 section 20 of an essay concerning human understanding book 2 by John Locke this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org chapter 23 of our complex ideas of substances one the mind being as I have declared furnished with a great number of the simple ideas conveyed in by the senses as they are found in exterior things or by reflection on its own operations takes notice also that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together which being presumed to be long to one thing and words being suited to common apprehensions and made use of for quick dispatch are called so united in one subject by one name which by inadvertency we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple idea which indeed is a complication of many ideas together because as I have said not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves we accustomed ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist and from which they do result which therefore we call substance to so that if anyone will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general he will find he has no other idea of it at all but only supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us which qualities are commonly called accidents if anyone should be asked what is the subject wherein color or weight and hears he would have nothing to say but the solid extended parts and if he were demanded what is that solidity and extension in here in he would not be in a much better case than the Indian before mentioned who saying that the world was supported by a great elephant was asked what the elephant rested on to which his answer was a great tortoise but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad back tortoise replied something he knew not what and thus here as in all other cases where we use words without having clear and distinct ideas we talk like children who being questioned what such a thing is which they know not readily gives this satisfactory answer that it is something which in truth signifies no more when so used either by children or men but that they know not what and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of is what they have no distinct idea of at all and so are perfectly ignorant of it and in the dark the idea then we have to which we give the general name substance being nothing but the supposed but unknown support of those qualities we find existing which we imagine cannot subsist Sine Ray Substante without something to support them we call that support substancia which according to the true import of the word is in plain English standing under or upholding three an obscure and relative idea of substance in general being thus made we come to have the ideas of particular sorts of substances by collecting such combinations of simple ideas as are by experience and observation of men's senses taken notice of to exist together and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution or unknown essence of that substance thus we come to have the ideas of a man horse gold water etc of which substances whether anyone has any other clear idea further than of certain simple ideas coexistent together I appeal to everyone's own experience it is the ordinary qualities observable in iron or in diamond put together that make the true complex idea of those substances which a Smith or a jeweler commonly knows better than a philosopher who whatever substantial forms he may talk of has no idea of those substances than what is framed by a collection of those simple ideas which are to be found in them only we must take notice that our complex ideas of substances besides all those simple ideas they are made up of have always the confused idea of something to which they belong and in which they subsist and therefore when we speak of any sort of substance we say it is a thing having such or such qualities as body is a thing that is extended figured and capable of motion spirit a thing capable of thinking and so hardness friability and power to draw iron we say our qualities to be found in a lodestone these and the like fashions of speaking intimate that the substance is supposed always something besides the extension figure solidity motion thinking or other observable ideas though we know not what it is for hence when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances as horse stone etc though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities which we used to find united in the thing called horse or stone yet because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone nor one in another we suppose them existing in and supported by some common subject which support we denote by the name substance though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we suppose a support 5 the same thing happens concerning the operations of the mind that is to say thinking reasoning fearing etc which we concluding not to subsist of themselves nor apprehending how they can belong to body or be produced by it we are up to think these the actions of some other substance which we call spirit whereby yet it is evident that having no other idea a notion of the matter but something wearing those many sensible qualities which affect our senses do subsist by supposing a substance where in thinking knowing doubting and a power of moving etc do subsist we have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit as we have of body that one being supposed to be without knowing what it is the substratum to those simple ideas we have from without and the other supposed with a like ignorance of what it is to be the substratum to those operations we experiment in ourselves within it is plain then that the idea of corporeal substance in matter is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions is that of spiritual substance or spirit and therefore from our not having any notion of the substance of spirit we can no more conclude its non-existence then we can for the same reason deny the existence of body it being as rational to affirm there is no body because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of matter as to say there is no spirit because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of the spirit six whatever therefore be the secret abstract nature of substance in general all the ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of substances are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas co-existing in such though unknown cause of their union as makes the whole subsist of itself it is by such combinations of simple ideas and nothing else that we represent particular sorts of substances to ourselves such are the ideas we have of their several species in our minds and such only do we by their specific names signify to others for example man horse son water iron upon hearing which words everyone who understands the language frames in his mind a combination of those several simple ideas which he has usually observed or fancied to exist together under the denomination all which he supposes to rest in and be as it were adherent to that unknown common subject which and hears not in anything else though in the meantime it be manifest and everyone upon inquiry into his own thoughts will find that he has no other idea of any substance for example let it be gold horse iron man vitriol bread but what he has barely of those sensible qualities which he supposes to in here with the supposition of such a substratum as gives as it were a support to those qualities or simple ideas which he has observed to exist united together thus the idea of the sun which it is but an aggregate of those several simple ideas bright hot roundish having a constant regular motion at a certain distance from us and perhaps some other as he who thinks and discourses of the sun has been more or less accurate in observing those sensible qualities ideas or properties which are in that thing which he calls the sun seven for he has the perfectest idea of any of the particular sorts of substances who has gathered and put together most of those simple ideas which do exist in it among which are to be reckoned its active powers and passive capacities which though not simple ideas yet in this respect for brevity's sake may conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them thus the power of drawing iron is one of the ideas of the complex one of that substance we call load stone and power to be so drawn is a part of the complex one we call iron which powers pass for inherent qualities in those subjects because every substance being as apt by the powers we observe in it to change some sensible qualities in other subjects as it is to produce in us those simple ideas which we receive immediately from it does by those new sensible qualities introduced into other subjects discover to us those powers which do thereby immediately affect our senses as regularly as its sensible qualities do it immediately for example we immediately by our senses perceive in fire its heat and