 Good morning, and welcome to Vermont House Judiciary Committee. It is Friday, March 12th, day of crossover. So we're doing a number of different things this morning, this afternoon. We are going to be turning to H145 in a second. Before we do that, I want to just let committee members know that Walter White was listening to our meeting this morning, and so she is aware that we will be considering her concerns next week, and was very appreciative of that and does understand the process and why we need to vote today. But we'll consider it. And I have sent her concerns to Rory, and we'll also send them to Representative Ann Donahue when I have a chance. So hopefully we can further understand all those concerns and come to some conclusion on that. But we will be taking testimony on Tuesday. OK, so now I would like to turn to H145 regarding use of force by law enforcement. And there is, I think, yeah, Martin has sent you all a proposal from a DPS where she wants, where they're suggesting to combine the two sections. So, Bryn, I think I'll turn to you first to help us explain what she's proposing. And then if you do have any thoughts in terms of case law statutory construction or otherwise. Thank you. So good morning, committee. For the record, Bryn here from Legislative Council. So my understanding of the request from DPS is to combine two sections, two subsections of the standards. And does everybody have, does everyone have the latest draft in front of them? The draft is 3.1. The last version you looked at was 2.1. There is an additional section in this bill that's in this draft. That's the only change between this draft and the previous version you looked at. And that additional section is the justifiable homicide statute. So I'm not sure we need to start with that. We can jump right into the request from DPS. But I just want to make sure everyone has the bill in front of them so they can see what I'm going to talk about here. Otherwise, I can share my screen. How about, let's see, why don't you just give us a minute to get it? Thank you. So it's good to go. OK. So if you're looking at draft 3.1, scroll down to page 2. And you'll see about halfway down the page says subsection B, the use of force provisions. And then you scroll down a little further and you look at subdivisions 4 and 5. So as a reminder to the committee, these subdivisions, subdivision 4 is that articulation of the standard by which a finder of fact should judge an officer's use of force and whether or not it was reasonable. So this provides that use of force is objectively reasonable. And an analysis of that reasonableness has to be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable officer in the same situation based on the totality of the circumstances. And the law enforcement officer's failure to use feasible and reasonable alternatives to force are a part of the consideration for whether or not the use of force was objectively reasonable. And the following subdivision 5 is that specific directive to law enforcement that provides that if a law enforcement officer knows that a subject's conduct is the result of some type of impairment or condition or language barrier or another factor that's outside of the subject's control, law enforcement has to take that information into account in determining whether or not the use of force is appropriate and what level of force is appropriate. So the suggestion from DPS was to kind of merge these two sections. So to essentially just take out that number 5 and have the two sections be one subdivision. So and I don't know if you would you like to discuss that? Would you like me to just go right ahead and talk about my perspective on that? So I want to just make sure everybody sees where we are and understands what's being proposed. Folks good? Okay, sure. Okay, go ahead, Bryn, thank you. Okay, so what I have discussed with some members of the committee about my perspective about this proposal is that subdivision 4 and subdivision 5 are two pretty different directives. Subdivision 4 sort of is the clear articulation of what is the reasonable use of force and what a finder of facts should look at in determining whether the use of force was reasonable. So it really is the directives to, when I say the finder of fact, I mean it's kind of the analysis that's taken after the fact. So after the use of force has already taken place, a determination of whether or not that use of force was reasonable will look directly to subdivision B4 for guidance on whether or not that use of force was reasonable. And then subdivision B5 is pretty straightforward. It's a pretty straightforward directive to law enforcement. If law enforcement knows that a subject's conduct is the result of one of these different factors, then they have to use that information in determining whether or not to use force and in determining how much force is appropriate to use, if any. So because those two subdivisions are pretty separate directives, one is directly to law enforcement in making their determination. And the other is a directive to the finder of fact about whether or not the law enforcement's use of force was reasonable at all. I see combining them may create some confusion. It would create kind of a hybrid directive