 Book 3, chapters 6 through 10 of On War. This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by Timothy Ferguson. On War, by Carl von Klausowitz, translated by Colonel J. J. Graham. Book 3, Chapter 6, Boldness. The place and part which boldness takes in the dynamic system of powers, where it stands opposed to foresight and prudence, has been stated in the chapter on the certainty of the result in order thereby to show that theory has no right to restrict it by virtue of its legislative power. But this noble impulse, with which the human soul raises itself above the most formidable dangers, is to be regarded as an active principle peculiarly belonging to war. In fact, in what branch of human activity should boldness have a right of citizenship, if not in war? From the transport driver and the drummer up to the general, it is the noblest of virtues, the true steel which gives the weapon its edge and brilliancy. Let us admit, in fact, it has in war even its own prerogatives. Over and above the results of the calculation of space, time and quantity, we must allow a certain percentage which boldness derives from the weakness of others, whenever it gains the mastery. It is therefore virtually a creative power. This is not difficult to demonstrate philosophically. As often as boldness encounters hesitation, the probability of the result is of necessity in its favour, because the very state of hesitation implies a loss of equilibrium already. It is only when it encounters cautious foresight, which we may say is just as bold, at all events just as strong and powerful as itself, that it is at a disadvantage. Such cases, however, rarely occur. Out of the whole multitude of prudent men in the world, the great majority are so from timidity. Amongst large masses, boldness is a force, the special cultivation of which can never be to the detriment of other forces, because the great mass is bound to a higher will by the framework and joints of the order of battle and of the service, and therefore is guided by an intelligent power which is extraneous. This is therefore here only like a spring held down until action is required. The higher the rank, the more necessary it is that boldness should be accompanied by a reflective mind, that it may not be a mere blind outburst of passion to no purpose, for with the increase of rank it becomes always less a matter of self-sacrifice, and more a matter of the preservation of others, and the good of the whole. Where regulations of the service as a kind of second nature prescribe for the masses, reflection must be the guide of the general, and in his case individual boldness in action may easily become a fault. Still at the same time it is a fine failing, and must not be looked at in the same light as any other, happy the army in which untimely boldness frequently manifests itself. It is an exuberant growth, which shows a rich soil. Even fool-hidliness, that is, boldness without an object, is not to be despised. In point of fact it is the same energy of feeling, only exercised as a kind of passion without any cooperation in the intelligent faculties. It is only when it strikes at the root of obedience, when it treats with contempt the orders of superior authority, that it must be repressed as a dangerous evil, not on its own account, but on account of the act of disobedience, for there is nothing in war which is of greater importance than obedience. The reader will readily agree with us that supposing an equal degree of discernment to be forthcoming in a certain number of cases, a thousand times as many of them will end in disaster through over-anxiety, as through boldness. One would suppose it natural that the interposition of a reasonable object should stimulate boldness, and therefore lessen its intrinsic merit, and yet the reverse is the case in reality. The intervention of lucid thought, or the general supremacy of the mind, deprives the emotional forces of the great part of their power. On that account boldness becomes of rarer occurrence the higher we ascend the scale of rank, for whether the discernment and the understanding do or do not increase with these ranks, still the commanders, in their several stations as they rise, are pressed upon more and more severely by objective things, by relations and claims from without, so that they become the more perplexed, the lower the degree of their individual intelligence. This so far as regards war is the chief foundation of the truth of the French proverb, tell-brill, or secant, quesai, eclipses en première. Almost all the generals who are represented in history as merely having attained to mediocrity, and as wanting in decision when in supreme command, are then celebrated in their antecedent career for their boldness and decision. In those motives to bold action which arise from the pressure of necessity, we must make a distinction. Necessity has its degrees of intensity. If it lies near at hand, if the person acting is in the pursuit of his object, driven into great dangers in order to escape others equally great, then we can only admire his resolution, which still has also its value. If a young man to show his skill in horsemanship leaps across a deep cleft, then he is bold. If he makes the same leap, pursued by a troop of head-chopping janissaries, he is only resolute. But the father of the necessity from the point of action, the greater the number of relations intervening which the mind has to traverse in order to realise them, by so much the less does necessity take from boldness in action. If Frederick the Great in the year 1756 saw that war was inevitable and that he could only escape destruction by being beforehand with his enemies, it became necessary for him to commence the war himself. But at the same time it was certainly very bold, for few men in his position would have made up their minds to do so. Although strategy is only the province of generals in chief or commanders in the higher positions, still boldness in all the other branches of an army is as little a matter of indifference to it as their other military virtues. With an army belonging to a bold race, and in which the spirit of boldness has been always nourished, very different things may be undertaken than with one in which this virtue is unknown. For that reason we have considered it in connection with an army, but our subject is especially the boldness of the general, and yet we have not much to say about it after having described this military virtue in a general way to the best of our ability. The higher we rise in a position of command, the more of the mind understanding and penetration predominate in activity, the more therefore is boldness, which is a property of the feelings kept in subjection. And for that reason we find it so rarely in the highest positions, but then so much the more should it be admired. Boldness, directed by an overruling intelligence, is the stamp of the hero. This boldness does not consist in venturing directly against the nature of things in a downright contempt of the laws of probability, but if a choice is once made in the rigorous adherence to that higher calculation which genius, the tact of judgment, has gone over with the speed of lightning. The more boldness lends wings to the mind and the discernment, so much the further will they reach in their flight, so much the more comprehensive will be the view, the more exact the result, but certainly always only in the sense that with greater objects, greater dangers are connected. The ordinary man, not to speak of the weak and irresolute, arrives at an exact result so far as is possible without ocular demonstration at most after diligent reflection in his chamber, at a distance from danger and responsibility. Let danger and responsibility draw close round him in every direction, then he loses the power of comprehensive vision, and if he retains this in any measure by the influence of others, he will still lose his power of decision, because in that point no one can help him. We think then it impossible to imagine a distinguished general without boldness, that is to say, no man can become one who is not born with this power of the soul, and we therefore look upon it as the first requisite for such a career. How much of this inborn power, developed and moderated through education and the circumstances of life, is left when the man has attained a high position, is the second question. The greater this power still is, the stronger will genius be on the wing. The higher will be its flight. The risks become always greater, but the purpose grows with them. Whether its lines proceed out of and get their direction from a distant necessity, or whether they converge to the keystone of a building which ambition has planned, whether Frederick or Alexander acts, is much the same as regards the critical view. If the one excites the imagination because it is bolder, the other pleases the understanding most, because it has in it more absolute necessity. We have still to advert to one very important circumstance. The spirit of boldness can exist in an army either because it is in the people, or because it has been generated in a successful war, conducted by able generals. In the latter case it must of course be dispensed with at the commencement. Now in our days there is hardly any other means of educating the spirit of a people in this respect, except by war, and that too under bold generals. By it alone can the effeminacy of feeling be counteracted, that propensity to seek for the enjoyment of comfort which cause degeneracy in a people, rising in prosperity, and immersed in an extremely busy commerce. A nation can hope to have a strong position in the political world only if its character and practice in actual war mutually support each other in constant reciprocal action. Chapter 7 Perseverance The reader expects to hear of angles and lines and finds, instead of these citizens of the scientific world, only people out of common life, such as he meets with every day in the street, and yet the author cannot make up his mind to become a hair's breadth more mathematical than the subject seems to him to require, and he is not alarmed at the surprise which the reader may show. In war, more than anywhere else in the world, things happen differently to what we had expected, and look differently when near to what they did at a distance. With what serenity the architect can watch his work gradually rising and growing into his plan, the doctor, although much more at the mercy of mysterious agencies and chances than the architect, still knows enough of the forms and effects of his means. In war, on the other hand, the commander of an immense whole finds himself in a constant whirlpool of false and true information, of mistakes committed