 All right, good morning, everyone. So our first panel this morning takes its inspiration from something that Admiral Richardson published in January of this year. So our Chief of Naval Operations published his design. And the document is entitled, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Security and Superiority. It discusses, amongst other things, the importance of understanding and learning the lessons of history so that we don't have to relearn them on the battlefield and so that we don't repeat mistakes from the past. The design document also emphasizes the nature of war, the enduring nature of war. The idea that it has been and always will remain a violent human contest between thinking and adapting adversaries for political gain. So the design also highlights the importance of understanding the theorists, understanding those people who have looked at war over many, many years and try to distill down the important elements, the enduring ideas, the enduring frameworks. And the design mentions by name, Thacitiesus, Klauschwitz, Sun Tzu, Mao, Corbett, and Mahan. So what we're doing this morning is each of our panelists takes one of these theorists. And we're going to look at the enduring lessons from these theorists and how they apply in the 21st century, particularly with this idea of maintaining maritime superiority. So our first panelist this morning is the chair of the strategy and policy department, Professor Mike Pavkovic. Professor Pavkovic is a noted classicist. And I should, in full transparency, also say he is also collectively our boss. So he will be going for an hour and a half, and I won't stop him. No, he has promised to keep his remarks focused to the importance of Thacitiesus as a strategist. And if you've read the book, you know that 15-minute conversation on that is extremely challenging. So we look forward to hearing what you have to say. Thank you, Mike. Thank you, Andrea. And good morning, everyone. When Thacities wrote his War of the Peloponnesians in the Athenians, he was not only narrating what he considered would be a great war and more worthy of account than any previous one, but also given that human nature is unlikely to change, that his work would be a possession for all time. And so it would serve as a didactic work to instruct future generations. Indeed, Thacities would be happy to know that the enduring value of his work has seen it read from antiquity until the present, so that the lessons of history need not be relearned. You can see the theme there of the design. Many notable scholars, soldiers, and statesmen have seen value in Thacities, including the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V, who carried his copy with him everywhere he went. The noted philosopher Thomas Hobbes thought it was important enough that he did the first translation from the original Greek into English. John Adams commended reading Thacities to his son, John Quincy Adams, and in more recent times that epitome of the soldier statesman, George C. Marshall, who at the dawn of the Cold War in 1947 said, quote, I doubt seriously whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep conviction regarding certain of the basic issues today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the fall of Athens. And of course, lastly, President of the Naval War College, Dan Fields Turner, was also a great admirer of Thucydides and made sure that he was a core component of the curriculum. Such is the power of Thucydides that, like Mark Twain and Winston Churchill, quotes are sometimes attributed to him in order to give them greater gravitas. One of the most famous examples I have on the screen here and I'm not sure you can read it, but it is the famous quote about a nation that divides its fighting men and its scholars, has its fighting done by cowards and its thinking done by fools. This quote is ubiquitous when it comes to discussions of the study of war. And as you can see, it appeared here, this is the opening page of the recent, a recent House Armed Services Committee report. The quote, however, is found nowhere in Thucydides, but instead is from the biography of General Chinese Gordon of cartoon fame, a biography written by Sir William Francis Butler. There's the actual quote and it's a little more sophisticated than the redacted version. Despite Butler being an accomplished Victorian military officer, writer, and lecturer in his own right, a quote by Butler, no matter how insightful, simply didn't have the cachet of one by Thucydides. And so it has been misattributed for many years and I expect it will continue to do so. Now, despite this legacy, there are often doubts about the utility of Thucydides in the wars that are being fought today. After all, how can a man who wrote nearly 2,500 years go about great power clashes of armies composed of heavily armed spearmen on land and fleets of ore-driven galleys at sea still be relevant in a world of insurgencies, unmanned aerial vehicles and cyber attacks? I think the answer lies in that while at the tactical level, Thucydides is certainly of little value and matters of little value today, but in matters relating to strategy and especially grand strategy, he still has much to say to us today. Now, while there are numerous lessons of strategy and grand strategy, still of enduring worth that we can take from Thucydides, something I know many of our students in the audience can no doubt corroborate, I'm gonna concentrate just on two things in the interest of time. As Andrew said, I only have 12 to 15 minutes here, so I'm gonna pick two things that I think are either less thought of or in some ways misinterpreted. The two things I'm gonna concentrate on are first, Thucydides' view of the importance of sea power and secondly, his views on why wars occur. Now, Thucydides' discussion of the role of sea power during the Peloponnesian War are well trod by both students of military history and students of strategy, so I'm not gonna walk that path again. Instead, I wanna focus more on Thucydides' discussion of sea power outside of a great power war. Simply put, Thucydides argued that sea power created the stability that in turn created the wealth and that these two ultimately together led to the prosperity of classical Greece. To paraphrase Thucydides, navies were the foundations and the maintainers of civilization in the classical period. In the opening sections of Book I of his Peloponnesian War, Thucydides recounts how in earliest times the Greeks were not tied to places, but rather were semi-nomadic and at the mercy of Maraudian groups who hoped to displace them from what good arable land there was. And there was also little, if any, trade. Those who lived by the sea were subjected to raids by predators who found piracy an easy way to make a living, even easier than displacing those who lived further inland. Nor was piracy considered dishonorable, but simply another way to make a living and indeed a certain amount of glory was heaped upon successful pirate leaders. Thucydides notes that at this early time, piracy was prestigious and it was nothing to be ashamed of. This age of predatory pirates suffered its first blow according to Thucydides when the famous Minos, the king of Crete, acquired a navy and began to clear out the sea-going raiders so that he could better collect revenues. Some have argued that the Minoans on Crete represent the world's first Thalusocracy. That is a state whose power rested entirely on control of the sea. While Thucydides is certainly drawing on the world of Greek mythology. Minos is the famous king who is tied to the Labyrinth and the Minotaur. There is archeological evidence that the Minoans who were a major sea power in their own time and had fleets that were strong enough to go and ply their trade across the Aegean Sea and they were so strong that they felt no need to wall their cities as later Greeks were want to do. Thucydides further tells us as piracy was suppressed, first by the Minoan Navy and then later by other states as well, that the stability this created encouraged more and more Greeks to move to the coast, which was becoming a more secure place to live because of the role of navies. Although many of the new settlements felt the need to build walls and that this was possible because travel between places by sea became easier so that those who lived on the coast were now able to pursue the acquisition of wealth and lived in greater security. Thucydides continues to discuss the history of the Greek, discuss Greek history and naval developments and this discussion reinforces the relationship of a couple of things. One is stability, wealth and the flourishing of civilization in the Aegean. But in the interest of time, I'm not gonna go through his later discussion. Instead, I just wanna say a few words of how why I think his thoughts on the importance of sea power, generating stability, generating wealth and therefore being a guardian of civilization have some resonance today. In a world where something like 