 Good morning everybody. Good morning and welcome to Carnegie. My name is Bill Burns and I'm fortunate to be the president of the Carnegie Endowment but I'm especially fortunate today to welcome home to Carnegie, my friend and former colleague Rose Gautamuller. FOMO, The Fear of Missing Out, is a condition that afflicts many in this town and in our profession but I suspect that Rose was very glad to be on this side of the Atlantic when NATO leaders gathered in London earlier this week and I have to say we're equally glad to have the opportunity to hear and learn from one of the wisest policy voices and certainly one of the most decent human beings that I ever encountered in many years of public service. It took seven decades for NATO to appoint a woman as deputy secretary general, the alliance's number two job and if we've learned anything during Rose's remarkable three-year tenure it might take another 70 to find anyone with her combination of skill, energy, leadership and grit. I don't need to tell anyone here that NATO has had to navigate some stormy waters in recent years and I think we've all been very lucky to have Rose helping the captain that ship from managing a resurgent Russia and a very frail arms control regime to coming to grips with newer challenges like cyber Rose has been an extraordinarily steadying force and through her example and advocacy Rose has also worked hard to promote diversity and inclusion in a profession that desperately lacks both Today we'll have the opportunity to get Rose's assessment of NATO and whether it can use this moment of crisis to adapt to a transformed international landscape and we'll also get her assessment of where we are in arms control today and where we need to go if we're to avert the new arms race After Rose's remarks, I'll moderate a very brief conversation just to get us started and then leave plenty of time for questions from the audience So I want to thank you all again for coming today and ask you to join me in giving Rose Gadamal a very warm welcome Thank you. Good morning everyone. It's wonderful to be back on the stage. It's wonderful to be back at the Carnegie Endowment Thank you very much Bill for this opportunity and thank you for your warm words I hadn't thought about FOMO with regard to the London meeting, but you're absolutely 100% right I will start this morning by talking about the London meeting. I am going to start with Macron. It's inevitable There'll be some questions about that and then I will move on to talking about Where I think we need to go with regard to particularly strategic arms reduction According to Macron, NATO Was heading into the December 4 meeting in a brain dead state a kind of zombie alliance and I like that picture In fact, there were apparently some very funny jokes around NATO headquarters of people kind of walking in Zombie way just just to make it clear that there is a sense of humor at NATO as well um His point though is that NATO is too attached to its old ways Too tied down by its old relationships, especially the transatlantic one And NATO is seeing the world as it was and not as it is now Riven by terrorism, but not so menaced by nation states such as russia Macron likes russia or at least wants to open up to a more wide-ranging dialogue with russia And that has been something that of course has been difficult For NATO I'll speak in a moment about the dual-track dialogue plus deterrence and defense But since the seizure of Crimea in 2014, of course, there has been A constraint on NATO's reaction relations with russia But leaving this meeting yesterday all seemed satisfied that macron had launched a useful debate And in fact, that's an important point about all this macron himself said that he Played the role of the icebreaker crunching through the ice making a lot of noise But in the end opening up water where a good debate and discussion can take place You know, it's Strange though in my mind that the way he went about it in the early critique was to say That france was not consulted when the u.s. President made his decision about withdrawing troops from syria and Then the turkish army was unleashed in northeast syria To me, that's a strange assertion because nato never has and never will serve that purpose of being the Entree the general entree for consultation on all matters of defense And security with the united states or with any of the other members Uh, you know allies consult among themselves on issues related to nato business. Sometimes that's kind of loosely defined But nevertheless not on every issue affecting their national security Frankly also, I want to make the point that the us consultation record at nato has been rather good in the last year There are two very good examples of that. I think first the consultation about The nine m729 the russian missile that is in violation of the inf treaty. So the the consultation pre the demise of the inf treaty was excellent and allowed Individual nato allies to themselves determine that russia is in violation of the in of the inf treaty So that was a very good consultative process that the us undertook and second Preparing for the peace process in afghanistan I note this morning that ambassador calisade is back in Kabul today The peace process will again get going the negotiations will still Uh, I know take some time, but nevertheless We are back to that point and he consulted regularly in the run up to august I think we will see again ambassador calisade being a regular visitor at nato headquarters in brussels So while nato is not designed for blanket consultations on all security issues It is designed for providing security in the eurotlantic space for its members Here macron's comments were mixed