 Okay, I think it's a good time to begin. Welcome to the Southeast Asian Seminars, where this is another one of our seminars online. Our guest today is Dr. Iqra Anugra, who's a research fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies at Blaine University and a research associate at the Institute for Social and Economic Research Education and Information, OP3ES in Jakarta. His current project formulates political theory of conservatism in modern Indonesia, 1945 to 2020. His works on Indonesian development and politics have been published in PS Political Science and Politics, Cornell University Press, and Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia. Before I invite Dr. Boomer to speak, if you have any questions, please put them in the Q&A box, and I will relate these at the end of the session to our guest. Okay, thank you. Would you please begin? Thank you very much for being part of this. Thank you so much, Mike. Thank you so much, Mr. Charney, for the generous introduction, and I should also say thank you to Michael Abiler, and I hope the colleague of mine for connecting me with the source network and encouraging me to share my latest project. And before I begin, I hope you can hear me all right. Again, I'm Iqra Anugra, a research fellow at the IIIS at Leiden University, and also a research associate at the Institute for Economic and Social Research Education and Information, or LPE3ES, in Jakarta. I'm a political scientist turned political theorist, and my talk today really is a testing ground for my new project on multi-strand conservatism in Indonesia, basically comparing anti-communist inflectables upon market economies, and Islamist populists looking at the underlying logic, connecting these different friends and their connections or disconnections with western conservative thoughts and politics. It's a new project, therefore, your comments and suggestions would be very appreciated. Let me start by mentioning some parameters of my talk or my discussion today. Here, I'm trying to do political theory, or rather than intellectual history. And what I mean by that is that what I'm aware of the importance of tracing influence and genealogy of ideas, which is the focus of intellectual historians. For my project, I'm more interested in identifying what I call as strange parallels and divergences between Western and vernacular conservatism. Specify the novelty of this vernacular or peripheral conservatism, including the problematics it advances and its transmutations, and see how this vernacular variant of conservatism can help us to better understand the anatomy and characteristics of conservatism as a modern reactionary ideology or sensibility. And therefore, try to ask better, more innovative questions about it based on these reflections. Moreover, while I truly recognize the need to study the subalterns or history from below, my account really focuses on history from above. After all, as the Marxist historian Perry Anderson once said, and I quote here, quote, a history from above, a history of the intricate machinery of class domination is no less essential than a history from below. Indeed, without it, the latter in the end becomes one sided, post-op, end quote. Therefore, here I studied the antagonists. The enemies, so to speak, authoritarian state elites who are basically, to use a somewhat politically incorrect language here, that native or pre-boomi males. And my working definition of conservatism borrows from the definition used by the political theorist Corey Robin who defines conservatism, broadly speaking, as an elitist pragmatic yet cross-class idea slash movement in defense of tradition, order, and great world progress. My purpose here is to provide an account of modern conservatism, making sense of conservatism in and through Indonesia. With that, let's begin our discussion. Paris, July 14, 1789. The city was burning. The Bastille, a fortress and a state prison, was stormed by the revolutionaries of France. The prison was the notorious symbol of the monarchical abuse of power. The ancient regime, unable to tackle the severe inequality and unable to address the people's grievances, witnessed its twilight. Its days were numbered. This symbolic event assured a new era where the ideals of democracy, liberty, equal citizenship, and fraternity spread like a wildfire. It was also a bloody event with the revolutionaries demanding the evolution of corrupt feudal order and monarchy through insurrections, ending with the beheading of King Louis XVI, later known as Citizen Louis Capet, in 1793, followed by the reign of terror. While Europe was watching the revolution with enthusiasm, an Anglo-Irish statement was watching in horror. Edmund Burke, a political king and a member of parliament, had his reaction to the unfolding of the French Revolution. He was not a hardcore British noise. After all, he was a wig, a believer in humanity's march to progress. But he was horrified by the idealism or rather dogmatic convictions in his view of the revolutionaries. In his famous treatise, Reflections on the Revolution in France, he said, I shall suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of France until I was informed how it had been combined with government, revenue, morality and religion, property, peace, and order. The English conservative philosopher Roger Scruton said that Burke, while recognizing the importance of political freedom, insisted that religion, family, tradition