success stories of cooperation and capacity building, but there have been a lot of instances, some instances that we're seeing now where this just hasn't really added up to what we'd wanted. Is that an authorities problem? Is it a local capacity problem? Are there lessons learned from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan that we can be bringing to this? I think this is something that, the Hill needs to be doing even more oversight on. I mean, the one final point that I'd make, somewhat related, not to go back to the sort of high-end capability question, but the extent to which I think we're providing the priorities that Matt and Tom have identified on the defense side, I think are correct. They're also sort of more purely defensive in nature. I mean, when we get into the offensive side, I think it's trickier and harder, it requires more thought, but it also, I think, is something that we need to think through in terms of something you raised about autonomy of action. And we provide these capabilities, but we also wanna have influence over how they're used. And I think a lot of that comes down to the confidence level that these countries have in us. And I don't want this to be a partisan comment, but I think there's some concern about whether that's there right now. And when you look at instances outside of the Middle East itself, the event that happened in Libya that media reports suggest one of our Gulf partners was involved in, we're providing these capabilities to countries for use in certain domains, and we want to cooperate with them, and we wanna build collective action capacity in certain areas, but we're also empowering them through that very process to act on their own where they believe their national interests are concerned. There will be times, I think, where that will dovetail with ours, but there will also be times where we're essentially enabling them to act autonomously. And if they don't have the confidence in us and sort of our approach to the region, I think we're creating an incentive for them to do it with the various systems that we're providing. And actually, I think that's a fair point to make across the spectrum from training, if you will, down at the lower end, all the way up to high-end capabilities, that's a concern. Okay, let me open it up to the audience. And just as John had asked you in the first panel, I ask that you state your name, your affiliation, and make it an actual question. And one, please, as you raise your hand, so. Holy cow, we've answered every possible question you have. That's amazing. Hi, thank you for your comments today. Melissa Dalton from CSIS. I was wondering if the panel could comment on the role of extra-regional partners playing and allies playing in a federated approach in the Middle East going forward, both in terms of developing capabilities, as well as approaches to forced posture. Okay, and by extra-regional allies, I mean UK, France, Australia. Right, and I'd just broaden that out a little. I know, for instance, on Countermind, we have some Asian allies who have participated, and if you're willing to go this far, if you could talk a little bit about the role of China, which certainly has an interest in security in the Gulf. So let me start with Matt. Sure, I mean, I think, first of all, is we're, to the extent possible, we try to build a broader coalition. I mean, I think, Kath, as you mentioned, for the international mind countermeasure, exercising it would be 42 nations participating. So there's an important role for the UK, France, but also, again, if you take something like the Strait of Permutes, it's a collective security issue that China benefits as well and also has an interest. So I think what we try to do there is bring as many countries together to make the point that a disruption of commerce there is something that impacts us all. There's nothing we can both do ourselves. I think, as far as the other partners there, is we have a set of pretty intensive conversations with the British and with the French or other European partners about what we can do, in a sense. Now, of course, there are gonna be some times which we're facing competition over particular weapon sales issues, and that's just the nature of what you have when you have countries with very high quality material. But I think the bigger thing that we try to do is find ways to make sure that we're looking at ways together so the things that they're doing can allow for the type of interoperability that we need with them as well. And the final piece I just say is, one thing that we started doing which doesn't get as much attention is to add talking about the Middle East with other regional partners. So it's well known that the Middle East is talked about with NATO partners. Syria and ISIL in Iraq was a key part of the summit agenda at Wales. But also these are conversations we have with our Asian partners with other ones because as we're all doing things together, it's better to start that conversation and understand how we see various pieces together, which I think is something, frankly, that we need to accelerate and do a lot more in the future. Tom, do you have any thoughts on this, too? And I think both Matt and Chris have mentioned the extraordinary competitiveness in the international market. And so that's from a U.S. industrial-based perspective we face that every day. So from my view, my vantage point, U.S. advocacy for transfer of technology, enabling them with our equipment is a key aspect of it. Now, does