 I'd like to say a few words firstly about the Euro, but I'm not going to rehash all the things that I think you basically know about. Say a few words about where Germany is before and after the elections and also what the future might be. First of all, the Euro, as we all recognise, it was put together for a whole series of different motivations, and not all of which can be achieved. And keeping that show on the road is very, very difficult. It's not least for Germany, because Germany is called upon to do a great deal. And for all the reasons that Eckhart mentioned, Germany doesn't actually want to step up to the plate literally to pay for everything. Germany, and this is one of the points I'm making in my book, is often overestimated when it's quite weak. It's underestimated when it's quite strong. And I put forward a number of occurrences since 1870, when foreigners tend to have the wrong impression of Germany at a time when it's absolutely opposite to how the foreigners see it. One example, I think, was in 1989-1990, when both François Mitterrand and Mrs Thatcher both thought that the Germans would be incredibly strong after being unified. Mrs Thatcher even thought that the birth rate would go up. I mean, she was really very badly informed. I actually myself thought that Germany would be relatively weak, but I won't go into all those examples. But I think we are going through a period now when the German strength is overestimated by the rest of the world and the rest of Europe. So I support Mrs Mitterrand when she says that Germany cannot do everything. But her tragedy, and unfortunately I do think that Europe is in a rather tragic state at the moment, and he's condemned to a relatively low growth path. Her tragedy is that she never does enough to really appease or please or bail out the countries that are the debtors. But she probably does too much for some of her own people, which is why there is a lot of Euro-antagonism in Germany. Nothing like as much as in France or in Italy. We may see some signs of that at the election at the weekend. I'll come on to that. As far as Ireland is concerned, I've said this many times before, I think Ireland will stay at the course, not least because eight years of the Troika is better than 800 years with England. And that would be your alternative. And I think people do admire Ireland for the fact that you went on a bit of a binge, you had a party, the Irish people are very intelligent educated people, they realise that things got a bit excessive and then you've had to row back and you've done it very successfully. And I think Ireland will stay the course because Ireland wants to stay in. You want to be there in the major club of Europe. I also think the Euro will stay together. I actually don't think it's all going to fall apart. I think there's a danger that one or two of the peripheral countries will simply get tired of the whole thing. But I think it's a very long running story. And we're probably not even halfway through this Shakespearean play. Just in terms of Germany and the election, I think it's an extraordinarily fascinating and exciting election. We couldn't expect the ambassador to go into too much detail. But let me just make five points about the election, all of which I think are really sublime and interesting. One is that I think that the coalition that people think might be occurring when the results come out on Sunday night probably won't be the one that we have at the end. I think it's going to be four to eight weeks of really almost Italian style bargaining. We might end up thinking that Italy is a relatively stable place after the four to eight weeks of coalition bargaining that will come across in Germany. The second point is that we have to watch also the Hessian elections taking place on the same day, which also on a knife edge with the major blocks running neck and neck if you count the left against the right. And that's going to have a big impact because if the CDU run out of states where they've got votes in the Bundesrat, it's going to be de facto a grand coalition in Berlin. And as you've all noticed, Mrs Merkel has certainly not played her cards in a very visible way. She's clearly a very opaque politician that explains a lot of her success. She's managed also to dispossess herself of many of her rivals who've become her victims. But that is also a weakness because there's nobody obvious to take over from her. And we can see that in the lack of CDU support in the lender, and one of them may go again in Hessian, depending on what happens there, then we will have de facto a grand coalition, whatever happens in Berlin. The third point is it's really strange to think that we might have a grand coalition, even though the CDU and the SPD in opinion polls are between 12 and 10 percentage points apart from each other. Normally a grand coalition in the times when we've had it in Germany, or indeed in any other country, happens when there's more or less parity. There's a bigger difference between the CDU and the SPD than there has been any election in Germany since 1957, when Konrad Arnall, for the first and only time, won an absolute majority. So there'll be a lot of enmity and ill feeling amongst the CDU if there is in the end a grand coalition. It won't make a very happy time. The fourth point is that all these parties, their nature will change depending on whether they are in government, half in government or in opposition. Mrs Merkel and the CDU would be much more virulent, much more oppositional vis-a-vis the Euro rescue measures if she was to be in opposition. The SPD, as has often been said, have been supporting the CDU on the whole during the time of the successive rescue missions and rescue measures that we've had in the last three or four years. The CDU will not be a pushover if they go into opposition. It will not be easy to get these further rescue measures through that we all know will happen. Greece will need more money, Portugal will need more money, probably Ireland will as well, even though Ireland is doing relatively well. I think the next two or three years will be quite difficult. The FDP, if they're pushed into the background or if they're forced to really fight for seats at the grand table, if they are forced to go into a repeat of the present coalition but in a much weaker position, in their weakness they will become very tough and very difficult. The fifth point, I think it is something of a tragedy that Pierre Steinberg, who I would say is by far the most intelligent politician in Germany and also has got a good deal of extremely useful experience during his time as the minister-president in Nord-Weinbergsfalen and also as finance minister. So almost certainly he will retire from politics. I think that's a dreadful waste actually because he's very unlikely that he'll be chancellor in almost any constellation and he said, I believe him, that he won't go on, he won't become serving in a grand coalition. I would like him to reconsider that actually and I think they could possibly offer him a sort of super ministerial home like Carl Schiller as one last chance to get him to remain on site but I do think that's going to be a big waste that we will see in the next four to six weeks. So those are my five points about the election. Just in terms of the future and very, very quickly, I do think that the British have become actually more European over the last 15 years. You might think this is all bit paradoxical because we have to talk about wanting to leave the EU and so on but in terms of the trade and investment relationships, in terms of the personal relationships that there are, just look at the number of young people flying every weekend to Berlin. I happen to think that Ryanair to quote one of your local heroes and EasyJet, they've done far more for European integration than any number of European commissioners. I actually do think the Brits have become quite European. We trade a lot with the Germans when Eckhart kindly said that they do a lot of trade with the Bricks. I thought he meant with the Brits because in fact Britain has now become the biggest trading partner of Germany, exports and imports, unfortunately many more imports than exports but the British, strangely enough, have integrated more with the Euro area over the last 15 years than the Germans have. The Germans have been integrating with the non-Euro area which is all rather paradoxical because the whole point was to bind you into Europe. You've become bound into non-Euro. Anyway, I do think that a future where people like us can debate these things in a sensible, pleasant way and also where there is a lot of genuine interaction between places like Britain and Ireland and Germany is the kind of Europe that I want and I want to be in. I couldn't really care less about the currency. The currency is a nice thing to have. You can have debates about it. People can do trade with each other with the currency fluctuating slightly as it is. No, you can also write books about it and it kind of keeps discussions going. If you run out of things to do at a bus stop in Germany, you can always start talking about the Euro. It guarantees you instant conversation. The Euro clearly does bring people together. It is also true. I think the Euro also makes Europe more interesting than it would otherwise be, but basically the Euro is a bit of a red herring. I actually also think that between Britain and Ireland and Germany there is a current and I'm very pleased that over the last five years all sorts of reasons the current between Britain and Ireland has improved a great deal. I do think that is what Europe is all about. I would say long live the Euro, but there are many things about Europe that are far more important. Thank you very much.