 Hey, we're just starting to record now. So you're just going to start with just quick introductions. So we all know who we all are. And then we're going to go right into the scenario. Okay. Okay, I'm going to start it. Hi. My name is Dazza Greenwood. I'm a scientist here at the at the media lab. Which Brendan Maher first introduced me to. So, thanks again, buddy. And I run law.mit.edu here and computational law research where we're very, very keenly interested in trying to prototype a generalizable open source reference implementation for a automated legal entity. And I'm thrilled to be part of it and to find, and to, you know, we can do a deeper dive in a working initial implementation that already started and learn more about that. And what we're going to try to do today is, is part of kind of mapping the legal frameworks that may be needed or or, or, or useful for automated and autonomous legal entities. We're going to start with a simple agency law kind of pattern and play it out. First, with just humans, make sure everyone understands it and then start to swap in a distributed autonomous organization or other automated legal entity for, you know, each of the roles and see, you know, what's the same and what might be different. And what can we learn from that in terms of maybe crisping up some new requirements or design goals that we can engineer so everything works well. So, Beth, do you mind going next? And then, Brendan, and then we can go right down the line. I can call names so we don't miss any button. So, Beth, welcome. Yeah, maybe, um, yeah, Brendan, can you try meeting or anyone who's not muted because it's like super scratchy, am I in? Yeah. So, hi, I'm Beth McCarthy. Oh, no, no, it's doing an echo. Yeah. So I'm a co founder of starfish network in the incubator. So it's, I help with research and design kind of fab lab for dolls and other on chain off chain entities. And with this style incubation program that's essentially building Kind of are working with designing like kind of role based like functional taxonomies for dolls and looking into the dynamics of kind of these human systems. So really Had some great conversations with does and Brendan kind of planning this and thinking through some of the applications we are applying these same Issues to in real life. So really excited to hear about everyone's perspectives and how it can apply to these kind of new emerging organizations that we're working with. Awesome. Thanks, Beth. And you're really happy to again be collaborating with mechanism design group and and all you bring to to the table, which is just so such a great Looking at a scenario and playing it through. So, Brendan, you're up. You're on mute. Hey, Brendan, you're on mute. No, we can't hear you. I'm not muted. How about now. Okay. Yep, you're coming through. Oh, great. Okay. Yeah, so I guess most of you know me of some sort. I'm Brendan more I am a media lab alum from 1995 to 96 I got started computing doing virtual reality back then I did distributed computing and Cybernetics and and You know, I just have a passion for all this stuff and I'm a long time friend of Daza and you know this stuff is just really exciting. Great. Amen. And Brendan among many other things put together the automated and autonomous legal entity telegram group, which is really what this exercise kind of grew out of and Where we'll be on kind of trying to make this useful. So thanks, Brendan. Let's see just going down the line as it appears on my screen at least Brian Wilson legal hacker extraordinaire. You're up. Hi, my name is Brian Wilson. I as Daza mentioned, I'm a legal hacker. I founded the Kansas City legal hackers chapter And shortly I will be working as a visiting researcher at MIT Media Lab where I'll be looking to build out Some of the work on computational law specifically with computational law report and just kind of like kind of bringing together more pieces of the community And I'm really excited because this is obviously a big piece of that as it's going to serve as one of the first first challenges that we look to include in the in the computational law report. Beautiful. Thank you. And Brian's also going to be joining us as a visiting researcher at the media lab and helping to do everything you just said Right here, probably in this room largely so thanks Brian. So Christopher, you're on mute right now but welcome Hello. Hi. Yeah. Chris Ray. I'm an English lawyer working on automated systems of contracts to provide reliable data on real world assets for use by Thousand and other other automated systems and very, very happy to be here. Wait, Chris. Are you are you with the material? Yes. Okay. I think we spoke once. Hey, how's it going? Yes. Yes. Absolutely. Hey, sweet. Perfect. Thank you. I'm glad you're on the line, Chris. Do you prefer Chris or Christopher? Chris is good. It saves saves a couple of syllables. Okay. All right. Thanks Chris. And so now next we have an empty Starship commanders seat where Gabriel will be soon. So let's Sorry about that. Oh, just stepped away for a second. Yeah, so I'm Gabriel Shapiro. I'm a corporate lawyer. For a long time I practiced primarily mergers and acquisitions at the Silicon Valley offices of various big law firms. While Gotchall was the one I was at the longest did that for about seven years and now practice crypto law loosely speaking. I have a company that I recently founded called Zero Law, which combines a tokenized security platform with legal advice necessary to implement tokenized securities. And one of my hopes is that people will start papering dows a little bit better. And I hope to help with that. And that's part of why I'm here in this group as well. Grant, could you introduce yourself and Sure. Yeah, definitely. My name is Grant Ellison. I'm an attorney based in downstate Illinois. Pretty much amongst the cornfields. I probably the least academic of this group here. But the reason why I've been really interested in what this project is doing is because I see this as being really the The, to me, it's like the most important issue that not to sound overly dramatic, but humanity will be facing as far as as we transition to more automated systems. Taking more and more of the duties that humans have been doing up to now and ensuring that the legal framework that we've been relying upon for this past several hundreds of thousands of years is, you know, is accurately conveyed to this to this new era, I guess, because I mean, this is one of those things where well, just all of the dystopian sci fi films or books we've read. I'm sure that we want to try to avoid that as much as possible. And I think this group is may have a lot to do with with ensuring that that it does not turn into something like that. So next up, we have Jonathan Askin. Welcome. Hi, hi, folks. I'm Jonathan Askin. I'm a professor of local law school. I teach tech telecom startup law different combinations of me and my students and various collaborators have tried to figure out how to resolve this intractable Issue and I hope to play a role in helping this community. Thank you. Welcome, Jonathan. And also from the great, you know, what ought to be a state of Brooklyn, or or welcome. Please introduce yourself and don't leave out the door. Yeah, thanks. I'm also based in Brooklyn. I work with Dorg who recently incorporated in Vermont as a BLLC linked Dow. So we use that for operations and governance and we use the BLLC law in Vermont to give that decision making engine legal capacity and limited liability for the members. So I do a lot of the operational work for Dorg also on on the technical projects like working on like the specifications and code reviews, but we're mainly a technical team doing a lot like building doubt tooling and recently really focused on the legal issue and tooling around The legal admin side of the house. I bet. I'm sorry because I'm mute again for those who want to learn more about that there's some links at law.mit.edu forward slash BB LLC to the Dorg project and your excellent GitHub repos and press releases and things so definitely take a look. Okay, and I think we've got one more person here in the room. Hey, which one do I look at this one. I'm Robert. I'm an MIT alum and current student at HLS Harvard law school where I'm president of the law and tech society. And right now I'm a visiting student at the media lab in Sandy Pantlin's human dynamic group. So I've been working with that on various projects and this is all very exciting. Welcome. Welcome back to MIT double major when he was undergrad, which I think is phenomenal. Okay, then. So I'm now going to do a little screen share. A moment. Am I muted? No. Okay. Present to everyone. So everybody has some is this Screen coming through now of our of the HackMD file or anybody Brian It's small. Yeah. Okay. It is coming through the Okay, so I would encourage everybody