 So, first and foremost, I just want to thank ASU and New America for having a panel on rebuilding cities. I think in these kind of national security discussions, we don't often talk about local populations, some of these, quote, unquote, soft issues. So thank you for that. Let me introduce very briefly. We have Major John Spencer, who is the chair of Urban War Studies at the Modern War Institute and the co-director of Urban Warfare Project. We're delighted to have him for several reasons, but also he's got war in his title three times, which is a big deal. And then Kelly Uribe, who I'm really excited to have here, she was the senior stabilization advisor through the development of the new, a year-old U.S. stabilization policy. So I think we can skip through. Everyone here would know what the challenges are to fighting in an urban war center. We've got the infrastructure, water, electrical grids, local population, do they stay or do they go, explosive weapons, can we see into buildings, lots of stuff. And then we get to the rebuilding. So, John, you just recently wrote an article called How to Kill a City and How to Protect It. And when thinking about Raqqa, my humanitarian colleagues say that it's a pancake. And I would expect that that's basically the definition of killing a city. So can you walk us through that and maybe how we don't do it again? Sure. Well, I don't have all the answers, but so yeah, I wrote the article on basically how to destroy a city without being too statistic. I really wanted to look at is it possible to kill a city, because we use the term a lot, especially in modern times, with so much conflict happening in urban areas, which in job security I think is the future. But I wanted to analyze, could you kill a city? I don't normally do that. I usually study military operations and how they're going to approach urban warfare. So it was a great chance to take it down. But as soon as I started it, I ran into the challenge of, how do we define a city? Nobody agrees on what that means. Is it just an urban area? And is that what we're talking about? How to rebuild an urban area? But there are very specific definitions on what a city is. And that's important because if you think you can kill a city, that means you thought it was alive beforehand. And that is pretty solid in urban studies in academia, is that a city is something different than just a lot of people on urban terrain. It's a self-complex, adaptive living organism, meaning it's not just the reductive thinking of people, the buildings, and the infrastructure to support those people. But that's the way that most people look out the world if you're not in urban studies, if you're not an urban planner. So I took that on, and then I took on historical studies to show where have cities actually been killed, going all the way back to Carthage. Cities are really resilient. And cities, again, I talk of them as organisms, as this civilization in a certain location that has thrived for many reasons of why it's in that location. And what you would really have to do in order to destroy it, and I use that in my papers, you'd have to destroy why that location is an ideal location for civilizations. You can, and this gets to the point of rocker, you can flatten every structure of a city and not kill it. You can remove the people, flatten every structure, put the people back, and you still have a city. And that's pretty much what historical urban warfare study has been. Has been the destruction of buildings. We dropped a bomb on Hiroshima, and, you know, travesty killed 90,000 people, destroyed five miles of the city within an instant second, and the power in the water were back on in a week. The population had thrived from 90,000 to 160,000 within a year, because you have to understand what that city was to that culture, to that location of where it was and why it was. All that study gave me the ability to say, let's look at any of the cities we're talking about now, Raqqa, Masool, Morari, and say, was it destroyed? So unfortunately, I have to say that Raqqa was not destroyed. So the UN estimates that 10,000 buildings were damaged. That new report showed that 1,600 people were killed based on airstrikes and artillery. But as of today, 150,000 people have repopulated the city, 90% of the water is back on. So the second part of the question, one, I don't think Raqqa was destroyed, although severe travesty of what happened to it and we've flattened most of the structures, you have to understand why we do that. So that's the second part of the question, how could we not do that again? And that gets to what I really study all the time is any military, including US military, is approached to urban combat. It hasn't changed in a long, long time. Our technologies aren't designed for that environment. So what you saw in Raqqa and mostly through the extent of by width and through, you have an untrained military attempting to fight in the worst environment known to man, where every building is a battlefield. Every building becomes a bunker, every window becomes a. So if you send an untrained army in there, of course, their inaccuracies on being able to do maneuver warfare to have tanks and all of that, they're going to rely on fire support because they're taking fire from that building. And you just do that 10,000 more times until you've cleared every building. So, but I also say that through, yeah, in Raqqa, we put 35,000 rounds of artillery in it in four months. That's more artillery that was fired by the US military than for the entire invasion of Iraq was fired into Raqqa. But you have to understand that's the nature of urban warfare because we refuse to prepare for that environment. And that's how do you retake cities without harming them? One, you have to assume that this is an operation that we'll continue to do in the future, and I strongly believe that. And then understand that the nature of the urban war