color which are if rightly considered nothing but powers in it to produce those ideas in us we also by our senses perceive the color and brittleness of charcoal whereby we come by the knowledge of another power in fire which it has to change the color and consistency of wood by the former fire immediately by the latter it immediately discovers to us these several qualities which therefore we look upon to be a part of the qualities of fire and so make them a part of the complex idea of it for all those powers that we take cognizance of terminating only in the alteration of some sensible qualities in those subjects on which they operate and so making them exhibit to us new sensible ideas therefore it is that I have reckoned these powers amongst the simple ideas which make the complex ones of the sort of substances though these powers considered in themselves are truly complex ideas and in this looser sense I crave leave to be understood when I name any of these potentialities among the simple ideas which we recollect in our minds when we think of particular substances for the powers that are severally in them are necessary to be considered if we will have true distinct notions of the several sorts of substances eight more are we to wonder that powers make a great part of our complex ideas of substances since their secondary qualities are those which in most of them serve principally to distinguish substances one from another and commonly make a considerable part of the complex idea of the several sorts of them for our senses failing us in the discovery of the bulk texture and figure of the minute parts of bodies on which their real constitutions and differences depend we are fain to make use of their secondary qualities as the characteristic notes and marks whereby to frame ideas of them in our minds and distinguish them one from another all which secondary qualities has been shown are nothing but their powers for the color and taste of opium are as well as its saporific or anodyne virtues near powers depending on its primary qualities whereby it is fitted to produce different operations on different parts of our bodies nine the ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal substances are of these three sorts first the ideas of the primary qualities of things which are discovered by our senses and are in them even when we perceive them not such are the bulk figure number situation and motion of the parts of bodies which are really in them whether we take notice of them or not secondly the sensible secondary qualities which depending on these are nothing but the powers those substances have to produce several ideas in us by our senses which ideas are not in the things themselves otherwise than as anything is in its cause thirdly the aptness we consider in any substance to give or receive such alterations of primary qualities as that the substance so altered should produce in us different ideas from what it did before these are called active and passive powers all which powers as far as we have any notice or notion of them terminate only in sensible simple ideas for whatever alteration a lodestone has the power to make in the minute particles of iron we should have no notion of any power it had at all to operate on iron did not its sensible motion discover it and I doubt not but there are a thousand changes that bodies we daily handle have a power to use in one another which we never suspect because they never appear insensible effects 10 powers therefore justly make a great part of our complex ideas of substances he that will examine his complex idea of gold will find several of its ideas that make it up to be only powers as the power of being melted but of not spending itself in the fire of being dissolved in aqua regia our ideas is necessary to make up our complex idea of gold as its color and weight which if solely considered are also nothing but different powers for to speak truly yellowness is not actually in gold but is a power in gold to produce that idea in us by our eyes when placed in a do light and the heat which we cannot leave out of our ideas of the sun is no more really in the sun than the white color it introduces into wax these are both equally powers in the sun operating by the motion and figure of its sensible parts so on a man is to make him have the idea of heat and so on wax is to make it capable to produce in a man the idea of white 11 had we senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of bodies in the real constitution on which their sensible qualities depend I doubt not but they would reduce quite different ideas in us and that which is now the yellow color of gold would then disappear and instead of it we should see an admirable texture of parts of a certain size and figure this microscopes plainly discover to us for what do our naked eyes produce a certain color is by thus augmenting the acuteness of our senses discovered to be quite a different thing and the thus altering as it were the proportion of the bulk of the minute parts of a colored object to our usual site produces different ideas from what it did before thus sand or pounded glass which is opaque and white to the naked eye is pellucid in a microscope and a hair seen in this way loses its former color and is in a great measure polluted with a mixture of some bright sparkling colors such as appear from the refraction of diamonds and other polluted bodies blood to the naked eye appears all red but by a good microscope where in its lesser parts appear shows only some few globules of red swimming in a polluted liqueur and how these red globules would appear if glasses could be found that could yet magnify them a thousand or ten thousand times more is uncertain 12 the infinite wise contriver of us and all things about us have fitted our senses faculties and organs to the conveniences of life and the business we have to do here we are able by our senses to know and distinguish things and to examine them so far as to apply them to our uses and several ways to accommodate the exigencies of this life we have insight enough into their admirable contrivances and wonderful effects to admire and magnify the wisdom power and goodness of their author such a knowledge as this which is suited to our present condition we want not faculties to attain but it appears that god intended we should have a perfect clear and adequate knowledge of them that perhaps is not in the comprehension of any finite being we are furnished with faculties dull and weak as they are to discover enough in the creatures to lead us to the knowledge of the creator and the knowledge of our duty and we are fitted well enough with abilities to provide for the conveniences of living these are our business in the world but were our senses altered and made much quicker and acuter the appearance and outward scheme of things would have quite another face to us and i am apt to think would be inconsistent with our being or at least well-being in this part of the universe which we inhabit he that considers how little our constitution is able to bear a remove into parts of this air not much higher than that we commonly breathe in will have reason to be satisfied that in this globe of earth allotted for our mansion the all wise architect has suited our organs and the bodies that are to affect them one to another if our sense of hearing were but a thousand times quicker than it is how would a perpetual noise distract us and we should in the quietest retirement be able less to sleep or meditate than in the middle of a sea fight nay if the most instructive of our senses seeing were in any man a thousand or a hundred thousand times more acute than it is by the best microscope things several millions of times less than the smallest object of his sight now would then be visible to his naked eyes and so he would come nearer to the discovery of the texture and emotion of the minute parts of corporeal things and in many of them probably get ideas of their internal constitutions but then he would be in quite a different world from other people nothing would appear the same to him and others the visible ideas of everything would be different so that i doubt whether he and the rest of men could discourse concerning the objects of sight or have any communication about colors their appearances being so wholly different and perhaps such a quickness and tenderness of sight could not endure bright sunshine or so much as open daylight nor take in but a very small part of any object at once and that too only at a very near distance and if by the help of such microscopic eyes if i may so call them a man could penetrate further than ordinary into the secret composition and radical texture of bodies he would not make any great advantage by the change if such an acute sight would not serve to conduct him to the market and exchange if he could not see things he was to avoid at a convenient distance more distinguished things he had to do with