to click the link on yourself to the HackMD file and bring it up full screen and log in as well to add content, but you don't have to log in to to follow along. Okay, so does anybody on this on this Hangout want to click the link but you don't think you have the link because we can fix that right now before we go forward. Going once going twice. Okay. Somebody. Okay. Great. Um, so Who was it that cleaned up the scenario? Was that you grant? Yeah, that was me. Okay. That's right. Do you I mean, do you want to do the honors of of walking us through walking us through the scenario or you want me to do it? No, I mean, that's fine. I can I can start off and would you be willing to handle sure. Yeah, that's fine. No problem at all. The there's some there's a common facts to this particular this fact pattern. First being that the you have a principal who engages an agent to find and purchase a rare book. Then you have an agent who finds the bookseller and makes an offer. And just the last portion, the third of the common facts is that the seller now becomes the third party for purposes of the the remainder of these different scenarios. And those those three facts are common to all all of the scenarios presented. The first scenario involves the third party, the bookseller accepting the payment plan proposed by an agent by the agent, which presumes that the agent proposed the agent found the book and and proposed a payment plan, which the third party accepted. The seller then delivers the book to the agent based upon the agreement that they have. The agent delivers the book to the principal. The principal. I assume that no money changed hands up to this point. It wasn't clear from the from the fact pattern. I guess that's something we can determine. Let's let's let's fix it up while we're talking. Okay, sure. No money changes hands because that'll make it cleaner. No, I think I think that's right. I think it does. And then the final the last part of this is the principal pays the first installment, but then claims that the agent had no authority to bind her to any sort of payment. Payment plan and therefore refused to make any additional payments. And that that's the first scenario. Great. And then so the question of the first scenario would be basically what are the third parties like rights as against the agent and or the principal. Under under that and what are the what defenses could the principal or the agent bring under these circumstances. That will get us into what should we just play the scenario out now and then do the next permutation after we play it through. Yeah, I think we should. Okay, so I'll take a look at it. Yes. Hey, I got a quick question to you before you start. Do you think when we're going over things last night with that, do you think it would be might be good for folks to just get a sense of kind of the the. Larger framework nuggets that we're talking about like when we're talking about these things in terms of like networking and that there's that there are patterns and what we're really looking for. I think that all this are not just the individual. Transactions but but the the. Qualities of those transactions like it is clear to us that authority and proof of authority, etc. is very important. So we're looking for these kind of pieces that are patterns through all of this. Right. Definitely. So, yeah, why don't we get at that through the scenario. Okay, great. So, so, so, and again, but like if I were disclaimer, I'm like, I don't know, maybe like 15 years out of practice of law. So, like, this is not legal advice and I'd encourage anyone that's like a more recent or currently practicing lawyer to pipe in with. With things, but based on just reading the restatement of agency, like 3rd, which has been republished largely kindly at through a link we shared in telegram by Berkeley school of law. You know, one of the key principles, one of the key. Rules in agency law is called vicarious liability, basically. And what it means is that the when a person would when a principal. Uses an agent to conduct some kind of transaction on their behalf. The principal is legally responsible for for that transaction. They're liable for what the agency does agent does, particularly within the scope of their authority. And this is a reminder. There's explicit authority. You know, like the principal might say, like the principal Alice say engages the agent named Bob to buy this rare book. But then you're authorized to spend up to, you know, $200 or $2,000 or something that would be kind of explicit authority with a little bit of scope there. There may also there's also a concept of implied authority. So if the if the 3rd party would reasonably have concluded that the agent has authority to take an act that can also bind the principal. So those are some of the some of the parameters of agency law that are most relevant, I think, for this first scenario. So my under like, if all things are equal, and let's just say that the agent, you know, negotiated like a fair deal for like the ordinary market cost of the book and it was within the agents explicit authority. Let's just say that the book was $2,000 and it was like, you know, 10 $200 installments, for example, and they just decide, well, I've got the book. I'm a bad actor. I don't want to pay anymore. My analysis would be that the 3rd party could sue the principal for the remaining or the remaining money, maybe some other damages and that would be let's see 2,000 less 200 be $1,800 and that they should win. And and in the way I just played the scenario, there's really no defense I can think of for the principal, you know, to offer a little permutation is. Let's say the agent went ahead and negotiate like the market price for the book, you know, on whatever, according to objective markers, which maybe is $2,000 and the agent agreed to a $20,000 price. The principal played the first installment say of $2,000 and was like, well, I feel like I paid the market price for that book and and I will not pay another $18,000. And and that now we may have a situation where a defense that the principal can can bring is is that the agent exceeded their authority and the 3rd party knew or should have known that 8, you know, the $20,000 is. Would not be, you know, was not the agent wasn't authorized to bind the principal to that amount, in which case that that could be a defense that the principal would bring like in litigation or arbitration, and they could prevail. I think in general, if you just apply agency law to that scenario. So let me just stop. You've got the agent also and ask and ask for feedback like any comments or questions about all that. Yeah, this is grant on the issue of on that last scenario I think you still have to deal with the actually theoretically both scenarios, you have to deal with the agencies, the agents liability to the third party, because the agent is made because the principal was undisclosed. Based, at least that was my interpretation based on the fact pattern. Then the agent becomes a party to the contract. It's the agent the third party or basically have two contracts one between the principal and the third party and the other between agent and third party and the In the case of in the first example, I believe that it would be the. I think the third party would have had a claim against the agent as well. In the last example, I think you're right the principal would have a valid defense that just beyond the scope of the authority that was given to the agent, but I do think that the third party would could theoretically have a claim against the agent if from the third party standpoint it was reasonable to believe that the 20,000 was what it was worth and the third party believed, you know, objectively that that the negotiation was in good faith, and that the book was worth $20,000. So I think in that scenario the, I think the agent would have a claim or sorry the third party would have an agent claiming the agent. Okay, so just in the online 40 of our shared pack. MD file, I just added well I had a section from line 36 down on analysis of the scenarios for scenario one. I wrote the 1st thing that you said grant, which is if the principal was undisclosed and we didn't really make that explicit. And that was part of the fun. I was hoping somebody would would say what you just said, then like, here's a fun fact. When you have an undisclosed principal, the agent actually made, or would bear more responsibility or accountability for the obligations of the contract. So I tried to write that point down on online 40. And then you were talking so concisely that I couldn't buffer the other things you said when I was doing that. Oh, no, that's fun. In the in the first before you made before you did the permutation. I believe that the the agent would also would be liable to the same degree as the principal. But