game hasn't changed and we refuse to change it. You still can't see inside of a building. So I know you do a lot of work on this. I can't see if there's a civilian inside of it. I know I'm taking fire from it, so within all rules of law or work here, I can respond by all of self-defense. I'm taking fire from that building, even if it's a protected building. I can't see what's inside of it. It sounds like such an obvious thing, and yet it's something that is one of our biggest challenges. Yeah, so I mean, we all want frameworks to think about environments. I want an acronym. I'm a former military. I had to have an acronym to think of anything, whether it's the way I'm going to fight offensive operations or whether I'm going to think about an environment. So we want acronyms, mental frameworks that all work for cities, the same as they do for the countryside. We want acronyms and frameworks that work for nation states, that work for major cities. If you understand anything about a city, that's not the way it works. Cities are organisms to themselves, and you have to have an urban lens when you're fighting in them, reconstructing them, building them. The whole gamut, but that's not comfortable for this. And that spans military, diplomatic, aid organizations. Nobody specializes in urban. So it's job security for me, which I love, but there's not a single urban warfare school in the US military. There's not an urban warfare or urban operations stability organization. Within the Department of State, there's nobody who focuses on urban. Within academia, there's not a single US-based academic institution that focuses on cities and conflict, and that's mind-blowing. If you think about everything, and Ann Marie mentioned last night, every potential future security dilemma is originating from urban spaces. Whether that's water shortages, overpopulation, it's all urban. And we refuse as a civilization to focus, and there's many reasons for that, and we can get down that. Why we refuse to think about that? So I think it's a national defense agency and resources to develop capabilities for urban areas. I mean, if you talk about big cities, big cities are something different. But once you get the threshold for me as a city, and you talk about this complex social living organism, you enter a new field and your old frameworks aren't going to work, and we saw that in Baghdad. We applied nation-state rebuilding capabilities to a metropolis of Baghdad. We applied frameworks of security. And I wrote something about the use of concrete, and how we use concrete to achieve our security. We severed every natural forming flow of a city by doing that. And I think that's a major area where we could change things. So if you want to ask the guy who kind of specialized in blowing things up, how to rebuild a city, I'd ask you, okay, who's my team of people that specialize in urban areas? And there are a few, there's urban planners, but they don't have a specialization in military aspects or in development and humanitarian aspects. Or any doctrinal book that we could all read, urban doesn't appear in stability operations doctrine. Both at the army and the joint level. The word urban doesn't get in there. So we're going to apply frameworks to nation-states. And rock is a great example where you have a city of over 200,000, what it was, not connected to a nation-state. It's an entity of itself. So if you want to rebuild it, and I do think that it's a mistake not to the United States, not to invest in rebuilding it right now, because we're holding RA development based on everything's politics and agreements to what Damascus is going to do for peace and everything. So we're holding, but rocket is an organization or an organism to itself. The people of Raqqa understand that we were involved in destroying it. And if we're not going to help rebuild it, it just becomes the, which I think it'll be talked about later in the conference. It becomes the next evolution of what ISIS will become. It's the perfect breeding ground for that. And that's, so when I was in the joint staff in the defeat ISIS campaign, there was this assumption that it was bad to kill a city, that we wanted to protect a city, and that we wanted to rebuild it. And so Kelly, that's where you come in as the principal architect of the stabilization policy. And my understanding is that that policy is supposed to set the United States on the right track toward actually rebuilding something like Raqqa. So I have to ask you, what's the problem there? Thank you very much, Sarah. And it really is an honor to be here and to be able to speak about this really strategically important question today. I think that we have to realize, when we look at history, the seeds of the next conflict are often planted in the rubble of the current one. And I just, before I begin, want to remind the audience that I am no longer working on this portfolio in the Department of Defense. So what you will hear this morning are my personal reflections of the time I spent working on the stabilization assistance review. And DOD's stabilization policy. I think how I want to frame this is to start first with the positives. I think that the stabilization assistance review and DOD's recent stabilization policy do two positive things that we previously had not had. They establish a shared definition for stabilization. And they both identify clear roles and responsibilities when we are in this very complex environment that John described so well. But I do think that there are challenges, Sarah. And so the second piece of my remarks I'll turn towards some of the questions about how do we really implement this approach that we have agreed on for the United States? And how do we ensure that we have the right bureaucratic cultures within the US government and also the right bureaucratic mechanisms to really be able to do and think and ask the right questions? So let me just begin first