 Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. We're just waiting a couple more minutes now and there's still people coming in to Into the zoom we'll kick off in a couple of minutes Well, ladies and gentlemen, I think we'll make a start We still have a number of participants coming in but an endeavor to to get started in a timely fashion Ladies and gentlemen, I'm Christina Gauter and on behalf of my fellow directors of the so Michael Howard Center at Kings I welcome you to this annual lecture this year given by Sir Hughes drawn It I think it's very fitting that this year marks the 60th anniversary of the founding of the war studies department by So Michael I should Say that this lecture is being live-streamed and you can also follow on Twitter And please also look for updates on the Sir Michael Howard Center newsletter If we happen to have connectivity problems this evening, we have got a pre-recorded version of Sir Hughes Lecture and we'll switch to that if we find that he's pixelating. That's always a danger Oh Well, ladies and gentlemen in Margaret McMillan's latest book war How conflict shaped us she she made the point that the long piece that we've enjoyed Largely, I would say since the end of the second world war has dulled our interest in studying war and Classworks of course made very similar observations and he felt that his Contemporaries were getting far too complacent The often quoted line the world is a dangerous place Do not blunt your sword too much as someone will come along with sharp sword and hack off your arms Well, Sir Michael Howard understood this only too well through his experience in the Italian campaign during World War two and I think what Sir Hugh is doing is to implore us to resuscitate interest in class words and with the recent passing of both Sir Michael and Peter Parry whose edition of class words, of course, we all tend to use I think there is a danger of class that's being seen as rather being seen as rather old-fashioned Nothing could be further from the truth war is war and it doesn't matter How many times we read class words that always gems to be found and repolished and treasured all over again Sir Hugh has been a major influence on the discipline of military history not least his work in 2007 about Classwords his other work spans everything from the Napoleonic era right through to his reflections on The most recent Iraq war and that has had enormous traction in the right places So what what we can say is that Sir Hugh's Military history canvas has been absolutely enormous and this is why his reflections are so important So Hugh is currently the Bishop War Law War Law professor in the School of International Relations at St Andrews University. He's joining us now from home He'll speak for about 40 minutes and then we will turn it over to the Q&A session And if you could please just hold off until Sir Hugh has finished before you start logging your questions Thank you very much and With that over to you Sir Hugh. Thank you very much Thank you very much indeed For that introduction I'm very conscious that this is the first Michael Howard lecture to be delivered since Michael Howard's death Almost exactly a year ago on the 30th of November 2019 One day after his 97th birthday For military historians of my generation He was a constant presence Redefining the subject Sometimes abrupt if he disagreed with you, but a compassionate mentor and a deeply empathetic correspondent and friend The need to pair Michael Howard the great student of war of the second half of the 20th century With Carl von Klauswitz author of the best name work on war ever written Was compounded by the news as Christine's just said of a second death two months ago That of Peter Paré at the age of 96 Peter Paré was Michael Howard's partner in the 1976 edition and translation of Klauswitz's on war Let me be clear This lecture is not about Michael Howard's understanding of Klauswitz, but Peter Paré's But there are moments when the two are not easily separated Paré's PhD thesis published as York and the era of Prussian reform 1807 to 1815 was trailblazing in its unification of military with intellectual and political history It was a true inspiration To I remember the Department of War Studies at Santerst when I was there in the late 1970s It was supervised here at King's by Michael Howard But Michael himself said in his memoirs that it would have been impertinent to describe himself as Paré's supervisor so much did he learn from him Peter Paré similarly acknowledged Michael's influence Saying that Howard had first introduced him to the study of war in the framework of intellectual social and political history Michael Howard first read Klauswitz in 1953 Presumably, but I don't know in the JJ Graham translation, which first came out in 1873 and was reissued in 1908 In 1962 Peter Paré persuaded Princeton University Press to undertake a translation into English of all Klauswitz's work So much for the ambitions of youth Extraordinarily, there is no full scholarly edition of all Klauswitz's works in his native language So unsurprisingly, we're still awaiting their English edition And until very recently Remarkably little of Klauswitz's other output massive output beyond on-war had been translated into English In 1964 Two years later Paré was instrumental in convening a conference in Berlin to divvy up the work involved in this massive project Howard and Paré undertook to contribute and edit the translation of on-war This was to be based on the original first edition of on Krieger published between 1832 and 1834 and Revised as the 16th German edition in 1952 by Werner Halweg who was himself at the Berlin conference Howard and Paré kept their side of the bargain Michael Howard wrote in Captain Professor his memoir But the task was the most rewarding work intellectually as well as financially that I have ever undertaken Intellectually it made me realise what a superb training for a historian it is to edit a text To live in intimate contact with a great mind Place what he wrote in context and try to express his meaning in terms that make sense for one's own generation In the age before email and even before faxes joint working across the Atlantic was not easy Michael was not helped by all souls Where he was then established as a fellow because the college failed to elect Paré to a visiting fellowship so that they could progress the work They seem only to have met twice in the ensuing decade Peter Paré at least twice in person Peter Paré came to London for one summer and Michael Howard reciprocated with a week at Stanford Importantly although did they did the editing They did not do all the translation that Was initially undertaken by Angus Malcolm a retired diplomat who had already translated Karl Demeter's history of the German officer corps However, Mark died in 1970 before the work was completed the factor which needs to be borne in mind Given what Michael himself said about the translation Michael Howard was a great stylist a man who took pride and care in his powers of expression both on the page and in the spoken word He wanted the English text to flow even if it does not always do so in the original German Klaus Witz could write Extraordinarily expressively and Christina's just given us an example in that introduction the way in which he described battle in book four of on wall Both vivid and also at times ironic But he could also write with two tonic obscurity where lengthy sentences seem to lack a subject and whose clauses have too many verbs in the passive tense Many of my German students have preferred to read how in a praise on war than the early 19th century German prose of von Krieger Michael hired put Klaus Witz into English that was colloquial and accessible Peter Paray himself said all translation is in the end interpretation But Michael at times went further likening himself to an impressionist painter several scholars Including especially Jan Wilhelm Honig have written persuasively of the liberties Which they took the translation in order to give it contemporary resonance Klaus Witz was not consistent in his use of vocabulary as how them Paray acknowledged But they were not consistent either in English words. They employed to translate the German into English They regularly rendered Krieg for example as campaign rather than war if it suited how they wanted that section of the text to be treated They also translated hand down as Operations so inserting a contemporary concept that of the operational level of war in a text in which it is absent And they added adjectives like political in order to gloss the meaning of the words where they