there'd be a set off so that if the I believe either the the third party could can only collect once basically can't can't double dip see them both and get double damages for the for the value of the for the 1800 times two or whatever. So I'll let you type that double dip double dip and get contract amount from both the agent and principal. Yeah, I mean, obviously one of the interesting things about all this is that the agent could be acting within the scope of its authority from the third party's perspective. But vis-a-vis one of the same action could be outside the scope of its authority from the principal's perspective, right? And so, you know, when that occurs, the third party may have a claim against the principal, but the principal may also have a claim against the agent. But they're premised on different things. One is premised on a parent agency and one is premised on, you know, a breach of fiduciary duty or a breach of contract, you know, based on going outside the scope of action. So outside the scope of actual authority. So it gets it gets pretty squarely that way. But it's interesting. So I'm writing that down because this is matters of actual authority than the principal may have claim against the agent for, for example, for the money obligation above the set amount that the agent agreed to pay like that, right? Yep. Perfect. Yep. This is great. And then by the way, this is like agency law 101 kind of stuff. So like if you're in law school learning agency law, this is the kind of conversation you'd be having right now. I'm getting traumatic flashbacks to law school learning. Any other minus the Socratic method. So you're welcome. So any other questions or comments on scenario one, just while we're playing it through? I think it would be really good to kind of say a kind of summary of like what it means for the principal to be able to act for the agent and just and, you know, to summarize the scenario to be like, you know, when the agent does this action, they're acting on behalf of the principal. So they, you know, have responsibility to do this, a certain thing, you know, to kind of have a summary framing of the entire scenario and the framework, which I think is what does it. I mean, sorry, what Brendan was referencing of yesterday, how we were talking very explicitly about the functional roles of the agent and principal and their party in relation to one another. So maybe to just say, you know, yeah, it'll probably be more effective if you were to do this, but I'm picturing, you know, like a diagram and I had of how, you know, the principal has a duty to do a certain thing for the agent because their relationship exists in a certain way and kind of go through that for each of them. It sounds kind of like the issue rule application conclusion, just kind of like basic law school framework of like, how you solve solve the legal use case. Yeah. Yeah. And what you would say at the end of a hype out like, this is what happened. Yeah. Well, actually what it sounds like, what it sounds like, even well, I think, even before you get to the issue rule discussion holding or whatever. You remember when you're starting for the bar spam, you can get like those little like one page like laminated sheets. If they don't even know if they still have those, but it kind of just says like, here's like the essence of contract law the essence of agents. Yes. Yes. Like, I think, and they actually have a little like three way diagram. So I feel like that's exactly what I was thinking. Yes. That is what I meant. Like a simple encapsulation. So that's outside of the scope of anything I could do, maybe like definitely right now, and maybe without saying that, but, but I added a note by the way on line 48. I'll just put your name on it. It would be helpful to have a high level framework of how agency law works and like a simple diagram of the rights and duties of each party to the other two. And I think we can squeeze that out. Like maybe by scrubbing the Wikipedia page again or some other stuff that's created comments, we can, you know, some combination of cribbit and just, you know, just restate it ourselves. We're not totally then we can have that to refer to when we are talking explicitly about dows and placing this discussion in the relation, you know, in a more abstracted application and then drawing back down to the specific applications that we're working with with dows. I think it would be really cool to kind of keep that in mind of the fact that everything that we're talking about, no matter how deeply get into the facts of the fact pattern, what we're really looking at is, you know, rights and duties and responsibilities, you know, legally and normatively that like flow, all these three points. Well, I'm sorry. What you just said, I kind of just tweaked the notes a little bit. So I just added in line 46 another high level header called like action items for July 8. And I just made this like the level of a task, which I guess I promised to help with and would seek some, you know, with me on that a little bit of a chore, but let's do that. Okay, so more any more questions comments on the first scenario just while we have it and encourage everybody to click the link and telegram or to do a quick Google for agency law on Wikipedia if you want to get, you know, if you're unfamiliar with the one refresher on the on the basics of agency law. But meanwhile, look, we have enough people that kind of know it or and a Brian just took the bar exam recently. So it may be fresher in some people's mind. So you people that actually know agency law are and are heightened obligation in my view to pipe up any. So, okay, we can come back to scenario one, but why don't we go forward to scenario two and see what happens. And then, okay. There are no objection. Thank you to bunch of mutes, I guess, scenario to same scenario one, except the seller takes the money, but doesn't deliver the book to the agent. Oh, okay, so then what happens. This is great. As far as defenses. I didn't see any from the way the facts were presented as thinking about it from a litigator standpoint I could think of some arguments that I would make perhaps make. If I were the third party and one would be that wouldn't get me very far but one would be that the didn't seem like the agent had the authority to accept the book on behalf of the principal. Like I said, I think that would that would that would carry the day. That was that was really the only defense I could come up with. I mean the seller has obviously breached their contract right. The question is who who who has remedies against the seller. Assuming the agent was acting within the scope of authority of the principal, then, as long as there wasn't fraudulent concealment of an agency relationship on the part of the agent to the seller. Then, you know, the seller should be liable to the principal. The seller may also be liable to the agent on behalf of the principal. Since the agent was sort of, you know, sort of the contracting interface for the principal. It should also be liable to the principal, right, because maybe the agent didn't use reasonable care in guarding against this scenario, right, maybe it, you know, sold to an obviously, you know, bought from an obviously fraudulent seller, or something like that. So that could also be an issue. And instantly, I think I just detected something kind of major. So in scenario two, the, you know, the actor that's taken the wrong action or done something wrong, created liability is the seller, who is the third party. And then the seller did not deliver the book. The seller takes the money and doesn't deliver the book. So going to the analysis, which I'm just adding to line 43. The third party couldn't, at this point, they couldn't say, Well, I mean, are you saying the reason that the third party, the seller didn't deliver the book is because they felt that the agent didn't have authority to accept it. And that's why they didn't deliver it. That would only be a defense against the agent because the principal would still have the claim to the book seller. And that defense wouldn't work in that case. Yeah, but they would, I'll just say, presumably, presumably, presumably, still have an obligation, have an obligation to deliver the book to the principal. And actually, I think we can postulate something like that. So like if it was a truly rare book, and like with like really expensive art, maybe like the insurance or other or just basic business practices suggest, I'm not like I'm obligated to only give this to a license bonded, you know, like bring, bring struck or armed guard to escort you. I'm not just going to give it to the agent because then I may be responsible for the loss of the expensive rare book. And so, you know, they may be waiting for instructions on like a bonded delivery person or something like that. Just to try