that would apply in two pretty different situations. So that's my perspective on combining those two subdivisions. That's it. Thank you. Questions or comments? Discussion, just committee members. Bob. I gotta unmute and do everything else here. So in the last section, we're in thank you for explanation here. So being reasonable and objective doesn't apply in that section of what you're saying. If the officer, after evaluating someone with a condition, aren't those two, they still don't come into play with whether or not they have to use force if at all? Yes, and I'm sorry if I didn't make that clear. This is kind of what, as you've been talking about these two sections, I think I testified earlier that subdivision before that reasonableness and analysis applies. It certainly applies to an officer's decision about whether or not to use force and it applies under those circumstances that are articulated in B5. So what I think my testimony now is that the two sections just offer a separate directive. B5 is a directive directly to law enforcement and B4 is how the analysis is conducted with respect to whether or not an officer's use of force is reasonable. However, that provision in B4 that says officers, whether or not there was a feasible alternative is a part of the analysis to whether or not their use of force was reasonable. That certainly applies to a situation that may arise under B5, which is an officer has to use information that they have in determining whether or not to use force. So then B5 is not a directive to the finder of fact then? So I think a finder of fact is going to look at all of these standards. The standards will be viewed as a whole by any finder of fact who's determining whether use of force is reasonable. But my testimony is really that the way that it's drafted, the way that B5 is drafted is a directive to law enforcement. So a finder of fact will use all of these standards and determining whether or not conduct is reasonable. But it's just a different, because it's directed directly to law enforcement, I just think it's a little bit different than the standard that's set out in B4, which is after the fact analysis. So one final question then. So are you saying in your opinion out that the merger of those two will not work? No, I don't, I'm not saying that it won't work. I think that it's my opinion that because they're two separate directives, because of the B4 really talks about the analysis that's done after the use of force takes place. And B5 is intended to direct law enforcement's decision during the interaction with the person. I think that it just makes it a little bit less clear. If those two directives are merged into one, it makes it a little bit less clear. I'm not, it's up to the, obviously it's a policy choice to whether or not you want to merge them into one. But it's my opinion that it won't be quite as clear because you're gonna have a hybrid directive, one to the finder of fact and one to law enforcement. One that's directing the analysis that takes place after the use of force and one that is a directive to law enforcement in making their decision during the interaction. Thank you. Martin. Yeah, so I mean, I'd be open to such a change if I saw that there was some benefit to it, but it seems rather than helping it potentially muddies the water a little bit. So I'm just trying to understand where the benefit is and I don't know if you have any suggestion on that Bryn or not or if that's just a rhetorical question of why we would want to put those two together when they're separate directives and when a court evaluates the directive in B5, they necessarily have to look at it through the lens that we've established in B4. I'm just not understanding the benefit of doing that. I don't know if that's really a question for you on that Bryn is just a statement. Unless you can tell us what the benefit is. Well, I don't wanna speak for DPS. I don't think that's my place to speak for them, but my understanding was that removing that barrier of the subdivision five and compressing them into one would make it clearer that reasonable alternatives being available applies also to B5. But as I've testified before, the analysis that's done after the fact has that feasible language in it, what alternatives were feasible. So any analysis of an officer's use of force is going to take that into account. Were there any feasible alternatives to the use of force? So if there weren't, then it's likely that that use of force is going to be judged to be reasonable. So it's my understanding that that's why DPS wants that change but it's been my testimony throughout that that analysis will apply even in situations that arise under B5. Right, and this was an alternative to ideally, first choice I think was to add to the extent feasible. And so this is another approach. Tom, I just have a follow-up real quick to what Bryn said, just to complete my thought on that, is that again, if there was a benefit to doing this, I wouldn't see a problem, but what I'm instead hearing is that it muddies things. It doesn't clarify things. It makes it a little bit less clear. Any event, I'm done. Okay, Ken and then Tom. I'm fair, and I stopped was before me. Okay, sorry, my mistake. Thank you, Tom. Thank