on the one hand He seemed to call into a doubt the viability of the nato security guarantee article five of the washington treaty So I was very glad to see it reasserted in the final statement from the london meeting But on the other hand he praised the operational ability of nato to deliver On those deterrence promises underscoring the interoperability and operational effectiveness of the alliance nato, he said clearly is working well in commanding operations and That to me is nato's bread and butter. That's what nato is all about Providing true and tested ability to fight and in that area macron was actually quite complimentary That was little notice last week when all the ferrarii was going on So I think it was fair to say that there was a vivid environment for discussion and debate entering into the london meeting No doubt this situation I think is valuable for the alliance since alliance strength is based on consensus and decision making And that consensus can only be forged through discussion And debate so as painful as achieving consensus can be it is the only way I suspect That this process being launched out of the london meeting Will take some time. It's being talked about as a two-year process But nevertheless, I think it will be effective in Forging some new directions for the alliance perhaps but in the end of the day I think it will come down to the results of the harmel report These conclusions were profound for the alliance back when france withdrew from the military Command structure of nato in 1966 belgium foreign minister pierre harmel and his colleagues undertook a process To figure out what to do about nato going forward and in the end of the day The process produced a very short and succinct report that we continue to live by today The bottom line was the so-called two-track decision The decision that was reiterated in the 2016 war saw summit After a 20-year hiatus when There were hopes of deeper cooperation between nato and russia But the two-track decision Focuses on the one hand on strong deterrence and defense and on the other hand on dialogue And detente I think this has been such a firm Foundation for nato to continue to work on over the years because it serves a profound purpose As former deputy assistant secretary jamie shea put it in a 2009 lecture the dual-track Agreement or decision ensured that nato's role was not simply to preserve the status quo But ultimately to change it and I think that is an important point to my mind That is nato's greatest advantage Its adaptability in other words nato will not stand still That continue to adapt and change to respond to circumstances political as well as military Jens Stoltenberg when he was preparing for the london's meeting said In his 28 november press conference that he's wrestling with the paradox and i've seen that every day In the office of the secretary general that is while questions are being asked about the strength of the transatlantic bond North america and europe are doing more together than they have For many many decades jens put it in a very amusing way yesterday when he said i'm a politician I'm used to good rhetoric and bad substance In this case we have bad rhetoric and great substance So I thought that was a very very telling comment from him and it gets to the point that i wanted to underscore for you Gets back to the point that macron made about actually nato doing well in leading operations Where the rubber meets the road where defense and security are concerned nato is doing its job Now I would like to just say a few things about what what I see as Perhaps some less noticed results from this leaders meeting and it gets to again the substantive accomplishments first of all There is a real effort underway now to focus on readiness and reinforcement After again the move into Crimea by russia in 2014 nato took initial very important Decisions to do some quick reinforcement But also to put the battle groups in place in the three Baltic states in poland Everyone recognizes they are but a tripwire They are not the kind of force if it came to a long range conflict that could actually defend the allies So the emphasis since the battle groups and very much since our july meeting in 2018 has been on building up our ability to reinforce and on improving Readiness and so I think this nato readiness initiative that was launched in brussels in 2018 has been very very Promising in terms of what it helps to accomplish Just to recollect for you It's 30 battalions 30 air squadrons and 30 combat ships ready in 30 days to participate in reinforcement activities if needed Allies by the time of this meeting in london had already assigned about 90 percent of the units required But they were able to fill in the gaps so that the nri is now 100 percent filled and on its way To implementation and I think this is very important I'll come to it again in a moment But all allies definitely recognize that they need to do more on readiness And they need to be better prepared for reinforcement The second area less known perhaps is that nato is working on monitoring and surveillance abilities In a number of ways the leaders in london Agreed that space would be a new domain of operations just as we've had air sea land and cyber Added to the domains of operations over the years Over time as nato works with its member states to enhance space-based reconnaissance nato's ability to monitor for crises And conflict will increase The first of nato's new surveillance drones has just arrived in sicily in the last week or 10 days And nato has just signed a contract worth 1 billion us dollars to modernize the airborne warning and control system the awaq system All of these initiatives will help nato