to try to make it make sense somehow what you're saying about the reason why the seller didn't give it to the agent was because they felt it was irresponsible or something. Does that make sense? Yeah, I mean, I think it's a bad argument, but that's the only one I could come up with. Yeah. Right. No, it makes sense. So what else can we say. So I think just in the spirit of what Beth said about just applying just applying agency law. So unless there's some really good reason, the application of the by operation of law, I'd say the prince, the third party who's the bookseller would be liable for would would be, you know, there was an enforceable right of the principal and or the agent to get the book. So you go to court and get an injunction and send the sheriff and get the book because he took the money and he's in breach of contract and maybe some other terms. And there could be an agency cause of action here as well. But I think it would sound in contract more so contract an agency blur. And this would be one of those places where there's some blur, but there's a breach which for which to provide a remedy. And the seller may have, they may have committed a tort as well. Right. They couldn't the tort of conversion. Right. Yeah, good one. Actually, I'm just going to, could you add that is who's in the, I'm monkeying with something else. It could somebody add that. I'll try to add it. This is a. Oh, I'm actually I'm not signed in. I'll swear I could sign it online 47 that the seller may have also. Yeah, good. Where was doing that. Okay, so let's. I had a question. Yep. That was like when it was mentioning like fraudulent concealment and there was something else. I forgot the term that you had said, but you know, basically these different levels of life, knowing and not knowing that's kind of inferred between like, you know, the buyer seller and the third party like, you know, a certain like standard of knowledge. So I was curious if that is written out anywhere like, you know, if fraudulent concealment you kind of touched on this just now, but it's like a fraudulent concealment is like, you know, a concern. Then this is kind of what I was talking about with like levels of liability that flow between these different roles to each other where it's like, you know, is it on is it. On behalf of the agent to make, you know, to be reasonably sure that they're not concealing something is it on, you know, the role of the seller to make sure that they aren't kind of participating in somebody concealing things like, you know, if there's a. Yeah, like, you know, how do people, is there some something that anybody in this scenario of you referring to to make sure that their behavior is in accordance with the standards of what is okay and what the other roles expect of them. Well, I mean, I think I think this is where some of the hypos deviate a little bit from the real world because, you know, really, really what the doctrine is saying is, you know, third party beneficiaries to a contract can exist. And the principle of an agent may be one of those third party beneficiaries. But of course, when people enter into written contracts, I mean, almost every contract has a boilerplate language that says no third party beneficiaries right. And so, you know, if you had such a contract, then I think, you know, the seller didn't know that the agent was acting as an agent. And there was also a disclaimer of third party beneficiaries right, then the principal doesn't have a direct remedy against the seller, you know, for the breach of the contract right. The flip side, the fraudulent concealment thing, I think, you know, ignoring what may be in a contract that just gets into the general, the more general principle of, you know, is the is the agency, you know, is the seller sort of, you know, reasonably, reasonably relying on the existence of an agency relationship, or are they unreasonably doing so. And of course, if they, you know, if their reasoning is based on fraud, you know, then then you should sort of disclaim, you know, you should discount the whatever conclusions are reached because they've been defrauded, you know, and so, you know, they shouldn't be, you know, there shouldn't be a legal, there shouldn't be a benefit, you know, there shouldn't be a harm from their perspective, you know, accruing to them because they were defrauded. Yeah. But did you prefer Gabe or Gabriel, by the way? Either, either is fine. Okay, so Gabe, I'm going to suggest that we back up a little bit even from that because those are quasi-sophisticated. So the way I would approach Beth's inquiry about like what are the underlying fake like axiom, like foundational rights and responsibilities. The contract law in particular, the seller has a kind of implied duty of fair dealing and good faith, you know, so that's one that, you know, would come up potentially if they were doing something nefarious, or if they were supposed to, you know, disclose something like, oh, didn't I mention that pages, you know, like the middle 50 pages, you know, are like pouring out or something. And then the, but the main one for agency law analysis, I believe, would be a fiduciary duty that agents own the principles. And this is really important, and I think this is one we should return to again and again with automated entities. And it's a duty to actually disclose, actively disclose, like everything that's relevant about the transaction. To the principal, I thought she was talking about disclosure by the agent to the third party, but I could have, maybe I was confused about that. I think that was Beth said that for short, but what I took from Beth's kind of comment was like every pair wise duty, so from the agent to the principal and third party from the third party, the principal and the agent and from the principal to the agent and the third party. So one of the big ones is if there's something hinky, or if there's some reason to suspect something, or, or if they did an analysis of the price in the market, and they saw like where the this particular seller came up all that stuff they actually have an affirmative duty to say and communicate back to the principal. And so I'd say that would be a foundational one. And then you start getting into more twists and turns where you get into unjust enrichment and to stop all some of the other kinds of stuff that gave that I think you were bringing up. So that was helpful. Actually, well, let's see if we can squeeze some more milk out of this scenario before we go to the next one. So any more comments or questions on this one. Well, just that, you know, this kind of filling in, you know, relevant, relevant contextual information, or buzziness kind of reminded me of what the point you had made about universal commercial code or wait, uniform commercial code at different times. And, you know, kind of my question was specifically guiding to see if there's an analog to that. So that would, you know, if that's governing contract law and commercial situations like, you know, would something like that come in that is, you know, essentially a agreed upon catalog of normative standards that now has become, you know, something that would, you know, people, people know that they reasonably should abide by those things. Like if I was picking up the book, and I can see that it has like, you know, water damage, and I'm supposed to report that the book is in good condition. And like, you know, I, and I choose, and I choose to be like, oh, that has water damage, it's still in good condition because the paper's on corn. Like, you know, I'm not being a reasonable person by doing that. Like, and that, you know, is there somewhere where kind of normative behavior like this is codified? Yeah, in terms of the fiduciary relationship, I mean, I think it's, there's not something like the UCC, but there is, there's common law, and the restatement, you know, that that was circulated, that's, that's a restatement of the common law, so to speak. So that that's basically, you know, what you would look to as a guide, you know, at least in the US. Yeah, and to that point, I think section seven has a lot of the kind of like overview of like what happens to who when things go poorly. So, you know, going back through, we could specifically like start tying in some of the different sections of the restatement as kind of like the bedrock of like justifying things if we wanted to expand these out more. Yes, I'm glad you mentioned that. I'm sorry, one quick thing, Grant, I failing of my duty to speak on behalf of Gloria, who can't didn't log in quick enough. And so she said on Telegram several minutes ago due diligence explanation mark. And so we might, you know, there's some due diligence that may be presumed on behalf of the agent to, you know, ensure that they're not doing maybe business with a disreputable seller. Or who's someone who's likely to, you know, or, or, or, or, or, you know, kind of damage property or something like that. So the whole concept of due diligence duty of care. Remember, I'm sorry to have interrupted you, Grant, you got the floor. Yeah, I was only going to make the point that the thing about section seven is that most of those those subsections deal only with torches conduct. So I think that there are there's the, let's see, section 7.03 sub C or sub one sub C dumb question. Brian and sorry, I just had a call command. I just killed it. Yeah. Section seven. Oh, sorry, the rest, the restamen of restamen of agency. Oh, okay. Great. Apologies. Yeah, just that that that helps. You're a standalone third of agency section 7.0. 