 All right, so some acknowledgments here and just to let you know the conflicts of interest and whatnot, but whenever I work with companies, we donate 100% of the fees to either MSF or Habitat for Humanity. We just talked a little bit about access and innovation, but for antibiotics there's a third element that you have to think about, which is the issue of resistance and sustainable use. And so the first thing to realize is that, you know, for the, around the world we have hundreds of thousands of people who are dying today, who lack access, not to a new antibiotic we haven't invented yet, but to an antibiotic which would save their life and is available generically without patent protection. So we have an access problem that's immense for antibiotics in the world right now. We also have a sustainable use problem. You know, we have, you know, we're wasting these drugs through inappropriate utilization. Not only in humans, you know, in the United States, an estimate of 50 to 60% of outpatient and in a smaller percentage of inpatient antibiotics are not used in appropriate, medically appropriate ways, but also we're feeding these antibiotics to animals and using them in agriculture in ways that clearly are wasteful if we were to value this as the global resource that it really is. And simultaneously we have an innovation problem and the difficulty here is that in order to do anything effective in this area you have to do all three of these things simultaneously. It does not work to address just innovation or just access or just sustainable use. If we talk about access alone, if we just flooded the world with inexpensive antibiotics, yes, that would solve the access problem. It would totally destroy us on resistance but also undermine innovation because we'd be giving the drugs away for a little. And if we have a great sustainable use policy, if we constrain the unnecessary, you know, use of antibiotics, yes, that preserves them for future generations. It also undermines our access initiatives around the planet and can put barriers between people and the actual need for antibiotics. And with innovation, if all we do is fix innovation and we haven't done anything on these other issues, then we've created yet another system in which the wealthy and the elite have access to a drug that we're denying to the rest of the planet. So uniquely in this area all three of these things have to be solved simultaneously. About a decade ago I was working more in drug research in general. I pivoted towards antibiotics because of the extra element of the difficulty here. So I want to talk about some of the incentives and some of the things that are being looked at around the world to try to solve this problem. So this is a paper from Chatham House. The same approach is going to come out of the Drive AB. We presented this data last week in Amsterdam the week before now. And to think about the different phases of research and the different results, the different incentives that you would use. So for early, you know, I think several people have said it, you know, obviously research grants and additional funds in this area, even the U.S. Senate agreed to two extra billion dollars in the NIH budget appropriation that they came through last week. And so there's some consensus, even bipartisan consensus on this first kind of red area. On the orange area, you know, in the clinical trials, several people have talked about possibly an expansion of tax credits, something akin to orphan drug but focused on qualified, specific antimicrobial research and development. Also the PPPs, the public-private partnerships, not only the ones in Geneva but also think of what BARDA is doing and what BARDA is about to do with the BARDA accelerator. The standards for those are more narrower. You want to focus the research, not just on anything, but, you know, by some sort of a triage process. And the threat assessment is referring to the 2013 CDC threat assessment, which triaged antimicrobial threats for the U.S. And then finally at the bottom, the green bit is the more novel bit. You know, post-registration, what do you do to change the market after the FDA or the EMA has approved the antibiotic? And we call, you know, these incentives generally delinkage, trying something that's entirely different than just paying based on volume times price. Because the last thing we want to do with antibiotics is to give a volume-based incentive, again because we're trying to simultaneously do three things, you know, innovation, access and sustainable use. The delinkage model that I'm associated with, this is a paper with John Rex, myself, who died of cancer and infectious diseases from two months ago. And this is calling for basically a global prize. And the first person that I ever read that talked about, let's transform for antibiotics from a patent-based system to a price-based system, I think is Jamie's article in 2002 or 2003, a short article, but a good one. And so here we're trying to lay out, you know, exactly what that would look like and trying to start the discussion. It's a large-dollar amount, you have to put real money on the table. But this is not an idea that's just an academic pie in the sky. John Rex is head of anti-infectus for AstraZeneca. And this is actually the type of thing that was being discussed and approved by the various companies at the Davos Declaration. It's also one of the four models that DriveAB is bringing forward. So the idea would be simply to have a price-based approach that's modulated based on the type of molecule. Not every antibiotic is equally good, but if you brought a novel, first-in-class molecule that was good against gram-negative pathogens, what's that worth? To the global system, it's worth a couple billion dollars. And because we don't want that company to bring it to market and to feel like they have to sell it in order to cover R&D, that's the sort of molecule we actually don't want to sell. We want to sell as little as possible of it for as long as you can hold out. So these are the antibiotics that have come to the market since in the past five years, the past seven years I guess at this point. We have eight new molecular entity antibiotics approved by the FDA in the recent years. We actually have, you