by those sensible qualities others do he that was sharp-sighted enough to see the configuration of the minute particles of the spring of a clock and observe upon what peculiar structure and impulse its elastic motion depends would no doubt discover something very admirable but if eyes so framed could not view at once the hand and the characters of the hour plate and thereby at a distance see what a clock it was their owner could not be much benefited by that acuteness which whilst this discovered the secret contrivance of the parts of the machine made him lose its use end of section 20 section 21 of an essay concerning human understanding book two by john lock this is a libra vox recording well libra vox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit libra vox.org chapter 23 of our complex ideas of substances part 2 13 and here give me leave to propose an extravagant conjecture of mine that is to say that since we have some reason if there be any credit to be given to the report of things that our philosophy cannot account for to imagine that spirits can assume to themselves bodies of different bulk figure and confirmation of parts whether one great advantage some of them have over us may not lie in this that they can so frame and shape to themselves organs of sensation or perception as to suit them to their present design and the circumstances of the object they would consider for how much would that man exceed all others in knowledge who had but the faculty so to alter the structure of his eyes that one sense is to make it capable of all the several degrees of vision which the assistance of glasses casually at first lighted on has taught us to conceive what wonders would he discover who could so fit his eyes to all sorts of objects as to see when he pleased the figure in motion of the minute particles in the blood and other juices of animals as distinctly as he does at other times the shape and motion of the animals themselves but to us and our present state unalterable organs so contrived is to discover the figure in motion of the minute parts of bodies where on depend those sensible qualities we now observe in them would perhaps be of no advantage God has no doubt made them so as is best for us in our present condition he have fitted us for the neighborhood of the bodies that surround us and we have to do with and though we cannot by the faculties we have attained to a perfect knowledge of things yet they will serve us well enough for those ends above mentioned which are our great concernment I beg my readers pardon for laying before him so wild a fancy concerning the ways of perception of beings above us but how extravagant so ever it be I doubt whether we can imagine anything but the knowledge of angels but after this manner some way or other in proportion to what we find and observe in ourselves and though we cannot but allow that the infinite power and wisdom of God may frame creatures with a thousand other faculties and ways of perceiving things without them and what we have yet our thoughts can go no further than our own so impossible it is for us to enlarge our very guesses beyond the ideas received from our own sensation and reflection the supposition at least that angels do sometimes assume bodies needs not startle us since some of the most ancient to most learned fathers of the church seem to believe that they had bodies and this is certain that their state and way of existence is unknown to us 14 but to return to the matter at hand the ideas we have of substances and the ways we come by them I say our specific ideas of substances are nothing else but a collection of a certain number of simple ideas considered as united in one thing these ideas of substances though they are commonly simple apprehensions and the names of them simple terms yet in effect are complex and compounded thus the idea which an Englishman signifies by the name swan is white color long neck red beak black legs and whole feet and all these of a certain size with a power of swimming in the water and making a certain kind of noise and perhaps to a man who has long observed this kind of bird some other properties which all terminate and sensible simple ideas all united in one common subject 15 besides the complex ideas we have of material sensible substances of which I have last spoken by the simple ideas we have taken from those operations of our own minds which we experiment daily in ourselves as thinking understanding willing knowing and power of beginning motion etc coexisting in some substance we are able to frame the complex idea of an immaterial spirit and thus by putting together the ideas of thinking perceiving liberty and power of moving themselves and other things we have as clear perception and notion of immaterial substances as we have of material for putting together the ideas of thinking and willing or the power of moving or quieting corporeal motion joined to substance of which we have no distinct idea we have the idea of an immaterial spirit and by putting together the ideas of coherent solid parts and a power of being moved joined with substance of which likewise we have no positive idea we have the idea of matter the one is as clear and distinct as idea as the other the idea of thinking and moving a body being as clear and distinct ideas as the ideas of extension solidity and being moved for our idea of substances equally obscure or none at all in both it is but a supposed I know not what to support those ideas we call accidents it is for want reflection that we are apt to think that our senses show us nothing but material things every act of sensation when duly considered gives us an equal view of both parts of nature the corporeal and spiritual for whilst I know by seeing or hearing et cetera that there is some corporeal being without me the object of that sensation I do more certainly know that there is some spiritual being within me that sees and hears this I must be convinced cannot be the action of bare insensible matter nor ever could be without an immaterial thinking being 16 but the complex idea of extended figured colored and all other sensible qualities which is all that we know of it we are as far from the idea of the substance of body as if we knew nothing at all nor after all the acquaintance and familiarity which we imagine we have with matter and the many qualities men assure themselves they perceive and know in bodies will it perhaps upon examination be found that they have any more or clearer primary ideas belonging to body than they have belonging to immaterial spirit 17 the primary ideas we have peculiar to body as contra distinguished to spirit are the cohesion of solid and consequently separable parts and a power of communicating motion by impulse these I think are the original ideas proper and peculiar to body for figure is but the consequence of finite extension 18 the ideas we have belonging and peculiar to spirit are thinking and will or a power of putting body into motion by thought and which is consequent to it liberty for his body cannot but communicate its motion by impulse to another body which it meets with it rest so the mind can put bodies into motion or forebear to do so as it pleases the ideas of existence duration and mobility are common to them both 19 there is no reason why it should be thought strange that I make mobility belonging to spirit for having no other idea of motion but change of distance with other beings that are considered as at rest and finding that spirits as well as bodies cannot operate but where they are and that spirits do operate at several times in several places I cannot but attribute change of place to all finite spirits for of the infinite spirit I speak not here for my soul being a real being as well as my body is certainly as capable of changing distance with any other body or being as body itself and so is capable of motion and if a mathematician can consider a certain distance or a change of that distance between two points one may certainly conceive a distance and a change of distance between two spirits and so conceive their motion their approach or removal one from another 20 everyone finds in himself that his soul can think will and operate on his body in the place where that is but cannot operate on a body or in a place a hundred miles distant from it nobody can imagine that his soul can think or move a body at Oxford while he is at London one cannot but know that being united to his body it constantly changes places all the whole journey between Oxford and London as the coach or horse does that carries him and I think may be said to be truly all that while in motion or if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear idea enough of its motion it's being separated from the body in death I think will for to consider it going out of the body or leaving it and yet to have no idea of its motion seems to me impossible 21 if it be said by anyone that it cannot change place because