0.03 sub one sub C has the example where an agent is tasked with performing a duty to use care to protect other persons or their property and I think in the, in the scenarios that we're doing today, the agent was tasked with protecting the the cash from the principal, the money, assuming that that was part of the transaction that the transaction was actually done at the booksellers. But almost all of the other principles only deal with only explicitly deal only with tort. So I does just something to keep in mind because I know that that might be relevant. Definitely. Yeah, we could, we could postulate another thing, which is not unperceivable at all with dows and with dynamic systems where, you know, the agent takes possession of the thing. And then oops, like he gets hacked or something happens to reduce the value of it. Like did they, did they take appropriate count measures to protect the value of the goods and the property or the money. So that is a really good one. Thanks, Brian. And, and Grant, like, nice one. Oh, Brian, could I trouble you to chuck that in the analysis of any analysis like oh yeah. Thanks. I've been taking like a miscellaneous set of notes at the bottom to do. And I just had a general point in there to link the vignettes with the restatement of agency. Okay, but in particular this one in section seven, we touched on it. And I do think we could plumb the depths of that a great deal and it kind of speaks very directly to what that has been reminding us we should highlight. So, thank you. Okay, any, any more ideas, questions, comments on scenario two going once going twice. All right. Let's go to scenario three, which is same, but the agent obscons with the money and or the book. So bad, a bad actor who's the agent is basically a fraudster. The reason I said obscons is I want to say you know did so unlawfully. You know, they weren't like running away from a bandit trying to steal it or something. They are they converted it. They stole it. So what happens in that case, I can get it started. So one thing is the, so it's like a permutation a the agent delivers the money to the seller to the third party receives the book on behalf of the principal steals the book and disappears. The reason obscons is important is because the agent isn't like sitting there with a book where you can just take it back like we have no idea where the agent is like we can't find them. They disappeared off the radar off the grid. So now the question is who's left holding the bag at that point who bears the risk of loss and actually truth is I'm not absolutely sure. Like, I'd like to say something, but I don't have a high confidence rating, but it feels like from what I remember vaguely from law that the principal would be in a bad position there. And that the third party seller, you know, was not in a good position to prevent the loss, you know, they did what they were supposed to do and assuming all things are equal. And the, you know, like the agent was authorized to accept the book on behalf of the seller, you know, it seems like the principal, the agent was authorized to receive the book on behalf of the principal, rather, it seems like the principal might bear the risk of loss in that case. And then conversely, the principal gives the agent the money and the agent obsconds with the money. Well, okay, so if it's just a two party transaction and the third party was never like that, never involved, they didn't give the book back. Obviously, I think the principal would have a claim against the agent for stealing their money. But if we kind of say that, tweet that a little bit so that the third party seller delivered the book to the principal, but the agent stole the money, then we have a situation where the question is, can the third party seller, what claims they have against the agent and or the principal, and that becomes claims against the principal when you can't find the agent. And I believe there's direct vicarious risk liability. The third party seller has a direct claim for the value of the book that was agreed from the principal. So the principal ends up having to pay twice once for the agent that stole the money and then once again to the seller. But my confidence rating on that legal analysis is terribly low. So any lawyers or people that took the bar exam recently can, can anyone, you know, Yeah, I can explain this grant. I can just explain why I broke out the broke them out into three different categories because it does vary depending upon whether it's just the book that the agent obsconds with just the money or the book and the money. I think my analysis was that if it was just the book. The assumption was that the money would have been delivered. Given my assumption was that the money had actually been delivered to the seller, the agent then took the book and absconded with it. So in that case the seller actually would not have any claim against anybody because seller got the money. Whereas, and that's a quick grant. Pause there for a second. Sure. Does the principal have a claim against the seller to get the money back to make it even more complicated. No, that's right. That's actually I don't think I didn't, I didn't spend that much time on the analysis. So I think that would that would be part of I'd have to take a closer look at I don't know the answer to that. Neither do I. I think it's actually an interesting question. I totally missed that. We should add. Well, I'll add that to the questions. Yeah. Beautiful. That's a good point. I'm sorry. I was just informed that there's another out of channel kind of like debate going on in the YouTube page where people are commenting on the YouTube directly. So he's going to bring us the best of that. But I missed the permutation. Could you repeat it or tell me what line I can read it on. I think Gabriel was talking about line in the case of line 29. Yeah, where's the book. Yeah, the question is whether the principal would have a claim against not just the agent, but also the third party. In the event that the seller got the money, right, and the principal didn't get the book. Is there any scenario under which the principal may have a claim against the seller to get the money back. And I don't know. I mean, it would be it would be a tough question, but I think it's possible that there may be some scenario. For example, if, you know, the seller had some reason to believe that something was a miss and knew that the that the agent was acting in an agency capacity, etc. It's possible. Perfect. Okay. And so now thanks to that. We, we've got, I can say, I'm not sure how to pronounce the name, but CEM. Um, has said thinking of what the definition of disclosure of the principal in the context of autonomous entities is, um, I eat the doubt could become with the principal be identified disclosed as an address or the collective. KYC of the participants. Um, that would be legally required. So the question in part is, um, when you have a disclose principle, are you disclosing like a legal entity? Are you disclosing a Dow? And then by extension, the addresses of humans. So, and the, uh, who are, um, you know, members of the Dow. And so this is not a bad place, maybe to, to ask for a, who, um, is, um, maybe making a sandwich now or something. But if you can hear us already, um, this might be a good place to say how you deal with that under the Vermont blockchain based LLC. Um, uh, in terms of disclosure of human beings that are comprised of the, uh, the LLC. And, um, and like, if you wanted to disclose those, like, where were the person go to see who are the humans that, um, that collectively comprised the, um, the Dow, that's Vermont, the LLC. Yeah, well, in, in Vermont, uh, and, you know, other states with Nevada, Wyoming, and probably many others, there's no requirement to disclose the members of the military. But if you can have totally anonymous membership, um, and there doesn't need to be a standard place for any of them to find it, but there's a dispute between, um, at least in our operating agreement. It says that the authoritative list of members is the reputation holders of our Dow. So you could always, at the end of