thought it appropriate In 1976 when the book was published it was a triumph I remember I was at Cambridge at the time And I was told that copies had arrived at Heffers Rush down to part with what was the then the princely sum of 12 pounds In order to acquire mine With its somewhat improbable dust jacket it looks as though it is color-coded like a regimental tie a series of stripes diagonally across the cover As a stroke Howard and Paray had shattered the illusion carefully nurtured not just by his British critics But even by Germans the Klaus Witz was obscure contradictory and hard to understand Here was on war with a punch both readable and comprehensible Princeton University Press even managed to reduce its bulk Abandoning the three volume structure of the original German And the three volume structure which the Graham translation had emulated for a single volume It was compact enough to go into the revised every man's theories When that started production A copy of which a report have found in an al-qaeda safe house in afghanistan after the 9 11 attacks One of my current students at st. Andrews connor collins Did a google books engren search to show references to klaus witz in printed works in english In english english and in american english those references peaked in the early 1980s In britain that peak was twice on war's previous peaks. There had been one in each of the two world wars in the united states That peak had no significant president It was five times greater than that in britain The howard and parade translation affected two major shifts in anglo-saxon strategic thought In the united states it ended the dominance of klaus witz's contemporary zhomini Which had persisted since the mid 19th century when it was translated into english and when the praesit de la de la guerre Was translated into english for the first time and was still to be found in legacy form Even during the cold war And in the united kingdom it finally ended up The nonsense written about klaus witz particularly by basal little heart In the ghost of napoleon published in 1933 little heart had lampoon klaus witz as the mardi of the mass Had characterized his text as obscure and self-confidictory And confusingly had even argued that klaus witz believed war invariably trumped policy Howard particularly relished his demolish his demolition Of little heart who had died six years previously But his hatchet had a regrettable byproduct Michael howard was particularly interested in klaus witz's influence on military thought But he failed to notice how profoundly on war had shaped julian corbitt's some principles of maritime strategy This may have been because michael howard had a little interest in naval matters Or it may have been because some of the ideas which little heart had branded as his own particularly the british way in warfare Which howard also criticized We lifted unacknowledged from corbitt Corbitt had used klaus witz to stress the relationship of war and policy To distinguish between what corbitt called major strategy or grand strategy and minor strategy And to show the relationship between major war and limited war that war had a binary character By reading corbitt Through the lens of little heart Not little heart through the lens of corbitt Howard contributed to a culture in britain which concentrated so heavily on little heart And gave insufficient attention to corbitt The sales of the 1976 edition of on-war have comfortably exceeded those of any previous edition In any language In German Michael howard used to cite figures of 200 000 and that was some time ago and they must still be climbing What particularly pleased michael howard in all this Was was that on war was being read by soldiers Especially it was being read in u.s war colleges For michael howard klaus witz was a soldier writing for other soldiers This was evident In the graphic way in which klaus witz described combat But it was also obvious in klaus witz's attention to the issues of morale and friction Apart from the addition of on-war itself michael howard wrote only two extended pieces on klaus witz The first was the introductory essay for the translation Which is on the influence of klaus witz a total of 17 pages And the second is a short volume 74 pages on klaus witz for oxford university presses past master series The latter in particular is studied with apesu Which reflect the experience of the young michael howard as a junior officer in the cold stream guards between 1943 and 1945 He empathized with klaus witz's observations on the military profession On its resistance to learning on the long periods of boredom in war as well as the moments of intense terror The second chapter of michael howard's klaus witz is called the theory and practice of war It is actually a chapter on practice not theory And in a sense is a dialogue between one soldier and another which focuses above all on morale in war But that band of shared experience Then prompted in michael howard the same Frustration with klaus witz's methodology Which have been expressed by many other soldiers who have read on war And at times makes howard's comments on klaus witz Read in terms which are as catchy as those of little heart Howard stressed the elements of confusion in klaus witz's thinking and the contradictions within the text Although he acknowledged that klaus witz's approach was dialectical He never seemed fully to embrace the implications of the method Its purpose was to set up propositions To juxtapose thesis and antithesis Both of them based on historical evidence or on klaus witz's own experience Sows to generate an understanding of war as a phenomenon Rimo Aron had called his book on klaus witz also published in 1976 Ponce la guerre how to think about war But it is as though howard wanted on war to be a book that was more practical than philosophical He wanted to resolve the paradoxes through congruence At the beginning of his short study of klaus witz Howard said that klaus witz and i'm quoting him Had limited his analysis to what would be of immediate utility to a commander planning a campaign That makes klaus witz sound very like geometry the third chapter of Howard's book on klaus witz is called ends and means in war Howard mentioned the dialectical method at the beginning But then suppressed the tensions In order to develop a linear view of war shaped by the vocabulary of ends and means He had already in the book summarized klaus witz's view of war in ways which are inherently hierarchical To quote cloud Howard again on on klaus witz Military maneuver was pointless unless it was designed to culminate in battle And battle was pointless unless it was designed to serve the ultimate purpose of war And so in the chapter on ends and means Howard tells us that klaus witz uses the word zweck to the german word to describe the ultimate end of war And the word zeal to describe the intermediate objective of a subordinate military commander And so he manages to create a hierarchy The means that middle of war this intermediate objective Zeal and then the ultimate objective of speck The trouble is the klaus witz did no such thing what instead happens is that he uses Different words at different times to create different meanings Sometimes zeal refers to the ultimate objective of war rather than speck and vice versa A source of particular frustration for Michael Howard was book three of on war that which is entitled strategy in general Howard dismissed it as only a collection of chapters on diverse topics linked by no very evident common theme One might assume he went on that klaus witz's interest in strategy was slight in comparison with its almost obsessive concern With what he saw as the main tool of the strategist that is to say battle Klaus witz had indeed defined strategy as the use of the battle for the purposes of the war But how Howard neither cited that definition despite the fact that it was one to which klaus witz cleaved throughout his writings from 1804 onwards Nor was ready to accept that it was what klaus witz believed strategy to be He wanted klaus witz to interpret strategy as the ordering of priorities that was Michael Howard's frame of the ordering priorities So that strategy Would be a more more hierarchical and also be given a more modern meaning than klaus witz accorded One which reached its fulfillment if you like in policy in that hierarchy And herein lay a second source of Howard's frustration with klaus witz He actually says very little About the idea that war is the continuation of policy by other means He asserts it in book one chapter one And he develops the implications much more fully in book eight on war plans