it hath none for the spirits are not in logo but who be I suppose that way of talking will not now be of much weight to many in an age that is not much disposed to admire or suffer themselves to be deceived by such unintelligible ways of speaking but if anyone thinks there is any sense in that distinction and that it is applicable to our present purpose I desire him to put it into intelligible English then from then straw a reason to show that immaterial spirits are not capable of motion indeed motion cannot be attributed to God not because he is immaterial but because he is infinite spirit 22 let us compare then our complex idea of an immaterial spirit with our complex idea of body and see whether there be any more obscurity in one than in the other and in which most our idea of body as I think is an extended solid substance capable of communicating motion by impulse and our idea of soul as an immaterial spirit is of a substance that thinks and has a power of exciting motion in body by willing or thought these I think are our complex ideas of soul and body as contra distinguished now let us examine which has most obscurity in it and difficulty to be apprehended I know that people whose thoughts are immersed in matter and have so subjected their minds to their senses if they seldom reflect on anything beyond them are up to say they cannot comprehend a thinking thing which perhaps is true but I affirm when they consider it well they can no more comprehend an extended thing 23 if anyone says he knows not what it is thinks in him he means he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing no more say I knows he what the substance is of that solid thing further if he says he knows not how he thinks I answer neither knows he how he is extended how the solid parts of body are united or cohere together to make extension for though the pressure of the particles of air may account for the cohesion of several parts of matter that are grosser than the particles of air and have pores less than the core puzzles of air yet the weight or pressure of the air will not explain nor can be a cause of the coherence of the particles of air themselves and if the pressure of the ether or any subtler matter than the air may unite and hold fast together the parts of a particle of air as well as other bodies yet it cannot make bonds for itself and hold together the parts that make up every the least corpus all of that material subtelus so that the hypothesis how ingeniously so ever explained by showing that the parts of sensible bodies are held together by the pressure of other external insensible bodies reaches not the parts of the ether itself and by how much the more evident it proves that the parts of other bodies are held together by the external pressure of the ether and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion and union by so much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the cohesion of the parts of the core puzzles of the ether itself which we can neither conceive without parts they being bodies and visible nor yet how their parts cohere they wanting that cause of cohesion which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all other bodies 24 but in truth the pressure of any ambient fluid how great so ever can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of matter for though such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two polished superficies one from another in a line perpendicular to them as in the experiment of two polished marbles yet it can never in the least hinder the separation by a motion in a line parallel to those surfaces because the ambient fluid having a full liberty to succeed in each point of space deserted by a lateral motion resists such a motion of bodies so joined no more than it would resist the motion of that body were it on all sides environed by that fluid and touched by no other body and therefore if there were no other cause of cohesion all parts of bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral sliding motion for if the pressure of the ether by the adequate cause of cohesion whatever their cause operates not there can be no cohesion and since it cannot operate against a lateral separation as has been shown therefore in every imaginary plane intersecting any massive matter there could be no more cohesion than of two polished surfaces which will always not withstanding any imaginable pressure of a fluid easily slide one from another so that perhaps how clear an idea so ever we think we have of the extension of body which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts he that shall well consider it in his mind may have reason to conclude that it is as easy for him to have a clear idea how the soul thinks is how body is extended for since body is no further nor otherwise extended then by the union and cohesion of its solid parts we shall very ill comprehend the extension of body without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of its parts which seems to me as incomprehensible as the manner of thinking and how it is performed 25 I allow it is usual for most people to wonder how anyone should find a difficulty in what they think they everyday observe do we not see will they be ready to say the parts of bodies stick firmly together is there anything more common and what doubt can there be made of it and the like I say concerning thinking and voluntary motion do we not every moment experiment in it ourselves and therefore can it be doubted the matter of fact is clear I confess but when we would a little nearer look at it and consider how it is done there I think we are at a loss both in the one and the other and can as little understand how the parts of a body cohere is how we ourselves perceive or move I would have anyone intelligibly explained to me how the parts of gold or brass that but now infusion whereas loose from one another as a particles of water or the sands of an hourglass come in a few moments to be so united and adhere so strongly one to another that the utmost force of men's arms cannot separate them be considering man well I suppose be here at a loss to satisfy his own or another man's understanding 26 the little bodies that compose that fluid we call water are so extremely small that I have never heard of anyone who by a microscope and yet I have heard of some that have magnified to 10,000 need too much above a hundred thousand times pretend to perceive their distinct bulk figure or motion and the particles of water are also so perfectly loose one from another that the least force sensibly separates them nay if we consider their perpetual motion we must allow them to have no cohesion one with another and yet let but a sharp cold come and they unite they consolidate these little atoms cohere and are not without great force separable he that could find the bonds that tie these heaps of loose little bodies together so firmly he that could make known the cement that makes them stick so fast one to another would discover a great and yet unknown secret and yet when that was done would he be far enough from making the extension of body which is the cohesion of its solid parts intelligible till he could show wherein consisted the union or consolidation of the parts of those bonds or of that cement or of the least particle of matter that exists whereby it appears that this primary and supposed obvious quality of body will be found when examined to be as incomprehensible as anything belonging to our minds in a solid extended substance as hard to be conceived as a thinking immaterial one whatever difficulties some would raise against it twenty seven for to extend our thoughts a little further that pressure which is brought to explain the cohesion of bodies is as unintelligible as the cohesion itself for if matter be considered as no doubt it is finnett let anyone sent his contemplation to the extremities of the universe and there see what conceivable hoops what bond he can imagine to hold this massive matter in so close a pressure together from whence steel has its firmness and the parts of a diamond their hardness and indissolubility if matter be finite it must have its extremes and there must be something to hinder it from scattering asunder if to avoid this difficulty anyone will throw himself into the supposition and abyss of infinite matter let him consider what light he thereby brings to the cohesion of body and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible by resolving it into a supposition the most absurd and most incomprehensible of all other so far is our extension of body which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts from being clear or more distinct when we would inquire into the nature cause or manner of it than the idea of thinking 28 another idea we have of body is the power of communication of motion by impulse and of our souls the power of exciting motion by thought these ideas the one of body the other of our minds every