know, this is a work that we recently published in the Annals of Internal Medicine. It says online first. It was published now two weeks ago. Two things to note. First of all, is we have a lot of antibiotics. So when you hear stories that there are no antibiotics, there actually, we have a lot of antibiotics that are coming to the market. The second thing to note, you can't see it, it's hard to read on the slide, is almost all of this innovation with the exception of Bidakwilen was occurring in small and medium companies. Eventually, they found their way into large companies, but a lot of innovation is happening in small companies. So two things. We need to focus our efforts so that we get the type of drugs we want. And secondly, whatever we do needs to be something that a small company can respond to because they are the ones who are actually carrying out the early stage work. So this is a chart that, from earlier research that my group did, but if you look at the blue 29, 23, 9, that's how it's traditionally given to people. Look, antibiotics are falling off the cliff. By the next decade, we'll have none whatsoever. These are new molecular entity approvals in the U.S. And so we went back and looked at this data and we broadened the category to other anti-infectives. And the red are antivirals and antiretrovirals and the green are antifungals. So what happened in the 1990s, it was not that the companies fled anti-infectives, it was that they switched to antivirals. They responded to the immense public health need and also to the public pressure to do something in this area. So in my mind, this is not a disaster story for antibacterials. This shows that public engagement and the recognition of public health actually shifts the way that pharmaceutical innovation occurs, which is a good story. The second thing we did with this data is that we recognized that many of these antibiotics that were approved, the 29 approved in the 80s, weren't actually very good. And just counting noses of antibiotics is a pretty inaccurate way to figure out the quality of them. And so we went back and looked at the antibiotics that had been withdrawn from the market, either officially under FDA requirements or because the companies found them to be commercially not a worthwhile drug, and they just voluntarily withdrew them from the market. When you back those out, you get this, which is a much different innovation picture. In other words, the 1980s were not the success story of an amazing moment of antibiotic innovation. There were actually quite a few drugs that later turned out to be fluff or worse. And you see the actual increase in the innovation in the sector, particularly because of the shift of emphasis in that to retrovirals. There's a lot of things going on in the world right now with antibiotics. There was almost nothing going on 12 years ago when it started in this area. I have nothing to do with that. People like Dame Sally Davies and the occasional outbreak of things, that's what's driving the political engagement. But for those of us who've worked in this area, it's interesting to see as our research is being consumed up the political chain and how it gets changed. So far, nothing I've ever written has been quoted or used by Donald Trump, but I'm waiting for the moment to see how it comes out of that machine at the end of the day. But these are the things that are going on recently and actually could add to them. The O'Neill Commissioner report, the FONO reports are out. The English government is strongly supporting an antibiotic delinquish sort of mechanism. DriveAB, which is a EU funded research project that I've worked on with dozens of other people. Also, one of our major results would be an antibiotic delinquish mechanism. And so you have things going on on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as a lot of coordination. There was a joint declaration coming out of the German G7. It's on the agenda for Japan for G7. It's on the agenda for China who heads up G20. It's obviously all over WHO and you in general assembly in this next couple of years. And this is a slide that we gave in Amsterdam, and I think it's my last slide. But this is really the consensus views that are emerging from all of these different streams that we need both push and pull. So, you know, the idea that we are going to increase tax credits we're going to think about additional grants at the NIH style. But there needs to be something that incentivizes the companies to do the right thing after registration. And that something cannot be the oncology model. We don't want $100,000 antibiotics because of access and because of sustainable use. There needs to be something different. And the different mechanism because this is a relatively small market, the global market for patented antibiotics, about $4 billion. The total global market for antibiotics in total perhaps $40 billion. So, a buyout prize in this area is actually within the reach of the United States and Europe working together. Delinkage, a key component. We do not want to reimburse for R&D cost based on volume. That might work for everything else in the drug system. It does not work because of resistance for antibacterials and other drugs to which resistance is transmissible. You can't have access and sustainable use. It's just tack on ideas. Think of the tripod. If there's only one thing you go away with, we have to build into the system all three things simultaneously. As secondary thought, we're going to do innovation and then later maybe think about access and maybe think about sustainable use. We will have failed and those drugs would be wasted and those drugs won't get to the right people. We have to do this simultaneously and try to do all things together. And that obviously a national solution is inadequate. The MCR gene that showed up in Pennsylvania in the intestine of the woman came from probably from animals, from pigs that are being fed at Cholestine in China through a complex chain that we can't hardly understand at this point. These are global diseases. It's a global effect. What we're creating here are global public goods and so we need to have global coordination and financing. Did I beat 12 minutes? And I'm going to give 54 seconds to somebody else.