through fear, through negligence, through precipitation, of contraventions of his authority, either from mistaken or correct motives, from ill-will, true or false sense of duty, indolence or exhaustion, of accidents which no mortal could have foreseen. In short, he is the victim of a hundred thousand impressions, of which the most have an intimidating, the fewest and encouraging tendency. By long experience in war, the tact is acquired of readily appreciating the value of these incidents, high courage and stability of character stand proof against them, as the rock resists the beating of the waves. He who would yield to these impressions would never carry out an undertaking, and on that account, perseverance in the proposed object, as long as there is no decided reason against it, is the most necessary counter-poise. Further, there is hardly any celebrated enterprise in war which was not achieved by endless exertion, pains and privations, and, as here, the weakness of the physical and moral man is ever disposed to yield, only an immense force of will, which manifests itself in perseverance, admired by present and future generations, can conduct to our goal. Chapter 8. Superiority of Numbers. This is in tactics, as well as in strategy, the most general principle of victory, and shall be examined by us first in its generality, for which we may be permitted the following exposition. Strategy fixes the point where, the time when, and the numerical force with which, the battle is to be fought. By this triple determination it has therefore a very essential influence on the issue of the combat. If tactics has fought the battle, if the result is over, let it be victory or defeat, strategy makes such use of it as can be made in accordance with the great object of the war. This object is naturally often a very distant one, seldom does it lie quite close at hand. A series of other objects subordinate themselves to it as means. These objects, which are, at the same time, means to a higher purpose, may be practically of various kinds, even the ultimate aim of the whole war, may be a different one in every case. We shall make ourselves acquainted with these things, according as we come to know the separate objects which they come in contact with, and it is not our intention here to embrace the whole subject by a complete enumeration of them, even if that were possible. We therefore let the employment of the battle stand over for the present. Even those things through which strategy has an influence on the issue of the combat, insomuch as it establishes the same, to a certain extent decrees them, are not so simple that they can be embraced in one single view, for as strategy appoints time, place and force, it can do so in practice in many ways, each of which influences in a different manner the result of the combat as well as its consequences. Therefore we shall only get acquainted with this also by degrees, that is through the subjects which more closely determine the application. If we strip the combat of all modifications which it may undergo according to its immediate purpose and the circumstance from which it proceeds, lastly if we set aside the value of the troops, because that is a given quantity, then there remains only the bare conception of the combat, that is a combat without form, in which we distinguish nothing but the number of the combatants. This number will therefore determine victory. Now from the number of things above deducted to get to this point, it is shown that the superiority in numbers in a battle is only one of the factors employed to produce victory, that therefore so far from having with the superiority in number obtained all, or even only the principal thing, we have perhaps got very little by it according as the other circumstances which cooperate happen to vary. But this superiority has degrees, it may be imagined as twofold, threefold or fourfold, and everyone sees that by increasing it this way it must at last overpower everything else. In such an aspect we grant that the superiority in numbers is the most important factor in the result of combat, only it must be sufficiently great to be a counterpoise to all the other cooperating circumstances the direct result of this is that the greatest possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive point. Whether the troops thus bought are sufficient or not we have then done in this respect all that our means allowed. This is the first principle in strategy therefore in general as now stated it is just as well suited for Greeks and Persians or for Englishmen and Marathas as for French and Germans but we shall take a glance at our relations in Europe as respects war in order to arrive at some more definite idea on this subject. Here we find armies very much more alike in equipment, organization and practical skill of every kind. There only remains a difference in the military virtues of the armies and in the talent of the generals which may fluctuate with time from side to side. If we go through the military history of modern Europe we find no example of a marathon. Frederick the Great beat 80,000 Austrians at Luthon with about 30,000 men and at Rossbach with 25,000 some 50,000 allies. These are however the only instances of victories gained against an enemy with double or more than double in numbers. Charles the 12th in the Battle of Narva we cannot well quote for the Russians were at that time hardly to be regarded as Europeans. Also the principal circumstances even of the battle are too little known. Bonaparte had at Dresden 120,000 against 220,000 therefore not the double. At Cullen Frederick the Great did not succeed with 30,000 against 50,000 Austrians. Neither did Bonaparte in the desperate battle of Leipzig where he was 160,000 strong against 280,000. From this we may infer that it is very difficult in the present state of Europe for the most talented general to gain victory over an enemy double his strength. Now if we see double numbers prove such a weight in the scale against the greatest generals we may be sure that in ordinary cases in small as well as great combats an important superiority of numbers but which need not be over 2 to 1 will be sufficient to ensure the victory, however disadvantageous other circumstances may be. Certainly we may imagine a defile which even a tenfold would not suffice to force, but in such a case it can be no question of a battle at all. We think therefore that under our conditions as well as in all similar ones the superiority at the decisive point is a matter of capital importance and that this subject in the generality of cases is decidedly the most important of all. The strength at this decisive point depends on the absolute strength of the army and on the skill of making use of it. The first rule is therefore to enter the field with an army as strong as possible. This sounds like a common place but still it is really not so. In order to show that for a long time the strength of forces was by no means regarded as a chief point we need only observe that in most and even in the most detailed histories of the war in the 18th century the strength of the armies is either not given at all or only incidentally and in no case is any special value laid upon it. Tempelhof in his history of the Seven Years War is the earliest writer who gives it regularly but at the same time he does it only very superficially. Even Massenbach in his manifold critical observations of the Prussian campaigns of 1793 and 94 in the Vostras talks a great deal about hills and valleys roads and footpaths but doesn't say a syllable about mutual strength. Another proof lies in the wonderful notion which haunted the heads of many critical historians according to which was a certain size of an army which was the best a normal strength beyond which the forces in excess were burdensome rather than serviceable. Lastly there are a number of instances to be found in which all the available forces were not really bought into the battle or into the war because the superiority of numbers was not considered to have that importance which in the nature of things belongs to it. If we are thoroughly penetrated with the conviction that with a considerable superiority of numbers everything possible is to be affected then it cannot fail that this clear conviction reacts on the preparations for the war so as to make us appear in the field with as many troops as possible and either to give us ourselves the superiority or at least guard against the enemy obtaining it. So much for what concerns the absolute force with which the army is to be conducted. The measure of this absolute force is determined by the government and although with the determination the real action of the war commences and it forms an essential part of the strategy of the war still in most cases the general who is in command of these forces in the war must regard their absolute strength as a given quantity whether it be that he has no voice in fixing it or that circumstances prevented a sufficient expansion being given to it. There remains nothing therefore where an absolute superiority is not attainable but to produce a relative one at the decisive point by making skillful use of what we have. The calculation of space and time appears to be the most essential thing to this end and this has caused that subject to be regarded as one which embraces nearly the whole art of using military forces. Indeed some have gone so far as to ascribe to great strategists and tacticians a mental organ peculiarly adapted to this point. But the calculation of time and space although it lies universally at the foundation of strategy and is to a certain extent it's daily bread is still neither the most difficult nor the most decisive one. If we take an unprejudiced glance at military history we shall find that the instances in which the mistakes in such calculation have proved the cause of serious losses are very rare at least in strategy but if the conception of a skillful combination of time and space is fully to account for every instance of a resolute and active commander beating several separate opponents with one and the same army Frederick the Great burn apart then we perplex ourselves unnecessarily with conventional language. For the sake of cleanness and the profitable use of conceptions it is necessary that things should always be called by their right names. The right appreciation of their opponents, Down, Schwarzenberg, the audacity to leave for a short space of time, a small force only before them, energy-enforced marches, boldness in sudden attacks, the intensified activity which great souls acquire in the moment of danger, these are the grounds of such victories and what have these to do with the ability to make an exact