But it is absent from book three on strategy and almost entirely so for all the other books The significant exception to that generalization is its latency in book six that on the defense Michael Howard's Significant contributions was his recognition of just how fundamental book six was to the evolution of klaus witz's thinking The book forced klaus witz not just to adjust the relationship between defense and attack But also to embrace a wider view of war a wider history of war That went beyond klaus witz's own experience of the napoleonic wars And ultimately to recognize the role of policy as a way of uniting the different forms which war might assume Howard and pare justified their treatment of on war By their constant reiteration of the point But the text was unfinished Save in relation to book one chapter one In other words, if you take this chapter in isolation You can use it to iron out the differences distinctions paradoxes and contradictions in what follows In order to produce an interpretation of both war and strategy That is less about dialectics and more more about an aphoristic hierarchical relationship That runs from tactics or battle through strategy to war as a political instrument If you follow that line too, you've also got much less of klaus witz to read The staff college student who has been only too pleased to know that all he needs to read is book one chapter one And not the whole text that has been endlessly grateful to howard and pare The intellectual basis for this approach Is one of two Prefectory notes written by klaus witz to von klinger and both published by his wife Mary von brul in the first edition of 1832 One of those prefectory noted note Notes is dated 10th of july 1827 And it lays out klaus witz's plans for revising the text as a whole The other is undating And it says that klaus witz regarded only book one chapter one has finished Howard and pare dated this note to 1830 Assuming it was written as klaus witz packed up his papers Before joining nison now as his chief of staff in poland As revolution threatened across europe Werner helve the great german scholar who had been at that conference in berlin in 1964 Dated this undated prefectory note to 1827 And others including michael howards pupil as our gat have agreed with helve If this note was written in 1827 then klaus witz klaus witz did much more to revise the text than howard ever acknowledged Indeed since 1976 the work of a number of scholars preeminently andreus herberg rota Anders poundgren and paul donker Has developed our understanding of the genesis of the text First of all by detecting a fresh notes from klaus witz himself that explain the evolution of his thinking And secondly by relating it to other publications of the 1820s on which klaus witz drew And thirdly by linking the theoretical text of on wall To the military histories which klaus witz wrote in extensive Throughout the period that he was in which he was developing his thinking The result of all this world is that if anything We need to push back the maturation of klaus witz's theoretical approaches to a period Even earlier than 1837 certainly to 1825 and possibly before that And what it does not do is confirm the notion that all comes to the great man very late That he was only in 1830 that he realized his book one chapter one was finished peter purée himself He re-empted this point by stressing the early formation of klaus witz's thinking at the kreege's academy under sharnhorst's direction When klaus witz in his early 20s regarded sharnhorst effectively as his second father It is then that his definition of strategy, which I've already quoted Is is first formulated And then two he begins to sketch out the idea of the relationship between war and policy But the effect of going back that far in klaus witz's life is to produce another problem Which is to reduce the formative experiences on the maturer klaus witz Of the yena campaign of 1806 when prussia was smashed by the polin of his service in russia in 1812 And of the war of german liberation between 1813 and 1815 Michael hired for his part Although he's stressed the importance of these years for klaus witz the soldier Never paid much attention to their impact on klaus witz's political thought He specifically rejected the idea that klaus witz had ever been a german nationalist Not least so that he could rebut the nazi's appropriation of klaus witz in the 1930s But the circumstances of 1806 to 1815 of that period between yena and waterloo Did make klaus witz a german nationalist It is extraordinary that michael howe did not recognize this Given that he lectured on yohan gotley victor The philosopher whose speeches to the german nation delivered in 1808 so impressed klaus witz Between the treaty of tulsi in 1807 And the polin's demand that prussia supply a contingent for the invasion of russia in february 1812 klaus witz became increasingly frustrated with the reluctance of his king frijek wilhelm III of prussia to confront the french The effects radicalized him He and nazi now looked with admiration at the insurgencies Against french occupation of french rule emerging in spain swissily switzerland and italy And in 1812 klaus witz resigned his commission and the prussian army to fight against it with the russians In that month he penned a lengthy and angry confession of faith It is addressed to the german nation Over the head of the prussian monarchy In his writings michael howe blamed the king's distrust of klaus witz on the king himself But here was an officer who ultimately put his faith in the nation Over his loyalties to the crown if he had to choose between the two The neglect of this phase in klaus witz's life Also led howe to underestimate klaus witz's contribution in another respect And overestimated in a third respect Let me deal with each of those in turn Under estimation relates to klaus witz's thinking on guerrilla and even revolutionary war howe read Klaus witz's interest in guerrilla warfare in terms of what he wrote in book six chapters 26 of on-war Here guerrilla warfare is seen as supplementary to the main effort But the end of the chapter talks about the nation continuing to fight after the How did the query actually translate the as a after the major battle by means of a general insurrection Klaus witz believed that it was important never to give up This is what he had hoped for between 1807 and 1812 a national insurgency against the french occupiers His lectures at the war academy in those years addressed small wars Their their their content refler refer reflects the conduct of so-called petty war in the 18th century But when said to get alongside the private correspondence with nison eye which plotted a national insurgency And the use of terror they acquire a much wider significance So important with these years to klaus witz's intellectual political and emotional formation The some have argued that klaus witz planned a second book on small war to go alongside that on war And my colleague at st. Andrew's sabbola shapers has gone further And seen in these developments the crucible of on-war itself After all a national insurrection As klaus witz certainly recognized at the time would have been a war without limits Michael Howe did not address klaus witz the insertion Instead he stressed klaus witz's emphasis on war's binary character In the prefectory note of july 1827 the note that is dated klaus witz said war would be of two kinds first of all War could be a war of annihilation to overthrow the enemy and to dictate to that defeated enemy a peace cycle Secondly it could be a war for more limited objectives, but which ended in negotiation Michael Howe recognized rightly that the second form of war is underrepresented in on-war Indeed on-war lampooned 18th century Styles of limited warfare precisely because they were limited It took the writing of book six on defense Which had to use frederick the great more than napoleon as its historical exemplar for klaus witz to appreciate that any universal theory of war Had also to accommodate wars which were not fought with the intensity that are characterized warfare of the era of the french revolution And indeed the sort of wars which he klaus witz had personal experience Both types of war the michael howe's typology of klaus witz's thinking were the result of political choice The idea that war was the continuation of policy by other means Could accommodate both major and limited war and so provides an overarching framework for all wars howe's overestimation of klaus witz's contribution Was the result of his determination to relate this binary model of war To the conditions of the cold