it always turn out that way? They do, each nation does buy equipment that they think they need. The advantage though, and I'm gonna call it the U.S. government seal of approval on it, you get it for a long time and you get the whole tale that goes with it, everything from training to sustainment to a long-term relationship. Fortunately, many of our other competitors in the international market aren't necessarily there as long or can provide as sustained support. And so the bilateral relationship that goes along with a U.S. procurement is essential. And the other aspect I think that is key to it is our ability to help industrialize, again, if that's in their nation's interest, with capacity beyond just the transfer of the equipment. Developing factories, developing technologies, working with their universities, we help in the background of university relationships, universities that are in Saudi, for example, with teaching institutes here in the United States. Like I said before, they have 100,000 students here in the United States. We should be leveraging that relationship. Thanks very much. Other questions? Studyingly, complacent crowd. Let me add my own then. I have plenty more. Chris, you started to touch on a train of questioning that I will pursue, and let me go directly to unmanned systems. And I think that's an area where we've seen on the part of Congress or some members of Congress may be more fairly said, this concern about letting U.S. technology into the region when we can't control its end use. Can you talk a little more about the areas, whether it's unmanned or others, that you think Congress is particularly sensitive to in terms of either capability types, specific system areas, or other things that you hear as concerns from members in terms of sharing of technology? Sure. I think the example you mentioned on unmanned systems kind of comes back to the question that she asked, which is this kind of dynamic or debate of, well, if we don't provide it, will someone else fill that gap? Are we better or worse off as a result of that? I think the unmanned system has really, the products, for example. I mean, those are things that have really focused the minds of people in Congress, even I think outside of the committees of jurisdiction, because it would appear to make it easier for countries to take the kinds of action that members of Congress would be concerned about them taking. And to the extent we're sort of emboldening that or furthering that trend, that's something that I think is kind of warranted specific scrutiny from the Congress. But again, I mean, I think you very quickly run into the pressure of increasingly, even in the unmanned systems market. There's a lot of competition. There's a lot of countries that are eager to fill that void and will do that less scrupulously than the United States of America will. So the argument that you very quickly run into is, well, are we better off providing an armed unmanned system to country X ourselves with the sustainment and the peace that comes along the tail and all of that, as well as the influence diplomatic and otherwise that it provides us into sort of how it's being and will be used, again, limited though that may be, or are we just gonna assume that if the United States government says no, they'll take no for an answer and they won't go seek that capability from someone else who will have far fewer restrictions on how it's ultimately used. Matt, can you talk a little bit about the congressional relations approach that you all are taking in terms of identity? You'd mentioned earlier about not having big surprises at the end of the FMS process. Part of that, of course, is working closely with Congress. Can you talk a little bit about your approach to doing so inside the administration? Sure, I think there are two parts that goes along. I mean, of course, is the formal approval process, which is prescribed by number of days and notifications and we keep that, but I think increasingly I thought we tried to do is just do even more informal conversations, which I think makes the difference and especially there's a huge amount of information, I think, frankly, that we get through congressional delegations and staff delegations coming out about what's really important and also as we look at things as Chris said, also to explain when we see competitive sales too. I mean, to go through and say we want the United States to be the defense provider of choice. Now this means working with partners and not the United States bearing the cost of it, but we want, we think our equipment is superior, our technology is better and it has all these goals and I think for things that we can do together on that informal level, that's something that we've tried to do. As Chris said, there's specific committees of jurisdiction that it's relevant for, but I think it's also a broader conversation with other folks, with members who are looking at what is going on here? Why are we should drain the burden and what concrete are we doing to make sure that we're not going it alone, which I think is a big part of the conversation now. I'm sorry, Matt, I'm gonna pick on you by asking you a different question and that's about posturing. We've talked a lot about capabilities in terms of equipment, but there's also capabilities, as you all have said, in terms of interoperability working together, maybe shared logistics capabilities, other like that. We have locations already in the region, particularly in the Gulf, where we're co-located. Do