calculation of two such simple things as time and space. But even this ricocheting play of forces when the victories at Rossback and Montmeral give the impulse to victories at Lutheran and Montrose to which generals on the defensive have often trusted is still if we would be clear and exact only a rare occurrence in history. Much more frequently the relative superiority that is the skillful assemblage of superior forces at the decisive point has its foundation in the right appreciation of those points in the judicious direction which by that means has been given to the forces from the very first and in the resolution required to sacrifice the unimportant to the advantage of the important that is to keep the forces concentrated in an overpowering mass. In this Frederick the Great and Bonaparte are particularly characteristic. We think we have now allotted to the superiority in numbers the importance which belongs to it. It is to be regarded as the fundamental idea always to be aimed at before all and as far as possible. But to regard it on this account as a necessary condition of victory would be a complete misconception of our exposition. In the conclusion to be drawn from it lies nothing more than the value which should attach to the numerical strength in the combat. If that strength is to be made as great as possible then the maximum is satisfied. A review of the total relations must then decide whether or not the combat is to be avoided for want of sufficient force. Chapter 9 The Surprise From the subject of the foregoing chapter the general endeavor to attain a relative superiority there follows another endeavor which must consequently be just as general in its nature. This is the surprise of the enemy. It lies more or less at the foundation of all undertakings for without it the preponderance at the decisive point is not properly conceivable. Surprise is therefore not only the means to the attainment of numerical superiority but it is also to be regarded as a substantive principle in itself on account of its moral effect. When it is successful in a high degree confusion and broken courage in the enemy's ranks are the consequences and of the degree to which these multiplier success there are examples enough great and small. We are not now speaking of the particular surprise which belongs to the attack but of the endeavor by measures generally and especially by the distribution of forces to surprise the enemy which can be imagined just as well in the defensive and which in the tactical defense particularly is a chief point. We say surprise lies at the foundation of all undertakings without exception only in very different degrees according to the nature of the undertaking and other circumstances. This difference indeed originates in the properties and peculiarities of the army and its commander in those even of the government. Secrecy and rapidity are the two factors in this product and these suppose in the government and the commander-in-chief great energy and on the part of the army a high sense of military duty with effeminacy and loose principles it is vain to calculate upon a surprise but so general indeed so indispensable as is this endeavor and true as it is that it is never wholly unproductive of effect still it is not the less true that its seldom succeeds to a remarkable degree and this follows from the nature of the idea itself. We should form an erroneous conception if we believed that by this means chiefly there is much to be attained in war in idea it promises a great deal in the execution it generally sticks fast by the friction of the whole machine in tactics the surprise is very much more at home for the very natural reason that all times in spaces are on a smaller scale it will therefore in strategy be the more feasible in proportion as the measures lie nearer to the province of tactics and more difficult the higher up they lie toward the province of policy. The preparations for a war usually occupy several months the assembly of an army at its principal positions requires generally the formation of depots and magazines and long marches the object of which can be guessed soon enough it therefore rarely happens that one state surprises another by a war or by the direction which it gives the mass of its forces in the 17th and 18th centuries when war turned very much upon sieges it was a frequent aim and a peculiar and important chapter in the art of war to invest a strong place unexpectedly but even that only rarely succeeded on the other hand with things which can be done in a day or two a surprise is much more conceivable and therefore also it is often not difficult thus to gain a march upon the enemy and thereby a position a point of country erode and such but it is evident that what surprise gains in this way in easy execution it loses in the efficacy as the greater the efficacy the greater always the difficulty of execution whoever thinks that with such surprises on a small scale he may collect great results as for example the gain of a battle the capture of an important magazine believes in something which is certainly very possible to imagine but for which there is no warrant in history for there are upon the whole very few instances where anything great has resulted from such surprises from which we may justly conclude that inherent difficulties lie in the way of their successes certainly whoever would consult history on such points must not depend on sundry battle-steeds of historical critics on their wise dikta and self-complacent terminology but look at the facts with his own eyes there is for instance a certain day in the campaign in Silesia 1761 which in this respect has attained a kind of notoriety it is the 22nd of July on which Frederick the Great gained on Lounden the march to Noysen near Nisa by which as he said the junction of the Austrian and Russian armies in Upper Silesia became impossible and therefore a period of four weeks was gained by the king whoever reads over this occurrence carefully in the principal histories and considers it impartially will in the march of the 22nd of July never find this importance and generally in the whole of the fashionable logic on this subject he will see nothing but contradictions but in the proceedings of Lounden in this renowned period of maneuvers much that is unaccountable how could one with a thirst for truth and clear conviction accept such historical evidence when we promise ourselves great effects in a campaign from the principle of surprising we think upon great activity rapid resolutions and forced marches as the means of producing them but that these things even when forthcoming in a very high degree will not always produce the desired effect we see in examples given by generals whom may be allowed to have had the greatest talent in the use of these means Frederick the Great and Bonaparte the first when he left Dresden so suddenly in July 1760 and falling upon Lasky then turned against Dresden gained nothing by the whole of that intermesio but rather placed his affairs in a condition notably worse as the Fortress Glatz fell in the meantime in 1813 Bonaparte turned suddenly from Dresden twice against Blutcher to say nothing of his incursion into Bohemia from Upper Lusatia and both times without in the least attaining his object though a blows in the air which only cost him time and force and might have placed him in a dangerous position in Dresden therefore even in this field a surprise does not necessarily meet with great success through the mere activity energy and resolution of commander it must be favoured by other circumstances but we by no means deny that there can be success we only connect with it a necessity of favourable circumstances which certainly do not occur very frequently and which the commander can seldom bring about himself just those two generals afford each a striking illustration of this we take first Bonaparte in his famous enterprise against Blutcher's army in February 1814 when it was separated from the Grand Army and descending the Marne it would not be easy to find two days march to surprise the enemy productive of greater results than this Blutcher's army extended over a distance of three days march was beaten in detail and suffered a loss nearly equal to that of a defeat in a great battle this was completely the effect of a surprise for if Blutcher had thought of such a near possibility of an attack from Bonaparte he would have organised his march quite differently to this mistake of Blutcher's the result is to be attributed Bonaparte did not know all these circumstances and so there was a piece of good fortune that mixed itself up in his favour it is the same with the battle of Lignitz 1760 Frederick the Great attained this fine victory through altering during the night a position which he had just before taken up Loudon was through this completely surprised and lost 70 pieces of artillery and 10,000 men although Frederick the Great had at this time adopted the principle of moving backwards and forwards in order to make a battle impossible or at least to disconcert the enemy's plans still the alteration of position on the night of the 14th and 15th was not made exactly with that intention but as the king himself says because the position of the 14th did not please him here therefore also chance was hard at work without this happy conjunction of the attack and the change of position in the night and the difficult nature of the country the result would not have been the same also in the higher and highest province of strategy there are some instances of surprises fruitful in results we shall only cite the brilliant marches of the great elector against the Swedes from Franconia to Pomerania and from the Mark Brandenburg to the Priegel in 1757 and the celebrated passage of the Alps by Bonaparte 1800 in the latter case an army gave up its whole theater of war by a capitulation and in 1757 another army was very near giving up its theater of war and itself as well lastly as an instance of a war wholly unexpected we may bring forth the invasion of Silesia by Frederick the Great great and powerful I hear the results everywhere but such events are not common in history if we do not confuse them with cases in which a state for want of activity and energy Saxony 1756 and Russia 1812 has not completed its preparations in time now there still remains an observation which concerns the essence of the thing a surprise can only be affected by that party which gives the law to the other and he who is in the right gives the law if we surprise the adversary by a wrong measure then instead of reaping good results we may have to bear a sound blow in return and in any case the adversary need not trouble himself much about our surprise he has in our mistake