are a distillation of collective wisdom and practical rather than abstract reason. Scruton adds that according to Burke, these things connect us with the dead and the unborn, the past and the future. And these things make society instead of a mere collection of individuals. As Burke said, people will not look forward to posterity whenever they look backward to their ancestors. The French revolutionaries, in the view of Burke, in the name of liberty, aim to tear down everything. And in doing so, they duped the masses. And in their attempt to build a new world upside down, they ended up building a despotism. The distress of the masses is also inherent in Burke's thought. He claimed when the multitude are not under the discipline of the wiser, the expert, and the more opulent, they can scarcely be saved to be in civil society. Later, Burke was Christian as the founding father of Anglo-American conservatism. Fast forward two centuries later to revolutionary Indonesia. The masses and the rising educated bourgeois class kick out the Dutch colonizers. Indonesia joined other nations in celebrating and defending their independence through diplomacy and vicious battles. However, what constituted freedom was interpreted differently by these different social forces. The working masses demanded more. Independence revolution was a hollow concept without the democratization of class relations, without popular control of the mighty capital, and without popular participation in state institutions. The communists, hardened by multiple struggles, and had long history as patriots, supported the aspiration of the masses. So did the left wing nationalist Ocarnau, Indonesia's founding father. Under his guided democracy, essentially a form of left wing bonapartism, Sukarno attempted to form a united front with the masses and the communists or the PKI. This alienated other political forces and personalities, many of whom had middle class bourgeois or even aristocratic backgrounds, who thought that the national revolution had gone too far. It was in this context that Ali Murtoba emerged into the scene and later became one of the most dominant payers in the nation's political stage. Historian Sonny Carsono notes that Ali Murtoba was born in a relatively middle class family on September 23, 1924. His family experienced economic hardship. He did not complete his education at the Dutch language middle school or Mulu, and later opted to join his Bula, a Muslim militia or paramilitary organization at the age of 15. Later on, he joined the military and eventually achieved the rank of left and general. Carsono rightly notes that, quote, though the first cards that life provided him were not very promising, he played them so well that in three decades he not only achieved success in the military, but become one of the modernizers of his country. During his days of glory, his iconic portraits could be easily found and identified, including his trademark photograph of him in black classes, giving him a sinister quality of third world dictators. For many, the fear of revolutionary communist takeover of power was real. Yusuf Wanandi, an anti-communist, Chinese Catholic activist, and Ali Murtoba's close collaborator remarked in his memoir, Shades of Grey. He said, Sokarno used mass movements and mass mobilization as his strategy, not institution building. He overturned the relatively liberal democracy of 1950s, and then he squandered the country's economic wealth, therefore he lost the support of the middle class, including Wanandi. And in the view of Yusuf Wanandi at that time as an anti-communist activist, he thought Indonesia would most probably become a communist run country. And we, as Catholics, knew that we would be the first up against war. The history of Western Indonesian conservatism might be separated by fast geographical, cultural, and historical differences, but both share the same features as world historical events with important consequences. Both share the features of conservatism of fear, fear of the democratic demands for redistribution, class struggle, and control of the state by so-called easily manipulated working masses. David Borchier in his Marvel's book, Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia, identifies the possible influence of Catholic social teaching on Murtoba's thinking due to his friendship with Yusuf Wanandi and other Catholic and Black laws, especially on Murtoba's thinking on the role of peasants and workers in development. But what is also interesting in my view is the parallels and divergences between Ali Murtoba's thoughts and Anglo-American conservatism. This is the focus of my inquiry. After the destruction of the Communist Party or the PKI and its sympathizers and the outside of Sukarno, the anti-communist bourgeois coalition managed to install their own version of democratic governance, the developmentalist new order regime. With the coalition's political credentials and Suharto at the helm of the state, Murtoba and his boys had a re-rind to realize their visions. Murtoba became a close aide of Suharto, co-founded the Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, as it's famously known, as the regime's unofficial think tank. It made feasible political moves and not so feasible or hidden special intelligence operations. Ali Murtoba, with the help of his intellectual collaborators at CSIS, most notably Yusuf Wanandi and Harijan Silalahi, published numerous