you. So it just goes through my mind since Bryn brought up DPS and instead of, and maybe we can get it straight from them what their ideas is. That's the main thing I had to say, but it almost seems like sometime earlier in our testimony, and I don't remember how long ago, certainly not today, but that there was a suggestion that B4 and B5 hang together back then. And I guess I would, I guess as new light come to, as far as keeping them separate now as new light come forward. Something that wasn't understood back then, but it is now. But my main thing is I guess I would like to see somebody from DPS come in and explain their reasoning and maybe we can hear something that'll be that benefit that Martin is talking about. Yeah, thank you. I just reached out to the commissioner. It's Friday, so he may have to, I know there's a press conference coming up, but I asked if he or Jennifer Varsinger are watching right now. Ken. Tom just asked that where is DPS on this one, where we're dealing with such a, with this bill. And the other thing is in how I look at this, in how I look at this, if nothing else, all you're doing is combining four and five together with one word, which is further. So, I mean, from what I understand with this right now, if that's all that, if that's all that DPS is looking for, which I'm shocked, I'm interested in being, I'm changing my mind in support of this bill, if that's, if it's a simple change. If it's a simple change like that, I'm a lot more workable in doing something, but I'd really like to hear from DPS. Right, okay, so. Thank you. Yeah, thank you. So I've just asked Evan to please send a Zoom link to both the commissioner and to Jen Morrison. And I've just heard back from the commissioner and one of them will hop on. This is their proposal, you know, this email is their proposal. And as we have heard in testimony, they do support the bill even without this proposal, they do support the bill certainly feel like this bill is better than the no bill. So, coach, I thought I'd seen Martin's hand, but I don't, so coach, and then Martin, if you have something else, let's go to coach. I agree that it's always best to hear, you know, from the source for clarity's sake. That being said, part of the reason that this occurred was when we did get this position when Major Jonas presented the agency's position. And so getting more clarity, you know, from Jen, you know, like, makes sense. But in addition to that, the attorney Pepper and attorney Shear both made a statement around the judicial procedures and the judicial procedures and how certain languages interpreted within the statute. So, you know, before we, let's say, after we hear that, we might need to hear back from them as far as clarity around that again, if this has an effect on it, because the instructions that are given, you know, during the actual trials, if it gets to that point, do refer back to the language of the law. So that was something that I heard in testimony from the two of them. So that would be the only thing that I would need a little more back up from them as well. Great. Thank you. Well, Jen Morrison is here. Thank you so much for jumping on a short notice. We are looking at your email that some of us received on March 8th. And then I think others might have received it last night and where you proposed to merge four and five. And it would be helpful just to hear your thinking. Yeah, thank you so much. I think what Coach Christie just said really gets to the heart of it, which is the way it's written as Ledge Council Hair demonstrated, there's instructions in B4 to the trier fact. And I've heard her and Representative Lalonde offer testimony that B4 and B5 would have to be considered together. But what they're not, it would appear that they're trying to create a new never before had standard that is a standalone for judging the appropriateness of a police response to a person with a perceived or known impairment. And it is unclear that a trier of fact would rely only on B4 and not have a separate and distinct standard. So the officer may have been deemed to have responded in an objectively reasonable manner under the guidelines in B4, but now I'm examining it from B5. It would appear to be setting a second level of standard or hurdle, so to speak, that must be cleared. And that is in fact, not what we would support. So if all of the previous conversations that we have had with the author of S119 and the subsequent iterations, if everything we've heard is true, which is that B4 and B5 are meant to hang together and be considered together, then let's put them together so that it's unequivocal to a judge or anyone else interpreting this down the road that they are not two separate and distinct standards. So that's why we make this request. Thank you. Thank you. Questions? Martin. So, I mean, I guess again, this kind of leaves us in the situation where if we move this language from B5, which it is intended to create a statutory duty, it's a little bit different. I mean, it's definitely directing, it's directive towards law enforcement. I mean, certainly B4 is as well, but B4 is really looking after the fact and trying to analyze what has happened with any use of force. And I just continue to think that that's pretty