 section 62 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, this is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org, recording by Jim Clevenger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses Grant chapter 62. Sherman's March North, Sheridan ordered to Lynchburg, can be ordered to move against Mobile, movements of Schofield and Thomas, capture of Columbia, South Carolina, Sherman in the Carolinas. When news of Sherman being in possession of Savannah reached the North, distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him. Among others who went was the Secretary of War, who seemed much pleased at the result of his campaign. Mr. Draper, the collector of customs of New York, who was with Mr. Staunton's party, was put in charge of the public property that had been abandoned and captured. Savannah was then turned over to General Foster's command to hold, so that Sherman might have his own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future. I sent the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac, General Barnard, with letters to General Sherman. He remained some time with the general, and when he returned, brought back letters, one of which contained suggestions from Sherman as to what ought to be done in cooperation with him when he should have started upon his march northward. I must not neglect to state here the fact that I had no idea, originally, of having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond or even to North Carolina. The season was bad, the roads impassable for anything except such an army as he had, and I should not have thought of ordering such a move. I had, therefore, made preparations to collect transports to carry Sherman and his army around to the James River by water, and so informed him. On receiving this letter he went to work immediately to prepare for the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to collect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north through the Carolinas. I was only too happy to approve this, for if successful it promised every advantage. His march through Georgia had thoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that state, and had completely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west of it. If north and south Carolina were rendered helpless, so far as capacity for feeding Lee's army was concerned, the Confederate garrison at Richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw supplies, to very narrow limits in the state of Virginia, and although that section of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted of both forage and food. I approved Sherman's suggestion, therefore, at once. The work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load the wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance. Sherman would now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisions than that he had previously been operating in during his march to the sea. Besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of the enemy vastly superior to any his troops had encountered on their previous march, and the territory through which he had to pass had now become of such vast importance to the very existence of the Confederate army that the most desperate efforts were to be expected in order to save it. Sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to start with, made arrangements with Admiral Dahlgren, who commanded that part of the navy on the south Carolina and Georgia coast, and General Foster, commanding the troops, to take positions and hold a few points on the sea coast which he, Sherman, designated in the neighborhood of Charleston. This provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea coast in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop his onward progress. He also wrote me a letter making suggestions as to what he would like to have done in support of his movement further north. This letter was brought to city point by General Barnard at a time when I happened to be going to Washington City where I arrived on the 21st of January. I cannot tell the provision I had already made to cooperate with Sherman in anticipation of his expected movement better than by giving my reply to this letter. Headquarters, armies of the United States, Washington, D.C., January 21st, 1864, 1865, Major General W.T. Sherman, commanding military division of the Mississippi. General, your letters brought by General Barnard were received at city point and read with interest. Not having them with me, however, I cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on all points of recommendation as I arrived here at 1 p.m. and must leave at 6 p.m., having in the meantime spent over three hours with the Secretary and General Halleck, I must be brief. Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis, Maryland with his corps. The advance, 6,000, will reach the seaboard by the 23rd, the remainder following as rapidly as railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati. The corps numbers over 21,000 men. I was induced to do this because I did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off before spring. His pursuit of hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would never do to conduct one of your campaigns. The command of the advance of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed far behind. When hood had crossed the Tennessee and those in pursuit had reached it, Thomas had not much more than half crossed the state from whence he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport. He is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but he is not good on a pursuit. He also reported his troops fagged and that it was necessary to equip up. This report and a determination to give the enemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere. Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to Selma under an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to, to know whether he could go and if so, which of the several routes he would select. No reply is yet received. Canby has been ordered to act offensively from the sea coast to the interior towards Montgomery and Selma. Thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day or some of his troops will be sent to Canby. Without further reinforcements Canby will have a moving column of twenty thousand men. Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a force there of eight thousand effective at New Bern about half the number. It is rumored through deserters that Wilmington also has fallen. I am inclined to believe the rumor because on the seventeenth we knew the enemy were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell and that on the eighteenth Terry moved on Wilmington. If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there. If not, he will be sent to New Bern. In either event all the surplus forces at the two points will move to the interior toward Goldsburg in cooperation with your movements. From either point railroad communications can be run out. They are being here abundance of rolling stock suited to the gauge of those roads. There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army south. Of these you will have fourteen thousand against you if Wilmington is not held by the enemy casualties at Fort Fisher having overtaken about two thousand. All these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communication with them. They will be so instructed. From about Richmond I will watch Lee closely and if he detaches much more or attempts to evacuate will pitch in. In the meantime should you be brought to a halt anywhere I can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men to your support from the troops about Richmond. To resume, can be is ordered to operate to the interior from the Gulf. A J. Smith may go from the north but I think it doubtful. A force of twenty eight or thirty thousand will cooperate with you from New Bern or Wilmington or both. You can call for reinforcements. This will be handed you by Captain Hudson of my staff who will return with any message you may have for me. If there is anything I can do for you in the way of having supplies on shipboard at any point on the sea coast ready for you let me know