respond more quickly in crises and conflict And finally it has been a headline matter and it has been since President trump came to office, but investing more in defense Has been at the top of the agenda. It was for this meeting in london as well But the point i'm going to distress for you is that it is critically tied to a wide ranging recognition inside the alliance That in fact the allies the nato member states have to address mass obsolescence mass obsolescence and lack of readiness The war saw packed Era equipment in the hands of many of our newer allies in central and eastern europe I think are a fine example of that they need to modernize their equipment base Therefore it's for good reason that stoltenberg is advertising that nato defense spending figures are showing a fifth consecutive year of growth With 130 billion dollars invested since 2016 He is forecasting that the accumulated increase in defense spending by the end of 2024 Will be 400 billion dollars believe me ends is very careful about about calculating these numbers They are numbers that the alliance can stand by and they played well at the summit meeting I do think that they contributed to a kind of Lower key president trump than we've been accustomed to seeing at nato meetings in the in recent years So in the end the results of December 4th could not be determined from the outside That's clearly the case But I was glad to see that the planning that had gone on before my departure in mid-october In fact bore fruit in addition to the points I mentioned. I will also just Make one final emphasis on the agreement over china policy where nato has been you know for some time now Engaged in military to military staff talks with china We've also had a paul mill discussion going on which I have led in recent years But now it's been regularized turning it into a Regular meeting between our assistant secretary general for political affairs And the director general of the of the chinese ministry of foreign affairs I think this is a good thing rather than the dsg meeting from time to time with the chinese ambassador It's a good thing to have a regularized paul mill discussion So our interactions with china have been I think good in terms of Improving and increasing communication But the thing I always want to emphasize for every audience including for our chinese Colleagues who ask all the time, you know look at the name Of nato. It's the north atlantic treaty organization. Our center of gravity is in the transatlantic space We are not going to be shifting wholesale to china But nevertheless the implications of china's rise are important for the alliance in such things as military mobility As china buys up port facilities in europe, for example, what what implications are there for For nato, what do we need to be thinking about in terms of our ability to reinforce And we're working very closely with the european union on issues of military mobility So these are some of the things that have driven this policy review in nato But i'm very glad to see that it has come out looking Very balanced in terms of being aware of the opportunities that china represents But also the necessity of continuing to look for the challenges be aware of the challenges And be wise about how the rest of the The relationship develops going forward Now let me talk a bit about the nuclear arms control agenda and in particular the new start treaty Which I had the honor of working on with a great team of us negotiators One message I wanted to begin by stressing is one that often gets lost in the debate I think And that is Any arms control treaty Including the new start treaty is not a good in and by itself It is only valuable in so far as it Enhances us national security and the security of our allies Arms control is not worth pursuing if it does not contribute to our security and indeed facilitate our ability to defend ourselves In that way arms control is a part of the spectrum of deterrence and defense Just as our capable conventional forces strong nuclear forces and reliable missile and air defenses I know that a debate has been underway as to whether to extend the new start treaty in for five years from february 2021 To february 2026 as is permitted by the treaty A number of arguments have been advanced against this step Including that the treaty does not control the new nuclear systems that russian president Putin has announced And most prominently in a speech on march 1 2018 Frankly, I don't find these arguments convincing In part because in fact new start can play a role in regulating these systems and i'll say more about that in a few moments But more importantly, we need to take a bald look at whether new start benefits us national security And what blows to our security would accrue should new start go out of force on february 5 2021 To me the answer is clear During the coming decade the united states will be modernizing its nuclear forces If the treaty is extended until 2026 it will continue to cap russian deployed warheads at 1550 And delivery systems at his missiles and bombers at 700 Giving the united states a stable environment in which to modernize Stable and may I say predictable predictable environment in which to modernize Without that that's a treaty in force That predictability and stability could go out the window and fast There's no faster way for the russians to outrun us than to deploy more nuclear warheads on their missiles This is not a new issue Starting in the 1970s the soviets and now the russians have built larger and heavier intercontinental ballistic missiles Or icbms on which they can load more warheads at will They have plenty of them in storage If released from the current 1500 limit on