war klaus witz dealt with the scale of major war in three ways First of all in book one chapter one He posits an ideal type that of absolute war which he says can never be achieved in reality Secondly in book eight he modifies that view by saying that actually absolute war does sometimes happen And it did so under the impact of revolution in france And thirdly klaus witz also introduces the notion of an organza qui A whole war in tiring itself which escalates because that is what is in war's nature Michael hardt tended to lump all these three together under the title total war So introducing a 20th century concept which klaus witz had not used and of course with which he was not directly familiar And is so he appropriated klaus witz's ideas to encapsulate not just the experience of the second world war in which of course he served himself But the threat of nuclear war The consequence of this for klaus witz's reputation however Was that there was a danger and showing if klaus witz was the profit of total war Then klaus witz was also nothing more than what klaus little heart of city was which was a german militarist So michael hardt then had to elevate The role of limited war thinking in klaus witz's calculations to offset this notion of total war How about to confess that apart from the prefatory note not much in on war addressed the notion of limited war Because klaus witz saw war's propensity for escalation How was stressed the importance of political control in containing it? The korean war particularly in michael hardt's Introduction to the influence of on war In the translation the korean war became the pivot for this argument The korean war did not become a limited war because klaus witz had said there was such a thing as limited war obviously not But klaus witz's theory provided a retrospective analysis as to why it could be so construed Michael hardt followed osgood in seeing a theory in seeing klaus witz as a theorist who could bestow utility on war in an era when nuclear war ruled out major war It was quite a stretch from the text of on war albeit a sustainable one After all even before the outbreak of the first world war before 1914 Both hands still broke the founding father of military history academic military history and certainly academic military history in germany And julian corbett the author of some principles and maritime strategy Had used klaus witz's 1827 note to make exactly the same point To point out the binary nature of war and the war could be limited. He did not have to be major But michael hardt used the korean war to make a further point And to argue that klaus witz was also a theorist of civil military relations Who recognized the need? subordinate the military to the political The trouble was the klaus witz's own behavior in 1812 Had more clearly matched that of douglas macArthur in asserting the authority of the military over the political How to pray make great play of the fact that their edition of on war Was the first in english to be on the first german edition of 1832 to 34 They acknowledged that there were good reasons Why both graham klaus witz is translated in 1873 and then jollies who had translated In a much more literal and closer to the german fashion on war in 1943 Had used the second edition And That was because The first edition had contained significant corruptions and misprints which needed correction and which were subsequently created However, when it came to the role of the military commander in the decisions of the cabinet An issue which is discussed in book eight of on war Howard and parade struck stuck with the first edition's text in their translation Which said as they put it in their rendering that the commander in chief Should be in the cabinet so that his military decisions will be fully consummate with the state's policy It is important to this juncture To remind ourselves as the howard and parade edition i have to say did not but the cabinet in question Was not a modern cabinet But the cabinet of the presidents of the united states or the prime minister of the united kingdom But the private office of the king A body to which klaus witz and his history of the yana campaign of 1886 attributed much of a fault for that catastrophe Howard and parade insist that the first edition Reflected klaus witz's intentions which were to enable the cabinet to take a part in the commander's decisions Not to enable the commander to take an active part in the cabinet's decisions The second edition michael howard suggested open the door to an over mighty military Which would participate in all political decisions The trouble with this interpretation is that klaus witz never drew such a clear demarcation between and the military In book eight of on war Klaus witz goes out of his way to address the need for policy to be shaped by what is militarily possible Recognizing the dangers that would arise if a statesman asked war to achieve something of which war was not capable And klaus witz as a consequence of this was emphatic that the commander-in-chief needed to be both a soldier and a statesman Howard wanted klaus witz to be addressing the civil military relationships of liberal democracy in the late 20s 20th century When in fact he was confronting those of a weak monarch Who nonetheless still believe in absolutism Since the 1990s particular attention has focused on the trinity that brief discussion at the end of book one chapter one Which had previously been neglected by many commentators But which after 1976 not least because of howard and perrae's attention to and focus on book one chapter one but also because of remond arons book Received much more attention Since the end of the cold war it is this passage which in particular has generated criticisms of klaus witz from contemporary commentators and they do so because in part Of the way in which they have elected to read that text In that text klaus witz addressed which first of all what he calls the primary or what you come to be called the primary trinity in war That is to say The passion that it involves the role of The player of probability and chance within it And the function of reason And klaus witz then goes on to suggest That these relationships Are best embodied the relationship between those three factors in The people in terms of passion The armed forces in terms of the player of probability and chance And the government in terms of reason But he then goes on to say these relationships are not fixed And indeed the relationship between each of them is like magnets alternately Repelling and attracting one another and there is certainly no suggestion within them that policy is dominant It is therefore particularly unfortunate when this Second interpretation has been used to criticize klaus witz as overly preoccupied With war as an instrument of the state That michael howard himself colluded in that interpretation He wanted klaus witz to be addressing The civil-military relationship with which he was familiar and in a lecture given at oxford in 1984 Michael howard described the trinity that brief passage in the following terms klaus witz described war as being compounded of a paradoxical that's the word used in the translation Trinity the government for which it was an instrument of policy The military for which it was the exercise of skill And the people as a whole the extent of whose involvement determined the intensity with which the war would be raised His footnote refers to his own translation of our war But the reading which he has imposed on that text Is one as i've already suggested which is open to Is only one of a number of possible readings Moreover in its focus on the government the armed forces and the people It elevates the actors of the so-called secondary trinity Over these qualities which are at the heart of the primary trinity michael howard was both a grotian and a hobson his reaction to the juneva convention Of 90 sorry the additional protocols Of 1977 to the juneva convention Which recognized the legal rights of freedom fighters so-called and his frustration At the united states his global war and terror in response to the 1911 attacks in 2001 Showed a man who believed the state had to ensure its monopoly of war In order to control it And he saw policy as a mechanism to limit it Hugo groce's development of international law in 1625 de jure bennieck parkus And thomas hobson's commonwealth in 1651 developed of course in the leviathan Provided the framework for howard of a rational order for war which could shape its utility and control its penchant for escalation In the era of the cold war that was a wise prudent and humane approach to war