because there may be some of you who are not familiar with the two documents that I have mentioned. The stabilization assistance review was approved last May. So we're almost one year in by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the USAID Administrator. And DOD's stabilization policy, DOD Directive 3000.05 was just updated and signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in December of last year. And from my perspective, the central positive point about both of these documents is that they establish a shared definition for the US government. It is exactly the same in both documents. And there are three important points I think that you'll hear in the definition. So the definition begins, stabilization is a political endeavor. And I think this gets to the heart of what John was talking about. People are at the center. And when we are thinking about stabilization in a city that needs to be rebuilt, we must consider the relationship people to people inside the city. We must understand the relationship with people to authority, people to the US government. It is a political endeavor at its heart. So that is, and I think to another point that John made, sometimes in the military we like easy acronyms and simplistic approaches. But I think what this definition says by starting out, it is stabilization is a political endeavor. We can restore essential services. We can rebuild infrastructure. We can establish security. We can train police. We can work on rule of law. Those are all of the things that we spend a lot of time focused on in Iraq and Afghanistan at 7, 8, and 9, and still not have stability. So if we forget that stabilization is a political endeavor, we have not gotten very far. So the definition begins, stabilization is a political endeavor, involving an integrated civilian military process. And that's the second piece that I want to highlight. There is this reality when we are in a post-conflict situation where the military has been involved in destruction and destroying. That what comes after must be integrated. It cannot be the military alone. It cannot be the civilians alone. But we've got to work together to achieve this stability that we're searching for. And then the definition goes on to conclude, stabilization is a political endeavor involving an integrated civmil process to create the conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. I know that's a big mouthful, but the word I want you to key on in there that was chosen very carefully is local, locally legitimate authorities and systems. We want to create the conditions where our local partners can develop sustainable solutions, have locally owned solutions to their problems in their city. So those are the three aspects that I think were pretty transformational in the definition. And then the second piece that I would just point out is the stabilization assistance review for the first time established clearly roles and responsibilities in the US government for this work. And by the way, after 17 years of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, this is the first time we had a shared definition was 2018 and clear roles and responsibilities. And the roles and responsibilities that are outlined in the review and in the forward looking framework is state, is the State Department, is the lead federal agency for stabilization. That is because it is a political endeavor at its heart. So they are the lead federal agency. USAID is the lead implementing agency because they have the tools and the resources and the capabilities to do a lot of this work. And DOD plays a supporting role. And I think for those of you familiar with the Department of Defense, that is a well understood approach for the department. We may not always do that, we may like to lead, but we have to understand that sometimes defense is in support. And what does defense support to stabilization look like? It could be anything from providing access and support to our civilian government partners who need to get into a less open area. It could be when we are the only ones, DOD forces who are on the ground at the behest of state and we may have to do some type of stabilization work. So all of those put us in the support role. So I think those are the two positives and I would commend to you the stabilization assistance review. You can find it on DefenseLink or the State Department's website. But there are many other recommendations and I just flag those two as the positives. But now finally to answer Sarah's real question. We are here into this, Syria continues to look very messy Iraq as well. So is this new policy, is this new approach actually making a difference? And I would say it absolutely is, but we need to look very closely inside the US government at our bureaucratic mechanisms and our bureaucratic cultures and how they are aligned to support this. And what I mean by that is we just have to ask ourselves the question, do we have the right mechanisms in place to implement this approach? Do we have the right mindset? And when I think about mechanisms, I often turn to my humanitarian colleagues when I think about foreign humanitarian assistance. Within the US government, we have a very clear structure with roles and responsibilities, organizations and support. So there is aid as the lead federal agency for humanitarian assistance internationally. They have an organization, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, who does this work. They have rapidly deployable teams, the disaster assistance response teams. They can go anywhere in the world on a very short notice. DOD has the authority to provide support to humanitarian assistance. We have the overseas humanitarian disaster assistance and civic aid account. It has money in it. USAID trains DOD personnel 100 times a year on how to manage and connect to them. We have well-established processes. But when I ask myself, do we have those kinds