deployed warheads the russians could Could readily add several hundred more warheads Some say up to a thousand warheads to their existing deployments of icbms without deploying a single additional missile Because of their ability to upload those missiles and do it fairly rapidly This would force the united states into a difficult targeting problem at best And a strategic crisis at worst So we cannot afford to lose parity or stop regulating it If new start lapses that outcome could happen fast and outcome dangerous for our national security Therefore I underscore and I believe it is in the national security interests of the united states To extend the new start treaty to february of 2026 Such an extension will provide a stable environment Both to modernize the u.s. Nuclear triad and to negotiate a new strategic arms reduction treaty Now as I conclude I'd like to mention that I am not At all pessimistic about the future of arms control and limitation We have we just have to be careful not to throw out the baby with the bath water Many today are saying that we have we've run the course on Traditional arms control we've run out the string on traditional measures that control weapon hardware Instead they say we must confront the difficult nay unprecedented problems associated with cyber weapons artificial intelligence other new and emerging technologies My point is we cannot afford to drop constraints on hardware and continuing to work to put in place new constraints on hardware Missiles and nuclear warheads are plenty potent threats and will remain so So while we look for ways to control and regulate new technologies We must continue improving how we control and regulate existing hardware Especially nuclear hardware nuclear weapons remain the most potent weapons of mass destruction And we cannot forget that fact with that I'll look forward to our conversation and thank you very much for this opportunity today. Thank you Well rose, thank you very much for um those characteristically thoughtful comments And I thought I'd start our conversation with just Two or three questions because I want to leave plenty of time for all of you and for your questions We have until about 10 30 this morning But let me start with the london summit and nato's future and then we can turn to arms control and its future If you set aside just for a second the imagery of brain death and zombie alliances You've reassured me that there's still a sense of humor at nato headquarters, which is a good thing That's one of nato's greatest strengths is its sense of humor. I think Little known and not recognized needs it these days in some respects, but um Clearly there are a lot of challenges Today and also as you look at over the next few years being one of them is about uncertainty over The american role and uncertainty that's been deepened in a lot of ways in in this era But there's another concern as well that NATO again as you know better than anyone is an alliance of liberal democracies And you've got some nato members today, whether it's turkey most visibly but also hungry and some other nato members Who are clearly going through a regression to put it diplomatically in terms of commitment by their leaderships To the democratic values which really are at the core of the alliance How big a problem is that today and how is the alliance going to manage that as you look ahead It's a problem today bill and it has been a problem in the past And that is how I think about this issue every member of nato signs up to the The basic principles in the washington treaty which are related to advancing the goals of liberal democracy And are powerfully stated actually the washington treaty if you haven't read it lately is A short and succinct document, but it it powerfully states these principles And so every nation who becomes a member of nato must sign up to these principles and in the run up to membership Of course as in the run up to eu membership They are in many ways stress tested on on these their ability to live up to these principles But uh, yes, it is clear there are authoritarian developments in some nato In some nato countries moving away from what we would consider the the principles of of Democratic practice But I take a long view of this and I look back to the past as well and consider Well consider what happened after the invasion of cyprus by turkey in 1974 And what that meant for turkey being shut out in many ways again weapons sanctions Against their purchase of weapons these types of things going on but more in in the same time period the long Rain of Of salazar in portugal and what that meant For portugal's participation in the alliance and I always think that the alliance by continuing Come what may day in day out in our Basically our daily activities how we continue to To be proponents of these principles in how we work and in the end of the day it was kernels who had been working And engaged as nato military staff or working out the portuguese mission in nato But who had been every day so engaged in Advancing in everything we do it's organic, you know targeting for example thinking about how to plan a military Operation so as to target and avoid civilian casualties all of these kind of organic Methods that relate back to our our principles in the washington treaty They're part of the day in day out life at nato and I feel like we need to continue to push those from the ground up at nato And we see historically I bring up portugal because it's the example that is most vivid of the flower revolution that took place in the early 1970s Bringing democracy back to portugal that was brought about by People who had been working at nato working in nato and really you know had The opportunity