clear. But I guess I'd also just, I would just comment that what is set forth in B5 is not a new standard. I mean, this is something that comes from case law, particularly the Chamberlain versus City of White Plains case, which I've talked about in the past out of the Second Circuit, which they adopted a rule that the use of force against an individual whom an officer knows or reasonably should know, and that even has the reasonably should know standard, which we've not put in here, is suffering from a mental illness should not be evaluated in the same way as use of force to apprehend a person suspected of a serious criminal wrongdoing. There are other cases that also talk about that the level of force that is constitutionally permissible in dealing with a mentally ill person difference both in degree and in kind from the use of force that would be justified against a person who has committed a crime or who poses a threat to the community. That's just, and there's a number of cases that first circuit, ninth circuit, sixth circuit you look at those particular, that particular situation. So in those cases, those courts still also apply the reason objective reasonableness standard as well. So I mean, they do have the objective, the standards that we have in before applying to situations that are similar to what we have set forth in B five. So I really, I'm trying to measure the dangers, and on the one hand, I don't want B five to be analyzed without the prism or the lens of the B four and the objective reasonableness, the feasibility, et cetera. On the other hand, I don't want to somehow water down what we're trying to do in B five by putting it in B four. That's kind of the balance I'm trying to figure out here. So that's all. Yeah, I saw, I didn't see it. I saw you said something. Jen, do you? Yes. I'll let you, yeah. You know, I want to, I want to point out, this is probably not the place, Madam Chair, to go into a deep analysis of the court cases that Representative Lalonde is presenting, but both of the cases he presents are about apprehension of a person who is mentally ill, not apprehension of a person who's committed a criminal act and may also be criminally ill. These are like taking a person into custody for their own welfare cases, which I would argue we've been operating at a higher standard than even what he articulated in Vermont, but we understand what the intent of B five is and we are not bucking the intent of B five. We are trying to not create a liability pitfall that you say you do not want to create, but we are not confident that somebody reading this three years down the road, five years down the road is not going to say there are two standards now. It's the totality of the circumstance, the objectively reasonableness of the totality of the circumstance, but there's also a second standard that we have to judge it against. So while I think we're actually all on the same page and Representative Lalonde and I have had many conversations, I think we're actually all on the same page. And if you carefully read the draft, the first draft that we have submitted, which will be much improved upon in the second draft, you'll see that we are following where you're laying down the breadcrumbs. We're going there, but please do not create a liability loophole that you don't intend. And that's what we see the separation of B four and B five as creating. Thank you. Can I just have a follow-up just real quick on that? And Madam Chair. Sure. I know that Ken and Kate, but just a follow-up. So, and maybe this is as much for Bryn just from what Jen Morrison just said. If there's any other kind of language that makes clear that we don't lose what's in B four. I mean, even if we take what is proposed and we merge B five with B four, I don't want to lose the fact that we really are, making clear on B five, that yeah, it is, it's slightly different standard, but it is looked at through the lens of B four. If you could ponder whether there's some way to thread that needle, because I agree with Jen Morrison that we're trying to get to the same place, but just disagreeing perhaps as far as how we get there. If you could ponder that, maybe you don't have something right off the top of your head, but all right, thank you. Is that for me? Yeah, yeah, yes. So, I guess one thing that makes sense for me to point out right now is that there are other directives in the standards. I feel like, because we've got such a narrow focus right now on B four and B five, you really have to read all the standards together for the whole thing to make sense. So there are other directives within the standards that are direct directives to law enforcement. So for example, C three law enforcement has to cease using deadly force as soon as the subject is under the officer's control. That's one example. There are other directives in here that are directly to law enforcement that are not merged with the reasonableness standard language. So, B four and B five are not the only instance of a place where there's a directive to the finder of fact and a directive to law enforcement. So I just thought it might make sense to mention that. And is it a matter of putting in B five language that very clearly brings in B four? And I guess a danger