writings. The amount or number of publications of Murtoba's extensive writings might match that of Vladimir Lenin's selected works. Here are some key texts of Ali Murtoba. Some basic thoughts on the exploration and modernization of 25 years' development, national political strategies, cultural strategies, workers and peasants in development, and he also published numerous essays, gave tons of speeches, and wrote short books. It is a common secret that these texts were most likely ghostwritten by his CSIS friends. But I contend, and this is also something that the CSIS intellectuals themselves argued, that these texts are the actual distillation of Murtoba's highly original thinking, whom he found it difficult to write in texts. So what are Murtoba's core ideas? His core ideas cover a wide range of topics, ranging from historiography to political strategies, and I will try to basically summarize his thinking. He argued that national revolution is a prerequisite for bourgeois development. Sukarno's flirtation with populism was an aberration and betrayal of the original spirit of the independence movement, or the national revolution. Three individuals are always connected to the social. These individuals are always part of historical, organic societal whole. Murtoba also promoted pragmatic capitalist development, and he oscillated between greater state control and greater deregulation or liberalization of the economy. He championed what he called as accelerated modernization, which he described as rational and programmatic economic, technological, and social transformation, as opposed to overzealous revolutionary enthusiasm. He also discussed about culture and education. He aimed to promote modern or non-primordial corporate citizenship. He saw education as a venue for cultivation of values conducive for economic development goals, and he attempted to promote a new national culture amidst the dying traditional culture. His political philosophy or strategy is notorious. He promoted what he called as democracy, which essentially took the form of electoral trusteeship, and they politicized the the citizenry by promoting the floating mass policy, which basically not allowing the masses to mobilize outside elections. He recognized different diverse social and political cleavages in Indonesia, with the exception of the left. He promoted anti-extremism, which basically meant anti-communism and anti-Islamism. Controversially, he promoted the extensive political involvement of the armed forces in politics, and lastly, and obviously, he was obsessed with political stability. As a carpus of conservative thoughts, Murtaupo's ideas might sound reasonably modern in a repressive way for sure, and transformative in a sense that it completely overhauls the vision of Sukarno and PKI. It completely overhauls the socialism of Sukarno and PKI into a more social form of market economy and electoral competition. So what is exactly conservative about this? This might look confusing, but remember that conservatism is not anti-change. Change is necessary in conservatism to defend privileges and to defend what Corey Robin said as the felt experience of power. After all, as Edmund Burke himself said, state without the means of some change is without the means of its own conservation. Seeing from this perspective, we can see the connections between Burke's and Murtaupo's thoughts and the consistency or the unifying logic between Murtaupo's thoughts and actions. In political engineering, Murtaupo ensured the victory and hegemony of Gorkar, the regime's party. He tame oppositions and opposition parties by limiting the number of parties and forcing different parties to join with each other. He suffered democracy in the name of democracy. He was in he was involved in the colonization of West Papua and East Timor and he turned Islamists into useful idiots for his own agenda of anti-Jewary political stability. He co-founded the CSIS, as I mentioned before. He published numerous writings. He was famous for his autodidic learning. He spent his nights reading books and one of his favorite pastime is to invite people to his house from morning till night and basically he used those opportunities as a way to build informal group discussions with these people and interlocutors from all walks of life, ranging from intellectuals to fellow military leaders and personnel. He was a close aide to President Suharto. He was involved in the normalization of Indonesian-Malaysia relations and he promoted what can be considered as regional peace and stability in ASEAN, regional stability in the surface of economic development. He was also involved in cultural propaganda by mentoring bourgeois activists. He was a patron of the film industry but he was also involved in censoring films. He helped establishing the regime's newspapers, Suwara Karya. He provided the initial capital for the newspaper's establishment. He once served as a Minister of Information, a fitting role for him I would say, and he was active giving speeches in different parts, different provinces in Indonesia. He went to the provinces, met low-ranking officials, he met civil servants, he met teachers and gave speeches, outlining his vision for Indonesia. Obviously, besides legal, political activities and lobbying, his operations and activities oftentimes were supported by covert intelligence operations and intense politicking. So what is the connection between Murtopo's vision of