the means of turning off the evil as the offensive includes in itself much more positive action than the defensive so the surprise is certainly more in its place with the assailant but by no means invariably as we shall hear after see mutual surprises by the offensive and defensive may therefore meet and then that one will have the advantage who has hit the nail on the head the best so should it be but practical life does not keep to this line so exactly and that for a very simple reason the moral effects which attend a surprise often convert the worst case into a good one for the side they favor and do not allow the other to make any regular determination we have here in view more than anywhere else not only the chief commander but each single one because a surprise has the effect in particular of greatly loosening unity so that the individuality of each separate leader easily comes to light much depends here on the general relation in which the two parties stand to each other if the one side through a general moral superiority can intimidate and outdo the other then he can make use of the surprise with more success and even reap good fruit where properly he should come to ruin Chapter 10 Stratagem Stratagem implies a concealed intention and therefore is opposed to straightforward dealing in the same way as wit is the opposite of direct proof it has therefore nothing in common with the means of persuasion of self-interest of force but a great deal to do with deceit because that likewise conceals its object it is itself a deceit as well when it is done but still it differs from what is commonly called deceit in this respect that there is no direct breach of word the deceiver by stratagem leaves it to the person themselves whom he is deceiving to commit the errors of understanding which at last flowing into one result suddenly change the nature of things in his eyes we may therefore say as wit is slight of hand with ideas and conceptions so stratagem is slight of hand with actions at first it appears as if strategy had not improperly derived its name from stratagem and that with all the real and apparent changes which the whole character of war has undergone since the time of the greeks this term still points to its real nature if we leave to tactics the actual delivery of the blow the battle itself and look upon strategy as the art of using this means with skill then besides the forces of the character such as burning ambition which always presses like a spring a strong will which hardly bends and such and such there seems no subjective quality so suited to guide and inspire strategic activity as stratagem the general tendency to surprise treated of in the foregoing chapter points to this conclusion for there is a degree of stratagem be it ever so small which lies at the foundation of every attempt to surprise but however much we feel a desire to see the actors in war out do each other in hidden activity readiness and stratagem still we must admit that these qualities show themselves but little in history and have rarely been able to work their way to the surface from amongst the mass of relations and circumstances the explanation of this is obvious and it is almost identical with the subject matter of the preceding chapter strategy knows no other activity than the regulating of combat with the measures which relate to it it has no concern like ordinary life with the transactions which consist merely of words that is in expressions declarations and such but these which are very inexpensive are chiefly the means with which the wily one takes in those he practices upon that which there is like it in war plans and orders given merely as make believers false reports sent on purpose to the enemy is usually of so little effect in the strategic field that it is only resorted to in particular cases which offer of themselves therefore cannot be regarded as spontaneous action which emanates from the leader but such measures as carrying out the arrangements for a battle so far as to impose upon the enemy require a considerable expenditure of time and power of course the greater the impression to be made the greater the expenditure in these respects and as this is usually not given for the purpose very few demonstrations so-called in strategy affect the object for which they are designed in fact it is dangerous to detach large forces for any length of time merely for a trick because there is always the risk of its being done in vain and then these forces are wanted at the decisive point the chief actor in war is always thoroughly sensible of this sober truth and therefore he has no desire to play tricks of agility the bitter earnestness of necessity presses so fully into direct action that there is no room for that game in a word the pieces on the strategic chess board want that mobility which is the element of strategy and subtlety the conclusion that we draw is that a correct and penetrating eye is a more necessary and more useful quality for a general than craftiness although that also does no harm if it does not exist at the expense of necessary qualities of heart which is only too often the case but the weaker the forces which are under the command of strategy so much the more they become adapted for strategy so that to the quite feeble and little for whom no prudence no sagacity is any longer sufficient at the point where all art seems to forsake him strategy offers itself as a last resource the more helpless his situation the more everything presses toward one single desperate blow the more readily stratagem comes to the aid of his boldness let loose from all further calculations freed from all concern for the future boldness and stratagem intensify each other and thus collect at one point an infinitesimal glimmering of hope into a single ray which may likewise serve to kindle a flame end of book three chapters six through ten recording by Timothy Ferguson Gold Coast Australia this LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by Timothy Ferguson on war by Carl von Klausowitz translated by colonel J. J. Graham book three chapter 11 assembly of forces in space the best strategy is always to be very strong first generally then at the decisive point therefore apart from the energy which creates the army a work which is not always done by the general there is no more imperative and no simpler law for strategy than to keep the forces concentrated no portion is to be separated from the main body unless called away by some urgent necessity on this maxim we stand firm and look upon it as a guide to be depended upon what are the reasonable grounds on which a detachment of forces may be made we shall learn by degrees then we shall also see that this principle cannot have the same general effects in every war but that these are different according to the means and end it seems incredible and yet it has happened a hundred times the troops have been divided and separated merely through a mysterious feeling of conventional manner without any clear perception of the reason if the concentration of the whole force is acknowledged as the norm and every division and separation as an exception which must be justified then not only will that folly be completely avoided but also many an erroneous ground for separating troops will be by admission chapter 12 assembly of forces in time we have here to deal with the conception which in real life diffuses many kinds of illusory light a clear definition and development of the idea is therefore necessary and we hope to be allowed a short analysis war is the shock of two opposing forces in collision with each other from which it follows as a matter of course that the stronger not only destroys the other but carries it forward with its movement this fundamentally admits of no successive action of powers but makes the simultaneous application of all forces intended for the shock appear as a primordial law of war so it is in reality but only so far as the struggle resembles also in practice a mechanical shock but when it consists in a lasting mutual action of destructive forces then we can certainly imagine a successive action of forces this is the case in tactics principally because firearms form the basis of all tactics but also from other reasons as well if in a fire combat a thousand men are opposed to 500 then the gross loss is calculated from the amount of the enemy's force and our own 1000 men fire twice as many shots as 500 but no more shots will take effect on the thousand than on the 500 because it is assumed that they stand closer order than the other if we were to suppose the number of hits to be double then the losses on each side would be equal from the 500 there would be for example 200 disabled and out of the body of a thousand likewise the same now if the 500 had kept another body of equal number quite out of the fire then both sides would have 800 effective men but of these on the one side there would be 500 men quite fresh fully supplied with ammunition and in their full vigor on the other side only 800 all alike shaken in their order in want of sufficient ammunition and weakened in physical force the assumption that a thousand men merely on account of their greater number would lose twice as many as 500 would have lost in their place is certainly not correct therefore the greater loss which the side suffers that has placed the half of its force in reserve must be regarded as a disadvantage in that original formation further it must be admitted that in the generality of cases the thousand men would have the advantage at the first commencement of being able to drive their opponent out of his position and force him to a retrograde movement now whether these two advantages are a counter-poise to the disadvantage of finding ourselves with 800 men to a certain extent disorganized by the combat opposed to an enemy who is not materially weaker in numbers and who has 500 quite fresh troops is one that cannot be decided by pursuing an analysis further we must here rely upon experience and there will scarcely be an officer experienced in war who will not in the generality of cases assign the advantage to that side which has the fresh troops in this way it becomes evident how the employment of too many forces in combat may be disadvantageous for whatever advantages the superiority may give in the first moment we may have to pay dearly for in the next but this danger only endures as long as the disorder the state of confusion and weakness lasts in a word up to the crisis which every combat brings with it even for the conqueror within the duration of this relaxed state of exhaustion the appearance of a proportionate number of fresh troops is decisive but when this disordering effect of victory stops and therefore only the