the time, in kind of a moment, there's a different set of addresses that are constituted, uh, members. So, for the, for other reasons, um, there are needs to disclose the members, like, uh, it's actually in-purchases. Um, you would need, uh, like tax, tax numbers, which would be different people to issue, uh, the proper funds, like, uh, if they could work with the Dow. So, going back to the question, I just want to clarify, but I don't think it's the requirement from the, there's been, like, a legal little scourge of perspective. There would absolutely be necessary because of, uh, taxation. Um, because, you know, then you'd probably be paying them something, whether it's dividends or wages or expenses as a contractor. So, practically, yes, you do need, um, uh, legal name, kind of stuff. So, at least with our Dow, like, we use the alchemy interface, which is built by DeskVac, and that has a way to kind of put in, um, user information. Uh, uh, decentralized verified identity. It's mainly just, if you're a reputation holder, you can go in and associate a meme and, like, Twitter, GitHub account, whatever you want, with, um, with your address. We are working on more, like, robust identity standards that may be integrated through Docs. Um, hey, hey, um, excuse me, Ori, like, your audio is coming in very softly, and, um, I'm having trouble hearing it. We just got some telegrams that other people can't hear you either. Sure. Is that better? I'll just talk loudly. I'm not sure. It sounds like not much better. I can also instruct some headphones just to have a good microphone on them. It's funny because your audio is really good when you joined originally, and I'm not sure if it's like connection problem or what, or the mic. This is Grant. I think if Brendan can mute his microphone, it might help. Okay. Hey, can you hear me now? That's better. Much better. That's better. Yeah, way better. Yeah, what I was saying is that, um, practically speaking, we do need identity information for every member of the DAO. And so, um, we can kind of, I would say informally or through social consensus, enforce self-identification. So, you know, knowing that we're a legal entity and that we're going to have to do, uh, tax reporting and, like, annual report for entity and all these other things. We can just decide as a group that, you know, if someone joins, they need to, um, in the interface, like, add their identity information. And maybe in our shared GitHub repo, in our private GitHub repo, put some sort of secret, not secret, but verifiable proof of identity. And so, yeah, when it comes to tracking it, the interface is one way. It's just in the interface. If you go to our, like, list of reputation holders, but it's not on-chain. You know, if you go to EtherScan and look up our DAO's address, you'll see a list of, you could see all the reputation holders, but the name of the reputation holder wouldn't be off on-chain. We would be, in various ways, keeping that information kind of on GitHub and the alchemy interface. So, we do need a more robust protocols for that. And I was mentioning some that we're working on, but beyond those, it'd be nice to have sort of these, like, shared operational protocols that any legal DAO or autonomous legal entity could use. For example, you know, you keep a JSON of address to legal name and address or some sort of legal information on an IPFS hash in this JSON structure. So, some sort of, like, we're kind of doing an ad hoc right now, but it would be nice. Something we want to work on is to have, like, a kind of common sense protocol, you know, to, you know, where can you find the member names? Where can you find the name of the jurisdiction that your DAO's incorporated in? Where you can find the name of the legal entity that it's using? I think you're muted, Daza. Thanks, sorry. So, the first thing I was thinking in the context of the Dorg and the Vermont Blockchain-based LLC is if everything goes off the rail after a transaction, and people are wondering, you know, basically, who do I sue or who do I seek? You know, some recourse from, like, call them on the phone and say, hey, I didn't get the money, I didn't get the book, whatever. One advantage that that has is that because it's an LLC that's been formed under the laws of the state, like, Vermont, the Secretary of State has a, among the requirements to form the BB LLC, just like any other LLC or corporation, you have a, like, a postal address and a name of a person who's a legal entity to serve process for process of service. So, if you were to have to sue them, like, you could just sue that person. And then after the fact, in discovery, say, give me the names and addresses of all of the people who are members of the LLC, for example. But what we, we don't like that. I'll speak for MIT in my own way. At lawdonmit.edu, we kind of feel that's a failure of a failure condition. And a better condition is could we engineer upfront a disclosure of the contact points in ways that, more along the lines that you were just speaking to, Ori, so that you kind of know who the people are and how to contact them so that you can keep the transaction on the rails and resolve issues or disputes, you know, before and after. Before they get ugly and tend toward litigation. And so it seems like you can, like you were saying, like with, and just by, in terms of like future evolution, that would be looking to things like a simplified implementation of lightweight directory protocols like LDAP or even like flat files somewhere that just are like an address list. It's like, like, you know, contact. And it's good to have some structured data protocols like, you know, address book protocol, LDAP protocol, something like that so you can, you know, very quickly type down or sort filter search and see who the points of contact are and how to, how to reach them. Yeah, absolutely. And we're like, I proposed like a metadata standard in our LLDAO repo for this kind of thing. It's evolving. So we need buy in from more people and kind of, you know, to spend dedicated time on making it robust, but exactly what you're talking about, just a standard, simple thing that, you know, everyone can post on IPFS and you can easily just do lookups to see, you know, who's the point of contact for this doubt. And we have built into our BVLLC, like you were saying, this point of contact where we have a mailing address on file with the state, we have, and we call it an administrative member of the LLC, who's the point of contact, but the administrative member does not have authorities to short circuit or bypass the like the decision making of the DAO. So it's a formal role, like you're saying, to be a tie into meat space where letters can get served, and someone can show up in court. But that member can be voted changed at any moment by the DAO. It can be required to post sort of like the material approach where the automated custodian and Chris please correct me if I'm getting it wrong but in material, the automated custodian posts a bond to execute the decisions of the whatever on chain entity is doing the decision making, so that if the automated custodian disobeys the token voters or the DAO voters, they can slash his or her bond. And so that should keep the admin in line with the DAO, most 99% of the time. And so similarly in our operating agreement, we carved out this ability for the DAO to require the admin to post a bond like let's say two months salary or something to have the privilege of serving as the DAO's admin. Admin ever abuses those powers like shows a drunk to court. I don't know. I don't know how they could have said but whatever whatever was considered negligent or abuse to the DAO or doesn't answer you know stops stops checking the mailbox. Then it could be switched and the admin can be punished by by way of this kind of bond that could be slashed. Here here. So just to make sure we covered that point. Where was it that so some of it was so this came up in the context of disclosed and undisclosed principle, which is kind of one of those fulcrums in agency law. And absolutely have an undisclosed principle, like if for example, like to do a socially a social one, like you're like a member of the Communist Party or something and or you're like, or you're you want to buy a house in some place that people don't like your race or your gender. And you still want to get a fair deal on the price on the house, you could actually authorize somebody to buy it on your behalf. And there will be an undisclosed principle and the law is totally good with that. Like that's why we have the whole phrase undisclosed principle. It's a thing that we can do. Assuming you're not undisclosing them to commit a crime or a fraud or something. And but then if you flip that and say, okay, it's a disclose principle. So you're like, you know exactly who the principle is. What does