it. Yours truly US Grant Lieutenant General. I had written on the eighteenth of January to General Sherman giving him the news of the Battle of Nashville. He was much pleased at the result although like myself he had been very much disappointed at Thomas for permitting hood to cross the Tennessee River and nearly the whole state of Tennessee and come to Nashville to be attacked there. He however as I had done sit Thomas a warm congratulatory letter. On the tenth of January eighteen sixty-five the resolutions of thanks to Sherman and his army passed by Congress were approved. Sherman after the capture at once had the debris cleared up commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river and taking up all obstructions. He had then entrenched the city so that it could be held by a small garrison. By the middle of January all his work was done except the accumulation of supplies to commence his movement with. He proposed to move in two columns one from Savannah going along by the river of the same name and the other by roads further east threatening Charleston. He commenced the advance by moving his right wing to Buford, South Carolina then to Pocotalego by water. This column in moving north threatened Charleston and indeed it was not determined at first that they would have a force visit Charleston. South Carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the South for cessation and had been so active in precipitating the decision of the question before the South was fully prepared to meet it that there was at that time a feeling throughout the north and also largely entertained by people of the South that the state of South Carolina and Charleston the hot bed of cessation in particular ought to have a heavy hand laid upon them. In fact nothing but the decisive results that followed deterred the radical portion of the people from condemning the movement because Charleston had been left out. To pass into the interior wood however be to ensure the evacuation of the city and its possession by the Navy and Foster's troops. It is so situated between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold out. Sherman therefore passed it by. By the first of February all preparations were completed for the final march. Columbia, South Carolina being the first objective. Fayetteville, North Carolina the second and Goldsboro or neighborhood the final one unless something further should be determined upon. The right wing went from Poco-Tallago and the left from about Hardyville on the Savannah River both columns taking a pretty direct route for Columbia. The cavalry however were to threaten Charleston on the right and Augusta on the left. On the 15th of January Fort Fisher had fallen, news of which Sherman had received before starting out on his march. We already had New Bern and had soon Wilmington whose fall followed that of Fort Fisher as did other points on the seacoast where the national troops were now in readiness to cooperate with Sherman's advance when he had passed Fayetteville. On the 18th of January I ordered Canby, in command at New Orleans to move against Mobile, Montgomery and Selma, Alabama for the purpose of destroying roads, machine shops, etc. On the 8th of February I ordered Sheridan who was in the Valley of Virginia to push forward as soon as the weather would permit and strike the canal west of Richmond at or about Lynchburg. And on the 20th I made the order to go to Lynchburg as soon as the roads would permit saying, as soon as it is possible to travel I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. This additional raid with one starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering about four or five thousand cavalry, one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay with about eighteen thousand mixed troops, these three ladder pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma and Montgomery and Sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of South Carolina is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last. On the 27th of February, more than a month after Canby had received his orders, I again wrote to him saying that I was extremely anxious to hear of his being in Alabama. I notified him also that I had sent Grayerson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficient officer. I further suggested that Forrest was probably in Mississippi and if he was there he would find him an officer of great courage and capacity whom it would be difficult to get by. I still further informed him that Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into Mississippi on the twentieth of February or as soon as possible thereafter. This force did not get off, however. All these movements were designed to be in support of Sherman's march, the object being to keep the Confederate troops in the west from leaving there. But neither Canby nor Thomas could be got off in time. I had some time before depleted Thomas's army to reinforce Canby for the reason that Thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had been ordered to send out and to have the troops where they might do something. Canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of his movements. I ordered him to go in person. But he prepared to send a detachment under another officer. General Granger had got down to New Orleans in some way or other and I wrote Canby that he must not put him in command of troops. In spite of this he asked the War Department to assign Granger to the command of a corps. Almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the cause in that quarter I said to Canby, I am in receipt of a dispatch informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corps and material to build 70 miles of railroad. I have directed that none be sent. Thomas's army has been depleted to send a force to you that they might be where they could act in winter and at least detain the force the enemy had in the west. If there had been any idea of repairing railroads it could have been done much better from the north where we already had the troops. I expected your movements to be cooperative with Sherman's last. This has now entirely failed. I wrote to you long ago urging you to push promptly and to live upon the country and destroy railroads, machine shops, etc., not to build them. Take Mobile and hold it and push your forces to the interior to Montgomery and to Selma. Destroy railroads, rolling stock and everything useful for carrying on war and when you have done this take such positions as can be supplied by water. By this means alone you can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interior can be kept broken. Most of these expeditions got off finally but too late to render any service in the direction for which they were designed. The enemy ready to intercept his advance consisted of Hardee's troops and Wheeler's cavalry perhaps less than 15,000 men in all but frantic efforts were being made in Richmond as I was sure would be the case to retard Sherman's movements. Everything possible was being done to raise troops in the south. Lee dispatched against Sherman the troops which had been sent to relieve Fort Fisher which including those of the other defences of the harbor and its neighborhood amounted after deducting the 2,000 killed wounded and captured to 14,000 men. After Thomas's victory at Nashville what remained of Hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as rapidly as possible to the east to cooperate with these forces and finally General Joseph E. Johnston one of the ablest commanders of the south though not in favor with the administration or at least with Mr. Davis was put in command of all the troops in north and south Carolina. Schofield arrived at Annapolis in the latter part of January but before sending his troops to North Carolina I went with him down the coast to see the situation of affairs as I could give fuller directions after being on the ground than I could very well have given without. We soon returned and the troops were sent by sea to Cape Fear River. Both Newburn and Wilmington are connected with Raleigh by railroads which unite at Goldsboro. Schofield was to land troops at Smithfield near the mouth of the Cape Fear River on the west side and move