of mechanisms on the stabilization side? Because the two are quite distinct, humanitarian assistance for humanitarian ends and stabilization for political ends. Do we have the right structures in place? Do we have the right mechanisms? And I think that that is worth a careful look because I can't articulate that. And then just quickly, in thinking about bureaucratic cultures, as stabilization is extraordinarily complex. And even though within the Department of Defense, we have a very strong planning culture. And we plan in-depth for strikes, attacks, destroy missions, whatever they might be. We can do these things really well. But when it comes to this question of rebuilding afterwards, and we now have a definition for stabilization, we now have roles and responsibilities. But I would venture to say that we do not give that the type of in-depth planning that it does require to do that. And I think also for some of the other agencies, this stabilization post-conflict revolt demands sieve mill integration. So we have to tear down some of the barriers between us and find ways that we can jointly plan and work together. So I was in Ninoa Province two weeks before the Mosul operations started. And at that time, there was woefully inadequate planning for was the population gonna stay or go? What about ISIS using them as human shields? Do we understand the infrastructure that's there and the buildings that are there? Even the integration with the United Nations and the Humanitarians. And it was a big mess as far as I was concerned. And I feel like we're saying that it is in the national interest. It is a political endeavor to have stabilization. It is not necessarily an obligation, is that correct? And if so, then would we ever say we're actually not gonna do this campaign because the rebuilding costs are going to be too. Because we don't know how to do rebuilding. We don't know how to get this community back on its feet. What is your sense of that? Is it we just find that ISIS, we have to go after ISIS so we're gonna do it and come what may? I think that is a great question. And truly, stabilization is a strategic imperative in my view. And so if we are going to consider something like that, we should take into account the full extent. And we have to consider upfront the implications of our partner choice. For example, for the US military, if we choose this partner, what are the long term impacts for this situation? But how do we integrate that into our national security decision making process is, I think, sometimes difficult. And John, so how does that factor into military planning when we're doing an O-plan? Yeah, so the decisions that we're talking about is strategic level between the nation states, not between a nation state and a city. So if we are going to a strategic decision to support a partner or another nation state in an operation that happens to be within an urban area, we're still looking back to the nation state to talk about what's that look like. During the conflict, pre-conflict, during the conflict, and after the conflict. After the conflict, Missoula's $40 billion to rebuild. So we hold a conference and say, okay, we need some donor monies, but, hey, $40 billion, come on. The analogy I like to use is the medical field, a human body. So you want the military to be experts at cutting cancers out of cities, with the least amount of harm to the body. But then we need experts to come in that can stabilize that body as we're doing it, and then we need the post-surgical care. That's the analogy I love to use, because if you enter that operating room, there's nobody in there that's an expert in any of that. The military's not an expert in cutting cancers out of cities with the least amount of harm. Or if you're talking about Mosul and Raqqa, it sounds like we're using chemotherapy and not a knife. I mean, so if you were to ask me if the US military would have led that operation, as in not by with and through providing air support and artillery, would it have been less damaging? And I'd think no, because of the nature of urban warfare. I mean, I think it would have been less damaging because most people don't realize the cost of the Iraqi military to do that operation and how they're just throwing units at the, and really. But as soon as that last 200 meter block of train was taken in Mosul, now we ask the question of what was the operation going into reconstruction. But as we talked about, all these decisions are political. So you almost have to reset the game and read the political cards down on the table going, okay, we said we were in this to help liberate your city from ISIS. All right, everybody else enter another room to talk about how to what happens after the rebuilding of that city. So I mean, could it be post 9-11, you buy a version? So the other, I love these conversations. The other decision is should we have helped at all? And that's the problem. So if you want to talk about how to save Raqqa, don't let it be held for three years, don't let Mosul be held for four years to where it becomes such a big operation to retake it. Kelly, and then we'll go to questions. And I think just one other point that I didn't highlight in the stabilization assistance review is the idea behind it is that we will not do stabilization in every place and everywhere. We must be strategic in our decisions and calculations. And this means we need people who understand the complexities, who can make the informed decisions. But the thing that initially drove the stabilization assistance review was states look at foreign assistance. And there were 16 conflict affected countries where the majority of US government foreign assistance was going in and they were asking themselves the question, are we strategic? Are these the right places with the right efforts? So, yeah. Great. Questions? Candice in the back. I'm going to cheat because I love this panel so much for so many different