conservatism and Burkian conservatism? I would say that Murtopo basically turbocharged Burkian conservatism. Murtopo's conservatism is Burkian conservatism on steroids. It is Burkian conservatism taken to its extreme end. Murtopo put his faith not only in tradition, as Burk did, but he also placed an emphasis on reason, which is a form of enlightened technocracy, which I will discuss later in later part of my talk. And for Murtopo, rather than dreadfully conceding to tribe, he conserved by shaking things up and accelerating bourgeois modernization. He shared similar strategies with his enemies left. One can even say that he copied strategies from the left. So Murtopo's conservatism is not only conservatism of fear, but it is also, I would say, a conservatism of optimism, a conservatism with a dash of kendo attitude. There are enabling contexts that allow Murtopo to have this more optimistic view of conservative statecraft. It was Cold War and the domestic balance of power was in his paper. He and his intellectual friends could use American social science theories, basically modernization theories for his intellectual justification. Murtopo and his collaborators had available blueprints for statecraft, for economic development, models such as bureaucratic policy and development of state models in Asian countries and to a lesser extent in Southeast Asia. Another influence on Murtopo's thoughts is Cold War social science. And what I mean by Cold War social science is empiricist social science, a variant of modernization theories. And the goal of this corpus of knowledge is to defend anti-communist liberal order and the American way of life against communist encroachment. So writers such as Samuel Huntington, Daniel Bell, or Rostow, the U.S. National Security Advisor, and his famous treatise, the stages of economic growth, a non-communist manifesto, where he outlined a stages view of capitalist development transitioning from traditional society to transitional stage to age of mass consumption driven by capitalist economy after a country managed to take off, managed to successfully graduate from the transitional stage. This was also the thinking behind New Order's economic development model. And in a nutshell, I would say that the idea is to combine revolution from above with entrepreneurship and middle-class society or middle-class rule. And Murtopo and his cohort see this as a way to discard the quote-unquote irrationality of highly emotional leftist populism and revolutionary creed of Sukarno and the PKI. In a way, the influence of Cold War social science in Indonesia under New Order mirrors the influence of libertarian or conservative economics of James Buchanan, the Nobel Prize winner and economist whose public choice theory became an intellectual foundation for the successful, radical, right-wing marketization agenda of social life against the gains of social movements in the United States. But phenomena showed attempts to subvert redistributive demands through democratic channels. Murtopo also had a hard time because New Order authoritarianism was anything but stable. The regime was threatened by interminatory rivalry, complaints and protests from younger student activists who then participated in riots against excessive Japanese investment in Indonesia, anti-Japanese riots. Murtopo also had to face Suharto Srat against Murtopo and his gang and the opposition and criticism from Islamic groups against against him and against his group. The New Order regime was also rift and full with latent social tensions. And this was reflected in Murtopo's occasional outburst. Murtopo was commonly known for his seemingly calm demeanor or at least that is the public image that he would like to portray. But as you can see here, he also showed some occasional outbursts of anger, especially during his tenure as a minister of information. In one speech he said, why is it that the minister of information produces lousy publications? This made me emotional sometimes. In my notes for the drafts of these publications, sometimes I write that this is crappy or this is dumbass. Eventually the cost of modernization, conservative modernization for the regime and Murtopo was pretty high. The regime was founded after the politicized of the communists. Over time, the regime witnessed tensions due to rising inequality and repression. Increasing chronic capitalism, corruption, and Suharto's increasingly erratic behaviors also do not help the regime's supporters. And this downfall trajectory of the regime was also mirrored in Murtopo's own trajectory. It was dismissed from Suharto's inner circle. He had to deal with declining health conditions. He suffered multiple heart attacks three times or four times and eventually he died in 1984 at the age of 60. So what do we make of Murtopo's conservatism? I think there are several observations and notes that we can make from Murtopo's brand of conservatism. Murtopo's belief in reason and programs, I would say, is a code word for a form of technocracy and non-contestational managed democracy, combined with some form of trickle-down economics. I also see Murtopo and his allies as fanguards of the new order counter-evolution. Moreover, Murtopo often liked to portray himself as a champion of new cultural sensibilities. But the idea of tradition and organism, the idea that tradition and the conception of Indonesian state and society as a cohesive family unit have always been there in Murtopo's