Both realistic in its recognition of wars uh wars possibility and ambitious in its hope that it could be contained But it was not the war which claus witz had addressed michael howard was the founding father in post 1945 britain of both academic military history And the nascent discipline of strategic studies He believed as claus witz did That the former was a key component possibly the key component of the latter But in claus witz himself He found a subject where too often the requirements of the first Were at odds with contemporary pressures of the second Where history and strategic studies were in collision rather than in collusion In seeking to make claus witz relevant for the late 20th century He could on occasion underestimate the influences of the early 19th century However, those very influences were to give claus witz a purchase on the developments of the early 21st century In ways that the howard interpretation underestimated Like any translation the 1976 edition of on war Was reflective of its times None of us historians or students of strategy is immune to those pressures nor should we be The point here is not to criticize michael howard But to criticize those who have mistaken his extrapolations from on war To the for the nuance and variety of vomkrieg Thank you very much indeed Thank you so much. Thank you for that. And I'm going to enjoy listening to that All over again tomorrow and I'm going to pick out and polish those gems Could I abuse the the chair's privilege here and just get the the q&a rolling Your observations about strategic culture and which strategic thinkers appeal to which countries Really fascinates me because I noticed this when I worked at the us naval war college Really the first exposure that I'd had to Julian corbett's work was in the states and I found this fascinating given that the americans Especially the us navy emphasized muscle power a large fleet and yet corbett Emphasized sort of peripheral approaches and how you don't need to control all the ocean in order to have an impact What why do you think that that britain was dismissive of people like julian corbett and perhaps a little slow on the uptake When it comes to class width thank you the I'm finding very strange That I mean michael's own engagement with corbett in relation to class width is literally two lines that I can find And it misses the main point And it is odd. I think part of corbett's problem, of course, is that he had published in 1911 immediately before the first world war and andrew lambard, of course, is working on on on corbett would have Does have strong views on this. I mean the corbett is still there Alive and kicking during the first world war But britain, of course, does not adopt a maritime strategy even if surreggul grays suggests that britain should on 3rd of august 1914 um, and after that I think in many respects although britain thought about a maritime strategy in 1939 as well and still anticipate using blockade in 1939 or economic warfare in 1939 um, and little heart, of course was in part responsible for keeping that particular light aflame He did not seem the right approach In 1939 either and indeed it's very association with little heart was one of the things that will tend to rubbish it because little heart was of course all asking for a limited liability before 1939 um, and then negotiation with hitler by 1941 so 4041 so so so there is Here a real difficulty and it's only recently people. It seems to me that people have gone back to corbett Who is you know possibly the most original of of of britain's strategic thinkers So I think that I think context is all And certainly in the 1980s When michael harbors writing The continental commitment was attacking So he's writing the continental commitment earlier, but with the continental commitment out paul kennedy Writing the rise and fall of british naval mastery Counts in very similar terms but addressing c power to michael and of course the paul's Representative c power is not corbett, but baham So there are all sorts of ways why And despite the fact there's a book on on on on on British rise and fall of british naval mastery. So so so I think there are a number of factors here which which Contribute but also in the end we pick up those strategic thinkers I suppose what this reflects who capture the mood of the moment Why does claus fits, you know, that of course is what michael harb did for claus fits He made him work for the mood of the moment, which is precisely why he was he became so widely read And you know, I that is the big achievement and I'm not for a moment Underestimating that so I think you know, there has there is a moment of of pacing here, which which which which is central Thank you. Thank you It dovetails very nicely with one of the incoming questions We've got a question from Olivia garage Given the inference that nuclear weapons had on the nature of their translation of claus fits As well as the liberties they've took are we ripe for a new translation? Do you think? they American friends said to me, how about we do a new translation? and and I said my life's too certainly now my life's too short It's uh We are ripe for I think we are ripe for a new translation I think but I think the the challenge is enormous and this of course is where again I have to doff my cap to how to pray and if you read the jolly this translation the 1943 one Which is very it is a very literal translation of the second edition check text It actually gets you much closer to claus fits in the german if you have no german But it's not just how do you? Get close to the german and retain fluency which jolly struggles to do In which of course how to pray achieve? It's also that a new edition actually requires Proper textual annotation which halvek began to give to the german edition requires even more You know i i was trained as a classist at school and when you read these ididis or when you read Tacitus or whatever There was a scholarly apparatus to the text which explained the influences which explained the references There is none of that in claus fits So you don't even have the military history references properly explained unless you know them And even more you we don't have an edition which explains where claus fits has lifted Unacknowledged ideas from other thinkers his immediate contemporaries, you know, he acknowledges macchiabelli We might he acknowledges jolly to abuse him or gulo to abuse him But he doesn't you know, there are moments when he's effectively using both gulo And jolly directly and certainly gibert and barenhorst and others of his contemporaries Very often word for word Without reference and and all that needs explaining so a scholarly edition in german would be a start as i was suggesting And it needs to be related of course to all claus fits his other writings because that's where he's hammering out these ideas So we absolutely do need a good scholarly edition of claus fits But it probably has to be in german before we even begin the english one But speaking as somebody who forced herself to learn german in order to do her phd thesis I um, I appreciate the challenges Many thanks for that. Um Very good question from sean minton about about the translation about continuation of policy by other means um Sorry Somebody's just Come in and overwritten that let me try that again. Um, uh, sean asks um Many thanks for your talk. What would you say to the asserted era? In the howard pare translation by james holmes and the diplomat where he claims that howard and pare Incorrectly translated the german to the continuation of policy by other means when it should be the continuation of policy with other means Um, and how correct is that assertion that that's a fairly uh familiar debate. I think Yes, it is and and of course, um, the answer is that as ever is there is ambiguity In these things I I need to go back and remind myself now of what precise german is but but but but You know clearly if you look at the text elsewhere Where claus witz describes policy as an alien element within war as sometimes acting as an alien element particularly if policy is trying to dampen down a war which is escalating or alternatively Uh policy wants to escalate war when when when when uh is going in the other direction um Absolutely, um policy is in in that sense understood by claus witz as being alien in relation to war itself and I and uh War itself has this capacity to dominate policy and therefore become the end if you like rather than just the means. Um, so I think that the the point of of of of uh the um The reference is to understand that this relationship is nothing like it's clearly fixed as