of doing that is do you have to do that with all the other drug? I guess that's my concern is that if you do it because a finder of fact will review every word very carefully. So if B five, the language of B five is placed in B four, will that change the way a court interprets C three for example, or another directive to law enforcement that isn't placed into the same subsection with the language to the finder of fact of how to judge a reasonable whether use of force was reasonable. Okay. So Jen, I see your hand up again. No, okay. Ken and then Kate. I'm sorry if I'm not getting the order correct. Go ahead, Ken. How about if I wait for DPS to respond before I speak, if you don't mind? Okay, well, let's Jen's hand is down. Let's go to Kate and then see where we get from there. Kate. Yeah, thanks. I mean, I think my comments sort of along the lines of maybe where Martin was headed in terms of trying to figure out some sort of compromise. I mean, I think my understanding of as we've been taking testimony of the statements of like these things hanging together was more in the context of like all of these things hanging together. They're all taken into consideration together. And so, I personally feel concerned about combining four and five. I think five is an effort to get at a very specific issue. But I do wonder if four is unique in a way to the other numbers in the sense that four seems to be laying out sort of a prism that we're assessing the behavior through to some degree, whether it's objectively reasonable and how we evaluate that. And so, my initial thought was can we keep four and five separate and sort of tag on a line that's like the five shall be considered in conjunction with the four. And I don't know if that's what you're referring to, Brynne, like if we do that, then we sort of have to do that for all of them, which sort of brings up a question of like, is there a way in the layout of the statute to have the four sort of go first or something, almost like use of force shall be considered through this prism. So like everything is considered through the lens of reasonableness. You know what I'm saying? I guess I'll stop there. Yeah, no, no, thank you. I know I'm sitting here thinking like, what if we just switched five and four? Yeah, can't be that simple, but yeah, thank you. Well, let's keep, let's hear from Ken and keep thinking. And then Jen, I'll turn back to you, Ken. Thank you. So I'm trying to, isn't five just a continuation of four with the word further added to it? Is that a question for me? Maybe, Jen? I don't know. Oh, yeah, Brent, yeah, sure. Sorry, I didn't know it was you. So before is the reasonableness analysis. That is the language. It is drawn very closely from existing case law. It's how a court will look at an officer's use of force to determine whether or not it's reasonable. That's the standard. I think moving it up to one would make sense because for example, in subsection C, which is the standard on the use of deadly force, C1 is the standard for the use of deadly force. So I do think it makes sense to shift B4 and put it first. That may make it clearer that this is the standard by which the conduct is going to be evaluated. I see B5 as a little different. I don't see it as a continuation of the same language because it's a directive to law enforcement. It isn't the directive to the court about how the analysis is going to be done. So that has been my testimony that I just don't think that it, I think that they're two separate directives. All of law enforcement conduct is going to be evaluated through the language in B4. So adding that one word makes all the difference in the world. What one word? Further. Nothing's changed between four and five on I think what I'm looking at that combined the two sections together if you insert a word further. That's where I'm struggling. It's like we're so close. I don't understand what the problem is. So Ken, you're looking again at the email. That's what you're looking at. Yes. Which is, I gotta be missing something because it's so obvious and so clear to me. Nothing we insert DPS by the looks has inserted one word to make this bill in my mind that most people I would think would be happy and nothing's been lost. Yeah, I appreciate that. Kate and then Martin. Yeah, I mean, I think this isn't necessarily gonna be a satisfactory response to you Ken, but I think from my perspective, one I'm hearing from Bryn that from a legal perspective it could create confusion. I'm also seeing an email that Martin forwarded from Will the White advocating that these remain separate statutes. And I think from my sort of separate sections and I think from my perspective, what is lost is there are a lot of people who have spent a lot of time advocating to ensure that people who have impairments of various sorts are well protected within the law in interactions with law enforcement. And I think the concern is that so that section means a lot to a lot of people. And I think that the concern is that bringing these together into one section and sort of burying it in this particular kind of way and adding other language on top of it dilutes the impact of that section of the law. And that does matter to a lot of people. And so I think that we're all