day's experience clearly furnishes us with but if here again we inquire how this is done we are equally in the dark for in the communication of motion by impulse where as much motion is lost to one body is got to the other which is the ordinariest case we can have no other conception but of the passing of motion out of one body into another which I think is as obscure and inconceivable as how our minds move or stop our bodies by thought which we every moment find they do the increase of motion by impulse which is observed or believed sometimes to happen is yet harder to be understood we have by daily experience clear evidence of motion produced both by impulse and by thought but the manner how hardly comes with our comprehension we are equally at a loss in both so that however we consider motion and its communication either from body or spirit the idea which belongs to spirit is at least as clear as that which belongs to body and if we consider the act of power of moving or as I may call it motivity it is much clearer in spirit than body since two bodies placed by one another at rest will never afford us the idea of a power in the one to move the other but by a borrowed motion whereas the mind every day affords us ideas of an act of power of moving of bodies and therefore it is worth our consideration whether active power be not the proper attribute of spirits and passive power of matter hence may be conjectured that created spirits are not totally separate from matter because they are both active and passive pure spirit that is to say god is only active pure matter is only passive those beings that are brought active and passive we may judge to partake of both but be that as it will I think we have as many and as clear ideas belonging to spirit as we have belonging to body the substance of each being equally unknown to us and the idea of thinking in spirit as clear as of extension in body and the communication of motion by thought which we attribute to spirit is as evident as that by impulse which we ascribe to body constant experience makes us sensible of both these though our narrow understanding can comprehend neither for when the mind would look beyond those original ideas we have from sensational reflection and penetrate into their causes and manner of production we still find it discovers nothing but its own shortsightedness 29 to conclude sensation convinces us that there are solid extended substances and reflection that there are thinking ones experience assures us of the existence of such beings and that the one hath a power to move body by impulse the other by thought this we cannot doubt of experience I say every moment furnishes us with the clear ideas both of the one and the other but beyond these ideas as received from their proper sources our faculties will not reach if we would inquire further into their nature causes and manner we perceive not the nature of extension clearer than we do of thinking if we would explain them any further one is as easy as the other and there is no more difficulty to conceive how a substance we know not should by thought set body into motion then how a substance we know not should by impulse set body into motion so that we are no more able to discover wherein the ideas belong to body consist then those belonging to spirit from whence it seems probable to me that the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts beyond which the mind whatever efforts it would make is not able to advance one yacht nor can it make any discoveries when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of those ideas thirty so that in short the idea we have of spirit compared with the idea we have of body stands thus the substance of spirits is unknown to us and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us to primary qualities or properties of body that is to say solid coherent parts and impulse we have distinct clear ideas of so likewise we know and have distinct clear ideas of two primary qualities or properties of spirit that is to say thinking and a power of action that is a power of beginning or stopping several thoughts or motions we have also the ideas of several qualities inherent in bodies and have the clear distinct ideas of them which qualities are but the various modifications of the extension of cohering solid parts and their motion we have likewise the ideas of the several modes of thinking that is to say believing doubting intending fearing hoping all which are but the several modes of thinking we have also the ideas of willing and moving the body consequent to it and with the body itself too for as has been shown spirit is capable of motion thirty one lastly if this notion of a material spirit may have perhaps some difficulties in it not easily to be explained we have therefore no more reason to deny or doubt the existence of such spirits than we have to deny or doubt the existence of body because the notion of body is combered with some difficulties very hard and perhaps impossible to be explained or understood by us for I would feign have instanced anything in our notion of spirit more perplexed or near a contradiction than the very notion of body includes in it the divisibility in infant item of any finite extension involving us whether we grant or deny it and consequences impossible to be explicated or made in our apprehensions consistent consequences that carry greater difficulty and more apparent absurdity than anything can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing substance thirty two which we are not at all to wonder at since we having but some few superficial ideas of things discovered to us only by the senses from without or by the mind reflecting on what experiments in itself within have no knowledge beyond that much less of the internal constitution and true nature of things being destitute of faculties to attain it and therefore experimenting and discovering in ourselves knowledge and the power of voluntary motion as certainly as we experiment or discover in things without us the cohesion and separation of solid parts which is the extension and motion of bodies we have as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of immaterial spirit as with our notion of body and the existence of the one as well as the other for it being no more a contradiction that thinking should exist separate and independent from solidity then it is a contradiction that solidity should exist separate and independent from thinking they being both but simple ideas independent one from another and having as clear and distinct ideas in us of thinking as of solidity I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without solidity that is immaterial to exist as a solid thing without thinking that is matter to exist especially since it is not harder to conceive how thinking should exist without matter than how matter should think for when so ever we would proceed beyond these simple ideas we have from sensation and reflection and dive further into the nature of things we fall presently into darkness and obscurity perplexedness and difficulties and can discover nothing further but our own blindness and ignorance but whichever of these complex ideas be clearest that of body or immaterial spirit this is evident the simple ideas that make them up are no other than what we have received from sensation or reflection and so it is of all our other ideas of substances even of God himself 33 for if we examine the idea we have of the incomprehensible supreme being we shall find that we come by at the same way and at the complex ideas we have both of God and separate spirits are made of the simple ideas we receive from reflection for example having from what we experiment in ourselves got the ideas of existence and duration of knowledge and power of pleasure and happiness and of several other qualities and powers which it is better to have than to be without when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the supreme being we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity and so putting them together make our complex idea of God for that the mind has such a power of enlarging some of its ideas received from sensation and reflection has already been shown 34 if I find that I know some few things and some of them or all perhaps imperfectly I can frame an idea of knowing twice as many which I can double again as often as I can add to number and thus enlarge my idea of knowledge by extending its comprehension to all things existing or possible the same also I can do of knowing them more perfectly that is all their qualities powers causes consequences and relations etc till all be perfectly known that is in them or can anyway relate to them and thus frame the idea of infinite or boundless knowledge the same may also be done of power till we come to that we call infinite and also of the duration of existence without beginning or end and so frame the idea of an eternal being the degrees or extent