up to secure the Wilmington and Charlottesville Railroad this column took their pontoon bridges with them to enable them to cross over to the island south of the city of Wilmington a large body was sent by the north side to cooperate with them they succeeded in taking the city on the 22nd of February I took the precaution to provide for Sherman's army in case he should be forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reaching North Carolina by forwarding supplies to every place where he was liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected march I also sent railroad rolling stock of which we had a great abundance now that we were not operating the roads in Virginia the gauge of the North Carolina railroads being the same as the Virginia railroads had been altered too these cars and locomotives were ready for use there without any change on the 31st of January I countermanded the orders given to Thomas to move south to Alabama and Georgia I had previously reduced his force by sending a portion of it to Terry I directed in lieu of this movement that he should send Stoneman through east Tennessee and push him well down toward Columbia, South Carolina in support of Sherman Thomas did not get Stoneman off in time but on the contrary when I had supposed he was on his march in support of Sherman I heard of his being in Louisville, Kentucky I immediately changed the order and directed Thomas to send him toward Lynchburg finally however on the 12th of March he did push down through the northwestern end of South Carolina creating some consternation I also ordered Thomas to send the 4th Corps, Stanley's, to bull gap and to destroy no more roads east of that I also directed him to concentrate supplies at Knoxville with a view to a probable movement of his army through that way toward Lynchburg Goldsboro is 425 miles from Savannah Sherman's march was without much incident until he entered Columbia on the 17th of February he was detained in his progress by having to repair and corduroy the roads and rebuild the bridges there was constant skirmishing and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies but this did not retard the advance of the infantry four days also were lost in making complete the destruction of the most important railroad south of Columbia there was also some delay caused by the high water and the destruction of the bridges on the line of the road a formidable river had to be crossed near Columbia and that in the face of a small garrison under General Wade Hampton there was but little delay however further than that caused by high water in the stream Hampton left as Sherman approached and the city was found to be on fire there has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in discussions of the question as to who set Columbia on fire Sherman denies it on the part of his troops and Hampton denies it on the part of the Confederates one thing is certain as soon as our troops took possession they at once proceeded to extinguish the flames to the best of their ability with the limited means at hand in any case the example set by the Confederates in burning the village of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania a town which was not garrisoned would seem to make a defense of the act of firing the seat of government of the state most responsible for the conflict then raging not imperative the Confederate troops having vacated the city the mayor took possession and sallied forth to meet the commander of the national forces for the purpose of surrendering the town making terms for the protection of property etc Sherman paid no attention at all to the overture but pushed forward and took the town without making any conditions whatever with its citizens he then however cooperated with the mayor in extinguishing the flames and providing for the people who were rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes when he left there he even gave the mayor 500 head of cattle to be distributed among the citizens to tide them over until some arrangement could be made for their future supplies he remained in Columbia until the roads public buildings workshops and everything that could be useful to the enemy were destroyed while at Columbia Sherman learned for the first time that what remained of hoods army was confronting him under the command of general Beauregard Charleston was evacuated on the 18th of February and Foster garrisoned the place Wilmington was captured on the 22nd Columbia and Chiro further north were regarded as so secure from invasion that the wealthy people of Charleston and Augusta had sent much of their valuable property to these two points to be stored among the goods sent there were valuable carpets tons of old Madeira silverware and furniture I am afraid much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops there was found at Columbia a large amount of powder some artillery small arms and fixed ammunition these of course were among the articles destroyed while here Sherman also learned of Johnston's restoration to command the latter was given as already stated all troops in north and south Carolina after the completion of the destruction of public property about Columbia Sherman proceeded on his march and reached Chiro without any special opposition and without incident to relate the railroads of course were thoroughly destroyed on the way Sherman remained a day or two at Chiro and finally on the 6th of March crossed his troops over the PD and advanced straight for Fayetteville Hardy and Hampton were there and barely escaped Sherman reached Fayetteville on the 11th of March he had dispatched scouts from Chiro with letters to General Terry at Wilmington asking him to send a steamer with some supplies of bread clothing and other articles which he enumerated the scouts got through successfully and a boat was sent with the mail and such articles for what Sherman had asked as were in store at Wilmington unfortunately however these stores did not contain clothing four days later on the 15th Sherman left Fayetteville for Goldsboro the march now had to be made with great caution for he was approaching Lee's army and nearing the country that still remained open to the enemy besides he was confronting all that he had had to confront in his previous march up to that point reinforced by the garrisons along the road and by what remained of Hood's army frantic appeals were made to the people to come in voluntarily and swell the ranks of our foe I presume however that Johnston did not have in all over 35 or 40,000 men the people had grown tired of the war and desertions from the Confederate army were much more numerous than the voluntary accessions there was some fighting at Avery's Burl on the 16th between Johnston's troops and Sherman's with some loss and at Bittenville on the 19th and 21st of March but Johnston withdrew from the contest before the morning of the 22nd Sherman's loss in these last engagements and killed wounded and missing was about 1600 Sherman's troops at last reached Goldsboro on the 23rd of the month and went into Bivouac and there his men were destined to have a long rest Schofield was there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to Wilmington Sherman was no longer in danger he had Johnston confronting him but with an army much inferior to his own both in numbers and morale he had Lee to the north of him with a force largely superior but I was holding Lee with a still greater force and had he made his escape and gotten down to reinforce Johnston Sherman with the reinforcements he now had from Schofield and Terry would have been able to hold the Confederates at bay for an indefinite period he was near the seashore with his back to it and our Navy occupied the harbors he had a railroad to both Wilmington and New Bern and his flanks were thoroughly protected by streams which intersect that part of the country and deepen as they approached the sea then too Sherman knew that if Lee should escape me I would be on his heels and he and Johnston together would be crushed in one blow if they attempted to make a stand with the loss of their capital it is doubtful whether Lee's army would have amounted to much as an army when it reached North Carolina Johnston's