Lake 20th century readings of particularly in english of on war made it. Um, so so so so yes, uh, I I I would accept that and it's and of course critically I mean You know The question of whether you translate policy as policy or politics. I mean, it seems to be self-evident that what claus witz is talking about The politic he means policy Partly because when he does address the issue of politics in his account of the 1815 campaign He then does deal with partisan politics. Um, and he's using different vocabulary to do that Uh than polity. So I think anybody who translates war is the continuation of politics by the means Again is glossing the text in terms which which which Um, with an ambiguity in that particular case Although politic is ambiguous ambiguous today in this translation. It seems to be clear What claus witz intended Yeah, thank you The next question is a very good one. I think from robert Levine, um Can you discuss how claus witz Addressed the issue of war termination and do you think the howard and parry version deal with it? And in the way that perhaps needed to be done Um, well, of course, you know the person who really addressed Uh, uh, what claus witz might have said about war termination was Raymond Aaron Uh, when he wrote ponce la guerre. Um, I mean he he took the text In much more benign and positive ways Um claus witz says it seems to me claus witz Is is Michael howard was was clear that, uh claus witz belonged And I am simplifying him, but it was clear that that the claus witz belonged Uh, with those who believe that a decisive battle would end the campaign part of the difficulty here Is of course what claus witz is so often addressing Is not the whole gamut of 1792 to 1815. Um, he is dealing with Uh individual which is why um howard and parry wants to translate creepers campaign so often He's dealing with individual campaigns Uh within the napoleonic wars and in a way that was entirely logical for oppression because after all pressure stopped fighting in 1795 And didn't fight again till 1806. Um, these were separate wars the wars of the first coalition and and and the war of 1806 So these were self-contained conflicts. Um, and the 1806 war absolutely ended with a with I mean there's a pursuit after the battle and claus witz is clear that that Termination is what ended but of course he says very little About peace. I mean he does say claus witz middle heart didn't give him the credit for this But he does say the object ultimately at one point is peace that it is what we should be trying to achieve As quarrel of war and he does talk in terms of balance of power theory Reflecting the thinking's of gents and and others of his own time that this is what you should be trying to achieve in order Get some sort of stability within europe but war termination in the sense in which he's understood now is underdeveloped And so of course as with other things you're having to gloss the text You ought to say what he wants you want it to say which is what arable above all was doing in 1976 more than how to parade There's a there's an interesting question about the influence Not not just of claus witz but the sort of german general staff System, you know, there was a certain amount of seduction of that influence on the british military From the late 19th century onwards Any thoughts on on that? What the The attract, you know, is this the attraction of claus witz? I mean we normally see Self-evidently that with the agrarian translation coming out in 1873 So right after the franco-prussian war right after the time when Prussia's put its stamp on on europe and and germany has been unified And the prussian army is seen to be the embodiment of modern army should be that that is the moment when when claus witz is read So there is a relationship here and of course it was that very influence the little heart was focused on Trying to deny. I mean he said you know the problem is we've become too prussian And during the first world war That was a recurrent complaint. There's no point in trying to beat A prussian eyes germany in a first world war if we ourselves become like prussia if we end up having A mass army conscription of dominant general staff Then we cease to be a liberal Democracy in the sense in which we would understand it. I mean that that was absolutely where the little heart is coming from And of course it's a fair warning, you know, it is um You know, there is a danger here on the other hand There is the issue of the necessity of war and and you might need to create a mass army and you might need to To create a powerful general staff. You certainly need an effective planning body If you're going to find 20th century warfare So you're going to have to do some things the prussians have have done Which britain hasn't really had to confront precisely because of its island status and and c power here the two so I think Is it the case? I mean, what's interesting, of course and paradoxical since 1945 Is that although the study of clousfitz in germany has Not gone away and although clousfitz has been welcomed As the honorary liberal now in the way that He was also welcomed as a nazi in the 1930s Um Although that has happened clousfitz is far more widely read in the english-speaking world than he is in the german-speaking world today um, and that is partly a reflection of the status of students in germany um, and It's it's flourishing state or comparison of flourishing state I know we always know that it could be bigger better and bigger. Um in the english-speaking world Thank you a very good question. Um What what do you think is the most dangerous reading or selective use of clousfitz in security studies? That would require the rest of the evening to answer. Well, I I've got the bullet I'm going to say that the most dangerous thing we talk about political leaders we Talk about soldiers but peacekeepers which for the most Sorry, I'm going to say the most dangerous thing is selective reading full stop You know the danger always with clousfitz Is precisely as you were saying in your introduction you read him again and you find something fresh I mean, it is extraordinary how he has that capacity And he has that capacity because here is an inquiring mind Um, who is constantly asking questions of his own assumptions um, and That it is that um internal debate on the page Which is what makes him? So full of insight And it is it precisely the danger of selective reading, whichever it is You know, even the you know war Well war is the continuation of policy by other means is probably the most dangerous of the lot Because that is the most fashionable, you know, if you see the adjective clousfitz um in in uh in any contemporary comment not that it happens much now but but but but Because other vocabulary is taken over but in the 80s after the impact of of the how in a great translation has been felt You know journalists would use this and what they meant was war is the continuation of policy by other means But what of course they lost sight of which clousfitz is absolutely clear about His war is a very different state. It's not a continuation And and particularly for a liberal democracy. It's a radical change in pace. Um, so it is It is dangerous purely because it is so seductive I mean little heart would have given you a very different answer because he would focus on all the Strong vocabulary about major war and battle and bloodthirstiness and violence within war Which is there saying, you know, this is what's dangerous Um, but we sort of take that for granted. We know we understand that we don't need to be preached to about that um and so it's actually the things that appeal to us as as as Early 21st century small l liberals. Um, which are the more dangerous Because we we read them selectively as we wish to read them Yeah, I One respondent this made me smile. Um, who in essence is asking who is a new clousfitz in Your mind? Are you optimistic or pessimistic about where strategic thinking is is going today? Well, I think um A one-level strategy thinking is a very healthy state precisely because we recognize A great, you know, it's so widely recognized as being necessary and although I think it went through a period of confusion when the end of the Cold War and the decline of nuclear deterrence With so much attention have been given to that dimension of the question it has it has Gained undoubtedly fresh impetus Since the beginning of the 21st century. Um, and I think it is in a comparatively healthy state but Is it actually going to Achieve the focus that clousfitz did Um on strategy as a way of understanding war No, I don't think it can because actually we see it