moral superiority remains which every victory gives then it is no longer possible for fresh troops to restore the combat they would only be carried along in the general movement a beaten army cannot be brought back to victory a day after by means of a strong reserve here we find ourselves at the source of a highly material difference between tactics and strategy the tactical results the results within the four corners of the battle and before its close lie for the most part within the limits of that period of disorder and weakness but the strategic result that is to say the result of the total combat of the victories realized let them be small or great lies completely beyond outside of that period it is only when the results of partial combats have bound themselves together into an independent whole that the strategic result appears but then the state of crisis is over the forces have resumed their original form and are now only weakened to the extent of those actually destroyed placed wars to combat the consequence of this difference is that tactics can make a continued use of forces strategy only a simultaneous one if I cannot in tactics decide all by the first success if I have to fear the next moment it follows of itself that I employ only so much of my force for that success of the first moment as appears sufficient for that object and keep the rest beyond the reach of fire or conflict of any kind in order to be able to oppose fresh troops to fresh or with such to overcome those that are exhausted but it is not so in strategy partly as we have just shown it has not so much reason to fear a reaction after a success realized because with that success the crisis stops partly all the forces strategically employed are not necessarily weakened only so much of them as have been tactically in conflict with the enemy's force that is engaged in partial combat are weakened by it consequently only so much as was unavoidably necessary but by no means all which was strategically in conflict with the enemy unless tactics has expended them unnecessarily cause which on account of the general superiority numbers have either been little or not at all engaged whose presence alone has assisted in the result are after the decision the same as they were before and for new enterprises as efficient as if they had been entirely inactive how greatly such cause which thus constitute our excess may contribute to the total success is evident in itself indeed it is not difficult to see how they may even diminish considerably the loss of the forces engaged in tactical conflict on our side if therefore in strategy the loss does not increase with the number of troops employed but is often diminished by it and if as a natural consequence the decision in our favor is by that means the more certain then it follows that in strategy we can never employ too many forces and consequently also they must be applied simultaneously to the immediate purpose but we must vindicate this proposition upon another ground we have hitherto only spoken with combat itself it is the real activity in war but men time and space which appear as the elements of this activity must at the same time be kept in view and the results of their influence brought into consideration also fatigue exertion and privation constitute in war a special principle of destruction not essentially belonging to contest but more or less inseparably bound up with it and certainly one which especially belongs to strategy they no doubt exist in tactics as well and perhaps they're in the higher degree but as the duration of the tactical axis shorter therefore the small effects of exertion and privation on them can come but little into consideration but in strategy on the other hand where time and space are a larger scale the influence is not only always very considerable but quite often decisive it is not at all uncommon for a victorious army to lose many more by sickness than on the field of battle if therefore we look at the sphere of destruction in strategy in the same manner as we've considered that of fire and close combat in tactics then we may well imagine that everything which comes within its vortex will at the end of the campaign or any other strategic period be reduced to a state weakness which makes the arrival of a fresh force decisive we might therefore conclude that there is a motive in the one case as well as the other to strive for the first success with as few forces as possible in order to keep up this fresh force for the last in order to estimate exactly this conclusion which in many cases in practice will have a great appearance of truth we must direct our attention to the separate ideas which it contains in the first place we must not confuse the notion of reinforcement with that of fresh unused troops there are a few campaigns at the end of which an increase of force is not earnestly desired by the conqueror as well as the conquered and indeed should appear decisive but that is not the point here for the increase of force could not be necessary if the force had been so much larger at the first but it would be contrary to all experience to suppose that an army coming fresh into the field is to be esteemed higher in point of moral value than an army already in the field just as a tactical reserve is more to be esteemed than a body of troops which has been already severely handled in the fight just as much as an unfortunate campaign lowers the courage and moral powers of an army a successful one raises these elements in their value in the generality of cases therefore these influences are compensated and then there remains over and above as clear gain the habituation of war we should besides look more here to successful than to unsuccessful campaigns because when the greater probability of the latter may be seen beforehand without doubt forces are wanted and therefore the reserving a portion for future use is out of the question this point being settled then the question is do the losses which are forced sustained through fatigues and privations increase in proportion to the size of the force as in the case in combat and to that we answer no the fatigues of war result in a great measure from the dangers with which every moment of the active war is more or less impregnated to encounter these dangers at all points to proceed onwards with security in the execution of one's plans gives employment to a multitude of agencies which make up the tactical and strategic service of the army this service is more difficult the weaker an army is and easier as its numerical superiority over the enemy increases who can doubt this the campaign against a much weaker enemy will therefore cost smaller efforts than against one who is just as strong or stronger so much for the fatigues it is somewhat different with the privations they consist chiefly of two things the want of food and the want of shelter for the troops either in quarters or in suitable camps both these ones will no doubt be in greater proportion as the number of men on one spot is greater but does not the superiority in force afford also the best means of spreading out and finding more room and therefore more means of subsistence and shelter if Bonaparte in his invasion of Russia in 1812 concentrated his army in great masses upon one single road in a manner never heard of before and thus cause privations equally unparalleled we must ascribe it to his maximum that it is impossible to be too strong at the decisive point whether in this instance he did not strain the principle too far is a question which would be out of place here but it is certain that if he had made a point of avoiding the stress which was by that means bought about he had only to advance on a greater breadth of front room was not wanted for the purpose in Russia and in very few cases cannot be wanted therefore from this no ground can be deduced to prove that the simultaneous employment of very superior forces must produce greater weakening but now supposing that in spite of the general relief afforded by setting apart a portion of the army wind and weather and the toils of war had produced a diminution even on the part which as a spare force would have been reserved for later use still we must take a comprehensive general view of the whole and therefore ask will this diminution of force suffice to counterbalance the gain in forces which we through our superiority in numbers may be able to make in more ways than one but there still remains a most important point to be noticed in a partial combat the force required to obtain a great result can be approximately estimated without much difficulty and consequently we can form an idea of what is superfluous in strategy this may be said to be impossible because the strategic result has no such well-defined object and no such circumscribed limits as the tactical thus what can be looked upon in tactics as an excess of power may be regarded in strategy as a means to give expansion to success if opportunity offers for it with the magnitude of the success the gain in force increases at the same time and in this way the superiority of numbers may soon reach a point which the most careful economy of forces could never have attained by means of his enormous numerical superiority Bonaparte was unable to reach Moscow in 1812 and to take that central capital had he by means of this superiority succeeded in completely defeating the Russian army he would in all probability have concluded a peace in Moscow which in any other way was much less attainable this example is used to explain the idea not to prove it which would require a circumstantial demonstration for which this is not the place all these reflections bear merely upon the idea of a successive employment of forces and not upon the conception of a reserve properly so called which they no doubt come in contact with throughout but which as we shall see in the following chapter is connected with some other considerations what we desire to establish here is that if in tactics the military force through the mere duration of actual employment suffers a diminution of power if time therefore appears as a factor in the result this is not the case in strategy in a material degree the destructive effects which are also produced upon the forces in strategy by time are partly diminished through their mass partly made good in other ways and therefore in strategy it cannot be an object to make time an ally on its own account by bringing troops successively into action we say on its own account for the influence which time on account of other circumstances which brings about but which are different from itself can have indeed must necessarily have for one of the two parties is quite another thing it is anything but indifferent