army was demoralized by constant defeat and would hardly have made an offensive movement even if they could have been induced to remain on duty the men of both Lee's and Johnston's armies were like their brother of the north as brave as men can be but no man is so brave that he may not meet such defeats and disasters as to discourage him and dampen his ardor for any cause no matter how just he deems it end of section 62 recording by Jim Clevinger, Little Rock, Arkansas, Jim at J-O-C-C-L-E-V dot com section 63 of personal memoirs of U.S. Grant this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Jim Clevinger personal memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant chapter 63 a rival of the peace commissioners, Lincoln and the peace commissioners an anecdote of Lincoln the winter before Petersburg Sheridan destroys the railroad Gordon carries the picket line Park recaptures the line the line of battle of White Oak Road on the last of January 1865 peace commissioners from the so-called Confederate States presented themselves on our lines around Petersburg and were immediately conducted to my headquarters at City Point they proved to be Alexander H. Stevens Vice President of the Confederacy Judge Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War and RMT Hunt, formerly United States Senator and then a member of the Confederate Senate it was about dark when they reached my headquarters and I at once conducted them to the steam Mary Martin a Hudson River boat which was very comfortably fitted up for the use of passengers I at once communicated by telegraph with Washington and informed the Secretary of War and the President of the arrival of these commissioners and that their object was to negotiate terms of peace between the United States and, as they termed it, the Confederate Government I was instructed to retain them at City Point until the President or someone whom he would designate should come to meet them they remained several days as guests on board the boat I saw them quite frequently though I have no recollection of having had any conversation whatever with them on the subject of their mission it was something I had nothing to do with and I therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject for my own part I never had admitted and never was ready to admit that they were the representatives of a government there had been too great a waste of blood and treasure to concede anything of the kind as long as they remained there however our relations were pleasant and I found them all very agreeable gentlemen I directed the captain to furnish them with the best the boat afforded and to administer to their comfort in every way possible no guard was placed over them and no restriction was put upon their movements nor was there any pledge asked that they would not abuse the privileges extended to them they were permitted to leave the boat when they felt like it and did so coming up on the bank and visiting me at my headquarters I had never met either of these gentlemen before the war but knew them well by reputation and through their public services and I had been a particular admirer of Mr. Stevens I had always supposed that he was a very small man but when I saw him in the dusk of the evening I was very much surprised to find so large a man as he seemed to be when he got down onto the boat I found that he was wearing a coarse grey woollen overcoat a manufacturer that had been introduced into the south during the rebellion the cloth was thicker than anything of the kind I had ever seen even in Canada the overcoat extended nearly to his feet and was so large that it gave him the appearance of being an average sized man he took this off when he reached the cabin of the boat and I was struck with the apparent change in size in the coat and out of it after a few days about the second of February I received a dispatch from Washington directing me to send the commissioners to Hampton Roads to meet the president and a member of the cabinet Mr. Lincoln met them there and had an interview of short duration it was not a great while after they met that the president visited me at City Point he spoke of his having met the commissioners and said he had told them that there would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they would recognize first that the union as a whole must be forever preserved and second that slavery must be abolished if they were willing to concede these two points then he was ready to enter into negotiations and was almost willing to hand them a blank sheet of paper with his signature attached for them to fill in the terms upon which they were willing to live with us in the union and be one people he always showed a generous and kindly spirit toward the southern people and I never heard him abuse an enemy some of the cruel things said about President Lincoln particularly in the north used to pierce him to the heart but never in my presence did he invent a revengeful disposition and I saw a great deal of him at City Point for he seemed glad to get away from the cares and anxieties of the capital right here I might relate an anecdote of Mr. Lincoln it was on the occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the peace commissioners at Hampton Roads after a little conversation he asked me if I had seen that overcoat of Stevens's I replied that I had well said he did you see him take it off I said yes well said he didn't you think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear that ever you did see long afterwards I told his story to the Confederate General J.B. Gordon at the time a member of the Senate he repeated it to Stevens and as I heard afterwards Stevens laughed immoderately at the simile of Mr. Lincoln the rest of the winter after the departure of the peace commissioners passed off quietly and uneventfully except for two or three little incidents on one occasion during this period while I was visiting Washington City for the purpose of conferring with the administration the enemy's cavalry under General Wade Hampton passing our extreme left and then going to the south got in east of us before their presence was known they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that were grazing in that section it was a fair capture and they were sufficiently needed by the Confederates it was only retaliating for what we had done sometimes for many weeks at a time when out of supplies taking what the Confederate army otherwise would have gotten as appears in this book on one single occasion we captured 5,000 head of cattle which were crossing the Mississippi River near Port Hudson on their way from Texas to supply the Confederate army in the east one of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellion was the last few weeks before Petersburg I felt that the situation of the Confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape at the earliest practical moment and I was afraid every morning that I would awake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone and that nothing was left but a picket line he had his railroad by the way of Danville south and I was afraid that he was running off his men and all stores and ordinance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him for his immediate defense I knew he could move much more lightly and more rapidly than I and that if he got to start he would leave me behind so that we would have the same army to fight again farther south and the war might be prolonged another year I was led to this fear by the fact that I could not see how it was possible for the Confederates to hold out much longer where they were there is no doubt that Richmond would have been evacuated much sooner than it was if it had not been that it was the capital of the so-called Confederacy and the fact of evacuating the capital would of course have had a very demoralizing effect upon the Confederate army when it was evacuated as we shall see further on the Confederacy at once began to crumble and fade away then too desertions were taking place not only among those who were with General Lee in the neighborhood of their capital but throughout the whole Confederacy I remember that in a conversation with me on one occasion long prior to this