90% of the world's population live on or near coastlines and where a huge percentage of the world's good moves by sea, the importance of maintaining stability on the maritime commons in order to generate wealth and hence allow for the flourishing of a global system is clear. And the role of a strong navy is as or even more important than it was when Thucydides was pondering the impact of sea power in his day. Next, I wanna turn to Thucydides and the question of why wars occur. One of the most famous passages in Thucydides is his assessment of why the Great Peloponnesian War began. And this occurs in book one, chapter 23, section six where he says, quote, I consider the truest cause, though the one least openly stated to be this, the Athenians were becoming powerful and inspired fear in the Spartans and so forced them into war. This idea of rise and fear recently inspired back in 2012 an article in the Financial Times by Harvard political scientist, Graham Allison. And here he laid out his concept of the Thucydides trap citing a version of the above quote and pointing out that there were two crucial variables that usually lead to war, rise and fear. While the Peloponnesian War was his model he was thinking of course of in more current terms of China and the United States today. Last year in an issue of the Atlantic he extended the idea of the Thucydides trap by looking at some 16 historical cases ranging from the early 16th century to the end of the 20th century. And he determined that 12 of those 16 cases ended in war where we have rise and fear coming together. This concept has received a lot of attention including a number of comments by China's president Xi Jinping. Now while the concept has gained a good deal of traction it does not however address something I think that's very important and Thucydides view of why wars begin and that is complexity. Thucydides seems to have intended that when it comes to the origins of wars that there is a great level of complexity. For example, as the translation I have given you above notes Thucydides says something very important namely that he does believe that fear and rise are the most important causes but they are not the only causes. He says this when he refers to it as the truest cause. But the ones that are most discussed are also important and thus fear and rise is not the only cause. The most discussed reason centers actually on something quite different. It is the complex struggle between Sparta's important ally Corinth and far off Coursera. What Thucydides is really getting at here is the distinction between underlying causes of war in this case rise and fear and proximate causes Coursera and Corinth. This becomes clear when after a decade of war a peace settlement, the peace of Nicheus proves to be not a stable piece as it doesn't address the underlying causes of the war but rather only the proximate ones and is really a little more than an armistice. But there is even more complexity at work. Later in book one chapter 76 section two Thucydides gives his trinity of the most important and most powerful motives for a state and they are honor, fear, and self-interest or perhaps even better gain. This is the order given that is given by Thucydides in the original Greek text although it is usually rendered based on the most commonly read translation the Strassler translation or the Strassler edition with the Crowley translation as fear, honor, and interest. Thucydides says that all three of these are the most powerful motives so he clearly implies that all need to be considered when looking at the causes or the potential causes of war. Moreover, if Thucydides' order has any meaning at all honor has pride a place in its trinity and a thorough reading of the text with this in mind seems to validate this as honor or an ancient Greek team is frequently mentioned in numerous contexts. So why does this matter today? While the concept of the Thucydides trap gives us a model that seems to fit Thucydides' assessment of the causes of the Peloponnesian War, it's not a very complete model. Today the world has a complex, then like today the world was complex and monocausal answers are generally insufficient to explain the complexity both of the Peloponnesian War and our world today. For example, one can see in a part of the world Thucydides' powerful motive of honor coming into play perhaps let's say the South China Sea. Should this occur, would the United States find itself coming to aid of a modern day Corinth to uphold its own honor by upholding its alliance requirements? So I'm gonna wrap up here in the interest of time and let me just say a few things. One, although written more than two millennia ago Thucydides was a keen observer of the role of human nature and of his own small but complex world. I've highlighted two examples that I hope may have the utility in our larger and more complex world today. Thank you. Thank you, Professor Pafkovec. So our second panelist this morning is Professor Tim Hoyt, who is also a professor in the Strategy and Policy Department. And he's picking up from this discussion on Thucydides and moving us forward to discuss Clowschwitz. Professor Hoyt is also the John Nicholas Brown counter-terrorism chair here at the Naval War College and we'll be discussing the range and the complexity of Clowschwitz's theory and how it applies to us in the 21st century. Thank you, Andrea. Carl von Clowschwitz's On War is one of the most quoted books in strategic studies. To those who take the time to study it, Clowschwitz can help officers and statesmen resolve the complicated problem of converting operational success and failure into victory and war. But to be sure, there are limits to On War. First, Clowschwitz was not a naval officer. Second, Clowschwitz states that his book is intended to focus on war proper and not the preparation for war. It's also a document written in and for a particular time and place and wars of a particular set of characteristics. The timeless elements of the book, however, emerge in its consideration of lasting elements of war and the human condition, politics, human passion, emotion, and the inherent unpredictability of organized violence. What then does On War offer us for dealing with the kinds of challenges laid out in the CNO's design and today's emerging security environment? Well, briefly, first, On War helps us to understand what war can achieve and the civil military responsibilities in planning and waging war. Some of the most famous phrases of On War concern the definition of war, the continuation of politics with the addition of other means, a clash between major interests resolved by bloodshed, an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will. Each of these ideas embraces a relationship between politics and war, where politics sets the objectives of the war and the military acts as an instrument to help states, regimes, and leaders achieve those ends. Politics therefore drives strategy and the primacy of politics and the political aim lies at the heart of determining the effective approach to war. Klausowitz notes that no one in his right mind should start a war without being clear about his objectives and how he intends to conduct military operations to achieve them. He then remarks that the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is the kinds of war on which they are embarking. This means the statesman must seek military advice on the best way to accomplish the political aim and military leadership must understand both the short and the long-term political objectives and any circumstances which enable or constrain the statesman. The political object, Klausowitz notes, will determine both the military objectives to be reached and the amount of effort that those require. Costs must be proportionate to the value of the objective sought and as a result, there will be many types of wars of differing levels of intensity. Sometimes military force is used to threaten, to coerce, or to punish and in those cases military operations may be very limited. We have found however, for instance in the drone strike campaign, that even limited military operations can have long-term political consequences that need to be balanced before operations commence. Finally, Klausowitz notes that war and reality has few easy solutions. The problem with war is that it is waged against an enemy that reacts, that has its own objectives, its own capabilities, its own motives. Therefore, war is not only about rational calculations of interests, costs, and consequences, but it's also about anticipating interaction and possible enemy response, trying to contain the costs of the war in both magnitude and duration. Now second, Enwar helps us to understand net assessment, the impact of war on the broader international community, and interaction with allies and coalitions. Klausowitz does give us insights about the international system, insights that are not generally recognized in a passage discussing war plans for a war with France. He notes