reasons. One, because it's timely, it's necessary, and it's a bit overdue in some ways. As Kelly pointed out, it's been 18 years now since the conflict in Afghanistan began. And this is the first time that the United States in all of its interagency processes has finally adopted some sort of shared definition and then shared terminology to deal with this critical crisis that actually we've been grappling with as a nation, and I think other nations as well, really since Rwanda. So that's a huge milestone in terms of progress. But one of the things I think we've talked about within New America, amongst the professors of practice who've been to Afghanistan and to Iraq, and we've had the experience of living in these places and seeing them destroyed and then the efforts to rebuild them. The question has been, why isn't there more talent? Why isn't there more skill? What is required to train up the next generation, not only of war fighters, but of humanitarian assistance providers and diplomats? What does that curriculum look like? And how do we resource that going forward? So let me add on to Candice's. 2030 seems to be a big thing here at this conference. So by 2030, what would we need to implement now in curriculum, et cetera, in order to get the talent and have a change for stabilization by 2030? So I've been pretty vocal that we, like I said, we don't have an urban operations center within the military. We do not have a National Urban Operations Institute. You have the Foreign Service Institute. You have institutes on almost every type of conflict there is, but there's not one in urban operations. You need major academic institutions, ASU, to start a research center that looks at the longevity of conflict in cities. I could see the ASU decision support theater has a really cool graphical interface where you could put a city up and then look at the interactions of it and build the profession of where you have these expertise, because right now we're not doing it. And that's to prevent needing to stabilize so much afterwards, is that it? Correct. Yeah. You're going to conduct disability operations, and it's going to happen. But especially looking at a city as an organism, you're treating the people as very important, but how do you treat the city as this host? I don't think as simplistic and reductionist as to say I provide essential services to the people, I'm restoring the city. I think I would just say that we created a lot of training and education mechanisms, particularly over the last 18 years, and many of those are now gone. I think one of the things that we really need to do is it gets back to this culture piece. We need to recognize even where the national defense strategy stands today, when we are looking at global competition, when we are thinking about Russia and China, we have to think more broadly. We have to think about the peripheries of Russia. We have to think about destabilizing activities being undertaken by China and Russia and how we are going to address those. And if we can change our mindset to really believe that this is critically important to our current national defense strategy, then that can help to drive change. Yeah, I'd love to follow that. As a reader of that, there's not a single mention of cities or urban areas. We fail to recognize as a government that cities are the strategic terrain of the future. And similarly, civilian populations is pretty absent from that document. I mean, just 300 cities of the world put out almost 70% of the GDP, the 300 biggest cities. After World War II, the global population went from 3 billion to 6 billion in 39 years. And they're all living in cities, and the fastest growing cities are the most underdeveloped. So all the future agitators, the words that we might use in our defense strategy of future conflict, are urban-centric because they're not politically stable because of population growth, of uncontrolled urbanization. I was at this large humanitarian conference, and I mentioned the word feral cities, and nobody in the room knew what that meant. I don't know what that means. Yeah, so it's pretty established in term when you have a major urban population that is basically self-governing, failing in essential services, but still connected to the global network. And that's the biggest point. We all understand what a failed state means. Few people realize what a failed city looks like within a functioning state. I was hoping somebody would whip out some statistics. Thank you. That's great. Here, down in front. She's coming. Thank you. Yesterday's New York Times, or maybe with Saturdays, had a story that said, for US commandos in the Philippines, a water pump is a new weapon against ISIS. Thank you, major, for mentioning Manawi. I've been there twice over the past two years. Full disclosure, I'm president of the US Philippines Society and a retired US diplomat. What's amazing is, and I think I would question, what Ms. Uribe has to say about the recent policy decision about who takes the lead in these things. Because in Manawi, in the area of Manawi, Lanao del Sur, there was a very small army group led by a captain and two or three members of her group that was instrumental in getting a water pump into the neighboring town so that the people, hey, 350,000 refugees out of Manawi, two and a half square kilometers destroyed by the Philippine military. And ISIS is still around, and our military is there. And they do it well. They do it with the Philippine military. And as an ex-American ambassador, I would suggest that that atmosphere is not good for embassy and USAID types, but it is very good for smart American army people. There's an example. We should be doing more of that and more training. So welcome your comments. In response, I think I would say that those soldiers that are working there, the Special Operations Forces are largely drawing on the authority and the fund that I mentioned previously