you think there's an ability to build on those sorts of assets or facilities in the future to create more collective approaches, maybe trilateral or multilateral arrangements that start to weave people together more closely? Yeah, I think there is, and I think that's a great point. I mean, when we talk about, I mean, there's sort of three parts of what we're trying to do in a sense. There are partnerships, but there's also the posture and US military presence in the region in our planning that we engage in. And I think for all the talk of, this was often before the ISIL discussions about sort of the US focus on being a Pacific power, I think it was easy to ignore the significant presence the United States had to sheer posture-wise in the Gulf. I mean, the United States has over 35,000 military personnel in the Gulf. That includes over 10,000 four-deployed soldiers who have attack helicopter, heavy armor, equipment. We have some of our most advanced ISR, radar, and fighter capability. We have over 40 ships in the region with the fifth fleet head of clutter there. There is a lot of sheer hard power that the United States still maintains in that region right now. And I think that's necessary, which both shows America's commitment to evolving threats in the region. And that has not tamed or decreased as a result of sort of the different negotiations that are going on and things like that. So I think what we need to do is sort of make clear that the United States is fully committed and the sign of our commitment part of it is the enormous amount of funds we still spend and the American service members who are serving in this very complicated and threatened region often. And I think to use that to build on what you're talking about are, well, how then can we think about using this posture most effectively to deploy in a cost-effective way to changing situations, to do it with countries that they're comfortable with, the various posture that we would have, and also to think about how do you sort of redeploy it? But, and when I say I don't mean redeploying it from the region, but think about what is the appropriate mix of capabilities that we have. But I think the starting point for that conversation really needs to be an understanding of here's what we have and here's America's skin in the game. Because I think when there's sometimes talk about finding creative approaches, it's wrongly thought of as a lessening of commitment. And it really is, it really is thinking about how we can think creatively and evolve what we're looking at given the different relations we have with these countries and different new opportunities, frankly, to build on it more. Okay, we have a couple questions over here. Let's start right here. Oh, that's fine, we'll go in order. Thanks. Tom Goff is from the Senate Armed Services Committee. I was wondering if you could talk a little bit as a panel about the challenges associated with a phased adaptive approach for Gulf missile defense and the similarities and differences that might occur between that and what we've done in Europe. We would like to start on that. You can take it on. Okay. Sure, I mean, I think, like I think at a, I mean, I think at a high level, I would just say just on the broader question of air and missile defense, I think that that has been, I think one of the most fruitful parts of this ongoing conversation that we've had. I mean, at the policy level is there have been a few things driving towards it. I think the recognition of the shared threat, you know, the interest in American equipment, but also very practical things. Take, for example, for the Combina Air Operations Center. The hat, there are liaison officers sitting most every day with the GCC states, with Americans looking at a common air picture right now. You know, we have the head of our Air Force and Centcom doing real and meaningful diplomacy with his counterparts to do that. So I think at the policy level, as we think of that, I'll let Tom talk about some of the operational and interoperability issues. There's a good framework to think about what we can do. Now, there's more work to be done, but I think as far as an issue that rises to very senior levels of the agenda, this is really one of them. So there's no technical reason why it can't be applied in the Gulf. Actually, you know, especially with many the Gulf states buying similar equipment that's either deployed in the phase adaptive approach or significant elements to it. Again, whether it's long range radars or engagement systems, a patriot that, you know, a whole host of capabilities, including the maritime aspect in the PAA as well. Right now, the U.S. enjoys the position of being the center point for integration of all those capabilities. Matt had mentioned at the Combined Air Center, it's the same thing for the maritime emphasis, you know, on whether it's on one of the four deployed carriers or not. So the U.S. now essentially through their bilateral arrangements, providing capability and interoperability, but there's no reason why that can't be shared across GCC countries should they decide that's in their best interest to do it. There's no technical reason to prevent that. Mike. Thank you. Mike Minahan with Lockheed Martin. I was wondering if the panel could comment on, I think it was Tom that referred to U.S. government advocacy for foreign military sales. And, you know, you have a situation where there's been some pretty significant examples of particularly with our European allies, where they've, you