to continue at nato to develop to develop in that way. So I think it's You know, it's just important to remind ourselves that we need to continue doing what we do And then work with With the different capitals if there are issues if there are problems The last thing i'll say about turkey though is that turkey is a very very strong ally And is someone who is a country that is very engaged day in day out on Operations military operations, whether in afghanistan k4 whether in iraq they are very strong and Very good Participants in our operations. So coming back to military effectiveness. They are they are really strong allies Thanks, ross. You talked in your opening remarks a bit about nato's long-term strategy and the last Formal strategy adopted by nato. I think was a decade ago in 2010 Lots happened since then to understate the facts Does it make sense to look to another sort of to adapting another formal strategy now a decade later Is that possible given all the complications we've been talking about before and if It made sense to try to do that. What do you think would be the most important innovations to try to focus on? Well, i'm interested to see what happens with this group that will be formed out of the london meeting Because i think it is possible they will be taking a good hard look apparently at nato strategic directions So it is possible that their work could form the basis for a new strategic concept We will see how it goes. Actually, i think nato has been doing very well Again focusing on the urgent issues that we have to address such as being able to put in place very quickly the battle groups in the Baltic states in poland Because we've had urgent Basically urgent issues to address and it's been done in a very pragmatic and i think effective way But it is also important then and that was a major point that macron was making to think about the Strategic directions of the organization. So i think we haven't been we haven't been doing badly We haven't been frozen in place. We have continued to adapt new challenges, but indeed the new challenges Uh, i think it it makes sense to take a good hard look at what they mean for the alliance overall An area that i really believe will be Well, it's important to every military but new and emerging technologies and where that is driving military operations military practice so these things can be addressed on a kind of Pragmatic basis as the challenges arise But i think it also makes sense to step back and take a take a long look take a good hard look And in order to ensure that nato is prepared to adapt and adapt as as necessary so So we will see what what happens, but i mentioned new and emerging technologies clearly We will continue to keep a sharp eye On what is going on with the russian federation that it's not inevitable And i'll be interested to see next week if there's any progress on the normandy format Uh, if we see some some progress in resolving the situation in the donbas that there could be some some improvement in our Interactions with russia overall we continue to emphasize the importance of dialogue and discussion with russia the nato russia council met met 10 times as i recollect In the years since 2016 so so we do have a regular dialogue with the russians But there are perhaps some areas we could look further at but for that to happen russia is going to need to to show some progress On the road to returning to as we call it the the world of international law and order And that i think we'll have to see what what normandy brings what the normandy process brings and the other processes that are going on in the donbas Whereas your mention of the enormous significance of emerging technologies on You know nato's future but it obviously has a huge impact as well on the future of arms control as you mentioned before And so that kind of leads me to my last question and i'll open it up to all of you And that is as you look at you know, what my colleague at carnegie james actin has written eloquently about the entanglement of cyber advanced conventional weapons missile defense a whole range of You know systems which are modernizing very quickly on traditional nuclear arms control As you look ahead beyond the issue of new start you made an eloquent case for the extension of new start So if just for a moment you assume that you know, we find a way with the russians to extend new start Can you talk a little bit more about what the agenda for arms control ought to look like? As we look at beyond a possible extension of new start over the next five or six years How does it engage? How does it broaden the circle beyond the united states and russia to deal with enormously important players like china? How do we deal with some of the most significant non proliferation challenges today? Whether it's north korea or ron how do all these how do you see all these pieces fitting together? As you look out over the next five or ten years nice easy question. Well, this is a This is a day long seminar I'll do my best I see several directions that are important to pursue first of all as I said at the podium a moment ago Let's not abandon the effort to continue to constrain existing hardware and I fear sometimes That's getting a little bit lost in the debate Second, I think we need to widen the aperture and how we look at handling these Less hardware oriented emerging and new technologies I think the role of Of regulation for example as a starting measure will be very very important in getting at some of the Cyber threats that we are concerned about and in the european union. They've already begun and there have been Moments of discontent. I know with our own tech industries about efforts to to regulate the cyber