disclosure mean? Like, and I think is I understand agency law correctly as soon as the third party is on notice that the person they're dealing with is an agent of another. That's like we were coding this in like a language in like a computer language or impure logic. That's a state change at that point. And they have and it triggers certain other obligations and rights when they're like. And I have to go back and read the Wikipedia page and the restatement again to see what those are, but I'm sure people on this line can can tell us and that and then that's just the mere like knowledge that there is a principle now you've disclosed it without even saying who the principle is or what their contact information is. So if you go to the next level, the more information that the third party knows about the principle that could be material in terms of the reasonableness of their judgment about whether the agent is acting within the scope of their authority. So if you know the principle is like, I don't know, like a small startup that has no funding and the agent is offering a huge, you know, billions of dollars, then maybe you're on notice basically that this agent may not be acting in the scope of their authority. Therefore, you know, that that could change the legal outcome. So those are some ruminations on just the way the question was asked. Okay. So any other questions or comments on what where do we end up with you've got a really bad day for the agent for the principle and the and the third party because the agent absconded with the book and the money. So what was the analysis of that of that scenario? Anybody. Well, I mean, you know, principle has a claim against the agent. So does the, you know, so does the the seller. Obviously, you know, the agent is basically they've committed a crime basically. The, you know, whether the seller also has a claim against the principle may depend on whether the seller knew that the agent was representing the principle and relied on that fact. I don't know if there's any case on that that effect, but it seems it seems like if the if the principle didn't use reasonable care in selecting the agent, you know, it turns out the agent was a known a known embezzler, you know, serial criminal. You know, and if the principle done the slightest amount of due diligence, they could have figured that out. And the seller also had relied on the fact that the agent was the principles agent and entering into the transaction. Possibly, you know, the seller could have a claim against the principle as well. Yeah. Cool. Thank you. Dammit. I just forgot where there's something I just read on on agency law that related to what you're saying. We talked about. Dammit. Well, anyway, it relates to what I think was Kim was saying about or someone was saying about due diligence. And, you know, what did you know and what should you have known and the sort of reasonable person standard. But there's some specific. The duty of care, right? I mean, it's the duty of care. Yeah, duty of care. Anyway. So, so basically people are hosed for the most part when the, when the agent, it's gone with everything. And then I think you get into very factual questions about, you know, what, what, as you say, what, what did each party know or what should they have known? And, you know, do they do with your portion responsibility differently as a result of that. So a couple, a couple of quick, like high level things in the spirit of that's kind of like looking at what's relevant in the overall legal framework. One thing is in order to be an agent, it's definitely established that the agent and the principal and the third party are all legal entities and capable. They have legal capacity to sue and be sued to make obligations to, you know, if necessary, go to court and get an injunction to enforce the rights to, you know, think through things and negotiate to be on notice to have intent to actually form intent to do something as opposed to process a rule. And so there may be some of the things that you that we've talked about just even the last hour about, you know, should something have signaled to an ordinary reasonable person under those circumstances that there's something hinky here and I should have asked more questions and if I didn't then I may be responsible for the result. He's squaring all these kinds of judgment and very wet brain based intent kind of things. I think is one of the should be one of the things that we take a look at on July 8th and see, you know, are some of the assumptions about agency law. Maybe some of the mechanical ones may be a good fit. Maybe other ones are not a good fit and a somewhat different type of legal framework may be more appropriate. Robert Mahari and I were just talking in an adjacent context about smart contracts for in the music industry with the open music initiative and how they kind of operate like escrows, which is okay if assuming you assume that the Dow is a legal entity that can act as an escrow agent and have fiduciary and other duties. But you could also say well, what if it's just contract law and you have like two parties like the principal and the third party and they have a contract with each other and they're using automated mechanisms for contract. This is well that's another legal framework. It's not an agency framework. It's just a straight up contract framework. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, electronic signatures and Global and National Commerce Act, all international law like un-sutral model on electronic commerce from the 90s. They all make it abundantly clear that parties are absolutely free to form electronic contracts and use automated transaction mechanisms and that a contract will not be denied legal force or effect on the sole ground that it's formed electronically and operates in an automated way. So that could be a different legal framework. We might want to look to even more deeply next session on July 8th if it turns out agency law is a little bit lacking in some places because it's entirely premised on three legal parties with brain tour mature and can have cognition and awareness and act reasonably. I mean, also something I think would be super valuable for us to look at is like, you know, with this idea of acting as a legal entity like does a union count as a legal entity in that context as a cooperative count as a legal entity. You know, is a foundation, you know, like a nonprofit foundation or whatever. Is that like a legal entity in a different way? Like, you know, kind of a comparative analysis of, you know, legal entities that have a duty of care, you know, in a kind of causality in this way. I think that could be because, you know, it's obviously there's, you know, a fruitful difference in looking at like a DAO that is, you know, registered like the org is LLC versus, you know, a DAO that are, you know, the DAO that's like not officially recognized legal entity and even that is a useful analysis to look at. But then, you know, if there's this question of like a DAO is, you know, there's a spectrum from like, you know, non legal entity DAO to do DAO in LLC and then in between there's, you know, a DAO that's like an LLC, a DAO that's like a different kind of legal entity that it could be registered as if there was a process for registering a DAO in the way that it is like, you know, if a DAO was more like a dumpster. Or more like a union versus a particular DAO being more like an LLC. I don't know. I think that could be cool. Or maybe if anyone knows like, you know, at what point as, you know, something like a union counts as a legal entity. Like can the union be liable to union members and a union be liable to third parties? Definitely, by the way, like a union, a foundation, these are all legal entities for sure. You know, foundations are typically corporations that are, happen to be not-for-profit corporations, but they go through the same rigmarole that Ori was going through where you go to find a state, you incorporate, you know, and everything kind of forms by operation of law thereafter. And then unions, actually we were collaborating, I don't know if you remember, but when you were a guest speaker, thanks Beth, at the computational law course, we actually had a uni-global union and Johnny and others were representing and we were talking that through. You don't remember what legal entity type they are, but they're some boring, which is good kind of legal entity that has all the attributes that you would hope and expect from a legal entity. And so I guess part of the question is, what, if any type of legal entity would be appropriate or beneficial for a DAO? And if they are, and if they're not a legal entity, how does that change, you know, how you would approach things? Like do you get anomalous legal results? Can you rely on contract law between the end parties or