General Butler remarked that the Confederates would find great difficulty in getting more men for their army possibly adding though I am not certain as to this unless they should arm the slave the South as we all knew were conscripting every able-bodied man between the ages of 18 and 45 and now they had passed a law for the further conscription of boys from 14 to 18 calling them the junior reserves and men from 45 to 60 to be called the senior reserves the latter were to hold the necessary points not in immediate danger and especially those in the rear General Butler in alluding to this conscription remarked that they were thus robbing both the cradle and the grave an expression which I afterwards used in writing a letter to Mr. Washburn it was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits they were losing at least a regiment a day taking it throughout the entire army by desertions alone then by casualties of war sickness and other natural causes their losses were much heavier it was a mere question of arithmetic to calculate how long they could hold out while that rate of depletion was going on of course long before their army would be thus reduced to nothing the army which we had in the field would have been able to capture theirs then too I knew from the great number of desertions that the men who had fought so bravely so gallantly and so long for the cause which they believed in and as earnestly I take it as our men believed in the cause for which they were fighting had lost hope and become despondent many of them were making application to be sent north where they might get employment until the war was over when they could return to their southern homes for these and other reasons I was naturally very impatient for the time to come when I could commence the spring campaign which I thoroughly believed would close the war there were two considerations I had to observe however and which detained me one was the fact that the winter had been one of heavy rains and the roads were impassable for artillery and teams it was necessary to wait until they had dried sufficiently to enable us to move the wagon trains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an army operating in the enemy's country the other consideration was that general Sheridan with the cavalry of the army of the Potomac was operating on the north side of the James River having come down from the Shenandoah it was necessary that I should have his cavalry with me and I was therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the James River let us now take account of what he was doing on the fifth of March I had heard from Sheridan he had met early between Staunton and Charlottesville and defeated him capturing nearly his entire command early and some of his officers escaped by finding refuge in the neighboring houses or in the woods on the twelfth I heard from him again he had turned east to come to White House he could not go to Lynchburg as ordered because the rains had been so very heavy and the streams were so very much swollen he had a pontoon train with him but it would not reach halfway across some of the streams at their then stage of water which he would have to get over in going south as first ordered I had supplies sent around to White House for him and kept the depot there open until he arrived we had intended to abandon it because the James River had now become our base of supplies Sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him divided into two divisions commanded respectively by Custer and Devon General Merritt was acting as chief of cavalry, Sheridan moved very light carrying only four days provisions with him with a larger supply of coffee, salt and other small rations and a very little else besides ammunition they stopped at Charlottesville and commenced tearing up the railroad back toward Lynchburg he also sent a division along the James River Canal to destroy locks, culverts, etc all mills and factories along the lines of march of his troops were destroyed also Sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a march to White House was now somewhat hazardous he determined therefore to fight his way along the railroad and canal till he was as near to Richmond as it was possible to get or until attack he did this destroying the canal as far as Gutchland and the railroad to a point as near Richmond as he could get on the 10th he was at Columbia, Negroes had joined his column to the number of two thousand or more and they assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads and the canal his cavalry was in as fine a condition as when he started because he had been able to find plenty of forage he had captured most of early's horses and picked up a good many others on the road when he reached Ashland he was assailed by the enemy in force he resisted their assault with part of his command, moved quickly across the south and north Hanna, going north and reached White House safely on the 19th the time for Sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to the time he could get away from Goldsboro where he then was supplies had to be got up to him which would last him through a long march as there would probably not be much to be obtained in the country through which he would pass I had to arrange therefore that he should start from where he was in the neighborhood of Goldsboro on the 18th of April the earliest day at which he supposed he could be ready Sherman was anxious that I should wait where I was until he could come up and make a sure thing of it but I had determined to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing so I had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting until Sheridan who was on his way from the Shenandoah Valley to join me should arrive as both his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the execution of the plans which I had in mind however having arrived at White House on the 19th of March I was enabled to make my plans prompted by my anxiety lest Lee should get away some night before I was aware of it and having the lead of me push into North Carolina to join with Johnston in attempting to crush out Sherman I had as early as the first of the month of March given instructions to the troops around Petersburg to keep a sharp lookout to see that such a movement should not escape their notice and to be ready strike it once if it was undertaken it is now known that early in the month of March Mr. Davis and General Lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in and about and Petersburg and they both agreed places were no longer tenable for them and that they must get away as soon as possible they too were waiting for dry roads or a condition of the roads which would make it possible to move generally in aid of his plan of escape and to secure a wider opening to enable them to reach the Danville Road with greater security than he would have in the way the two armies were situated determined upon an assault upon the right of our lines around Petersburg the night of the 24th of March was fixed upon for this assault and general Gordon was assigned to the execution of the plan the point between Fort Stedman and Battery number 10 where our lines were closest together was selected as the point of his attack the attack was to be made at night and the troops were to get possession of the higher ground in the rear where they supposed we had entrenchments then sweep to the right and left create a panic in the lines of our army and force me to contract my lines Lee hoped this would detain me a few days longer and give him an opportunity of escape the plan was well conceived and the execution of it very well done indeed up to the point of carrying a portion of our line Gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night at the point at which they were to make their charge and got possession of our picket line entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside of our main line of entrenchments this reduced the distance he would have to charge over to not much more than 50 yards for some time before the deserters had been coming in with great frequency often bringing their arms with him and this the Confederate general knew taking advantage of this knowledge he