as much more having to address the issues of war and peace um, and uh, that will Diffuse the focus and secondly We live in the era where we are constantly told that the pace of change Is endlessly increasing. Um, the sort of cliche which I resist because I don't think it helps us very much quite frankly But the pace of technological change um in the 20th and then the 21st century has meant That clousfitz who's really not concerned with technology at all because he was living in an era of of of Of um, comparatively unchanging technology. Uh, he was concerned with social and political change because the impact of the french revolution Uh, but because he doesn't address technological change He is free to think of of strategy and war in the realm of ideas um The challenge for us always is if you produce a discussion of strategy Which looks at war in a philosophical and more abstract sense Uh, is that the those who believe that a new wonder weapon is going to affect dramatic change Or those who believe that cyber war is going to Fundamentally change the nature of war These sort of things actually then get in in the way of a proper analysis um, I mean Not that you should be deterred after all clousfitz like corbett was neglected Uh, you know, both of them had a bad track record in getting leverage In the immediate aftermath of publication. The fact you're not recognizing your own lifetime Uh, should not be uh a deterrent. I mean the danger is if you're an academic You need to be recognized according to the ref cycle. Uh, not according to uh posterity 50 years on which would do for clousfitz And the danger if you're serving Is that no armed forces today are going to give you the leisure of 10 years and plus which is what the prussian army gave clousfitz To sit down and write on war That will be Thank you. Um One respondent has has posed the very interesting question. I think how has your Thinking about strategy changed over the years. Have you found your views morphing? I do. I have my ideas of morphing. I would certainly be very worried if they were static um, I think, um I think I have What I think golly I've got to collect my thoughts for this one um When I read how in a prayer in 1976. I thought this was it, you know And I self-evident for what I said now It still informs my thinking clousfitz certainly still certainly still informs my thinking But I don't think this is it any longer. Um, I think I will still find Insights and richness in clousfitz Um, but um, but I don't think this is it Uh, but why I still my admiration for clousfitz increases is that many of the things I would now think is important Like, you know, where do we fit in non-state actors? How do we fit in the notion of of insurgency? revolution and so on You know clousfitz is good on all these things. Um, just not so good and onwards. It is other writings that he's good Um, and I think the the other issue is, you know by training. I'm a military historian. I'm not a strategic studies man if we're talking about um disciplinary background, I didn't read politics. I read history came um, and um That is my discipline Which of course is you know, why I entirely empathize with michael how to pray peter parade because that was their discipline they were not That was the subject from which they came and crucially You know of all the disciplines that shape clousfitz Uh, history was was was the dominant one. I mean he looked at many other subjects mathematics engineering and so on in order to Get a a a a grasp on some of the metaphors and ways in which we understand strategy um, but um and the challenge today Is that of course strategic studies draws on many more disciplines than history And in some times can be actually for my money, of course too distance from history the point here about history is That history i'm going slightly off of the tangent, but history Teachers this is about understanding change. I mean people see the study of history somehow about continuity You know, that's not true. It's simply Why do we why do we prioritize the french revolution or the outbreak of the first world war? Or or 9 11 We we prioritize the things that actually have a dramatic effect in terms of how we behave and think And of course We understand history because it we need history to help us understand So we get context and purchase on those those big events But we also need to recognize how much they can change our thinking And I Um therefore Actually resist notions Which of course a fashionable and strategic studies today and I've debated these issues with others people give me Colin Gray But this notion that strategy is somehow unchanging. I mean, I I just don't see that Because actually chat the strategy is constantly presented with change The principles are not, you know, and simply to say well war is a constant and then people cite clouds That's, you know, the nature of war is constantly character or changes Colin Gray particularly was was keen on that And I you know, there's some truth in that but you can only take the argument so far I mean war may have enduring features including its reciprocity and the element of danger and violence within all that Moral friction having classes things classic stresses But at the same time the whole point about the argument about technology political change and so on Is is that war is also changing in response to those circumstances and You cannot simply look at the continuities In their own right for a historian to argue that history is about continuity and change is hardly the most original Earth-jashing observation, but that's really where I Come is it from I've averged a long way from whether my own moves of strategic studies to change. Well, the short answer is Um, it gets harder as you get older as everybody knows to change your views, but I certainly hope they continue to change And you used to think we're wrong a decade ago. I now accept a very important I used to be doubtful about the impact of climate change on strategy. I'm now Deeply impressed not because climate change itself affects trashy But simply because climate change will affect political behavior Um, and therefore it's a very important factor for us to consider. It will affect state behavior It will affect how we look at the balance and allocation of resources Uh, uh, it will affect the pressures for autarchy free trade and so on. So so, you know these One has to absorb change That that's a neat segue into the next question Which I've been dying to ask you for years actually about the the state of history as as a discipline Um, you know, I went through cycles talking about cycles Up and down. I was rather pessimistic until comparatively recently. What's your take on the profession? um It's very different from when Michael Howard Uh, and his generation were thinking about it and I think what in particular Has happened Has been that historians are increasingly talking to themselves. I do think one of the problems of of of You know, if you think of of people like uh, Michael Howard huge river roper island tailor a generation of of historians who saw um a responsibility that flowed from the engagement With history to engage in a public debate To have something to say And of course, there are plenty of historians who do engage in public debate. I still I'm not I'm not saying that they don't But they don't seem to me to have quite the The leverage or the range Uh, that was the case then and history as a profession tends to denigrate them Um, and of course if they're being sloppy historians, that's entirely right But the danger here is that as we um Pursue in true spirit of academic research True genuine scholarly work We need also to think to whom are we addressing the scholarly work? Where is it actually finding its reach? I don't think we ask historians ask themselves ask themselves that question often enough um, and um You know fashion as ever has a has a powerful effect. So there are certain I certainly don't be my own the state of military history military history is stronger in this country than it's been ever been quite frankly in terms of its support from within universities Um, because the universities have responded to where the customers and military history is is a popular and attractive subject And therefore, um, it's a it's light years away from when I began my career And that's not least thanks to Michael Howard, of course is who helped make it an academically legitimate subject so so You know that there are ups and downs. I suppose is my response to that but I would like to see Both as many would a greater historical understanding a sense of the past in Britain Because we don't seem to have