thinking. It reappeared in his talk in the name of the guys of the creation or the need to create modern national culture and identity. Ultimately, his vision for orderly, yet accelerated modernization is an oxymoron. In a way, we can say that Murtopo's project was a fulfillment of Indonesia's long bourgeoisie revolution, the fulfillment of the kind of political order that Indonesian elites were involved in the anti-colonial project had been dreaming for a long time, where the lower order, the masses, was integrated into the polity, but eventually the one in charge was the middle class and the bourgeois class. And Murtopo's project was also a fulfillment of the bourgeoisian vision of great-world quality of order quality and an efficient of defense of hierarchy. In the end, both Western and Indonesian conservatism share a fear of mass democratic demands, especially demands pertaining to wealth redistribution. Lastly, for today's progressive and activist, Murtopo might be a Machiavellian trickster or ruthless operator from whom we can learn from. One does not have to be a Machiavellian to acknowledge the enemy's analytical and political prowess, to acknowledge the necessity of combining sharp mind with street smart sensibility of the ability to negotiate things while holding a moral or political conviction. Perhaps the progressive, the activist, or even the left, can learn from the unfound terribly of the new order. Perhaps we need a little bit of a Murtopoism to defend Indonesian's democratic gains. And that's all for today. And before closing this talk, I would like to acknowledge my institutions that have supported my research project so far. So thanks to Kyoto University Southern Center for Center for Studyation Studies, KITLV, the Royal National Center for Studyation and Caribbean Studies, and IIIS, where I'm currently based now. Again, thank you so much for having me. Your comments and suggestions would be very appreciated. And I'll leave it at that. Thank you so much. Thank you for a very interesting talk. As the chair of the host, I'll ask the first question. I'll read some of the questions from the people in the audience. This is, you're looking at developing, looking at his evolution of a political approach, political theory. So it's not an intellectual history, but it does happen in intellectual context, regional context. And I'm just wondering, so you have military rule in Thailand, 57, and Burma, 58, and then again in Burma, 62, and South Vietnam, from 63. And then, you know, again, when we had the Korean Republic from 1970, these are all happening. And at this time, but some of them lead to a completely different direction, particularly Burma from February 1963. How much is this influence in the way that he's thinking about the military's role in, you know, is to bring about these changes and the problems of where it might be? Should I answer, by the way? Thanks, Mike. It's a great question for sure. It's been a while since I looked at, you know, the military history and trajectories of military politics in Southeast Asia. But I think ideational factor is just one factor that shapes these divergent trajectories of military regimes in Southeast Asia. Material interests of these regimes of the military themselves and the civilian and their civilian allies also matter, I would say, in shaping the trajectories of these military regimes. Timing of liberalization also matters, and also its context. My sense is that in the context of Indonesia, you can only do so much with anti-communism, at least, you know, at least in the context of New Order's Indonesia, because after a while, you know, the specter of the left was gone, so regime had to find a way to justify its military role. So in a nutshell, I would say, ideas matter as an intellectual basis, as an ideational basis to reorganize society in accordance to, you know, the interests of the military, but other factors, including the material interests of these regimes and their supporters and also the global national context surrounding them, I would say, also matters equally or maybe more, and that explains this. The combination of those factors explains these divergent trajectories of these regimes. I don't think I can hear you. Sorry, I think you're muted. Thank you. So the first question we have from the audience is for Anandas Tundi. Thank you for this very interesting presentation. My question would be, to what extent was General Motono able to control the narrative and public perception of the widespread corruption and nepotism under the Suharto's regime, and why where did it fall short? Thank you so much for this question. It's a great question. I haven't really looked at the archives yet. That's my answer for now, fortunately. But from the archives, from the documents that I've read, it was hard for him because critics and dissidents who initially supported the regime also complained about this increasingly widespread corruption, for example. Murtopo himself also noticed that the CSIS folks also noticed that including the corruption done by Suharto's family members and at one point, because of their criticism of the corruption cases, they were kicked out from Suharto's university. So it was also hard for them to control public perception and to defend the regime in light of these growing corruption cases. We have two questions or a question to come in a row from Suzie Suderman. Is it really Allie Mortono's or the Cold War thinking