know, shamelessly said, foreign ministers exclusively to the Middle East to plug their systems. And so you've got that dynamic. And at the same time, you've got the example or the situation where, you know, our technology edge is sort of eroding. And so you've got the convergence, I think, of those two dynamics where I think it makes it increasingly difficult for U.S. industry to compete in the region. Just be interested in the panel's comments on U.S. government advocacy to try to, you know, fight against that so that U.S. industry can maintain those decades-long relationships that come with the sales of our systems and the training that goes with it, the education. Thank you. Well, let's start with Tom. Is there more that you wish were happening to help you guys out? I think Matt framed it well in the fact of the continuing dialogue and the importance of that. You know, even at the early stages of the formulation, and we're gonna save the marketing approach, right, to make sure that we, from an industry perspective, are aligned with the U.S. government objectives and vice versa to make sure that we've got good communications and that we're sharing information. You know, we get different perspectives when we go into countries, so we make a point of it to feedback what we're hearing, what we're picking up and both at state and defense do the same thing. And we work, obviously, very closely with the Hill because they're a key part of it and we get a lot of information from them on CODELs and staff DELs as well. I think one of the things that we could maybe be more efficient and effective on is alignment of the planning and at the policy level to ensure that that actually gets flowed down all the way through the implementing agencies. So it's not unusual for us to run into challenges, for example, that might be aligned at the policy level but at the implementing level, you don't always get the forward motion and the timeliness that you would look for. And from an industry perspective, I mean, that's one of our metrics is our ability to be predictable and when we're going to make sales happen and those kinds of things. So I think if one of the key areas that we could work on would be to ensure that alignment within the government and the execution agencies. Chris, do you have a perspective on grading how well the administration is doing in terms of supporting the U.S. defense industrial base? Sure. Now, I mean, look, I think as the amount of these sales sort of testify to themselves, they're doing quite well. What I would say is I think, Congress actually does have a role to play in this as well. I mean, there's a lot of congressional travel, there's a lot of congressional staff travel. Senator McCain has been an advocate for American defense companies, particular contracts as we've traveled throughout the region. I think that the, you know, it's advocacy on the back end when you actually have a pending sale or a competition. You know, I think the idea that we're sort of pursuing here of a more federated approach would sort of lead to more advocacy on the front end in terms of, you know, as Kham kind of mentioned, the sort of the strategy and planning of not just sort of sitting down at the end and saying, you know, look, you country acts want to acquire the following capability. We really would encourage you to buy American, but engaging them on the front end, you know, as I think is being done to a large degree about, look, let's really work through the scientific method here. You know, what are your challenges? What kinds of capabilities do you need? What kinds of capabilities are extraneous? And, you know, here's why we believe, you know, what the United States offers is far, far exceeds the particular hardware that you will be acquiring, but you know, the sort of the broad partnership that I think all of us are in agreement, you know, is most responsive to these countries' challenges. And that's something that, you know, I think Congress can play a role in as members of Congress travel through the region, which they're increasingly doing. Okay, and we had one more question back here. Pete Dodie, CSIS. I was, as a follow-up to the comments on US skin in the game, how would you characterize what our GCC or other Middle East partners are expressing as the risks to that long-term, mill-to-mill relationship due to our decreasing defense budgets and forced structure? Jump all on that. Any thoughts? I can, I mean, I'm frankly just in time, what you're also hearing from folks, but just to come in and I think, I think the concern was less about, that I heard at least, you know, less about the defense budgets in a sense and more about, you know, thinking like, what is the nature of American presence in the region after a ground war in Iraq and Afghanistan? And as we think about focuses on the Asia Pacific. And I think, but at the same time with that, and I think our answer was, as I said, I mean, the United States commitment remains strong. I think as I look at things from within the Defense Department, there is not any lesson commitment. We're looking to try to do things smarter to address the security challenges, but it's not a sense that the United States has a less of a commitment to our security interests there. What I hear from my side of things still, though, is that the interest in the security partnership with the United States has not been diminished. I mean, there's a lot more public attention on it with the coalition towards ISIL, which we've been working very