trying to work to come to some resolution that makes sense. Again, I would advocate maybe moving before to one and maybe even adding a tagline if it feels legally responsible that's like all further sections of is it B are assessed through B1. There's something to that effect, but it allows the maintenance of the integrity of what is currently B5, which again, I think people feel very, many people feel very passionately about. Yeah. But again, we're talking a word. I mean, language isn't disappearing. Okay, Jen. So, Madam Chair, thank you. I agree completely with Representative Donnelly. There's a lot of people who feel very strongly about it and they, and the language in B5 is very, very important in terms of guidance to law enforcement as Ledge Council Hare said, et cetera. We do not for one minute want to weaken that or be dismissive of the power of that being, even as a standalone, what we're trying to avoid is inadvertently creating a new legal standard that has never existed. And we can talk about what the case law in the second circuit says, but this is not the place for it. Two things to bring to the committee. The first is, I don't think, I can't answer for my boss, but I don't believe we would object to moving B4 up to B1 the way Representative Donnelly constructed it as the overarching prism through which you see the rest of the directives to law enforcement. So that's the ultimate advice to the trier or finder of fact. And so we would have to see it and I'd obviously have to get legal approval, et cetera, but I don't think that we would object to that. That might be a very elegantly simple way to fix this. I would remind this committee that our original suggestion for B5 was to prepend it with four words to the extent feasible. And we took considerable time and testimony saying it was redundant and not necessary because it didn't change anything. We're here to say that it does change it because it creates the expectation for law enforcement without setting a legal standard that municipalities could then be, have to jump the hurdle of B4 as currently written and then also newly assessed under B5. So we're open to either option. I think what Representative Donnelly said makes a lot of sense. And I completely agree with not wanting to water down the impact of protecting the most vulnerable Vermonters. Okay, thank you, Tom. Thank you. I was gonna ask Jen basically the same thing what her opinion was on moving four to one. And I think there's still some question there on whether it would eliminate creating the new standard but I would certainly like to hear from somebody and I don't know who, if it does eliminate that new standard that DPS is worried about. So I'm gonna look to Bryn for your comment about that, respond to Tom's concern. And then I also after that would like to go back to the original proposal if feasible, if you could speak to that, okay. Go ahead, Bryn. Sure. Representative Burdick, could you repeat your point for me to respond to please? I'll try. Responding to an email. Yeah, no, Jen had just brought up supporting moving. I may not be the right word supporting, but moving four to one. And I guess the question is, does that eliminate the new standard that she's concerned with? I think that from my perspective, because you have directives to law enforcement throughout the standards to my mind, it's clear that there are directives to law enforcement and then there is the standard by which law enforcement's conduct will be judged, which is the reasonableness standard. I think moving the language in V4, which is the standard, but that the court will use when they're evaluating conduct. Moving that to be one makes sense from a holistic perspective, because that's what you do with subsection C, the use of deadly force language, right at C1 is the standard that all law enforcement use of deadly force will be judged by. So I think it makes sense to do the same thing with B, which is the use of force standards. And then what follows is directives to law enforcement, specific directives to law enforcement and other kind of broad brush language about how law enforcement officers should undertake the use of force with care and with respect and dignity. So in my mind, that would make it clearer overall. I think it's a great idea. Great. And Jen, a question for you. I think you said that you would have to run that by somebody in your office as far as that change goes. Representative Burt, yes. I'm texting with a commissioner. He's understandably on another commitment. So I'm trying to work with him on this. I think that we would agree with Brydon on this one that B1 is the frame up and everything else that comes after it is talking. I mean, it's giving, it's putting the values. It's putting the values and the boundaries on it. So I think we would be happier with that outcome than with leaving it how it is. So certainly we would see that as a favorable outcome of today's work session. So yeah, I guess that's all I want to say. I'm not the boss of anything anymore, so I can't really say yes or no. So that, and in a nutshell, I guess it would alleviate some of your concerns. It would. And the construct that has been described by both Representative Donnelly and alleged counsel here is exactly