that to assess the probable level of effort necessary to carry out a victorious war, we must understand our aim in the enemies, we must understand the strength and situation of the opposing state, the character and abilities of our government, people in military, and theirs, and finally, we must evaluate the political sympathies of other states and the effects that the war may have upon them. The response of the international system and of key states to military activities abroad can be incredibly important. Our air campaign in Kosovo led to an unexpected Russian intervention. Our drone campaign in Pakistan enraged parts of the Pakistani public and brought together a broader coalition of non-government organizations to oppose those efforts. Operation Iraqi Freedom raised concerns about the intentions of the United States in the war on terror, and enabled a sharp growth in relative Iranian power and influence in the region. Russia's intervention in Crimea alarmed its Western neighbors, and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine led to international sanctions and subsequent diplomatic isolation. Anticipating a number of 20th century international relations theorists, Klausavitz notes there is not a systematically regulated balance of power, but that relations between states tends to maintain the stability of the whole rather than to promote change. Aggressive powers that threaten the international order, therefore, invite balancing behavior, and we see this in the South China Sea and in Eastern Europe. Coalitions, therefore, are a powerful asset, often forming to balance regional or global aggression. They can, however, as Klausavitz says, be a weak point, as he notes in his discussion of centers of gravity, often the strongest power is less committed than others, and a sharp blow against that one state may dissolve the coalition. Third, Enmore helps us to understand the distinction between wars of different aims, their consequences, and their impact on the international balance of power and long-term prospects for peace. Klausavitz distinguishes between many types of wars, but the two most important are unlimited, in which the objective is the overthrow of the enemy and an imposed peace, and limited, in which the objective is more discreet and may involve negotiating with a regime which then remains in power. These types of wars require very different responses in the current international system, states which overthrow a regime have an obligation then to occupy and rebuild them, a complicated and often thankless task. Fighting limited wars and leaving objectionable regimes in power is politically difficult for the United States. Even when, as in the case of Saddam's Iraq or Libya's Qaddafi, those regimes play an important role in regional stability. Limited wars against regional powers therefore require a potentially protracted containment regime which will require naval enforcement. Unlimited wars against regional powers will require some form of occupation, not only because of international law and norms, but also because it is in the interest of the international community that a conquered state not then become a haven for terrorism. ISIL, unfortunately, is indicative of the potential in the event that occupation is not carried out. Thinking about the last step before taking the first is one of Klausowitz's most powerful and lasting recommendations. Wars against great powers are a much more complicated matter. The resurgence of Russia and the assertiveness of China raised the real possibility of armed conflict against a nuclear armed great power. Klausowitz warns us that the possibility of escalation is ever present because wars exhibit competing tendencies of primordial violence and hatred, chance, and unpredictability and rely on rationality to impose order on all. Even limited wars may escalate as passions inflame the public or leaders. The initial contact on the battlefield may spur the winning side to escalate its objectives because of success or prompt the losing side to choose to escalate both objectives and effort in an effort to retrieve a losing situation. Here Klausowitz anticipated maritime theorists in his discussion of centers of gravity. He observes the key centers of gravity include the enemy military, the capital city, coalitions and alliances, enemy leaders, and the people. Naval power is uniquely suited to attacking the lower elements of that list and applying indirect pressure to the enemy through blockade and trade denial, raids from the sea and threats to coalition partners, all issues that will be addressed in the next two presentations. Finally, the most important thing Klausowitz tells us about future wars is that the enemy has a vote and that in war the result is rarely ever final. War is rooted in political conflict and even the most elegant military victories may not ultimately resolve the basis for that conflict. The defeated state or its people may choose to simply wait until the situation is more promising and then revisit the issue. Great powers often revive to challenge again and pose unique challenges. Russia's A2AD zones in the Baltic and Black Seas are an example. Regional powers may remain an irritant like Saddam's Iraq or the Kim family in North Korea. Even defeated political movements may find sanctuary and continue to challenge new political regimes like the Taliban or the Bathist elements of ISIL. Combat operations may temporarily end actual fighting but a lasting peace will not be done without political compromise. The unique attributes of naval power with which Klausowitz was only mildly familiar may be critical in creating the incentives for an enforcement of a durable peace. Thank you. Thank you, Tim. So our next panelist is Professor Jim Holmes who is a former US Naval officer and also a professor in the Strategy and Policy Department. Those of you in the US Navy probably know Professor Holmes very well and I know that his thoughts and his various publications are very closely followed, particularly on maritime security. Thanks, Andrea. What do classic works of strategy have to teach us about America's strategic predicament in the world today? Well, classic works have a great deal to teach us about our predicament. They furnish the starting point for us to think through our predicament and they also help keep us grounded. Both of these functions are vital. Just ask Rudyard Kipling. In 1919, Kipling published a poem titled The Gods of the Copybook Headings. Copybook headings were proverbs or maxims that British school kids used to copy over and over to practice their penmanship. There was a heading at the top of each page and the students would copy it over and over again to fill that page. Therein lay wisdom. Kipling claims that common sense truisms like if you don't work, you die, outlast the false gods of the marketplace or the zeitgeist or the latest vision that grips a society or institution. If you lose touch with such permanent verities, he tells us then, as surely as water will wet us and as surely as fire will burn, the gods of the copybook headings will with fire and slaughter return. And indeed that is quite the image. The poem is Kipling's admonition to heed the wisdom of the ages. Using timeless precepts to organize our thinking. And it's his warning not to delude ourselves that we can repeal fixed and timeless facts of human existence. It constitutes his warnings against succumbing to fads. Now how does this fit with the topic of our panel this morning? Well, the classic works of strategy reveal how the gods of the strategic copybook headings work. Treatises on strategic theory are not algorithms or how-to manuals. You can't flip one over and run the checklist when some strategic problem confronts you. What they do do is help us think about our strategic predicament as well as the opportunities that beckon. They also anchor us in reality. Like Kipling's poem, the classics provide students of strategy with intellectual ballast. And they steady our temperament. Those steeped in the classics aren't too beguiled by the latest thingamajig to come out of some weapons laboratory or shipyard. Or by the latest big idea to come out of academia or the business world. By and large, these things are superficial and fleeting. They should not buffet us too much. Seldom of those steeped in the strategic canon gulled into thinking that newfangled technology, tactics, or organizational methods will let us escape permanent dynamics of human conflict. Still less did they yield to claims that history with a capital H has rendered basic facts about martial strife moot. Which brings me to sea power theory. In 1992, the American Sea Services published their first post-Cold War strategic directive entitled From the Sea. It's a remarkable document. You can read it in the Newport papers. In the preamble to that document, the Sea Service leadership declares rather starkly that America owns the sea. We had won big. The Soviet Navy had vanished from the high seas much as