that sense of the past except in a sort of, you know Johnsonian churchillian sense, which is not actually terribly helpful We don't seem to have a true and sophisticated understanding of the past Um, and we deal with other countries that have a very clear sense of their own past Which we both underestimate and are not qualified to challenge Okay There've been several questions about, you know, what would what would classmates think of this As I put it obsession was a fifth domain and and cyber and that's one of the reasons why the sort of classmates quote about Um, be careful how you think about the nature of warfare because if you blunt your sword too much Somebody's going to come up and hack off your arms. So It it's it's a problematic area, but I think Classwoods did recognize that there were more things going on, not least insurgencies and sort of some, you know existential threats Challenging, but um, yeah What what's your view about as I put it the obsession with cyber at the expense of other, you know traditional war fighting means Well, but for me because this is where classes is inference is going to come out, but but for me war involves both reciprocity and violence it involves killing and Cyber therefore talk about cyber threats in terms of Hostile threats in cyberspace Which may have repercussions short of war is not the same as talking about cyber war um, and cyber war itself seems to me A phrase which to claus witz would be meaningless Because he would certainly understand I assume The role of cyber as an ancillary instrument in the waging of war He would certainly understand that cyber is now central to communications intelligence collection all those things as an enabler Um, and therefore there will be conflict in cyberspace if there is war precisely because it is um a vital enabler And if you're going to get inside the mind of the enemy or the enemy's command cycle or The enemy's strategic planning or any of these things cyber will be central But let's not confuse A cyber attack in an election with war. It's not war Maybe a style act, but it's no more day. It's no more hostile Than inserting stories in other people's newspapers During the first world war which britain was very good at doing Um, you know that is not Uh, you know trying to influence opinion Both in war and peace in other countries Is not, uh, the important thing is to be aware of it's indeed. I mean and that's you know, we're inflating the issue In order to make ourselves aware of it, you know, and that's entirely right I mean, I mean we need to be aware of it. We need to make Be sensitive to what is influencing and shaping our opinions But let's not call war Things that aren't war Yeah, good point. I'm just conscious of claims winged chariot and we've really only got a few more minutes and you've been speaking for Much longer than we could have wished for really But but a number of respondents have spoken about What what you feel were the most? um significant influences On on both classworks and samichael's thinking in terms of educational background And this is really interesting because both of them at various times do lose off About the lack of intellectual curiosity Um among their cadre and that to me is is one of the most interesting questions, which you you touched on in relation to Both of them. So thank you Yeah um well You know that they had that common intellectual that common influence which was Serving in war as young men. I mean, I do think you know For it's not an intellectual influence, but in a formative influence, you know that right From childhood to adulthood um Or from adolescence to adulthood I mean in class this is case almost childhood because you know, he's he's he's 12 years old when when 1792 when the war of the first coalition begins um and he's um So so I think that writer passage and I you know This is sort of very personal anecdotal But when when you know, my father Was at Cambridge just for competes first year when the war broke out second world war broke out And I realized just how powerful the experience the second world war for him was for him and his generation Precisely because when they came back from that um They were men um, and of course many of their friends have been killed and all that sort of thing. Um, and And I think that was absolutely true for michael howard and and clausel. So I don't think we should underestimate The formative influence of war on young men. I mean that that's one thing intellectually um they What's I suppose interesting here is that um, I'm tempted to say Well, I'll be I'll be right in the same The influence on clausel is an autodidact. I mean, he you know, he's a man who who realizes he's not well read Uh because he's joined the army at such a young age and then takes the moment When he can get access to a decent library to educate himself Which means it's one of the reasons why he reads so interestingly and and and variously because He's he's hoovering ideas up from all different directions um schandhorst gives him direction By saying, you know, your experience is not enough. You need to read military history as well because only that's what you belong to God or other experiences But the autodidact means of course, he also You know, it doesn't go down the lines that somebody talked in a specific discipline And I'm tempted to say of michael howard too that um Although absolutely he went up to oxford to read history And although he became a historian I suspect if he Done that in a conventional way. I had a three-year degree Completed in the normal circumstances rather than circumstances of war um, and had then Not had the military experience he would have become In his ideal view Probably a standard oxford dawn probably become an early modernist rather than rather than a late modernist Um and not gone down the route that you were done. In other words, it's the other influences um that Changes having said that He is enough of a scholar to respond to a text like clauswitz. I mean, you know editing a text and translating a text Is as he said in his own memoirs a deeply scholarly activity and clearly Um, it was the moment it seems to me because the officer already had never done a phd or a d fill I mean, this is you know, he doesn't he didn't follow the any more than any other budding academic for his generation He didn't follow the standard academic Curses and orm. He'd never had a research fellowship any of the things that you would now see as normal Um for the academic was not where he had gone um, so he's he's he's um Generation of academics who are established before 1989 who therefore don't necessarily go off to the war in the sense of Um joining the army or the navy or the air force but go off to war. Um, perhaps in uh working for the foreign office or in a government department I mean, they're doing war work, but they're doing a different sort of war work Nor did he end up doing what many of the more academic ones did which is things like going to so we or or or into Into some forms of intelligence work or whatever. I mean, you know, he actually is an infantry officer um dangerous thing to be um and um, but crucially important it seems to me for his formation um, so Yeah, I mean it it's uh But in the end he's teaching himself You know, he he describes that process. He isn't people aren't guiding him because once he's once he's at kings and doing war studies That he's having to actually to grapple with what the subject is Because he's not very sure Bless you. Thank you. I I've just had a flood of thanks from people listening in and I'm conscious that we're about to turn into pumpkins. It's um the the sort of datum point so It just remains for me to thank you so much. You've been speaking for a long time So we must let you off the hook But it it's tremendous. I've had a lot of people asking is there a transcript of Q&A session and We'll piece together some of the questions that have come in um, and perhaps feed you some emails As as supplements, but bless you. Thank you so much for your time It has been you know, such an uplift in in this dreadful covid age When we're all feeling a bit closeted, but that was really uplifting So thank you on on behalf of this Michael Howard center and Literally hundreds of people listening and thank you so much for your time, Sihu Thank you Christina and thank you for fielding all those questions on my by behalf and putting them into rational shape Which I'm sure cannot have been easy. Um, it's been the pleasure and It's also an honor of course to remember clouds, uh, Michael Howard at this Juncture when we're a year on Thank you very much indeed Thank you everybody. Thank you