 I'd love to explore that theme a little bit more with you. As you know, this is the Vandenberg lecture. We want to explore themes that were important to Vandenberg. We were chatting earlier with Hank Meyer in Hank's book about Vandenberg. He really has a wonderful description of the transformation of Vandenberg from a very staunch isolationist and a real partisan to somebody who worked very closely with FDR, with the administration on the whole post-war order, NATO, Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the engagement of the United States in the world. It's kind of hard to imagine that kind of dialogue today. How do you, is there a chance? And how would we pursue that chance to take this moment of pretty good bipartisan consensus on Russia's invasion of Ukraine and build out a more bipartisan consensus on foreign policy? A great question. Look, my core concern is the sustainability of unity within the United States and unity in the West, whether it's NATO's European partners or all of the Western nations, the free democratic and open societies that have come to Ukraine's aid and our partners around the world that are also joining us in imposing sanctions on Russia. So we shouldn't forget that the South Koreans, the Japanese, the Australian, others, although not yet the Indians. We have a challenge in that there is a united approach towards Ukraine by Western democracies, but there is a significant sort of arms-folded kind of wait-and-see response from a significant number of African countries of South Asian and Southeast Asian countries who frankly view this more as hypocrisy, that in their view, the United States and other Western countries have not provided the same level of support, of engagement, of concern for conflicts on the continent of Africa and Middle East that we are for Ukraine. So first, there is significant unity in Congress and in the West with regards to how to respond right now to Ukraine and Russia. One of the reasons that Vladimir Putin really thought he would get away with this with very little consequences was that after his invasion of Georgia in 2008 and his invasion of Moldova, his invasion and occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014, and then of the Donbas, the response from the West was tepid, was divided, was unequal. And a lot of that had to do with domestic political concerns and with economic concerns, especially on the part of Germany. I think one of the key issues in the West is Chancellor Schultz and the new government in Germany and the dramatic shift in position they've taken. In Europe, this frankly has allowed us to move past for the moment at least some of the real divisions between the UK and the EU over Brexit and between Poland and the rest of NATO over some really misguided and inappropriate decisions by the Polish government in terms of journalistic freedom, port freedom. I was in Warsaw meeting with the Polish government three days before the war began and they are suddenly completely focused with us. That's NATO and Europe. Let's talk about here in the United States for a moment. We similarly are going to struggle with retaining focus and attention. Syria and the Syrian civil war was no less brutal or tragic and yet the American people after being riveted to those suffering in Syria for the first year of that war gradually drifted off and became less and less motivated or concerned. I'm very troubled Michael frankly by recent polling that suggests that the war in Ukraine and the defense of freedom in Ukraine doesn't make the top five in terms of identified what are the most pressing concerns in your life for a majority of Americans. They're more worried about inflation, about the economy, about the pandemic, about crime, about the border. So bluntly sustaining this focus particularly as we move into a midterm where control of Congress is gonna be at issue is gonna be a challenge. And hopefully you won't accuse me of being overly partisan. There is also a significant challenge here in terms of the political views, the global view of our former president who has repeatedly and publicly said congratulatory and laudatory things about Vladimir Putin and there is an upcoming election in France where the second place candidate the one who might, she has probably a one in five or two in five chance of winning has a comparable view, has a long close relationship with Putin and Putin's Russia. So holding us together in the United States, holding us together in NATO is going to take leadership, leadership that I believe President Biden has shown and is capable of sustaining leadership by the leaders and the strong voices in our caucuses in the House and Senate. And frankly, I think Senator McConnell is an internationalist, is someone who believes in NATO, is someone who believes in our defense of the West, but let's go back to Vandenberg where you started. It's going to take some vocal risky steps by some Republicans and Democrats challenge our parties and our administration to be more united and to be more forceful in our response to the ongoing developments in Ukraine. Congressman Meyer is one of a dozen House Republicans who made a very tough decision and is facing some political consequences as a result. Adam Kinsinger is someone I've traveled with and worked with and admire. And it is regrettable that his political career is certainly taking a sharp turn. Former Senator Jeff Flake of Arizona is someone who I traveled with regularly, legislated with deeply admire. He is now our ambassador in Turkey. And for him, the breaking point with the former president was in no small part his view of our alliances, our values and our priorities in terms of the defense of freedom. So I know there was a long answer. I think we could weld together a bipartisan consensus, but it's going to take a lot of work. And this is exactly one of the things to which I dedicate my time in the Senate and where I am hopeful that members of the armed forces, intelligence, appropriations and foreign relations committees will be actively engaged in the weeks ahead.