the cyber realm And also we need to be cautious because they're regulating it very well in beijing indeed and we need to be Very cautious again about proceeding in an anti-democratic direction Anti-free speech direction. We would not want to do that But I think there is enough evidence out there about Regulation being impactful in this world that we should look about at how we can We can begin perhaps to adapt it to fit into the arms control agenda as well The second area that I would emphasize and I have been for a long time I've spoken from this stage on that matter We really need to up our game on how we handle monitoring and verification We are still only equipping our our inspectors with the yardsticks pencil and paper when they go in to do inspections Of course, it's going to be difficult to negotiate because some fears will always exist about the intrusiveness of of technologies But I do think that the the potential that has flowed from the information revolution will Really help us to get at serious problems such as problems of warhead verification And so I urge that as a as a significant direction for technology Development but also for arms control policy development. How do we think in that way? Now the hardest problems have to do with the countries that are outside the npt regime Or just hanging on its edge Iran and north korea are the finest example of that We have proven that we can get at The issues with the jcpoa, which I continue to support very strongly However, it is currently as we know in a in a difficult parlous state I would say So I think in some ways it's a traditional diplomacy problem to figure out What you know, what the interests are and the incentives are for pyongyang and tehran to Participate in diplomatic processes and sometimes yes looking for ways to apply leverage on them Which the current administration has been been trying to do But I guess I would argue for looking A bit more at incentives in addition to the pressure tactics And how about our north korea rose? I mean, you know, it doesn't just as an outsider looking at this look Especially likely that the current north korean leadership is going to agree to a full denuclearization Anytime soon So, you know, how would you apply your experience and kind of you know arms control over many years to that problem? Does it make sense to look at kind of what we did with iranians and interim stuff that You know helps reduce make more manageable more easily to deter the problem Is that also a mistake? Well, we have two We have two challenges. We have many challenges with north korea, but just in in this space I would say we have a problem of getting a handle on Intermediate range highly capable missile systems across eurasia. It's not it's not limited to north korea This is the issue that in some ways drove The demize of the inf treaty because the russians over a decade ago decided that they were facing the proliferation of These missile systems in china in south asia and elsewhere and became concerned about it Why they didn't address this problem at the negotiating table? Well, we should have a drink and a conversation about this sometime But i've never figured out why they didn't try to address it at the negotiating table after surge even off First raised the issue with rumsfeld back over a decade ago But uh, I think we do need to think broadly you asked me about how to get others involved in the process This is the door in my view through which we go in order to get others involved in the process I would start with china because they are a member of the p5. They are members of the un security council They are interested in advancing the goals of the non-proliferation treaty of which they are signatories So I think there are there are General big incentives for them, but I think there are also more focused incentives for them That is getting a handle on proliferation that affects The most potent capabilities they have these are the ground launched intermediate range systems Our armed forces our navy calls them the the carrier killers, you know so From from our perspective we see them as a potent force But the chinese are also facing a potent force or potent force says in future And so they need to be thinking about about how perhaps To exercise some general restraint in this area. So that's the door through which I'd go eventually also Maybe not too far down the road to involve indian pakistan for the interest of stability in south asia I would focus I would focus there that also goes for north korea They have this bilateral effort in train now with the current administration I don't know with with mr. Beegan's New position whether he'll continue to have much time to work that problem But nevertheless, there is that process in train on the other side. Then there is the nuclear Arsenal and what we do about the north korean nuclear arsenal I I guess take a long view of this in some ways because I think the best way to get at it is a phased approach We started this some time ago In the old days with things like shutting down the young gyan reactor and stopping their ability to produce fissile You know we we can again. I think think about some phases to pursue with them And uh, that is how I go about it. I would go about it But with phases that presumes that then you do have a kind of step by step And they have to take some steps. We have to take some steps. Uh, I frankly Have never found it very effective to negotiate on an all-or-nothing basis. And so I will just leave it at that Thanks, let me turn to all of you if you just raise your hand wait for the microphone Identify yourself. Please be concise and remember to end with a question mark. Yes, ma'am Mike's Mike's right