sent his pickets with their arms creeping through to ours as if to desert when they got to our lines they at once took possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners in the main line our men were sleeping serenely as if in great security this plan was to have been executed and much damage done before daylight but the troops that were to reinforce Gordon had to be brought from the north side of the James River and by some accident on the railroad on their way over they were detained for a considerable time so that it got to be nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge the charge however was successful and almost without loss the enemy passing through our lines between Fort Stedman and battery number 10 then turning to the right and left they captured the fort and the battery with all the arms and troops in them continuing the charge they also carried batteries 11 and 12 to our left which they turned toward City Point Meade happened to be at City Point that night and this break in his line cut him off from all communication with his headquarters Park however commanding the 9th Corps when this bridge took place telegraphed the facts to Meade's headquarters and learning that the general was away assumed command himself and with commendable promptitude made all preparations to drive the enemy back General Tidball gathered a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them in rear of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground between the lines very thoroughly Hartraft was soon out with his division as also was Wilcox Hartraft to the right of the breach headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back into Fort Stedman on the other side they were driven back into the entrenchments which they had captured and batteries 11 and 12 were retaken by Wilcox early in the morning Park then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and batteries and communication was once more established the artillery fire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for the Confederates to retreat and equally impossible for reinforcements to join them they all therefore fell captives into our hands this effort of Lees cost him about 4,000 men and resulted in their killing, wounding and capturing about 2,000 of ours after the recapture of the batteries taken by the Confederates our troops made a charge and carried the enemy's entrenched picket line which they strengthened and held this in turn gave us but a short distance to charge over when our attack came to be made a few days later the day that Gordon was making dispositions for this attack 24th of March I issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th Ord with three divisions of infantry and McKenzie's cavalry was to move in advance on the night of the 27th from the north side of the James River and take his place on our extreme left 30 miles away he left Weetzel with the rest of the army of the James to hold Bermuda 100 and the north of the James River the engineer brigade was to be left at city point and parks core in the lines about Petersburg Ord was at his place promptly Humphries and Warren were then on our extreme left with the second and fifth course they were directed on the arrival of Ord and on his getting into position in their places to cross Hatcher's Run and extend out west toward Five Forks the object being to get into a position from which we could strike the south side railroad and ultimately the Danville Railroad there was considerable fighting in taking up these new positions for the second and fifth course in which the army of the James had also to participate somewhat and the losses were quite severe this was what was known as the battle of White Oak Road end of section 63 recording by Jim Clevenger Little Rock, Arkansas Jim at JOCCLDV.com section 64 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Jim Clevenger Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant chapter 64 interview with Sheridan grand movement of the army of the Potomac Sheridan's advance on Five Forks battle of Five Forks park and right storm the enemies line battles before Petersburg Sheridan reached city point on the 26th day of March his horses of course were jaded and many of them had lost their shoes a few days of rest were necessary to recuperate the animals and also to have them shod and put in condition for moving immediately on General Sheridan's arrival at city point I prepared his instructions for the move which I had decided upon the movement was to commence on the 29th of the month after reading the instructions I had given him Sheridan walked out of my tent and I followed to have some conversation with him by himself not in the presence of anybody else even of a member of my staff in preparing his instructions I contemplated just what took place that is to say capturing Five Forks driving the enemy from Petersburg and Richmond and terminating the contest before separating from the enemy but the nation had already become restless and discouraged at the prolongation of the war and many believed that it would never terminate except by compromise knowing that unless my plan proved an entire success it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat I provided in these instructions that in a certain event he was to cut loose from the army of the Potomac and his base of supplies and living upon the country proceed south by the way of the Danville Railroad or near it across the Roanoke get in the rear of Johnston who was guarding that road and cooperate with Sherman in destroying Johnston then with these combined forces to help carry out the instructions Sherman already had received to act in cooperation with the armies around Petersburg and Richmond I saw that after Sheridan had read his instructions he seemed somewhat disappointed at the idea possibly of having to cut loose again from the army of the Potomac and place himself between the two main armies of the enemy I said to him general, this portion of your instructions I have put in merely as a blind and gave him the reason for doing so here to fore described I told him that as a matter of fact I intended to close the war right here with this movement and that he should go no farther his face at once brightened up and slapping his hand on his leg he said I am glad to hear it and we can do it Sheridan was not however to make his movement against five forks until he got further instructions from me one day after the movement I am about to describe had commenced and when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far to the rear south Sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were then established at Dabney's Mills he met some of my staff officers outside and was highly jubilant over the prospects of success giving reasons why he believed this would prove the final and successful effort although my chief of staff had urged very strongly that we return to our position about city point and in the lines around Petersburg he asked Sheridan to come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them Sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had not been asked so one of my staff came in and told me that Sheridan had what they considered important news and suggested that I send for him I did so and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he was imbued knowing as I did from experience of what great value that feeling of confidence by a commander was I determined to make a movement at once although on account of the rains which had fallen after I had started out the roads were still very heavy orders were given accordingly finally the 29th of March came and fortunately there having been a few days free from rain the surface of the ground was dry giving indications that the time had come when we could move on that date I moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about Petersburg it soon set in raining again however and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for teams and almost so for cavalry sometimes a horse or mule would be standing apparently on firm ground when all at once one foot would sink and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all his feet would sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of