wherein we ascribe existence power wisdom and all other perfections which we can have any ideas of to that sovereign being which we call God being all boundless and infinite we frame the best idea of him our minds are capable of all which is done I say by enlarging those simple ideas we have taken from the operations of our own minds by reflection or by our senses from exterior things to the vastness to which infinity can extend them 35 for it is infinity which joined to our ideas of existence power knowledge etc makes that complex idea whereby we represent to ourselves the best we can the supreme being for though in his own essence which certainly we do not know not knowing the real essence of a pebble or a fly or of our own selves God be simple and uncompounded yet I think I may say we have no other idea of him but a complex one of existence knowledge power happiness etc infinite and eternal which are all distinct ideas and some of them being relative are again compounded of others all which being as has been shown originally got from sensation and reflection go to make up the idea own notion we have of God 36 this further is to be observed that there is no idea we attribute the God baiting infinity which is not also part of our complex idea of other spirits because being capable of no other simple ideas belonging to anything but body but those which by reflection we receive from the operation of our own minds we can attribute to spirits no other but what we receive from vents and all the difference we can put between them in our contemplation of spirits is only in the several extents and degrees of their knowledge power duration happiness etc for that in our ideas as well of spirits is of other things we are restrained to those we receive from sensation and reflection is evident from hence that in our ideas of spirits how much so ever advanced in perfection beyond those of bodies even to that of infinite we cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein they discover their thoughts one to another though we must necessarily conclude that separate spirits which are beings that have perfect or knowledge and greater happiness than we must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have who are fain to make use of corporeal signs and particular sounds which are therefore of most general use as being the best and quickest we are capable of but of immediate communication having no experiment in ourselves and consequently no notion of it at all we have no idea how spirits which use not words can with quickness or much less how spirits that have no bodies can be masters of their own thoughts and communicate or conceal them at pleasure but we cannot necessarily suppose they have such a power 37 and thus we have seen what kind of ideas we have of substances of all kinds wherein they consist and how we came by them from whence I think it is very evident first that all our ideas of the several sorts of substances are nothing but collections of simple ideas with a supposition of something to which they belong and in which they subsist though of this supposed something we have no clear distinct idea at all secondly that all the simple ideas that thus united in one common substratum make up our complex ideas of several sorts of substances are no other but such as we have received from sensation or reflection so that even in those which we think are most intimately acquainted with and that come nearest the comprehension of our most enlarged conceptions we cannot go beyond those simple ideas and even in those which seem most remote from all we have to do with and do infinitely surpass anything we can perceive in ourselves by reflection or discover by sensation and other things we can attain to nothing but those simple ideas which we originally received from sensation or reflection as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels and particularly of God himself thirdly that most of the simple ideas that make up our complex ideas of substances when truly considered are only powers however we are apt to take them for positive qualities for example the greatest part of the ideas that make our complex idea of gold are yellowness great weight ductility fusibility and solubility and aqua regia etc all united together in an unknown substratum all which ideas are nothing else but so many relations to other substances and are not really in the gold considered barely in itself though they depend on those real and primary qualities of its internal constitution whereby it has a fitness differently to operate and be operated on by several other substances end of chapter 23 end of section 21 section 22 of an essay concerning human understanding book 2 by John Locke this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Emanuel Zornberg chapter 24 of collective ideas of substances besides these complex ideas of several single substances as of man horse gold violet apple etc the mind hath also complex collective ideas of substances which I so call because such ideas are made up of many particular substances considered together as united into one idea and which so joined are looked on as one that be gratia the idea of such a collection of men as make an army though consisting of a great number of distinct substances is as much one idea as the idea of a man and the great collective idea of all bodies whatsoever signified by the name world is as much one idea as the idea of any the least particle of matter in it it's sufficing to the unity of any idea that it be considered as one representation or picture though made up of ever so many particulars these collective ideas of substances the mind makes by its power of composition and uniting severally either simple or complex ideas into one as it does by the same faculty make the complex ideas of particular substances consisting of an aggregate of diverse simple ideas united in one substance and as the mind by putting together the repeated ideas of unity makes the collective mode or complex idea of any number as a score or a gross etc so by putting together several particular substances it makes collective ideas of substances as a troop an army a swarm a city a fleet each of which everyone finds that he represents to his own mind by one idea in one view and so under that notion considers those several things as perfectly one as one ship or one atom nor is it harder to conceive how an army of 10 000 men should make one idea than how a man should make one idea it being as easy to the mind to unite into one idea of a great number of men and consider it as one as it is to unite into one particular all the distinct ideas that make up the composition of a man and consider them all together as one amongst such kind of collective ideas are to be counted most part of artificial things at least such of them as are made up of distinct substances and in truth if we consider all these collective ideas are right as army constellation universe as they are united into so many single ideas they are but the artificial droughts of the mind bringing things very remote and independent on one another into one view the better to contemplate and discourse of them united into one conception and signified by one name for there are no things so remote nor so contrary which the mind cannot by this art of composition bring into one idea as is visible in that signified by the universe chapter 25 of relation besides the ideas whether simple or complex that the mind has of things as they are in themselves there are others it gets from their comparison one with another the understanding in the consideration of anything is not confined to that precise object it can carry any idea as it were beyond itself or at least look beyond it to see how it stands in conformity to any other when the mind so considers one thing that it does as it were bring it to and set it by another and carry its view from one to the other this is as the words import relation and respect and the denominations given to positive things intimating that respect and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated to something distinct from it are what we call relatives and the things so brought together related thus when the mind considers kaias as such a positive being it takes nothing into that idea but what really exists in kaias that be gratia when i consider him as a man i have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the species man so likewise when i say kaias is a white man i have nothing but the bare consideration of a man who half that white color but when i give kaias the name husband i intimate some other person and when i give him the name whiter i intimate some other thing in both cases my thought is led to something beyond kaias and there are two things brought into consideration and since any idea whether simple or complex may be the occasion why the mind thus brings two things together and as it were takes a view of them at once though still considered