the Imperial Japanese Navy was strewn across the sea floor in 1945. With no one left to fight for command of the sea, we could afford to concentrate on projecting power ashore from that offshore safe haven. The leadership does send a strong bureaucratic signal. Battle is passe. History with a capital H has repealed the most basic fact about naval warfare, namely that you have to win maritime command if you hope to exercise command. It's no accident that many of the capabilities were now scrambling to recreate. Long-range anti-surface warfare, to name one, started to decay after 1992. Such atrophy was in keeping with the times and with official guidance. Kipling would shake his head at our presumption. As would Captain Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett, our two sages of sea power here at the college. These were men who looked to history to the age of wooden ships and iron men in search of permanent things. They sifted through the past for enduring lessons that could help a naval officialdom shape future naval strategy. Around here, as many of the students will know, we often ask students whether they are Mahanian or Corbettian, but that is a false choice. Mahan and Corbett agree on a lot. Together, in fact, they articulate a composite logic and grammar of maritime strategy that remains as compelling as it was when they wrote a century ago. Now, Klausavis teaches that international competition and war have a grammar all their own. The grammar of violent interaction between antagonists determined to get their way. But competition and war don't have their own logic. The logic comes from policy, from national purposes. So maritime endeavors are about purpose and power, policy and strategy. Mahan excels at explaining the purposes that drive nations to do business in great waters. While Corbett explains how to use sea power on the operational level to help fulfill national purposes. Mahanian logic, Corbettian grammar. You might almost call this a unified field theory of sea power. Look at purpose first. Mahan tells us that the purpose of sea power is to assure commercial, political and military access in that order of importance to vital theaters such as East Asia, South Asia, and Western Europe. To that end, maritime strategy is about amassing commerce. Fleets of merchantmen and warships and naval stations to support distant voyages. Commerce is king for Mahan. And in case some rival tries to bark, commercial, political, or military access, maritime strategy is about building a battle fleet capable of fighting with reasonable prospects of success against the strongest foe that it's likely to encounter in the waters where it matters most. When in command of the sea is the surest route to success in maritime strategy. Mahan is the theorist of the stronger navy. What about power? Corbett has little to say about the logic of sea power. His bosses, the likes of Queen Victoria and Admiral Jackie Fisher knew why Britain needed a navy. But he has a lot to say about the grammar of sea combat. Corbett says he agrees with Mahan that seeking a decisive fleet engagement soon after the outbreak of war is the right course to pursue 90% of the time. Nevertheless, he spends an inordinate amount of time delineating a strategy for that other 10% of the time when we are the weaker combatant and need time to build up strength to turn the tables on our opponent. This is what Corbett calls active defense or sometimes a fleet in being strategy. It's also eerily similar to Mao Zedong's concept of active defense which we will hear about in just a few minutes. Contrary to popular lore, a fleet in being is neither inert nor passive. Its commanders try to balk a stronger foe, frustrating his endeavors through offensive tactical blows while searching out ways to make themselves the stronger contestant at the decisive place and time. Flipping the naval balance could mean concentrating scattered fleet detachments. It could mean building additional ships. It could mean finding seagulling allies or breaking enemy alliances. Or it could mean knowing things that induce the enemy to do dumb or self-defeating things or both. So active defense is a restless, forward-leaning approach to naval warfare. Even as its practitioners remain prudent about the methods that they select to prosecute it. True defense is about offense for Corbett. It's about defeating the verdict of arms while positioning ourselves as the stronger antagonist. Rather than seek a decisive battle when the outcome is in doubt, Corbett counsels commanders to be patient, postponing a decision until the contest appears likely to go their way. He thus provides us a complete guide to sea combat, spanning both weaker and stronger combatants, where Mahan provides only a partial picture at the operational level. So there's a unified Mahanian-Corbettian copybook. Current or aspiring maritime power should harness diplomatic, economic, and military resources to open access to foreign theaters. They should build fleets of merchant men and warships to carry on and protect trade there. Should someone oppose U.S. commercial, political, or military access by force of arms, the Navy should seek a decisive battle when circumstances appear promising. If the U.S. Navy is the likely winner where it counts and when it counts, they should seek decisive battle early, as Mahan wants. If not, they should take the cue from Corbett, mounting an active defense until prospects for victory brighten. Either way, decisive battle is the eventual goal. Only then can we exploit command of the sea. That is the fallacy of from the sea. It assumed America could exploit the fruits of maritime command and would do so more or less forever and without fighting for it. It assumed history was on our side following the Soviet collapse and would remain on our side. That was a dangerous assumption and we are coping with its fallout to this day. No victory is permanent unless we make it so. Let us resolve never again to declare a holiday from maritime history, even if we win big in our next geopolitical competition as we did in the Cold War and World War II. Great sea powers don't get to take holidays, especially when maritime history is just beginning for ambitious, saltwater-minded rivals such as China. PLA Navy strategists read Mahan deeply and have premised their maritime strategy in part on his teachings, as they tell us. Mahan and Corbett helped China think about its strategic predicament just as they help us think about ours. To avert or manage challenges from the likes of China, let's constantly improve our ability to fight and win, even if the likelihood of combat appears remote. In so doing, we dishearten potential challengers while reassuring allies and friends. In short, let's heed the teachings of the masters of sea power. If we do, we will stay on the good side of the gods of the copybook headings, lest they return seeking their revenge. Thank you. Thank you, Jim. And then our final panelist this morning is Professor Toshiyo Shihara, who is the John A. Vampire and Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies here at the Naval War College, as well as being a professor in the Strategy and Policy Department. And he is taking on the challenge of Mao. Thank you, Andrea. This morning, I'd like to discuss Chinese views of military strategy through the lens of Mao Zedong, who was both a practitioner and a theorist. In particular, I'd like to address Mao's concept of active defense and how it applies to maritime Asia in the 21st century. We typically think of Mao as a theorist for a non-state actor seeking to win in a revolutionary war. But Mao's concepts, developed in the 1920s and 1930s, including active defense, have maintained their currency in a rising China today. Now, this is not just my interpretation of active defense. The term is common vocabulary in China's strategic community. It has appeared, for example, in every defense white paper, the most authoritative statement of China's defense policy. The language can be found in the most recent white paper in 2015. Active defense is basically the use of the offense to achieve strategically defensive goals, however defined by China. Now, the term has its roots in China's revolutionary war. Mao used the term as early as 1936, which makes it about 80 years old. Active defense as a military strategy was a mechanism to solve a dilemma for Mao. And that is, how do you defeat an enemy that is numerically, technologically, and materially superior to you? And active defense provided an answer. It served as an analytical framework by which Mao and his lieutenants would be able to achieve their prime directive, and that was the survival of the Chinese Communist Party. To do so, Mao understood that he would need to engage in physical fighting, in offensive operations and tactics to physically destroy parts of the enemy. One method was to lure an enemy unit deep inside Mao's territory so that it would be overextended, isolated, and at that particular place in