how we see it and how we've approached the policy making, which is there's the superordinate goal directive way we're gonna evaluate an officer's actions and everything else is like infusing the values and the boundaries. You're giving us the lane to run in and we're, I would say we go above and beyond, but we're gonna, it's codified here by doing it in that manner. I hope that answers your question. Yeah, that's great to hear. I was in the middle of a staycation when I was alerted that I needed to jump into action. So I wasn't. Sorry, but thank you. Coach. I would still think that it would make, once we do get to a reasonable conclusion, I heard Kate's original proposal, which was great. And we actually got concurrence. And then we got triple concurrence from Brent. So that being said, the actual prosecutorial discretion and intentional guidance to the court, I think it would behoove us to at least hear the thought from our prosecutors and possibly Judge Greerson, as far as just this makes sense from how the judge would issue guidance and how the prosecutors would interpret. Because ultimately they're the end of the line in that process because they have the discretion to determine what gets prosecuted. So it's just a, and it could probably just be a quick, ascertain on the part of the three. Okay, thank you. Martin. Yeah, maybe if they're readily available, but because we're really not changing any standards here, we're making, we're doing clarification. This is a clarification and I like where this is heading. I mean, yeah, if they're available, but I don't want to hold this up. No, no, I agree, Martin. It's just that other piece, because I heard mentioned, the what ifs and those what ifs are determined by basically those three entities. I mean, I think we're in agreement, but attorney White mentioned very clearly in her testimony about how particular language is. And I think we all agree. And it's at that point where determinations are made. And Bryn, attorney here had clarified that again today. So it wouldn't keep me from voting affirmatively, let's say, or if we do a straw poll, if we have agreement at this point, without all of those folks, but it would just be like the icing on the cake, so to speak. Thank you, coach Ken and then Tom. I was in a lot more agreement with the one word added than what I am now. I mean, I wasn't feeling quite so bad about this. Now I'm back really up in the air. I just, I don't, I don't get it, but if there's that much, if there's that much of a concern over one word, my mind is going okay to a lot of other concerns. So you guys kind of had me going with you and I'm not feeling it right now. Thanks. Thank you. Question for Bryn, I think. So where four is now, I think is part of the problem that only five will be run through four, but if we move it to, if we move four to one, everything will be looked at through four. I think, yes, I think that's the idea that because B four is the analysis, everything else is run through it and it's kind of plopped right in the middle there. So that's maybe where some of this kind of lack of clarity came from that it's plopped right in the middle and then there's directives to law enforcement on either side. So by putting it upfront at B one, the way that the standards are for the use of deadly force in C one, it may make it clearer that everything follows, runs through that analysis language that is now in B four. Which is the same standard for everything then. That's the standard, right? Right. And again, I know you already answered it. So where it is, not everything, potentially everything won't be run through four. That wasn't my testimony. My testimony. No, no. Because that language comes and hopefully this can answer some of the other questions that have been raised. Because that language tracks so closely, the B four language, the analysis language, because it tracks so closely with existing case law, a court is going to understand that that's, that is the analysis that it uses right there. That reasonableness analysis, reasonable feasible alternatives analysis, that's what it uses in deciding whether or not an officer's use of force was reasonable and pursuant to the standards. So it's been my testimony throughout that it's clear that that's the analysis. And because that's the analysis that's done after the fact, it's separate from the directives to law enforcement because those are directives that law enforcement will use in the moment. So, but however, that's not to say that I don't think it's a good idea to move it up. So there's consistency in the statute. Sure. And it flows more naturally. Yeah, good. Thank you. And I guess from here, I don't think Jen has, since she doesn't, she's not in control anymore, doesn't have the power. I'm looking forward to what her, the people in her office think of this, I guess. I can try and get commissioner to give a quick, I can tell you this, that affirmatively taking the action that representative Donnelly laid out and that Bryn has given us more information on, that is a better place for right now than as currently written. So we would feel that moving current before 2B1 is an improvement. I'm not in a position to say that would be DPS's final answer, but I'm not clear what kind