as distinct therefore any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation as in the above mentioned instance the contract and ceremony of marriage with sympronia is the occasion of the denomination or relation of husband and the color white the occasion why he is said to be whiter than free stone these and the like relations expressed by relative terms that have others answering them with a reciprocal intimation as father and son bigger and less cause and effect are very obvious to everyone and everybody at first sight perceives that relation for father and son husband and wife and such other correlative terms seem so nearly to belong to one another and through custom do so readily chime and answer one another in people's memories that upon the naming of either of them the thoughts are presently carried beyond the thing so named and nobody overlooks or doubts of a relation where it is so plainly intimated but where languages have failed to give correlative names there the relation is not always so easily taken notice of concubine is no doubt a relative name as well as wife but in languages where this and the like words have not a correlative term their people are not so apt to take them to be so as wanting that evident mark of relation which is between correlatives which seem to explain one another and not and not to be able to exist but together hence it is that many of those names which duly considered do include evident relations have been called external denominations but all names that are more than empty sounds must signify some idea which is either in the thing to which the name is applied and then it is positive and is looked on as united to and existing in the thing to which the nomination is given or else it arises from the respect the mind finds in it to something distinct from it with which it considers it and then it concludes relation another sort of relative terms there is which are not looked on to be either relative or so much as external denominations which yet under the form and appearance of signifying something absolute in the subject do conceal a tacit though less observable relation such are the seemingly positive terms of old great imperfect etc whereof i shall have occasion to speak more at large in the following chapters this farther may be observed that the ideas of relation may be the same in men who have far different ideas of the things that are related or that are thus compared those who have far different ideas of a man may yet agree in the notion of a father which is a notion super induced to the substance or man and refers only to an act of that thing called man whereby he contributed to the generation of one of his own kind let man be what it will the nature therefore of relation consists in the referring or comparing two things one to another from which comparison one or both comes to be denominated and if either of those things be removed or cease to be the relation ceases and the denomination consequent to it though the other received in itself no alteration at all the big Russia chaos whom i consider today as a father ceases to be so tomorrow only by the death of his son without any alteration made in himself nay barely by the minds changing the object to which it compares anything the same thing is capable of having contrary denominations at the same time there be gratia chaos compared to several persons may truly be said to be older and younger stronger and weaker etc what so ever doth or can exist or be considered as one thing is positive and so not only simple ideas and substances but modes also are positive beings though the parts of which they consist are very often relative one to another but the whole together considered as one thing producing in us the complex idea of one thing which idea is in our minds as one picture though an aggregate of diverse parts and under one name it is a positive or absolute thing or idea thus a triangle though the parts thereof compared to one to another be relative yet the idea of the whole is a positive absolute idea the same may be said of a family a tune etc for there can be no relation but betwixt two things considered as two things there must always be in relation two ideas or things either in themselves really separate or considered as distinct and then a ground or occasion for their comparison concerning relation in general these things may be considered first that there is no one thing whether simple idea substance mode or relation or name of either of them which is not capable of almost an infinite number of considerations in reference to other things and therefore this makes no small part of men's thoughts and words there be gratia one single man may at once be concerned in and sustain all these following relations and many more these father brother son grandfather grandson father-in-law son-in-law husband friend enemy subject general judge patron client professor european englishman islander servant master professor captain superior inferior bigger less older younger contemporary like unlike etc to an almost infinite number he being capable of as many relations as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things in any manner of agreement disagreement or respect whatsoever for as i said relation is a way of comparing or considering two things together and giving one or both of them some appellation from that comparison and sometimes giving even the relation itself a name secondly this father may be considered concerning relation that though it be not contained in the real existence of things but something extraneous and super induced yet the ideas which relative words stand for are often clearer and more distinct than of those substances to which they do belong the notion we have of a father or brother is a great deal clearer and more distinct than what we have of a man or if you will paternity is a thing where of it is easier to have a clear idea than of humanity and i can much easier conceive what a friend is than what god because the knowledge of one action or one simple idea is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a relation but to the knowing of any substantial being an accurate collection of sundry ideas is necessary a man if he compares two things together can hardly be supposed not to know what it is wherein he compares them so that when he compares any things together he cannot but have a very clear idea of that relation the ideas then of relations are capable at least of being more perfect and distinct in our minds than those of substances because it is commonly hard to know all the simple ideas which are really in any substance but for the most part easy enough to know the simple ideas that make up any relation i think on or have a name for the big Russia comparing two men in reference to one common parent it is very easy to frame the ideas of brothers without having yet the perfect idea of a man for significant relative words as well as others standing only for ideas and those being all either simple or made up of simple ones it suffices for the knowing the precise idea the relative term stands for to have a clear conception of that which is the foundation of the relation which may be done without having a perfect and clear idea of the thing it is attributed to thus having the notion that one laid the egg out of which the other was hatched i have a clear idea of the relation of them and chick between the two casuaries in saint james park though perhaps i have but a very obscure and imperfect idea of those birds themselves thirdly though there be a great number of considerations wherein things may be compared one with another and so a multitude of relations yet they all terminate in and are concerned about those simple ideas either of sensation or reflection which i think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge to clear this i shall show it in the most considerable relations that we have any notion of and in some that seem to be the most remote from sense or reflection which yet will appear to have their own ideas from them and leave it past doubt that the notions we have of them are but certain simple ideas and so originally derived from sense or reflection fourthly that relation being the considering of one thing with another which is extrinsical to it it is evident that all words that necessarily lead the mind to any other ideas than are supposed really to exist in that thing to which the words are applied are relative words there be gracia a man black merry thoughtful thirsty angry extended these and the like are all absolute because they neither signify nor intimate anything but what does or is supposed really to exist in the man thus denominated but father brother king husband blacker merrier etc are words which together with the thing they denominate imply also something else separate and exterior to the existence of that thing having laid down having laid down these premises concerning relation in general i