time, numerically inferior. Mao would then mass and unleash his superior forces against that vulnerable unit in a decisive battle of annihilation. Mao reasoned that if you could do this over and over again in a protracted war, you could strategically tire the enemy, tip the balance of power in your favor, and then go on the counter offensive. The analogy that he used was the clever boxer. He wrote, we all know that when two boxers fight, the clever boxer usually gives a little ground at first, while the foolish one rushes in furiously and uses up all his resources at the very start, and in the end, he is often beaten by the man who has given ground. Of course, we have our own 20th century analog, Muhammad Ali's famous rope dope in his match against George Foreman in the 1974 rumble in the jungle. Now this concept of active defense was again applied during the Cold War, 20 years after the Chinese Communist Party seized power in China. At the height of the Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese anticipated a massive Soviet invasion of the Chinese heartland. The Chinese hoped to lure the Soviets in deep, swallow up superior Soviet forces deep inside China, and grind them down in a protracted people's war. As I noted, active defense remains alive and well today, but it has been adapted to 21st century circumstances. And what are those circumstances? Well, first of all, China's major economic and political centers are all located along its long coastline. China's disputed territorial claims from Taiwan to island disputes in the east and south China seas are located just offshore. China's economic interests, such as seaborn commerce, so essential to China's wellbeing, extend out from the coast to the global commons. And the potential strong enemy or powerful adversary, frequently code for the United States, possesses long range strike capabilities that can threaten Chinese interests at a distance. In particular, long range strike allows the United States to bypass fielded forces to directly attack strategic and political targets. More broadly, the nature of 21st century warfare as exemplified by US expeditionary operations since the first Gulf War, further compelled adaptation. The Chinese understand tactical strikes can now produce strategic and political effects. They recognize that high tech modern wars are intense, highly destructive, fast, exhaust enormous amounts of material involve massive exchanges of firepower and demand initiative. And thus, falling back and luring the enemy in deep onto Chinese territory are no longer feasible options. Too much is simply at stake on the Chinese homeland. As such, forward defenses to slow down, if not stop a superior adversary before damage can be done directly to China is now a strategic imperative. And so what would active defense look like today? Well, first of all, when would it be triggered? The Chinese insist that China will not be the first to act, but that it will certainly react if threatened. Yet Chinese writings also suggest that the enemy need not make the first military move to invoke active defense. The enemy could cross a political red line that strategically assaults China's interests to trigger a first military move. Second, where would active defense take place? The operations would take place as far from the Chinese homeland as possible. Recent doctrinal writings extend the operational areas to a broad arc that encompasses the Bay of Bengal, to the waters well beyond the first island chain, namely the archipelago that stretches from Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines. Third, how would active defense be executed? Military strikes would be launched from the mainland and the near seas, namely the Yellow and East and South China Seas, and would reach deep into the Western Pacific and the Northern Indian Ocean. The forces would include a large family of missiles from ashore at sea and from the air, delivered from fixed sites, trucks, ships, submarines, and aircraft. And actions could take place in the cyber, space, and the electromagnetic domains. The strikes would target enemy logistic systems, command and control, bases, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance systems, as well as other high value assets. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, what would be the intended strategic effects of active defense? Well, active defense would create an expansive keep-out zone that extends far from China shores. Opponents would have to fight their way through a gauntlet of Chinese defenders in the zone. Those seeking to get within striking range of China would meet stiffer and stiffer resistance as they got closer to Chinese shores. They would in essence, to use Mao's terms, be lured in deep, except they would be lured into China's defended zone that extends hundreds of miles in the oceanic direction. This is a form of trading space for time, a kind of Fabian strategy. It would put up as much resistance in space in order to buy time for China to resolve a dispute in its favor. From the opponent's perspective, it would need to spend time and resources to fight through that space. It's worth noting that this defended zone is not some sort of impermeable shield. Rather, it is designed to cushion the adversary's offensive blow, like the crumpled zone of a vehicle, or the reactive armor of a tank. Another metaphor is the concertino wire, or the spike strip, designed to slow down the opponent's forward momentum. Strategically, this zone raises perceptions of the risks and costs of operating along China's maritime and aerospace periphery. Ideally, the risks and costs might deter an outside power, like the United States, to act against China in the first place. To put it more concretely, China could beat up on a weaker power in Asia, say Taiwan, while keeping the United States at bay. Now, I'm speaking here of a high-end conventional conflict. Let me be crystal clear that I'm not assigning probabilities to such a conflict, which would surely be ugly. A conflict would also represent the failure of statesmanship of the highest order on both sides. But there is value in thinking about active defense, even if you don't think a war is very likely. That is because active defense provides the umbrella beneath which China can coerce its neighbors in peacetime. A strong military deterrent provides options in the ultimate backstop. If peacetime encounters escalate, China can always climb that ladder with greater confidence, particularly against weaker neighbors. It's worth mentioning one more observation. A defensive goal, as defined by China, is a relative concept. It is in the eyes of the beholder. Those on the receiving end of active defense might see things quite differently. Operationally, a series of offensive Chinese actions would take place. But even in terms of goals, China may seek to achieve positive war aims, such as resting some territory from its opponent. In conclusion, active defense remains a durable concept in China. It is premised on China's relative weakness, and it is historically rooted in China's own experiences. It has proved durable because it is an adaptable concept. The Chinese have modified it to account for growing Chinese interests, the expanding geographical scope of China's strategic imperatives, the changing nature and character of modern warfare and of the enemy, and China's increasingly capable military. It should be noted, however, that this is not a uniquely Chinese concept. Active defense is just another way of thinking about the offense, defense, balance, and any confrontation. There is an underlying universal logic to the concept. Klauswitz and Corbett have both engaged in this concept in their own ways about when and how to go on the offensive from the defensive. In our own history, the United States has found itself on the strategic defensive during the initial phases of the Pacific War. Figuring out when and how to go on the offensive is a universal problem, and Mao offers both theoretical and contemporary insights into this dilemma. Thank you. Thank you to all of our panelists. If you've seen the size of the books that they were working from, you understand that a 10-minute, 11-minute summary of the key points and their application to the 21st century is a Herculean task, and they all managed incredibly well. So I'm going to take us back to our very first point this morning where I said we are taking our inspiration from the chief of naval operations, Admiral Richardson's document, a design for maintaining maritime superiority. And you heard from our four panelists different aspects of the theoretical and then the practical challenges of that in the 21st century. From Professor Pafkowicz, you heard about the complexity, the complexity of the origins of war, the proximate causes and the underlying causes, and the importance of understanding not just fear and rise, but also of understanding honor and self-interests. From Professor Hoyt, you heard about Klaus Schwitz's ideas about net assessments