the quick sands so common in that part of Virginia and other southern states it became necessary therefore to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced to move our artillery upon the army had become so accustomed to this kind of work and were so well prepared for it that it was done very rapidly the next day March 30th we had made sufficient progress to the southwest to warrant me in starting Sheridan with his cavalry over by Denwitte with instructions to then come up by the road leading northwest to Five Forks thus menacing the right of Lee's line this movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to the west as far as practicable towards the enemy's extreme right or Five Forks the column detached from the army still in the trenches was excluding the cavalry very small the forces in the trenches were themselves extending to the left flank Warren was on the extreme left when the extension began but Humphries was marched around later and thrown into the line between him and Five Forks my hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks get on the enemy's right flank and rear and force them to weaken their center to protect their right so that an assault in the center might be successfully made General Wright's Corps had been designated to make this assault which I intended to order as soon as information reached me of Sheridan's success he was to move undercover as close to the enemy as he could get it is natural to suppose that Lee would understand my design to be to get up to the south side and ultimately to the Danville Railroad as soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on the 29th these roads were so important to his very existence while he remained in Richmond and Petersburg and of such vital importance to him even in case of retreat that naturally he would make most strenuous efforts to defend them he did on the 30th Sin Picket with five brigades to reinforce Five Forks he also sent around to the right of his army some two or three other divisions besides directing that other troops beheld in readiness on the north side of the James River to come over on call he came over himself to super intend in person the defense of his right flank Sheridan moved back to Den Whitty Courthouse on the night of the 30th and then took a road leading northwest to Five Forks he had only his cavalry with him soon encountering the Rebel Cavalry he met with a very stout resistance he gradually drove them back however until in the neighborhood of Five Forks here he had to encounter other troops besides those he had been contending with and was forced to give way in this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place and stated that he was falling back toward Den Whitty gradually and slowly and asked me to send Right's Corps to his assistance I replied to him that it was impossible to send Right's Corps because that Corps was already in line close up to the enemy where we should want to assault when the proper time came and was besides a long distance from him but the second Humphreys and fifth Warren's Corps were on our extreme left and a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the left flank of the enemy at Five Forks and that I would send Warren accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move at once that night the 31st to Den Whitty Courthouse and put himself in communication with Sheridan as soon as possible and report to him he was very slow in moving some of his troops not starting until after Five O'Clock next morning when he did move it was done very deliberately and on arriving at gravelly run he found the stream swollen from the recent rains so that he regarded it as not affordable Sheridan of course knew of his coming and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as possible sent orders to him to hasten he was also hastened or at least ordered to move up rapidly by General Meade he now felt that he could not cross that creek without bridges and his orders were changed to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank or get in their rear but he was so late in getting up to move forward without him however Ares's division of Warren's corps reached him in time to be in the fight all day most of the time separated from the remainder of the Fifth Corps and fighting directly under Sheridan Warren reported to Sheridan about eleven o'clock on the first but the whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the afternoon Griffin's division in backing to get out of the way of a severe crossfire of the enemy was found marching away from the fighting this did not continue long however the division was brought back and with Ares's division did most excellent service during the day Crawford's division of the same corps was further off and although orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up it was late before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance once there it did very excellent service Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later in advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon Five Forks itself he was very impatient to make the assault and have it all over before night because the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in Bivouac during the night unless the assault was made and was successful he would be obliged to return to Den Whitty Courthouse or even further than that for the night it was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to get Crawford's division in hand with Warren he sent staff officer after staff officer in search of Warren directing that general to report to him but they were unable to find him and all events Sheridan was unable to get that officer to him finally he went himself he issued an order relieving Warren and assigning Griffin to the command of the Fifth Corps the troops were then brought up successfully made I was so much dissatisfied with Warren's dillatory movements in the battle of White Oak Road and in his failure to reach Sheridan in time that I was very much afraid that at the last moment he would fail Sheridan he was a man of fine intelligence great earnestness quick perception and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer under difficulties where he was forced to act but I had before discovered a defect which was beyond his control that was very prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just before us he could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it he would not only make preparations that might occur but he would inform his commanding officer what others should do while he was executing his move I had sent a staff officer to General Sheridan to call his attention to these defects and to say that as much as I liked General Warren now was not a time when we could let our personal feelings for anyone stand in the way of success and if his removal was necessary to success not to hesitate it was upon that authorization that Sheridan removed Warren I was very sorry that it had been done and regretted still more that I had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another field of duty it was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went over the parapets of the enemy the two armies were mingled together there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand the surrender of the other soon however the enemy broke and ran in every direction some 6,000 prisoners besides artillery and small arms in large quantities falling into our hands in different directions the cavalry and fifth corps under Sheridan pursuing the larger body which moved northwest this pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night when Sheridan halted his troops and knowing the importance to him of the part of the enemy's line which had been captured returned sending the fifth corps across hatchers run to Petersburg and facing them toward it Merit with the cavalry stopped in Bivouac west of five forks this was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the first of April I then issued orders for an assault by right and park at four o'clock on the morning of the second I also ordered the second corps general Humphries general Orrd with the army of the James on the left