of timeline you guys are looking at, but it would certainly be an improvement as written. Let me work on talking to my boss. Thank you, I appreciate that. Okay, see a bunch of hands. I'm gonna call on Bob because you haven't spoken in a bit. Start with Bob. Well, I'm glad to see that. You let me to speak, Maxi. I think that we're very close. I'm not totally happy with where the bill is and its totality, but I think we're very close upon agreement here. I think that representative Donnelly come up with an excellent idea and Jen appears to like it. And if she get the thumbs up from the commissioner due to everything else that we're dealing with here, I can probably support this in this existing form. So that's about all I got right now. Let's hope we get a thumbs up on it. Okay, well thank you. So I'm gonna hear, I see a few more hands which we can hear from. And then if Jen hasn't heard back from the commissioner, we could take a break, move on to something else. Let's see, coach and then Ken again, I'm sorry if I'm not doing the order correctly of when you put your hands up. And Tom had, your hands not up now, but it was up before. So when you go ahead coach and then Ken and then Tom. I just cleared my hand. I'll let it lie for the moment. Thank you. Thank you. And I'm just getting better at bringing my hand down. So I had taken it down. Okay, all right, Ken. I was looking for Bryn, but I think she just left. She's here. She's back. I'm here. Okay, so are you okay with that language? Was that, I don't know if I'm supposed to ask you that question, but I don't know how else to do it. I'm trying to understand, were you okay with that change? Will you specify what change you're referring to? I think it was Kate's move. Yeah, moving, yeah. Or moving. Moving the language in before to be one. Yes. I think that, I think that makes sense. Yes. I think it makes sense for the reasons I've articulated that it brings the standards in B5 in line with the standards and C in, sorry, brings the use of four standards in line with the use of deadly four standards. So therefore both sections would be set up the same, meaning the standard for the analysis would be right upfront and then the other directives would fall below. So yes, I don't think that it changes, I don't think it changes the impact of the standards. Okay. Thank you. And just for clarification, did I just hear representative Norris agree with that too? Bob and- I'm sorry. Did I just hear you, did I just, representative Norris, did I just hear you agree with that too? I think my statement was that the bill is not quite where I want it to be. However, if DPS gives us a thumb up to commissioner, I probably can support this. I think it was my exact awarding. And the commissioner is just signing on. And I feel like the lone ranger, but I'm used to it. Thanks. So commissioner, thank you so much for joining us. Good morning. Apologies for the lack of a tie. I was on an audio only press conference that I have to jump back to. And in a moment I have been listening with one ear, while I'm listening to Senator Sanders with the other ear. I appreciate all the continuing work. I think it's always helpful to see it on paper and see what the transition looks like. But I think this concept of moving B4 to B1 and having everything flow through that prism and from that, through that lens may be a good solution here. I do just want to flag. There's at least one other area, the hindsight discussion that you've had and opted not to include that we reserve the right to continue to chat with the Senate about that when it goes over. So I just want to be clear. I don't want to give you the impression that we're done potentially asking for small tweaks, but I think by and large, this is a solid, really solid piece of work to improve on the work from last year. And sorry for the fragmented thought process and I'm trying to pivot. It's a little bumpy. No, no, it's very, actually, it's very helpful. I appreciate it. And of course you have the right to go to the Senate. And I mean, that's the process here. We start the conversation here or they start there, whatever. And the conversation continues and might continue in a conference committee or might not, so no, absolutely. So can I do see your hand up? Do you have a question or was that from before? Not too much. Thank you. No, no, no, it's fine. So I do think it is always helpful to have it on paper. Bryn, how quickly would you be able to get us a new draft where you do that reordering? Because we can take an early lunch, we could take a quick break depending upon that and what works for you? I'm just checking some cross-references. So I probably just need a couple of minutes and then I can have a draft. So if you wanna take a brief break, that would be plenty of time for me. Okay, great. Why don't we take 15 minutes or so? Okay, let Bryn work. And then does that work for Jen and Commissioner to take a break? And then that way we can see what it looks like. That sounds great. I'll probably send my thoughts through Jen as I have to get back on the Marathon Press Conference for the next 90 minutes. I know, I can't wait to see that spigot. It's turning. That's great. Stick around, I'm gonna ask him a question. So, okay, so we'll...