behind you Hi, good morning. Amy Nelson national defense university rose. Thank you so much for your comments. It's always wonderful hearing How you see these issues and how you contextualize them I wanted to back up to the to what you were just speaking about about china coming to the negotiation table What do you think would effectively incentivize china into trilateral arms control and given your experience negotiating treaties? What are some of the unique challenges trilateral arms control negotiations might present? I think uh It's my experience has been and certainly this was a great revelation for me going to nato You know, many of you know me I've spent most of my career working on bilateral matters with the soviet union and russia Particularly in the nuclear realm suddenly to have to deal with 29 allies on a day in day out basis my My admiration is abundant for those of you who have made your career on multilateral diplomacy So I will just pay that compliment right up right up front But uh, I do think that it is uh that it is very possible What I don't think is possible is structuring a negotiation On their strategic forces. They are just too small compared to the us and russian forces We have 1,550 deployed warheads each of us then with some in storage the last time us Warhead numbers were made public. They were you know around 4,000 total China's down below 500. I just don't see how you structure a strategic Negotiation with them unless you're urging them to rush rush to parity And I don't think any of us want to urge them to rush to parity So that's the basic conundrum there and that's why I say we need to Go through the door of the intermediate range ground launch systems and place constraints there because Their numbers are you know, there's some equivalents There there are common stability threats the threat of short Warning or no warning attack on critical targets, especially command and control targets. They are consistent since You know russians the soviet union and us woke up to this in the 1980s short warning attack on command and control Decapitation strikes. So these same Conundrums these same difficulties affect all of those across eurasia who deploy these And that's the basic conundrum that in the end will I think inform an incentivization process to get countries to come to the table But it takes again phases of discussion you start by talking about what this Threat is you talk about the history you begin to get it's a kind of strategic stability dialogue to begin with And then afterwards you can move to discussion of restraint measures and Transparency measures They're never enough Unilateral statements are never enough in the arms control world But you move through these phases to get to the structuring of an actual control and limitation regime So that is how I would go about it. It's a long game Maybe it's not satisfying, but I would really think that Given the history we've had with the p5 process over the last 10 years I think there's been a certain maturation already in the relationship among the p5 to to begin such a such a process You could do it in the p5 context. You could do it on a trilateral basis Thanks. Let me look in the back way in the back He's just right on the aisle My name is David Loudon. I'm a policy analyst Ma'am, I'm wondering if uh, I I appreciate the comment about the drone deployment and and hopefully That will evolve into more locations. What I wanted to ask is does that fall under the umbrella of open skies? Oh, the uh, no the long-term The long-range Surveillance drone that nato has deployed in sicily as part of a You know a long-range program that is a nato program per se. It is not part of the OST the open skies treaty those capabilities are are quite defined. They are aircraft that are agreed among all the parties To to be used on open skies flights. The u.s. Aircraft are very old And they need replacement I actually have understood that the air force has put money for replacement planes as well as as cameras and Other equipment into their budget and I hope that can move forward because let me just say a word about open skies because it has been Under criticism and and some threat, but I see it as enormously valuable to providing Confidence building and predictability in in europe, of course the u.s. Has much more capable Much more capable national technical means satellites, etc, etc But the benefits of these open skies flights is that all open skies treaty member states including 27 of 29 nato allies are members of the open skies treaty many of them do not have ntm It's their way to get good surveillance information and also to participate in the process as well and finally, it's been really important to address some of the some of the Really difficult situations that have flowed from the clashes between russia and ukraine I refer you to the sea of azov incident a year ago in november And after that happened we used open skies flights flying over the territory of ukraine But essentially to convey some strong messages to russia about the unacceptable of their behavior So it's also an important diplomacy and signaling mechanism. That's very very important to the allies. So I really I really see a huge amount of value to open skies. It's from my way of thinking it's uh, it's a very, um Cheap way to go about additional stability predictability and as I said these important diplomatic tools We have time for two last questions. Let me, yes ma'am Microphones right behind you Thank you And i'm julie from sound of hope reader network. My question is mr. Stoltenberg Said nato believe 5g technology will be still built building block of society and is extremely Important as it will affect all works of life