that in reality emerged during the new order? And then the combat the military learned from the civic mission ideas from the US's counterinsurgency and laying the base for capitalist development? Thank you so much, Suzie, for your questions. These are really spot on. I mean, in a way, I guess we can argue that these are just transplantations of standard US Cold War thinking, for example. But we can also, I guess, trace the influence of other ideational inspirations. David Borcher talks about the influence, for example, of Catholic integrals thinking on Murtopo's conception of labor relations, of industrial relations, of the role of peasants in society. He said, well, there's no class conflict in Indonesia because our, you know, our society is organized as a harmonic society along the principles of Pancasila, the state foundation, which, you know, which sounds pretty much influenced by Catholic right-wing thinking, for example. And I guess this is also a challenge for me because as a political theory project, my aim here is to show, you know, things that might be original in Murtopo's or CSI's thinking and how these originality can intervene on debates among Western conservatives, whether these originally, if there's any, shows that there's something that the Western conservatives have been missing when talking about statecraft or economic management or development. So that's, that's indeed the challenge for me, I would say. We have a question from Ann Ruth. Could you say more about Murtopo's relations with the economic technocrats with Jojo, sadly, etc. My understanding is that he often opposed their economic policies and this was one reason for his fall from favor with Suharto, especially after 1998. Thank you, Buanna. Again, another great question. I'm still reading on it, to be honest. But more recently, I agree with this, I agree with this sort of tensions between Murtopo and other economic technocrats. I recently read a piece, a chapter by Ari Perdana, an economist used to be affiliated with CSIS and he basically mentioned exactly about that tension. His reading is that, well, the economic technocrats was still somewhat inspired by Fabian economic thinking, so they favored deeper involvement of the state in economic affairs, whereas Murtopo, at some point, preferred, well, maybe it's time to deregulate or it's time to let the private sector have a greater say in role in international economy. So based on my limited reading so far, yes, indeed the tensions was there and that might contribute to his ouster from Suharto's inner circle. I'm going to ask two questions in a row because otherwise I can't keep up. So we have a question from Dr. Phyllis Ferguson. Ams, a spousal of military and political expansion approved a court decision, see especially Ali Alatas, the pebble in the shoe. Can you speak to the decision regarding Papua and Papua and Timor? And U.G. Mizzuno asked, thank you for your presentation. To what extent this Murtopo's conservative pro-Bujwazi capitalist ideologies alive and reproduced under the current developmental Indonesian state? These are great questions. Thank you. Dr. Ferguson, I'm sorry, but I have to say that this is something that I haven't really looked at. So I'm aware of Ali Alatas' assessment of Murtopo's decision in annexing Papua and Timor, essentially. But yeah, I haven't really explored in it. I'm aware of the tensions among Murtopo's inner circle as well, but that's the limit of my understanding of that, basically. And for U.G. San, that's a great question. I'm not really sure. I think the current, the more recent form of developmentalism in Indonesia draws from other sources. So Ali Murtopo's thinking might be just one among many inspirations if assuming that there's something left in his thinking used in the current conception of developmentalism in Indonesia. I'm not sure to what extent his thinking is still used in national policies and whatnot. All I can say is for, at some point in history, his thinking mattered a lot. Why, from an honest point of view, why did Suharto accommodate Murtopo? Did Suharto put full trust on him or Suharto happened to need to accommodate Murtopo to control something? Again, another great question that it's like playing detective. So I have a conversation about this as well with a number of friends. Even the kind of interactions or friendship or collaboration between Murtopo and the CSIS, for example, Harijansila Lai and Yusuf Wanandi. In a way, it's a black box. So we don't know whether they just simply use each other, for example, or not. But reading on accounts of Suharto's rise at the time, you know, as someone lacking popular mass base, Suharto needed people, advisors, allies to support his takeover of power from Sukarno. So yeah, in a way, Suharto needed Murtopo and his allies and Murtopo, his allies and, you know, the anti-Sukarno coalition basically also needed someone to infiltrate the state. So Suharto was also a logical choice at that time. So in a way, I guess I would say they use each other. Leaving aside various comments on its interesting and amazing points, one says it's such an amazing presentation to get to the questions themselves because we only have 10 more minutes. I'm going to go through a couple of these and then you can answer them. I'm wondering how Murtopo orchestrated the Catholic boys' students, such as Casaboy, Casaboy from the 60s era to involve in CSIS. The second question, who were Murtopo's