intensively to build over the last few weeks. But it's been a constant theme that there's a demand for American involvement. I mean, I think in a thirst for American leadership here, which we're trying to make sure that we're still well-postured to answer. I mean, if I could just add to that. I mean, I think prior to the start of the ISIL campaign, I mean, the concern was not so much one of capability coming from the region. I mean, the question was more judgment and resolve. And I think certainly something that we hear and we travel extensively through the region and sort of serve as the, I don't know, the sounding board for partners to sort of express their frustrations about U.S. role, U.S. involvement, et cetera. But certainly prior to this, I mean, there was a huge hunger for greater American involvement, a perception that not just the administration, but the country at large just wanted nothing to do with the region anymore. There was total Middle East fatigue. So it wasn't so much a concern about the capability. I mean, I think as Matt correctly alluded, and you look around the region, there's a lot of military capability that's there. The concern was whether the resolve was there behind it to address the problems that were emerging. And hopefully we'll see what's going on now vis-a-vis ISIL as an inflection point that will lead to sort of a different response from the administration. I think that just kind of remains to be seen and how our Middle Eastern partners kind of respond to that also remains to be seen. My sense, and I'm in the region quite a bit and my sense is not so much about U.S. commitment it's more about their self-interest in self-sufficiency. So I think what I've seen is their interest in investing in capabilities and technologies that they really are looking for more self-reliance but clearly with the objective of interoperability and shared capability with the United States, I mean, which is why the significant interest in U.S. capabilities there. And it's just strengthened really with the U.S. government advocacy from that perspective. There is a lot of respect for the U.S. military force that you see in the day-to-day, our end users, so to speak, especially in the GCC countries. So I don't see any waning from that perspective at all. Okay, and one last question back here. Thank you very much. Robert Hutter at the Center for Transatlantic Relations. Given the common interest there is in fighting extremism, et cetera, does the panel see any chance in the future of a regional security system that would include all of the state actors, including Iran, or is that ruled out? What are the prospects for a NATO-like architecture to include Iran? I think that's many, many, many, many steps away. From where we are right now. I mean, I think the thing I would say is just if you look at where we are, I think even just the last three weeks, I think there's something, I think, pretty significant happening. You know, I think if our strategy to counter extremism in ISIL has been built around building international coalition and empowering some local partners, I think it's significant that you had statements from these governments about their pilots flying with U.S. air operations, both the Emiratis and the Saudis and then other GCC partners. That's a very significant, that's a real concrete mode of participation, a way that we're actually striking these targets together. I think it's very significant as we are looking to have a program to train and equip a moderate Syrian opposition that Saudi Arabia has publicly talked about their willingness to host part of this training mission and that you have a next planning team in Saudi Arabia working on this. So I think from where we sit, and even the last thing I'd say is even if you look at the last strategic cooperation forum, the communique that came out of this meeting really had teeth. I mean, really talked about something shared which I think is a step forward from where you've seen before. So I think on working for an architecture amongst our Gulf and other partners in the region, with also the Jordanians and the Egyptians and the Lebanese and there is momentum to do something more. I think what you've learned in the evolution of cooperation in this area is that it is slow and steady and overall you need to be patient because I think we're dealing much luck with the United States with sovereign nations which have capabilities and see common threats but I think we need to start with areas that we can move where we concretely need each other in the near term and I think that's where we are. I think we should focus on what's possible now and continue to build on it and I think taking large steps in the future I think what might be possible is that's, I think that's still a ways away. I think it's what you're talking about and your question about Iran. There's no contemplation of something like that as part of our policy. Okay, I'm gonna make a few administrative comments before I thank the panel. We have lunch outside for you to serve yourselves and then you can come back in here to eat so we'll have a little break for you to eat some and then we'll have Phil Gordon joining to give his talk hopefully at noon. So let me just end this session by saying thank you to this incredible panel of folks who brought all the various stakeholders other than the regional voice itself to the table and we look forward in our study over the next six months to digging deeper into these issues that you raised so thank you.