or unimportant and will be the subject of consideration here after the rule which we have been seeking to set forth is therefore that all forces which are available and destined for a strategic object should be simultaneously applied to it and this application will be so much more the complete the more everything is compressed into one act and into one movement but still there is in strategy a renewal of effort and a persistent action which as a chief means towards the ultimate success is more particularly not to be overlooked it is the continual development of new forces this is also the subject of another chapter and we only refer to it here in order to prevent the reader from having something in view of which we have not been speaking we now turn to a subject very closely connected with our present considerations which must be settled before full light can be thrown on the whole we mean the strategic reserve chapter 13 strategic reserve reserve has two objects which are very distinct from each other namely first the prolongation and renewal of the combat and secondly for use in case of unforeseen events the first object implies the utility of a successive application of forces and on that account cannot occur in strategy cases in which a core is sent to suck or a point which is supposed to be about to fall are plainly to be placed in the category of the second object as the resistance which has to be offered here could not have been sufficiently foreseen but a core which is destined expressly to prolong the combat and with that object in view is placed in the rear would be only a core placed out of reach of fire but under the command and at the general disposition of the general commanding in the action and accordingly would be a tactical and not a strategic reserve but the necessity for a force ready for unforeseen events may also take place in strategy and consequently there may also be a strategic reserve but only where unforeseen events are imaginable in tactics where the enemy's measures are generally first ascertained by direct sight and where they may be concealed by every wood every fold of undulating ground we must naturally always be alive more or less to the possibility of unforeseen events in order to strengthen subsequently those points which appear to weak and in fact to modify generally the disposition of our troops so as to make it correspond better to that of the enemy such cases must also happen in strategy because the strategic act is directly linked to the tactical in strategy also many a measure is first adopted in consequence of what is actually seen or in consequence of uncertain reports arriving from day to day or even from hour to hour and lastly from the actual results of the combats it is therefore an essential condition of strategic command that according to the degree of uncertainty forces must be kept in reserve against future contingencies in the defensive generally but particularly in the defense of certain obstacles of ground like rivers hills and such such contingencies as is well known happen constantly but this uncertainty diminishes in proportion as the strategic activity has less of the tactical character and ceases almost altogether in those regions where it borders on politics the direction in the direction in which the enemy leads his columns to the combat can be perceived by actual sight only where he intends to pass a river is learned from a few preparations which are made shortly before the line by which he proposes to invade our country is usually announced by all the newspapers before a pistol shot has been fired the greater the nature of the measure the less it will take the enemy by surprise time and space are so considerable the circumstances out of which the action proceeds so public and little susceptible to alteration that the coming event is either made known in good time or can be discovered with reasonable certainty on the other hand the use of a reserve in this province of strategy even if one were available will always be less efficacious the more the measure has a tendency towards being one of a general nature we have seen that the decision of a partial combat is nothing in itself but that all partial combats only find their complete solution in the decision of the total combat but even this decision of the total combat has only a relative meaning of many different gradations according as the force over which the victory has been gained forms a more or less great and important part of the whole the lost battle of a core may be repaired by the victory of the army even the lost battle of an army may not only be counterbalanced by the gain of a more important one but converted into a fortunate event the two days of kulm august 29 and 30 1813 no one can doubt this but it is just as clear that the weight of each victory the successful issue of each total combat is so much the more substantial the more important the part conquered and that therefore the possibility of repairing the loss by subsequent events diminishes in the same proportion in another place we shall have to examine this in more detail it suffices for the present to have drawn attention to the indubitable existence of this progression if we now add lastly to these two considerations the third which is that if the persistent use of forces in tactics always shifts the general result to the end of the whole act law of the simultaneous use of forces in strategy on the contrary lets the principal result which need not be the final one take place almost always at the commencement of the great or whole act then in these three results we have ground sufficient to find strategic reserves always more superfluous always more useless always more dangerous the more general their destination the point where the idea of a strategic reserve begins to become inconsistent is not difficult to determine it lies in the supreme decision employment must be given to all the forces within the space of the supreme decision and every reserve active force available which is only intended for use after that decision is opposed to common sense if therefore tactics has in its reserves the means of not only meeting unforeseen dispositions on the part of the enemy but also of repairing that which can never be foreseen the result of the combat should that be unfortunate strategy on the other hand must at least as far as relates to the capital result renounce the use of these means as a rule it can only repair the losses sustained at one point by advantages gained at another in a few cases by moving troops from one point to another the idea of preparing such reserves by placing forces in reserve beforehand can never be entertained in strategy we have pointed out as an absurdity the idea of a strategic reserve which is not to cooperate in the capital result and as it is so beyond doubt we should not have been led into such an analysis as we have made in these two chapters were it not that in the disguise of other ideas it looks like something better and frequently makes its appearance one person sees in it the acme of strategic scarcity and foresight another rejects it and with the idea of any reserve consequently even of a tactical one this confusion of ideas is transferred to real life and if we would see a memorable instance of it we have only to call to mind that Prussia in 1806 left a reserve of 20,000 men cantoned in the mark under Prince Eugene of Whartonburg which could not possibly reach the sale in time to be of any use and that another force of 25,000 men belonging to this power remained in eastern south prussia destined only to be put on a war footing afterwards as a reserve after these examples we cannot be accused of having been fighting with windmills chapter 14 economy of forces the road of reason as we have said seldom allows itself to be reduced to a mathematical line by principles and opinions there remains always a certain margin but it is the same in all the practical arts of life for the lines of beauty there are no abscissi and ordinates circles and ellipses are not described by means of their algebraical formulae the actor in war therefore sued finds he must trust himself to the delicate tact of judgment which founded on natural quickness of perception and educated by reflection almost unconsciously seizes upon the right he soon finds that at one time he must simplify the law by reducing it to some prominent characteristic points which form his rules that at another the adopted method must become the staff on which he leans as one of these simplified characteristic points as a mental appliance we look upon the principle of watching continually over the cooperation of all forces or in other words of keeping constantly in view that no part of them should ever be idle whoever has forces where the enemy does not give them sufficient employment whoever has part of his forces on the march that is allows them to lie dead while the enemies are fighting he is a bad manager of his forces in this sense there is a waste of forces which is even worse than their employment to no purpose if there must be action then the first point is that all parts act because the most purposeless activity still keeps employed and destroys a portion of the enemy's force whilst troops completely in active are for the moment quite neutralized unmistakably this idea is bound up with the principles contained in the last three chapters it is the same truth but seen from a somewhat more comprehensive point of view and condensed into a single conception chapter 15 geometrical element the length to which the geometrical element or form in the disposition of military force in war can become a predominant principle we see in the art of fortification where geometry looks after the great and the little also in tactics it plays a great part it is the basis of elementary tactics or the theory of moving troops but in field fortification as well as in the theory of positions and of their attack its angles and lines rule like lawgivers who have to decide the contest many things here were at one time misapplied and others were mere fribbles still however in the tactics of the present day in which in every combat the aim is to surround the enemy the geometrical element has attained anew a great importance in a very simple but constantly recurring application nevertheless in tactics where all is more movable where the moral forces individual traits and chance are more influential than in a war of sieges the geometrical elements can never attain to the same degree of supremacy as in the latter but less still is its influence in strategy certainly here also form in the disposition of troops the shape of countries and status of great importance but the geometrical element is not decisive as