shall now proceed to show in some instances how all the ideas we have of relation are made up as the others are only of simple ideas and that they all how refined or remote from sense so ever they seem terminate at last in simple ideas i shall begin with the most comprehensive relation wherein all things that do or can exist are concerned and that is the relation of cause and effect the idea whereof how derive from the two fountains of all our knowledge sensation and reflection i shall in the next place consider chapter 26 of cause and effect and other relations in the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things we cannot but observe that several particular both qualities and substances begin to exist and that they receive this their existence from the do application and operation of some other being from this observation we get our ideas of cause and effect that which produces any simple or complex idea we denote by the general name cause and that which is produced effect thus finding that in that substance which we call wax fluidity which is a simple idea that was not in it before is constantly produced by the application of a certain degree of heat we call the simple idea of heat in relation to fluidity in wax the cause of it and fluidity the effect so also finding that the substance of wood which is a certain collection of simple ideas so called by the application of fire is turned into another substance called ashes i.e. another complex idea consisting of a collection of simple ideas quite different from that complex idea which we call wood we consider fire in relation to ashes as cause and the ashes as effect so that whatever is considered by us to conduce or operate to the producing any particular simple idea or collection of simple ideas whether substance or mode which did not before exist hath thereby in our minds the relation of a cause and so is denominated by us having thus from what our senses are able to discover in the operations of bodies on one another got the notion of cause and effect is that cause is that which makes any other thing either simple idea substance or mode begin to be and an effect is that which had its beginning from some other thing the mind finds no great difficulty to distinguish the several originals of things into two sorts first when the thing is wholly made new so that no part thereof did ever exist before as when a new particle of matter doth begin to exist in rerum natura which had before no being and this we call creation secondly when a thing is made up of particles which did all of them before exist but that very thing so constituted of pre-existing particles which considered altogether make up such a collection of simple ideas as had not any existence before as this man this egg rose or cherry etc and this when referred to a substance produced in the ordinary course of nature by internal principle but set on work and received from some external agent or cause and working by insensible ways which we perceive not we call generation when the cause is extrinsical and the effect produced by a sensible separation or juxtaposition of discernible parts we call it making and such are all artificial things when any simple idea is produced which was not in that subject before we call it alteration thus a man is generated a picture made and either of them altered when any new sensible quality or simple idea is produced in either of them which was not there before and the things thus made to exist which were not there before our effects and those things which operated to the existence causes in which and all other causes we may observe that the notion of cause and effect has its rise from ideas received by sensation or reflection and that this relation how comprehensible so ever terminates at last in them for to have the idea of cause and effect it suffices to consider any simple idea or substance as beginning to exist by the operation of some other without knowing the manner of that operation time and place are also the foundations of very large relations and all finite beings at least are concerned in them but having already shown in another place how we get these ideas it may suffice here to intimate that most of the denominations of things received from time from time are only relations thus when any one says that queen elizabeth lived 69 and reigned 45 years these words import only the relation of that duration to some other and mean no more than this that the duration of her existence was equal to 69 and the duration of her government to 45 annual revolutions of the sun and so are all words answering how long again william the conqueror invaded england about the year 1066 which means this that taking the duration from our saviour's time till now for one entire great length of time it shows at what distance this invasion was from the two extremes and so do all words of time answering to the question when which show only the distance of any point of time from the period of a longer duration from which we measure and to which we thereby consider it as related there are yet besides those other words of time that ordinarily are thought to stand for positive ideas which yet will when considered be found to be relative such as our young old etc which include and intimate the relation anything has to a certain length of duration whereof we have the idea in our minds thus having settled in our thoughts the idea of the ordinary duration of a man to be 70 years when we say a man is young we mean that his age is yet but a small part of that which usually men attain to and when we denominate him old we mean that his duration is run out almost to the end of that which men do not usually exceed and so it is but comparing the particular age or duration of this or that man to the idea of that duration which we have in our minds as ordinarily belonging to that sort of animals which is plain in the application of these names to other things for a man is called young at 20 years and very young at 7 years old but yet a horse would call old at 20 and a dog at 7 years because in each of these we compare their age to different ideas of duration which are settled in our minds as belonging to these several sorts of animals in the ordinary course of nature but the sun and stars though they have outlasted several generations of men we call not old because we do not know what period god hath set to that sort of beings this term belonging properly to those things which we can observe in the ordinary course of things by a natural decay to come to an end in a certain period of time and so have in our minds as it were a standard to which we can compare the several parts of their duration and by the relation they bear their unto called them young or old which we cannot therefore do to a ruby or diamond things whose usual periods we know not the relation also that things have to one another in their places and distances is very obvious to observe as above below a mild distant from Tering Cross in England and in London but as in duration so in extension and bulk there are some ideas that are relative which we signify by names that are thought positive as great and little are truly relations for here also having by observation settled in our minds the ideas of the bigness of several species of things from those we have been most accustomed to we make them as it were the standards whereby to denominate the bulk of others thus we call a great apple such as one as is bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to and a little horse such as one as comes not up to the size of that idea which we have in our minds to belong ordinarily to horses and that will be a great horse to a Welshman which is but a little one to a Fleming they too having from the different breed of their countries taken several sized ideas to which they compare and in relation to which they denominate their great and their little so likewise weak and strong are but relative denominations of power compared to some ideas we have at that time of greater or less power thus when we say a weak man we mean one that has not so much strength or power to move as usually men have or usually those of his size have which is a comparing his strength to the idea we have of the usual strength of men or men of such a size the like when we say the creatures are all weak things weak there is but a relative term signifying the disproportion there is in the power of God and these creatures and so abundance of words in ordinary speech stand only for relations and perhaps the greatest part which at first might seem to have no such signification the ship has necessary stores necessary and stores are both relative words one having a relation to the accomplishing the voyage intended and the other to future use all which relations how they are confined to and terminate in ideas derived from sensation or reflection is too obvious to need any explanation end of section 22 recording by Immanuel Zornberg