whatever? And, you know, all those gaps and ideas and so much more. You know, kind of the subject of what we tackle on July 8th. So I see that it's 7.30pm Eastern Standard Time, which brings us to the hour and a half mark. And Brendan, who's one of the three pillars of our collaboration here with law.mit.edu and mechanism design with Beth has actually like dropped off the call and so have other people. And so we do entertain a, I guess, like a motion to adjourn. But before we do that, like, is there any kind of burning questions or other comments or ideas that people want to surface by way of wrap up for this session? I have a final thing to add that is grant. Yeah. No, go ahead. Oh, I was just going to add, you know, something to think about as we kind of, you know, segue into this question of like, you know, the cooperatives, the unions, etc. Is, you know, a lot of times when I'm explaining to people who are like, you know, why, why would you need to have a Dow? Why can't there just be this group of people? And then, you know, I kind of go through the difference of, you know, they're somebody are, you know, two people being in a marriage versus being in a domestic partnership versus in a domestic partnership. That's they recognize versus one that's recognized, you know, for a visa, for example, you know, like an immigration visa. And the kind of questions of like, you know, what, like, organizing in a particular format, because there is a legal purpose of being recognized organizing in that format. The thinking through that example, just now as we were talking about this, I was like, it's actually interesting, because I don't know, you know, if a married couple forms a unit in terms of, you know, being a legally recognized unit that has rights and privileges and responsibilities that go with it, you know, in terms of fiduciary duty and stuff, but is a, but a couple that is married is, you know, doesn't have actions like somebody I don't think can be liable to the couple as a unit or the unit that's the couple isn't liable to people even though it's a legally recognized form in this way and they're liable to each other within the pair. So anyways, I don't know if that could be something fruitful to think about as well, which is like, you know, maybe in some circumstances, the function of, you know, organizing into a Dow or this legal formalism of recognizing an organizational structure or maybe sometimes it is more like a marriage where the Dow itself is not a entity that carries, you know, that has, you know, limited liability because of forming into an entity. So I don't even know if that makes sense. It's useful but the interrogation path. Plenty makes plenty sense and just I wish maybe we can get Oliver good enough to join us next time but his analysis of dows without any special additional juice for corporations or LLCs or formalism is that the by operation of law they would probably be considered a general partnership. And another take on that that I had before I heard Oliver's theory which is pretty convincing is. If you look at the Uniform Law Commission, they've got a very well thought through treatment of unincorporated voluntary associations where you have multiple people coming together to do stuff. So there's, there's lots of ways. Well, there's lots of ways where I think that that analysis may be accurate. And I think the question that we could get to next next time is, is it beneficial? Like what are the, what are the, what are the legal outcomes that we're seeking? Are there anomalous legal results of the way that we're kind of doing these things now? And what's an appropriate way to align and harmonize the business context and the results we want with the legal framework and the technical architecture so that we're optimizing for the priorities and the goals and avoiding the disaster scenarios. So, good one. Brendan, you're just in time to say they are kind of closing thing. But before you do actually grant what had some closing thoughts and then you're up. Sure. Thanks. Thanks. This is real quick. One thing I noticed that the restatement is to agency. It's kind of telling that under, let's see, section 1.04 sub two, where it talks about disclosed versus undisclosed and unidentified principles. There's, there's mention of the word identity, having noticed the principles identity. And one of the comments I was made earlier, I think identity, I know identity is a big issue with this technology just generally. So that that's something that clearly would need to be dealt with for for this whole framework to work. But I think also, just trying to think like a software developer, just, I'm wondering, and this gets probably more to procedural than substantive, but I think it's important that in each of these scenarios that we've analyzed that if we're going to swap a Dow out. We have to make sure that we do it for each one of them and see how the, you know, how that how the, the restatement and the law of agency applies to try to find those, those difficult where there's a lot of friction and maybe there needs to be different law applied or something like that. I was just thinking, the extent to which just not to move too fast, I guess it's important to really, you know, just focus on each one of these, because we don't know what the impacts really are until we go through the steps on each of them. That's what I wanted to say. That's really helpful. I'm glad you said that. Thank you. And you're, you know, you're contributing now in the spirit that we were hoping everyone would. And many people have in the past, but thanks to a Harvard law student and MIT graduate to my left. He just then looked, he just did a search through restatement of law third, the part of it that we have from Berkeley Law School and discovered that that definition comes up in section 6.02. We have an unidentified principle to disclose, but unidentified. And so we need to analyze this a little more closely, but working these kind of parameters through, I agree is key. So we're going to add that to the action items for for July 8 and specifically the unidentified, but disclosed principle and Robert just kind of echoed. Is there, could we have a situation where we have a disclosed but unidentified agent somehow that ordinarily doesn't come up in, you know, meet space. But I wonder with zero knowledge proofs and with, you know, pseudonyms, no fires and, and other types of services if you're maybe that could come up a blind bid or auction or something. So we might want to do some identity bending through each one of the scenarios and see what's, what's different and what's the, what are the ramifications of that in terms of legal rights and responsibilities the roles and the predicted legal outcomes, when things come together. So nice catch. Thanks, Grant. Brendan, any, any final words. Yes, yes. You're muted. You're on mute now, Brendan. How about now. Okay, now you're good. Oh, great. Oh, this is wonderful. So, you know, I just wanted to say when I first came in. I was a little late so I didn't have my excitement enthusiasm hat on. I wanted to say, you know, I would imagine that Beth and Dazzle will concur that, you know, you guys are awesome. This is just tremendous. And, you know, what we're getting at the at the meat of this stuff and, and I wanted to say, you know, I've been involved in this stuff in a long and for many years, you know, when I was at the media lab back in, you know, 95 and, and whatnot. I mean, we were doing, I mean, I wasn't in the group but by proxy I was the agents group right we were doing software agents and and it was during the AI winter and all this stuff, you know, so there, we've been thinking about these things for so many years right but what's been missing is this stuff. So we're going to make some progress and thanks, thanks for everyone and, and, you know, I had an opportunity to kind of handpick a lot of you for this and, you know, I think the diversity is working out so let's let's keep doing this. Here here. Yeah, Brandon, please select all my party invitations in the future. Number one. And yeah, you do have a knack for convening that's for sure. And it was so we'll try to figure out how to do this. Maybe we'll use zoom or something. So everybody that wants to play can play next time. I apologize for the 10 person limit with hang out. So we've had a success disaster with all the people that want to play and, and so let's continue this on the hack MD and in Brendan's telegram channel. And I know this will be picked up in Beth's mechanism design group in different ways. And, and then we'll send invites out again to everyone that was on and new people that may want to join for July 8 same bat time. Same bat program and maybe new bat platform we'll see. So with that, thanks again everybody for for hacking the law with us today and we'll see you. See you soon. Bye bye.