in fortification and not nearly so important as in tactics the manner in which this influence exhibits itself can only be shown by degrees at those places where it makes its appearance and deserves notice here we wish more to direct attention to the difference which there is between tactics and strategy in relation to it in tactics time and space quickly dwindle to their absolute minimum if a body of troops is attacked in flank and rear by the enemy it soon gets to a point where retreat no longer remains such a position is very close to an absolute impossibility of continuing to fight it must therefore extricate itself from it or avoid getting into it this gives to all combinations aiming at this from the first commencement a great efficiency which chiefly consists in the disquietude which it causes the enemy as to consequences this is why the geometrical disposition of the forces is such an important factor in the tactical product in strategy this is only faintly reflected on account of the greater space and time we do not fire from one theater of war upon another and often weeks and months must pass before a strategic movement designed to surround the enemy can be executed further the distances are so great that the probability of hitting the right point at last even with the best arrangements is but small in strategy therefore the scope for such combinations that is for those resting on the geometrical element is much smaller and for the same reason the effect of an advantage once actually gained at any point is much greater such advantage has time to bring all its effects to maturity before it is disturbed or quite neutralized therein by any counteracting apprehensions we therefore do not hesitate to regard as an established truth that in strategy more depends on the number and magnitude of victorious combats than on the form of the great lines by which they are connected a view just the reverse has been a favorite theme of modern theory because a great importance was supposed to be thus given to strategy and as the higher functions of the mind was seen in strategy it was thought by that means to a noble war and as it was said through a new substitution of ideas to make it more scientific we hold it to be one of the principal uses of a complete theory openly to expose such vagaries and as the geometrical element is the fundamental idea from which theory usually proceeds therefore we have expressly brought out this point in strong relief end of book three chapters 11 through 15 recording by Timothy Ferguson gold coast australia book three chapters 16 through 18 of on war this LibriVox recording is in the public domain recording by Timothy Ferguson on war by Carl von Klausowitz translated by colonel J. J. Graham book three chapter 16 on the suspension of the act in warfare if one considers war as an act of mutual destruction we must of necessity imagine both parties as making some progress but at the same time as regards the existing moment we must almost as necessarily suppose the one party in a state of expectation and only the other actually advancing for circumstances can never be actually the same on both sides or continue so in time a change must ensue from which it follows that the present moment is more favorable to one side than the other now if we suppose that both commanders have a full knowledge of this circumstance then the one has a motive for action which at the same time is a motive for the other to wait therefore according to this it cannot be for the interest of both at the same time to advance nor can waiting be for the interest of both at the same time this opposition of interest as regards the object is not reduced here from the principle of general polarity and therefore is not in opposition to the argument in the fifth chapter of the second book it depends on the fact that here in reality the same thing is at once an incentive or motive to both commanders namely the probability of improving or impairing their position by future action but even if we suppose the possibility of a perfect equality of circumstances in this respect or if we take into account that through imperfect knowledge of their mutual position such an equality may appear to the two commanders to subsist still the difference of political objects does away with the possibility of suspension one of the parties must of necessity be assumed politically to be the aggressor because no war could take place from defensive intentions on both sides but the aggressor has the positive object the defender merely a negative one to the first then belongs the positive action for it is only by that means that he can attain the positive object therefore in cases where both parties are in precisely similar circumstances the aggressor is called upon to act by virtue of his positive object therefore from this point of view a suspension in the act of warfare strictly speaking is in contradiction with the nature of the thing because two armies being two incompatible elements should destroy one another unremittingly just as fire and water can never put themselves in equilibrium but act and react one upon another until one quite disappears what would be said of two wrestlers who remained clasped around each other for hours without making a movement action in war therefore like that of a clock which is wound up should go on running down in a regular motion but while that is the nature of war it still wears the chains of human weakness and the contradiction we see here is that man seeks and creates dangers which he fears at the same time will astonish no one if we cast a glance at military history in general we find so much the opposite of an incessant advance toward the aim that standing still and doing nothing is quite plainly the normal condition of an army in the midst of war acting the exception this must almost raise a doubt as to the correctness of our conception but if military history leads to this conclusion when viewed in the mass the latest series of campaigns redeems our position the war of the french revolution shows too plainly its reality and only proves too clearly its necessity in these operations and especially in the campaigns of bonaparte the conduct of the war attained to that unlimited degree of energy which we have presented as the natural law of the element this degree is therefore possible and if it is possible then it is necessary how could anyone in fact justify in the eyes of reason the expenditure of forces in war if acting was not the object the baker only heats his oven if he has bread to put in it the horses only yoke to the carriage if we mean to drive why then make the enormous effort of a war if we look for nothing else by it but like efforts on the part of the enemy so much in justification of the general principle now as to its modifications as far as they lie in the nature of the thing and are independent of special cases there are three causes to be noticed here which appear as innate counterpoises and prevent the over rapid or uncontrollable movement of the wheel work the first which produces a constant tendency to delay and is thereby a retiring principle is the natural timidity and want of resolution in the human mind a kind of inertia in the moral world but which is produced not by attractive but by repellent forces that is to say by dread of danger and responsibility in the burning element of war ordinary natures appear to become heavier the impulsion given must therefore be stronger and more frequently repeated if the motion is to be a continuous one the mere idea of the object for which arms have been taken up is seldom sufficient to overcome this resistant force and if a warlike enterprising spirit is not at the head who feels himself in war in his natural element as much as a fish in the ocean or if there is not the pressure from above of some great responsibility then standing still will be the order of the day and progress will be the exception the second cause is the imperfection of human perception and judgment which is greater in war than anywhere because a person hardly knows exactly his own position from one moment to another and can only conjecture on slight grounds that of the enemy which is purposely concealed this often gives rise to the case of both parties looking upon one and the same object as advantageous for them while in reality the interest of one must preponderate thus then each may think he acts wisely by waiting another moment as we have already said in the fifth chapter of the second book the third cause which catches hold like a ratchet wheel in machinery from time to time producing a complete standstill is the greatest strength of the defensive form a may feel too weak to attack b from which it does not follow that b is strong enough for an attack on a the addition of strength which the defensive gives is not merely lost by assuming the offensive but also passes to the enemy just as figuratively expressed the difference of a plus b and a minus b is equal to two b therefore it may so happen that both parties at one and the same time not only feel themselves too weak to attack but also are so in reality thus even in the midst of the active war itself anxious sagacity and the apprehension of too great danger find vantage ground by means of which they can exert their power and tame the elementary impetuosity of war however at the same time these causes without an exaggeration of their effect would hardly explain the long states of inactivity which took place in military operations in former times in wars undertaken about interests of no great importance and in which inactivity consumed nine tenths of the time the troops remained under arms this feature in these wars is to be traced principally to the influence which the demands of the one party and the condition and feeling of the other exercised over the conduct of the operations as has already been observed in the chapter on the essence and object of war these things may obtain such a preponderating influence as to make a war a half and half affair a war is often nothing more than an armed neutrality or a menacing attitude to support negotiations or an attempt to gain some small advantage by small exertions and then to wait the tide of circumstances or a disagreeable treaty obligation which is fulfilled in the most niggardly way possible in all these cases in which the impulse given by interest is slight and the principle of hostility feeble in which there is no desire to do much and also not much to dread from the enemy in short where no powerful motives press and drive cabinets will not risk much in the game hence this tame mode of carrying on war in which the hostile spirit of real war is laid in irons the more war becomes in this manner devitalized so much