and how he thinks about allies, the effect of conflict on alliances. And alliances in the 21st century surely are one of the topics that we have to pay the most attention to. Professor Holmes synthesized, and those of you who have been students here, I think you wish you heard that six months earlier, both Corbett and Mahan for you in 10 minutes or less, and looked at how the sea power classics shape our thinking, whilst keeping us on an even keel, intellectually and temperamentally, not following the fads, not following the bright and shiny objects, but understanding the enduring principles. And finally, Professor Yoshihara gave us an idea about how China may be thinking of using one of our theorists Mao and perhaps how we can think about some of these really challenging maritime concepts in the 21st century. And I'm gonna open it up to questions with a final comment to say, we've covered some of the challenges, some of the topics that are facing us in the 21st century. It might be worth considering how these frameworks apply to challenges with Russia, their adventures in the Baltic Sea, maritime adventures, but also on land in the Crimea, and also how these frameworks apply to challenges that come from irregular warfare, the terrorists, the insurgents, the militias and the pirates. So with that, I will open it up to questions and we'll open it up to our panelists to respond. Yes, please. Good morning, thank you. I look down at Carl Steve Kistner Army Reserve, fear, which I'm experiencing right now, especially since I've already turned in my Naval Warfare College weapons system, my iPad, I'm going from memory. Dr. Popkovich, you talked about fear, and I would say this last year, no tour words are spoken in FDR and it's inaugural dress. All we have to fear is fear itself. In the article you referenced, the Atlantic article as Professor Grayson or Adelson, I remember the Harvard guy. The 16 examples he used, the four examples that didn't fall into the trap, three were a part what the US was involved in, which gives me hope. Does the US look at things differently or do we have a way of not falling into the trap and what do we do to not fall into the trap with China? That's a very good question, you're right. I mean, America seems to figure into that model of being able to avoid the Thucydides trap. I'm not sure, I think I actually agree with President Xi who said there really is no Thucydides trap in the sense that it's not all about fear and rise. If you look at one of those cases again that you mentioned, I mean, one of them is Britain and the United States, let's say, in the 1920s and 30s. Certainly, Britain eyed America warily, but I think there are other factors that went into that other than the fear of America's rise. I mean, America had been a recent ally. There are so many other things about economic interest. Britain was economically tied to the United States. So I'm not so sure it's a uniquely American thing. I think it's more contextualized with some of those other Thucydides and elements of the Trinity. Hi, thank you, I have a question. I'd like to ask you about cyberspace, applying the lessons of history to cyber-cyber war. So cyberspace is characterized by its ubiquity, and boundedness, centralization, embeddedness, and complexity. So I'd like to ask each of you, and I include the moderator if she wishes as well, to choose one lesson from the master. One lesson that you'd like to impart when we try and think about averting cyber war. We're afraid now. Well, I'll start with one. Clows of its spends a certain amount of time early in on war talking about the concept of absolute war, and why there are inherent tendencies as political bodies go to war, as societies go to war, that would lead them towards the ultimate escalation. It seems to me that a fundamental problem with cyber war about which a great deal has been written and continues to shift and change with each new iteration, seems to me a fundamental problem with it is this concept of how does one limit escalation? If it is formless in space and time, it allows one to, at least in theory, open a conflict with an overwhelming strike, which might appear very promising initially. On the other hand, it would almost certainly lead the recipient of that strike to take the conflict much more seriously and to view it perhaps as much more existential because it could threaten economic productivity in the country, it could shut down a whole variety of infrastructure needs. So I would argue that Clows of its actually gives us a great deal to think about. Clows of its has been usefully applied to the problems of nuclear war, where escalation is a major issue. And in cyber, where some attempt to argue that the outcome of cyber conflict is relatively painless because, in theory, no one dies, the temptation for escalation, it would seem to me, is actually quite high and needs to be studied much, much more carefully. I'll give you two responses for the price of one, so it's worth what you paid for it. I guess the first one I would go back to my playbook and look at Mahan. We often ask our students here, is cyber warfare, is this a common in the sense that Mahan talked about a common, a place that belongs to all societies and to no society, much like Boston coming up and Boston back in the day. And I think my off-hand response is usually that it's similar and different. It's similar in that it belongs to everybody and nobody, but it's very different in a geographical sense because if we were to take the Mahan's idea of a commons very seriously, that would mean that the cyberspace reaches within state boundaries and that obviously has direct impacts on sovereignty and other things that nations hold dear. So in that sense, I think the comparison is actually more important or it's actually very useful for its differences, but not so much for its similarities. But that's a debate we have every year with our students. And the second one would just be to go back and because cyber is such a technical realm, it is it's really easy to try to do what Klausowitz warns against and try to reduce this theater of conflict to rules and formulas and widgets. I was whenever we think about cyber warfare, we should not rule out the human factor. And remember that this is an arena for human struggle just as any other has the era of maritime and land domains are. So be very careful about trying to reduce it to wiring diagrams and so forth. Yeah, if you think about it in terms of Mao's act of defense, Mao's notion of act of defense often emphasizes operational initiative, making the first move, perhaps even preemption. And that's consistent with Chinese doctrinal writing. So what I worry about of course in the cyber domain is whether that might tempt Chinese planners to think about pulling the trigger first. And so there are clearly escalatory dangers in superimposing the concept of Mao's act of defense on cyber warfare, but it's not just cyber warfare. It's all kinds of kinetic forces that the Chinese could potentially use that could lead us into an escalatory cycle. And thank you for giving me the opportunity to fumble my way through this one too. So Sun Tzu has not made his appearance in our list of theorists this morning. He was in the design document and I thought that perhaps since he is sneaky, you probably find his way into things, but not in a direct way. So I'm gonna sneak him into this one. I think perhaps my comments play off both Jim and Tim's comments to some extent. I think if you take Sun Tzu's approach to things, the idea of go where you're least expected. Go where your adversary is weak. Do not confront them directly. Don't go where they're strong. I think that the cyber realm is one that is immensely attractive and appealing to what we would think of as either irregular adversaries or asymmetric adversaries. We often think of those as states in the work that I do, I look at armed groups, the insurgents, the terrorist militias. They're inherently weaker than the people that they're challenging and cyber, I think provides them around perhaps a way to level that playing field, but also some opportunities. But then I would caveat that because it looks so tempting with some of the things that Tim is talking about. If you're a state, and I think you approach cyber warfare, shall we say indiscriminately or irresponsibly, you may get yourself into something that is much, much, much more serious than you thought it was going to be to begin with. My question then becomes if you're an armed group, to what extent can you deter them or punish them or bring some sort of wrath upon them for using the cyber realm? And I think that is immensely challenging. And I think if they had a patron saint, it would be Sun Tzu. I wanna pick up on the idea of commons and then going back to Thucydides and establishing control of the commons to create stability, wealth, and then ultimately civilization, if you will. I think one of the things that you have to do or we have to think about is, can cyberspace