to hold themselves in readiness to take any advantage that could be taken from weakening in their front I notified Mr. Lincoln at city point of the success of the day in fact I had reported to him during the day and evening as I got news because he was so much interested in the movements taking place that I wanted to relieve his mind that I could I notified Weetzel on the north side of the James river directing him also to keep close up to the enemy and take advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to promptly enter the city of Richmond I was afraid that Lee would regard the possession of five forks as of so much importance that he would make an effort to retake it risking everything upon the cast of a single die it was for this reason that I had ordered the assault to take place at once as soon as I had received the news of the capture of five forks the corps commanders however reported that it was so dark that the men could not see to move and it would be impossible to make the assault then he was artillery fire upon the enemy around the whole line including that north of the James river until it was light enough to move which was about a quarter to five in the morning at that hour parks and rights corps moved out as directed brushed the avatars from their front as they advanced under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery and went without flinching and mounted the parapets and threw themselves inside of the enemy's line park who was on the right swept down to the right and captured a very considerable length of line in that direction but at that point the outer was so near the inner line which closely enveloped the city of Petersburg that he could make no advance forward and in fact had a very serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the defense of his own troops and to hold them but he succeeded in this right swung around to his left and moved to hatchers run sweeping everything before him the enemy had traverses in rear of his captured line under cover of which he made something of a stand from one to another as right moved on but the ladder met no serious obstacle as you proceed to the left the outer line becomes gradually much farther from the inner one and along about hatchers run they must be nearly two miles apart both park and right captured a considerable amount of artillery and some prisoners right about 3000 of them in the meantime Ord and Humphries in obedience to the instructions they had received had succeeded by daylight or very early in the morning in capturing the entrenched picket lines in their front and before right got up to that point Ord had also succeeded in getting inside the enemies entrenchments the second corps soon followed and the outer works of Petersburg were in the hands of the national troops never to be wrenched from them again when right reached hatchers run he sent a regiment to destroy the south side railroad just outside of the city my headquarters were still at Dabney's saw mills as soon as I received the news of right success I sent dispatches announcing the fact to all points around the line including the troops at Bermuda hundred and those on the north side of James and to the president at city point further dispatches kept coming in and as they did I sent the additional news to these points finding at length that they were all in I mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works when I arrived there but just as right's three thousand prisoners were coming out I was soon joined inside by general mead and his staff Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost ground park on our right was repeatedly assaulted but repulsed every effort before noon long street was ordered up from the north side of James river thus bringing the bulk of Lee's army around to the support of his extreme right as soon as I learned this I notified Weetzel and directed him to keep up close to the enemy and to have Hartziff commanding the Bermuda hundred front to do the same thing and if they found any break to go in Hartziff especially should do so for this would separate the Bermuda Sheridan after he had returned to five forks swept down to Petersburg coming in on our left this gave us a continuous line from the Appomattox river below the city to the same river above at eleven o'clock not having heard from Sheridan I reinforced park with two brigades from city point with this additional force he captured works for better defense and built back from his right so as to protect his flank he also carried in and made an Appomattox between himself and the enemy Lee brought additional troops and artillery against park even after this was done and made several assaults with very heavy losses the enemy had in addition to their entrenched line close up to Petersburg two enclosed works outside of it Fort Gregg and Fort Whitworth we thought it had now become necessary to carry them by assault about one o'clock in the day Fort Gregg was assaulted by Foster's division of the 24th Corps Gibbons supported by two brigades from Ords Command the additional troops were repulsed several times but it was finally carried and immediately the troops in Fort Whitworth evacuated the place the guns of Fort Gregg were turned upon the retreating enemy and the commanding officer with some 60 of the men of Fort Whitworth surrendered I had ordered miles in the morning to report to Sheridan moving to execute this order he came upon the enemy at the intersection of the White Oak Road and the Claybourne Road the enemy fell back to Sutherland Station on the south side road and were followed by miles this position naturally a strong and defensible one was also strongly entrenched Sheridan now came up and miles asked permission from him which Sheridan gave by this time Humphries had got through the outer works in his front and came up also and assumed command over miles who commanded a division in his corps I had sent an order to Humphries to turn to his right and move towards Petersburg this order he now got and started off thus leaving miles alone the latter made two assaults which failed and he had to fall back a few hundred yards hearing that miles had been left in this position I directed Humphries to send a division back to his relief he went himself Sheridan before starting to sweep down to Petersburg had sent Merritt with his cavalry to the west to attack some Confederate drove them north to the Appomattox River Sheridan then took the enemy at Sutherland Station on the reverse side from where miles was and the two together captured the place with a large number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery and put the remainder portions of three Confederate corps to flight Sheridan followed and drove them until night miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he with Sheridan had carried so handsomely by assault I cannot explain the situation here better than by giving my dispatch to City Point that evening Boydton Road near Petersburg April 2, 1865 440 p.m. Colonel T. S. Bowers City Point we are now up and have a continuous line of troops and in a few hours will be entrenched from the Appomattox below Petersburg to the river above Heath's and Wilcox's divisions such part of them as were not captured were cut off from town either designedly on their part or because they could not help it Sheridan with the cavalry and fifth corps is above them Miles's division second corps was sent from the White Oak Road to Sutherland Station on the south side railroad where he met them and at last accounts was engaged with them not knowing whether Sheridan would get up in time General Humphreys the whole captures since the army started out gunning will amount to not less than 12,000 men and probably 50 pieces of artillery I do not know the number of men and guns accurately however I think the president might come out and pay us a visit tomorrow U.S. Grant Lieutenant General Second Hour Line was entrenched from the river above to the river below I ordered a bombardment to be commenced the next morning at 5 a.m. to be followed by an assault at 6 o'clock but the enemy evacuated Petersburg early in the morning End of Section 64 Recording by Jim Clevenger Little Rock, Arkansas at joclev.com