boys? How did he manage them as a team? And then third, does Murtopo's idea of floating mass, is it still relevant in discussing Indonesia's seemingly de-politicized or disinterested public to participate in politics today? Sure. Thank you so much for this. On the questions about Murtopo's connections with the Catholic boys or who are within his teams and how did he manage them, I think I will direct our audience to other works who I think did a better job in explaining this. So the fantastic work by David Portier, a number of works and reportage on Ali Murtopo and his CSIS connection done by Tempo, for example, or Made Supriatma, for example. So those are the references that I think can better answer these questions. Okay, so we have two further questions. One from Gregory, I can't pronounce the last name, sorry, let's say Gregory A. To what extent was Murtopo influenced by other intellectuals who are also attempting to come up with distinctive Indonesian conceptualizations developed by Miel Selim and Mubiarto's economy, Panjishila, Konjirai, Migrat's vision of values and development seen anthropologically and so on. And one last question, I am curious about the Opsas and their cultural impact managing anti-extremism in Indonesia today. These are great questions again, and I will answer these questions collectively from Dr. Acioli, from our colleague Nandu's attendee, and from Pa'al di Haider Amulia. I would say that these are interesting lines of inquiry that I haven't really looked at that somebody interested on these topics might pursue these questions further. So to what extent are Murtopo's ideas floating, are still relevant or applicable today? Or are they still used by some sections of the elites? I'm not sure about that. Whether Murtopo's Opsas operations have an impact or become an inspiration in managing anti-extremism in Indonesia today, that's also something that I don't really know, that I think someone should try to answer this. It is also a nice question that I can also explore in my research project. And what extent Murtopo was influenced by these other Indonesian intellectuals? I haven't really looked at that yet. But again, it's a great question. And it's interesting because these intellectuals that you mentioned, Emile Salim, for example, was also educated in the US. So this process of interconnections and one corpus of knowledge influencing each other from within Indonesia or among Indonesians, but through the mediation of Western ideas, especially in the context of authoritarian state building, it is also something that I haven't really looked at because the exercise that I just did today was really to see these strange parallels and differences between Murtopo's thinking and Anglo-American conservativeism. But the way he's thinking is also entangled with other networks. It is something that I need to look further in my project, I would say. We'll take one last question for Murtopo, which I'll rework a little. So in the past there had been collaboration between Islamic organizations and military against communists. So to what degree did Murtopo represent or was his thinking part of an anti-Islamic movement? It's interesting because he once participated in Hizbullah, a Muslim and Islamic militia. In a recent publication by an Indonesian newspaper, I forgot exactly. I'm speculated that Murtopo was a double agent that was implanted in Hizbullah. So we don't know for sure about the nature of his participation in Hizbullah. However, he was part of Hizbullah. In the counts that I've read, he seemed to be a practicing Muslim. So in a way, he was pretty close with these Islamic organizations. But we can say pretty sure that he didn't like Islamist rebellions and Indonesia experienced Islamist rebellions in the 1950s. So in a way, he saw Islamists as tactical allies sometimes, but he also saw them as a source of problems. Hence the nature of his ambivalent view and relationship with Islamist groups. Can we have one more question? Because we have one from Wendu Yusuf, which I think is very relevant to your talk. So I got the impression from a presentation that Murtopo was the modern prince of Indonesian conservatism. Do you find any other figures occupying the same position after Murtopo in the Indonesian context? Oh, that's a great question. After Murtopo, I have to think about that. But around Murtopo's time, we can, I would say, we can identify several modern princes or several high priests of the new order authoritarian modernization and project. So Wendu Yusuf obviously is one of them. And he left tons of writings to analyze as well. There are also other figures such as Ali Sadikin, the former governor of Jakarta, who had this technocratic vision, but he was also involved in making a vibrant cultural life in Jakarta. So around Murtopo's time, I could think of several fellow princes, fellow comrades of Murtopo, so to speak. But after Murtopo, I haven't really thought about it. So thanks for bringing that up. Well, I think we'll close it there. The timing is just about perfect for the end of the hour. We'd like to thank again, Dr. Ikra Anuga for presenting and for the numerous questions and attendance of our audience and their participation. And we'll call this close. And thank you. We remotely, we can't give a round of applause, but imagine that there is a round of applause for this. And thank you very much. And thank you so much. As well as to a close. Thank you very much.