in this trick Communications security in a much more fundamental way. We heard that some of countries in europe plan to accept Huawei's facilities Which some experts said it still can capture the data and information So in your way In your will how to help those countries avoid of working with huawei for security. Thank you Well, i'll speak from the perspective of the nato alliance industrial policy No matter what it is is determined by individual nato member states So nato per se does not have a policy with regard to any particular Industrial choices that nato members might might make in the case of of huawei allies differ on this matter And there is a vigorous discussion among nato member states as to What the the threats are that may ensue from from purchasing and making use of of 5g technology That would be constructed by huawei. So i don't want to opine on this matter further But i do take note of the fact that this was part of the discussions in in london That will continue to be an issue that is addressed at a high level I'm sure bringing 5g technology into our societies and our countries is going to be high On the priority list of of all the governments who are member states of nato So i know it's going to continue to be a hot issue, but it's uh, it's not one Frankly where consensus can be reached easily it will take it will take some time It will take some discussion and There will clearly be i think some Some further steps along along the way from a nato perspective. I'll just say just i'm talking about the nato institution We you know make our decisions and really focus on trying to purchase from from nato member states Equipment and and so forth that we need sometimes that's possible. Sometimes that's not possible One last question ken Thank you rose very ken yellow. It's rose. Thank you very much and also ray for your wonderful service Could i go back to russia for just a moment? um russia has an economy that is stagnating It has demographic problems. It has health issues um, it's it's already deeply engaged in syria and ukraine Um, there are a variety of of signs that are very interesting internally. There was a poll That showed that 18 to 24 year old young russians half of them wish to leave the country This is a country, you know, that's obviously very important and yet, you know, we you know We're coming into a situation now with iran With north korea and also the star treaty that is up for renewal. My question is You talked about the need, you know for deterrence and also dialogue Our nato in the united states gearing up for this type of a necessary dialogue with russia, you know That is changing that is both declining and dangerous, you know at the same time Are we up to this in this coming year because it seems that you know, we have very few level levels of Interaction anymore and what would you recommend? Well, I took note with interest that president, uh, trump said as he was in london and that he and president foodon have been talking about a new nuclear arms agreement and uh, Seems rather enthusiastic. Maybe china now. Maybe china later was also part of Of mr. Trump's remarks, but he clearly has an interest and i think from what i've heard president foodon Say he has an interest in in caring for some further nuclear arms agreement I think this is a good thing. Uh, the they were going back to the period of the Early 1970s the nuclear arms Treaties by the way both the abm treaty but also the first strategic arms limitation treaty They kind of led the way in in driving some Progress in other areas including scientific cooperation in those days and space cooperation early space cooperation in those Days, I you know just from my own career experience. I've always thought of of The nuclear arms limitation and reduction Agreements as being a kind of leading edge for perhaps some further cooperation We can't get around the fact can though that the russians Seized ukrainian territory and have been destabilizing the donbas That is still a basic constraint on the kind of wide ranging cooperation that i think we all hoped for I mentioned in my remarks that there was a long period from the 1990s until really the the invasion of of Crimea when we thought somehow we could draw russia and nato closer together And have and we did do some wide-ranging projects together. We worked on things like like Counterterrorism we worked on counter narcotics in central asia We did work effectively together in in some very pragmatic ways, but at the moment It's difficult to foresee how to how to get beyond That basic fact unless as I said there is some true progress On settling the situation in the donbas and then I could see The aperture beginning to open for for further cooperation between at least between nato and russia now the united states It's a different matter. I cannot comment further beyond What I heard from president trump I and clearly there have been many and wide-ranging constraints about russian behavior with regard to us elections and so forth So there are some I would say some some factors pushing in the other direction so I cannot Really say further where where I think things are going to go, but I do hope on the basis not only of my My career preferences, but also on the basis of The fact that I think it would be good for for global security if if there could be some progress on the nuclear arms control front Rose on on all of our behalf I want to thank you not just for the thoughtfulness of your remarks today But for reminding all of us why we were so lucky to have you in u.s Public service for so many years your service at nato and why we all hope so much We'll continue to hear your wise voice in the years ahead. So thank you very much