through our humanitarian assistance channels. It's the overseas humanitarian assistance, the civic aid account, and that likely falls under the civic aid portion of that. And that is absolutely vital. And I think that that is why when we developed, and there is a recognition that that is important and that there are often, in many places around the globe, I think the truth is that it will be a US military person on the ground, perhaps well before and long after a diplomat or an aid civilian. But I think we want to ensure, in the Department of Defense, when we talk about defense support to stabilization, that that is not done independently. It is not necessarily the captain on the ground making a decision and perhaps the right one, but that it is well connected to broader USAID State Department political and development objectives. John, do you have any comments? Yeah, I mean, I think Morari is the biggest example of what I write about our protest or urban combat. Empty the city, destroy it, and then wait till somebody else decides to rebuild it. It becomes, wars happen where people live, people live in cities. It becomes the biggest recruitment asset to any terrorist organization in the world. If I can, that would be the model that I would do, not to say that I'm a terrorist. If you live in a state that is fragile, is to pool that state's military, maybe they have support from some other country, into a city, make them destroy it, and then firm it, continue political instability when they can't rebuild it quickly, which is exactly what's happening in Morari. Yeah, we've seen a lot of good examples of that. Okay, one or two more? Yeah, so over here. One example of a successful, a non-US example of a successful rebuilding of a city with big rosny in Chechnya, Russia, and what made that happen, what accounted for that, was a massive influx of money, but also partnering with local allies who use severe repression to maintain that stability and security. So where does the United States stand on that? How do you work with allies like that, that sacrifice, what we would consider basic American ideals for the price of stability? Thank you. You probably can't speak on behalf of the United States, but what are your thoughts about that? Yeah, I think that that was, if I just go back to the definition that I started with, a political endeavor involving an integrated civilian military process to create the conditions where locally legitimate authorities can peacefully manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. I mean, I think when you start to ask, it's a very nuanced question, but I think when you look at creating conditions where, and try to evaluate, is this a locally legitimate authority? Are they peacefully managing conflict or are they repressing? I mean, you can dig deeper in this, but I think that we had that in mind when we drafted that definition. John? You don't have to have an answer for this one. I mean, you can't rebuild anything with other resources. So, I mean, rock is the greatest case of that. So the Rock of Civil Council, they have a civil engineer that grew up there that understands it, and they've been able to do amazing things with a lack of international resources because it's so fragile in that environment, because we don't recognize that as a strategic site. We're looking at the nation-state, which is a political decision, and I understand that. There has to be other mechanisms in which to get the resources that are needed, but rebuilding buildings is not necessarily the first priority, but rebuilding the city as a organism is. All right, so I think we, oh gosh, so many questions. That's great. Let's take one more there in the back. And I'm sorry, please be quick. Yeah, linear ward. I was in Iraq in 2003 in the Eastern side, one of the first army forces there, and I ended up losing about four inches of my arm while I was out trying to do what I was very ill-suited to do, which was standing up police and internal security functions within the city. And then, which again, I think many of us within DOD would say, yeah, that's what a hard for us to do, a hard turn, because we're externally focused in most cases. In a return in 2009, I was sort of disappointed in the steps that have been taken or not taken in regards to place that focus on the internal security mechanism within the city versus the constant focus towards the army functions, which many of the army officers from Iraq were telling us, we should be externally focused, not internally focused, much like we are here in the United States. What steps have we taken over time, I guess, to take those lessons learned and figure out how do we work on that internal security focus on helping that state stand up, or that city stand up, those capabilities versus leaving it to, in many cases, civil war to sort out? Sure, so I think we'll just have John answer that, if that's all right, it looks like you have a strong view. Yeah, so I deployed in 2003, was doing just that, and I went back in 2009 and was doing it again in Baghdad. Militaries know very little about urban policing. We know even less about urban policing in a foreign country where they don't have concepts of policing. That's because we don't understand the cultural aspects of how power is shared within different neighborhoods. We end up doing it by creating safe neighborhoods of concrete and then putting people on checkpoints, which is co-opting power sources, which then turn into legitimate power sources. To answer the question, we've done nothing to change that. Militaries are designed to train other militaries. Security Force Assistance Brigades will train other militaries to be able to do certain capabilities. If you talk about urban, that's something different. So another recommendation for it, thinking for, planning for, and then executing urban combat. Yes. Yes. Okay, thank you very much for a lively discussion. Thank you. Thank you.