as a commons ever be controlled in the way the sea can be controlled? And if not, what's the strategic implications of that? In other words, Thucydides would argue navies are critical to the creation of stability and therefore a generation of wealth. And certainly the cyberspace creates wealth and only needs to look at Google. But I don't know who polices it, who patrols it. So I have no answer, but just another thought about this is maybe more problematic than someone like Thucydides who didn't have to deal with something like this would have had to work through. But I think the idea of who polices this is everyone, as Jim said, has to do with sovereignty. I think that again adds, Thucydides would be comfortable with it in the sense that there's complexity, he would say. This is just another thing we have to work through. Other questions? We've stunned you into submission. Yes, please. In Rick Wilson, I'm with the foundation, Jesse Okahara, you mentioned active defense. Right now we see Russia and the Baltic and also North Black Sea and China and the South Sea having provocative kind of little incidents. What are the chances you think of them having really resulting in something occurring that could result in a loss of life because we've had several calls calls. And where would that put us? As had been mentioned already by the previous speakers in the morning, Secretary Davidson, as well as Dr. Krepenevich, is that I think many of the opponents or the potential adversaries that we're facing are engaging in salami slicing tactics, which is to engage in moves that fall well below the threshold of major escalation. So the question is, to what extent can those two powers walk up to the line without triggering an overreaction not only on the part of the United States, but we also have to remember some of our allies and partners in the region as well. So let me take a quick look at the China-Japan relationship. I think that's one of the areas where we need to pay attention to. Thus far, Japan, for example, has demonstrated great restraint both at the operational and strategic levels. That's because they have the capacity to essentially hold the line when it comes to China's maneuvers around the Senkakus, what the Chinese call the Diyutai. So as long as Japan has the will and the capacity to hold the line, in addition to U.S. security assurances to Japan, then we can say that you can essentially kind of maintain a stalemate over there. My main fear, of course, is a gradual shift in the balance of power that Dr. Kapenevich mentioned earlier this morning that will give China more material mass and muscle that could potentially give China the capacity, for example, to demonstrate virtually permanent administrative control of the waters and the airspace around the Senkakus. The question is what next? That leads us, I think, into a potential tit for tat action. That could, in fact, spiral into either an accident or miscalculation. So that is something that we definitely should keep an eye out for. But again, I think it's premised on having credible deterrent power so that Japan doesn't feel like it loses that confidence that it can hold the line in that part of the world. And I would say the same principle probably applies in the South China Sea as well. Thank you. Just a brief comment. In 2014, I attended several conferences in Europe talking about security issues and the main concern was ISIL and the flow of European citizens to go and fight in Syria. In 2015, I went to several conferences in Europe and the main concern was Russia. And in fact, as Klausowitz would predict, aggression in an area creates a sort of a natural balancing mechanism. And our NATO allies were much more worried about what we were going to do to help them. And also, to a certain extent, what could they do to begin to help themselves and re-enter the security environment more vigorously? Unfortunately, I've been to several conferences in 2016 in Europe and all of the questions are about Donald Trump, so I don't know what that means. Thank you. Do we have other questions? Yes, please. Hi, I've got a question for Professor Drew. And you can allocate it if you'd like. The topic is deterrence. And I think one could make an argument that deterrence is geared toward the preservation of some form of the status quo. And I think one could also make the counter-argument that deterrence is part of a proactive action. And I'd be curious to know where on the spectrum of those two points you and the team feel that deterrence sits. Sure, I get volunteered for everything. Well, one area that Klausowitz actually spends a fair amount of time talking about is the power of the defense and waging war for a negative aim, where the objective is simply to prevent your adversary from doing something. Waging war with a positive aim is where you are trying to accomplish something else, something specific. Much of deterrence, I think, is about that negative aim and we see that associated with status quo powers in the international system across history to a certain extent. However, we also know that to assure deterrence, sometimes one has to be more operationally positive, one has to take risks, one has to act in order to preserve the peace. I think Klausowitz, because he's mostly writing about on-war, looks at the transition from the defense, the negative aim, to the offense as fundamental ending the conflict. In terms of long-term peace time competitions, I think status quo powers have to be careful about when and where they choose to exercise operations for a more positive aim in order to assure a long-term peace. So I think to deter, you have to remain active. In this case, I would refer to Jim's sort of fleet and being idea that even if a fleet is on the defensive, it has to remain active, it has to remain forward postured, it has to do things. I think that's true in grand strategy as well as it is in strategy. And the art is in choosing when and where you have to intervene in order to get the most results for the least risk. Thanks for the question. One of my favorites, in fact, my favorite definition of deterrence comes from Henry Kissinger, who back in 1962 published a book about nuclear deterrence which he defined deterrence as a product of three factors. The first of all would be our capability, our physical capability to do things that the enemy would find acceptable. The second would be our resolve, our determination to actually use those capabilities to do things in well-defined situations vis-a-vis an opponent who defied our will. And to me, the most interesting variable is the one I think you're getting at it, which he says it's all about the enemy's belief in our capabilities and our resolve. If I can make the enemy, the person I'm trying to deter, the country I'm trying to deter, into a believer in my capability and resolve, then I have a pretty good chance of deterring him. So that's actually, and I think I would go, certainly align myself with what Tim said about having to involve a mix of offensive and defensive type measures. And this is consistent, I think, with what Klausowitz says. He describes deterrence and coerce and, in effect, his head games that we play with our opponents. He goes into a discussion in which he talks about winning without fighting. We think about Sunzeh as being the theorist of winning without fighting, but if you look at Klausowitz closely enough, he actually contemplates it as well. He quite clearly says that fighting is only a subset of combat, implying that there's something out there that would let us influence perceptions in our favor even in peacetime, and thus let us play these sort of head games, coercing opponents, deterring opponents, and reassuring friends and allies. So that's, I think that gives us a theoretical basis to think about that. Just to close out the response, I'll go to one more theorist that we haven't talked about, someone who's living today, Edward Lutwack, who's a, they call him Matt, Eddie Lutwack. He's an analyst down at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. In the late Cold War, he wrote a small book called Political Uses of Sea Power, in which he makes a lot of common sense points that relate to your question. One of which is, he basically points out that in a peacetime showdown, during peacetime strategic competition, whoever wins in that particular showdown is who people think would have won in wartime. It's all about shaping perceptions. It's all about making believers in our capabilities in our resolve, by flourishing impressive capabilities, by having our political leaders and our senior strategic leaders declare our intentions, and by basically conveying that we will follow through on our threats, which is basically what deterrence is, in that way that, in that way you can hope to deter. It's kind of like, and Toshi used one boxing analogy, and I would refer to another one, if you want to go back to the 1920s to Jack Dempsey, the great boxing champion. If you riff on him, I think the