the more its theory becomes destitute of the necessary firm pivots and buttresses for its reasoning the necessary is constantly diminishing the accidental constantly increasing nevertheless in this kind of warfare there is also a certain shrewdness indeed its action is perhaps more diversified and more extensive than in the other hazard played with Rillo of Gold seems changed into a game of commerce with Groschen and on this field where the commander of war spins out the time with a number of small flourishes with skirmishes at outposts half in earnest half in jest with long dispositions which end in nothing with positions and marches which afterwards are designated as skillful only because their infantesimally small causes are lost and common sense can make nothing of them here on this very field many theorists find the real art of war at home in these fates parades half and quarter thrusts of former wars they find the aim of all theory the supremacy of mind of a matter and modern wars appear to them mere savage fisticuffs from which nothing is to be learned and which must be regarded as mere retrograde steps towards barbarism this opinion is as frivolous as the objects to which it relates where great forces and great passions are wanting it is certainly easier for a practice dexterity to show its game but is then the command of great forces not in itself a higher exercise of the intelligent faculties is then that kind of conventional sword exercise not comprised in and belonging to the other mode of conducting war does it not bear the same relation to it as the motions upon a ship to the motions of the ship itself truly it can take place only under the tacit condition that the adversary does no better and can we tell how long he may choose to respect those conditions has not been the French revolution fallen upon us in the midst of the fancied security of our old system of war and driven us from Chalon to Moscow and did not Frederick the Great in like manner surprise the Austrians reposing in their ancient habits of war and make their monarchy tremble woe to the cabinet which with a shilly shally policy and a routine ridden military system meets with an adversary who like the rude element knows no other law than of his intrinsic force every deficiency in energy and exertion is then a weight in the scales in favor of the enemy it is not so easy then to change from the fencing posture into that of an athlete and a slight blow is often sufficient to knock down the whole the result of all the causes now adduced is that the hostile action of a campaign does not progress by a continuous but by an intermittent movement and that therefore between the separate bloody acts there is a period of watching during which both parties fall into the defensive and also that usually a higher object causes the principle of aggression to predominate on one side and thus leaves it in general in an advancing position by which then its proceedings become modified in some degree chapter 17 on the character of modern war the attention which must be paid to the character of war as it is now made has a great influence upon all plans especially on strategic ones since all methods formally usual were upset by burn parts luck and boldness and first rate powers almost wiped out at a blow since the spaniards by their stubborn resistance have shown what the general arming of a nation and insurgent measures on a great scale can affect in spite of weakness and porousness of individual parts since Russia by the campaign of 1812 has taught us first that an empire of great dimensions is not to be conquered which might have been easily known before secondly that the probability of final success does not in all cases diminish in the same measure as battles capitals and provinces are lost which was formally an incontrovertible principle with all diplomacy and therefore made them always ready to enter at once into some bad temporary peace but the donation is often strongest in the heart of its country if the enemy's offensive power has exhausted itself and with what enormous force the defensive then springs over to the offensive further since Prussia 1813 has shown that sudden efforts may add to an army sixfold by means of the militia and that this militia is just as fit for service abroad as in its own country since all these events have shown what an enormous factor the heart and sentiments of a nation may be in the product of its political and military strength in fine since governments have found out all these additional aids it is not to be expected that they will let them lie idle in future wars whether it be that danger threatens their own existence or that relentless ambition drives them on that a war which is waged with the whole weight of the national power on each side must be organized differently in principle to those where everything is calculated according to the relations of the standing armies to each other it is easy to perceive standing armies once resembled fleets the land force the sea force in their relations to the remainder of the state and from that the art of war on shore had in it something of naval tactics which it is now quite lost chapter 18 tension and rest the dynamic law of war we have seen in the 16th chapter of this book how in most campaigns much more time used to be spent in standing still and in action than in activity now although as observed in the preceding chapter we see quite a different character in the present form of war still it is certain that real action will always be interrupted more or less by long pauses and this leads to the necessity of our examining more closely the nature of these two phases of war if there is a suspension of action in war that is if neither party will something positive there is rest and consequently equilibrium but certainly an equilibrium in the largest signification in which not only the moral and physical war forces but all relations and interests come into calculation as soon as ever one of the two parties proposes to himself a new positive object and commences active steps towards it even if it is only by preparations and as soon as the adversary opposes this there is a tension of powers this lasts until the decision takes place that is until one party either gives up his object or the other has conceded it to him this decision the foundation of which lies always in the combat combinations which are made on each side is followed by a movement in one or other direction when this movement has exhausted itself either in the difficulties which had to be mastered in overcoming its own internal friction or through new resistant forces prepared by the acts of the enemy then either a state of rest takes place or a new tension with the decision and then a new movement in most cases in the opposite direction this speculative distinction between equilibrium tension and motion is more essential for practical action than may at first sight appear in a state of rest and of equilibrium a varied kind of activity may prevail on one side that results from opportunity and does not aim at a great alteration such an activity may contain important combats even pitched battles but yet it is still of a quite different nature and on that account generally different in its effects if a state of tension exists the effects of the decision are always greater partly because a greater force of will and a greater pressure of circumstances manifest themselves therein partly because everything has to be prepared and arranged for a great movement the decision in such cases resembles the effect of a mine well closed and tamped whilst an event in itself perhaps just as great in a state of rest is more or less like a massive powder puffed away in the open air at the same time as a matter of course the state of tension must be imagined in different degrees of intensity and it may therefore approach gradually by many steps towards the state of rest so that at last there is a very slight difference between them now the real use which we derive from these reflections is the conclusion that every measure which is taken during a state of tension is more important and more prolific in results than the same measure could be in a state of equilibrium and that this importance increases immensely in the highest degrees of tension the cannonade of valmy september 20 1792 decided more than the battle of hawk Kirk october 14 1758 in attractive country which the enemy abandons to us because he cannot defend it we can settle ourselves differently from what we should do if the retreat of the enemy was only made with the view to a decision more under favorable circumstances again a strategic attack in course of execution a faulty position a single false march may be decisive in its consequence whilst in a state of equilibrium such errors must be of a very glaring kind even to excite the activity of the enemy in a general way most bygone wars as we have already said consisted so far as regards the greater part of the time in this state of equilibrium or at least in such short tensions with long intervals between them and weaken their effects that the events to which they gave rise were seldom great successes often they were theatrical exhibitions got up in honor of a royal birthday hawk Kirk or merely satisfying of the honor of the arms punters dorth or the personal vanity of the commander freeberg that a commander should thoroughly understand these states that you should have the tact to act in the spirit of them we hold to be a great requisite and we have had experience in the campaign of 1806 how far it is sometimes wanting in that tremendous tension where everything pressed on toward a supreme decision and that alone with all its consequences should have occupied the whole soul of the commander measures were proposed and even partially carried out such as the reconnaissance toward frankonia which at the most might have given a kind of gentle play of oscillation within a state of equilibrium over these blundering schemes and views absorbing the activity of the army the really necessary means which could alone save were lost sight of but this speculative distinction which we have made is also necessary for our further progress in the construction of our theory because all that we have to say on the relation of attack and defense and on the completion of this double-sided act concerns the state of crisis in which the forces are placed during the tension and motion and because all the activity which can take place during the condition of equilibrium can only be regarded and treated as a colliery for that crisis is the real war and this state of equilibrium only its reflection end of book three chapters 16 through 18 recording my timothy figson gold coast australia