best strategic defense, the best deterrent is a good tactical offense at times, to shape those perceptions. My adult supervision. If I may, I would also like to bring Sun Tzu back into that conversation again. If you're talking about deterring states, if you're talking about deterring near peer rivals competition, I think there's a very rich literature and discussion on deterrence. The challenge comes, how do you deter the non-state actors, the insurgents, the terrorists, the militias? Part of what Jim was talking about is perceptions and head games, and the ability to get inside the thinking, the psychology of your adversary. And I think to some extent, you have to have an adversary that is willing to be deterred. And I think one of the challenges is, what do you do with people like Isis, who look at this and say, I'm not willing to be deterred because there's nothing you can do to me that I'm not already willing to sacrifice by myself. So I look at that and say, this is where we are in the 21st century. There's a huge challenge coming our way to think through how you deal with armed groups that are not simply in the cloud as ideas, but take geography, take territory, and are unwilling to be deterred on the other side of that. So I'll open this up to other questions, thoughts. Yes, please. Hello, I'm John Hanley, and I have a question for Dr. Yusha Hara, and others are welcome to follow up. But Andy Krepenevich, sorry, Dr. Krepenevich said that the two things in good strategy we should look for are one, enduring advantages, and secondly, attacking the adversaries strategy. So specifically with respect to China, what aspects of Chinese active defense and other aspects of their strategy would you suggest we should focus on? What do you think are enduring advantages that we should really rely on? Thank you for that question. I've done a little work on competitive strategies framework and thinking about how we can engage in a long-term competition with China, and that requires us to think about our comparative strengths compared to China's comparative weaknesses. And I'm here gonna focus mostly in the maritime domain. For the time being, at least, we have a pretty good sense that China is, for example, structurally weak in anti-submarine warfare. That would certainly be a domain in which the United States and its allies should maintain its lead, if not increase the lead in that particular domain. And again, that asymmetry fits into the competitive strategies framework because Chinese resource investments in filling that gap means that it will create a diversionary effect. So every UN that Chinese spend on anti-submarine warfare is a UN that they can't spend on something else more offensively oriented. And the fact of the matter is because they've been structurally weak in that particular area, it also means that they have to spend a disproportionate amount of their intellectual and material resources to close that gap. So that would be an example of how we can exploit our comparative strengths and exploit their comparative weaknesses. Another thing about competitive strategies, I think, is psychological, that there's a psychological component where the other side has already convinced itself that it suffers from these weaknesses or it suffers from those vulnerabilities. So in some ways, we need to think about what are China's biggest nightmares? What are things that gets President Xi Jinping waking up in a cold sweat in the middle of the night? That's competitive strategies. I think one of it is China's sense of its claustrophobic geostrategic environment. So I mentioned very briefly the first island chain that runs from Japan down to the Philippines. That first island chain forms a series of choke points and narrow seas through which Chinese mariners, whether they're commercial or military in nature, must pass through. That's deeply embedded in the Chinese strategic psychology about their maritime environment. So if there's anything that we can do in conjunction with our allies to potentially threaten China's access to the high seas were chips ever to fall, then that would add to our strategic psychological advantage. So whatever we can do, and that includes, again, our undersea superiority that would enable us to potentially deny China's access to the open water. So it's not just a material competition, but it's very much trying to get into the minds of the Chinese. What are the things that make the Chinese most fearful? And then we need to kind of focus on that and try to exploit those psychological fears to our advantage. Oh, thanks. That is a wonderful question. I can't differ with anything that Tushy said. Just to amplify on a couple of things that he hinted at, when you talk about having fun with nightmares, which sounds kind of like a weird thing, but if you're thinking about giving your opponent a nightmare, certainly from a geographic standpoint, that's a key advantage for the United States and its allies. One way to look at the first island chain would be a potential wall. I mean, think about China and the Great Wall. It's one of those enduring metaphors in their minds. If the United States, if Japan, if it's other friends and allies in the region could convert that island chain into something that would block East-West movement for the PLA Navy from the China seas into the Western Pacific, that starts to bring about one of those nightmare scenarios. The idea of a wall actually gives us also some way to think about how we might do that. It's, I think when we study walls in history, we tend to think that these are impermeable barriers. Hadrian's wall, the Great Wall, what if the security fence that Donald Trump wants to build along the Mexican, whatever the case may be. But in fact, walls are not meant to be impermeable shields. What they basically were, if you look at Hadrian's wall, these are fortifications that are supposed to channel enemy incursions, a breakthrough can happen at one place, but you slow it down and you channel it to some predictable place, and thus you have mobile forces operating in the rear. If you take that logic and apply to the first island chain, we can start asking ourselves exactly what that kind of barrier would look like. Do we operate forward in the China seas with submarines? Do we mine? Do we do all? So there's a lot of grist from history that you can put to work there. And Toshi was talking about enduring perhaps psychological disadvantages for China. And I think the way he put the question about submarine warfare, it fits into that. There seems to be a deeply tactically offensive mindset, but they're having a hard time getting their minds around anti-submarine warfare, around counter-mine warfare, all of these kind of things. I think that's something that the United States and the Allies can play on. Given our advances in areas like what we're calling subulites, a combination of passive sonar nodes on the sea floor augmented by UUVs, unmanned underwater vehicles that will essentially follow submarines around once they clap or once they get a track on them. I think these are things that we're pursuing under the guise of the third offset strategy, which to me is not really a strategy at all, but it is a search for a competitive advantage in this realm for this long-term of strategic competition. I'm a simple man. And so I tend to look for bigger answers sometimes. One thing that we found in the study of war is that in great power wars, coalitions matter a great deal. And both of my colleagues have alluded to alliances. I would look at that as the first enormous enduring strength of the United States versus China. The Chinese will cheerfully admit that they only have two allies. One is Pakistan and the other is North Korea. And they recognize that that's an enormous limitation. What we have found in studying great power wars is that coalitions add enormous strength. They are complex, they are difficult to manage, but the United States starts in a long-term competition with China with an enormous advantage in terms of having reliable partners. And in fact, our partners have gotten much more engaged in this process in the last 10 years because China has become increasingly aggressive. I think that that is an advantage that we may not pay quite enough attention to because we're used to having lots of friends in the international sphere. I think the Chinese pay enormous attention to it, particularly because some of our growing friendships are in powerful neighbors like India and Vietnam. And our relationship with Japan is incredibly important because Japan remains one of the three or four wealthiest countries in the world. That's a really good starting place and it does put enormous pressure on China. So with that note, Captain Mike Sherlock is giving me the hook at the front here. And so when Captain Sherlock gives you the hook, that means you're done. So I'd like to thank all of our panelists for the time and effort they put into preparing today and thank you for all of your questions.