 I would like to bring Taiwan more into the discussion between EU-China, it's a difficult one to have. But again, thank you for taking time to meet me and I really look forward to our conversation with your views. Sure, let's get started. As you could see in my card, I also work for 9-9, which is a digital platform that aims at connecting Europe with democracies in the Indo-Pacific. And Taiwan is one of our major focus. While I am here, I am trying to connect us more, also to help Europeans get a better understanding of Taiwan and the regional dynamics and also hopefully contribute to Taiwanese scholars or experts or think-takers in civil society to understand Europe better. So, I send my questions, I don't know, maybe we can stick to those more or less. It's fine, it's fine, I'm fine either way. I got the questions but feel free to reorder, expand, rotate, translate, scale, however you wish. Thank you. So, I would first of all be interested in you and in your work. And as a digital minister in charge of social innovation, I think your title has four different elements in it. It's not even my fault. I'm sorry, I didn't mean to reduce it. Yeah, but it's also open government, youth engagement. Yes, all of that. If you could expand on how do you see your role as a digital minister in charge of social innovation and much more. And much more? Indeed. And it's been four years now, right? Yeah, sure. And with this pandemic happening and as we see the global dynamics around that, how do you see this role and what are your ambitions in the near future with everything that you were provided as tools and your capacity to innovate beyond that? Well, my ambition is very plain on my card. It says Taiwan can't help. And Taiwan is helping. Yes, and Taiwan is helping. And I've had that card for the past three years now, except the backside changes every year because the MOFA designates different priorities. So it used to look like this on the first day, which is a focus, I think, more on the sustainability of circular economy and the agricultural technologies. Taiwan is, of course, very well known. And the next year's card? It's like collecting carding, man. I'll keep them all. Right, focus on the ocean, like marine debris management, plastic waste management, and also climate change mitigation. So that's the two colors. And understandably, though, this year we focus far more not only on health, but also pretty much everything is like a kaleidoscope. I think the design is more like a kaleidoscope this year, which is the one I just gave you, which means that in all and each of the 17 global goals, we're now much more confident that we can help and we are helping. And so this is about expanding Taiwan's traditional international role, whereas previously, as I mentioned, it was about agricultural technology. It's about marine debris, circular economy, climate change mitigation. But that's pretty much it. But nowadays, we also expand to other SDGs, including the 16th like open government and like digital governance. The 17th, which is what everybody is talking about now is the data norms. That's the 17th. Broadband is human rights. That's the nice as a one. And so I would say that we're going not only about like bilateral relationships that's focused on mutual aid. And in Taiwan's case, mostly about the countries that are more resemble like us for 30 years ago. But nowadays with country that resemble us for maybe three years in the future. So that's a very different configuration. And I think digital helps not only mutual accountability, but also the very important thing about norm shaping, which is also a core in your concern about how to make the chapter in the GDPR that nobody understands the joint data control ocean, how to actually make it work. There's various propositions like data unions, data trust, data coalitions, data cooperatives. I can say maybe Tim or the core idea is how not to fall to authoritarian intelligence on one side and to surveillance capitalism on the other. And that we can also help. So that's my ambition. But I think it's also an ambition for the US. Yes, indeed. The norm shaping is at the core of the EU's identity as a normative power. And this has been challenged for quite a while, especially with China's increasing aspirations or ambitions to shape norms themselves. There are also surveillance capitalists increasing ambitions. So these two, I often say it's like a Eurasian plate on one side and the Philippine Sea plate on the other. And they bump into each other and with experience earthquakes. So let's talk about the Taiwan model in that context. Not only Europe, but worldwide I think Taiwan is getting more and more attention because of this successful way of containing the virus and beyond. Not just domestically doing such a great job to protect the health of the people, but to help others. And you've seen, I think it was in April that our high representative, or actually not high representative, but the president of the... The president, yes. Yes, she also left on the line. She tweeted that she wants... Yeah, I saw the tweet. ...Taiwan for the millions of masks that we've received. So I think it is going to be crucial for the future how to maintain the momentum and how the Taiwan model can actually go beyond the global health component. Because the way I see the Taiwan model as such, I see a lot of elements to it and you've already discussed some of the elements. I also would like to talk about the public trust element and also how you see the Taiwan model to be able to become like a soft power tool for Taiwan. Yeah, we didn't send those masks. But that's part of the soft power too. So yeah, that would be the... If you could maybe speak a little bit about the Taiwan model in the context of fighting the virus. Because I think that's at the moment, as you see what is happening in Europe, in Belgium, it is heartbreaking for the people, but also in a way shameful. I think for democracies to fail at such a scale. So if you could tell me how you think Taiwan can promote the innovations in the Taiwan model and describe the model and maybe identify some elements that can be picked out of the model that can serve as soft power tool for Taiwan. Sure. Well, you mentioned the virus, but there's two virus simultaneously. There's a virus of the body, which starts 2.0, and there's a virus of the mind, which is the infodemic conspiracy theories and so on. And these two are intertwined. When people buy into conspiracy theories, then they become less capable of acting in the way that helps the scientific knowledge that could prevent the epidemic in the first place. On the other hand, if the government sees the citizen as not trustworthy, maybe because they buy into conspiracy theories and impose very stringent top-down, lockdown, take-down, shut-down procedures, then that actually makes the conspiracy theory even louder because people understandably see that this is a move toward grabbing state power and people would rebel for anything that's top-down or new data collection that violates the norm before the pandemic and things like that. So I'm just saying these two have this vicious cycle dynamic going on. And underlying both into the Taiwan module is an idea that if the government trusts the citizens, then there is no false dilemma between freedom and human right on one side and public health, either mental or physical, on the other side. This false dilemma only appears if the state wants to do everything. If we understand, for example, in early February, we understood that if three-quarter of people wear the mask and wash their hands, then the virus will not replicate. The R-value will be under one. And now you see, of course, these everywhere. But that's not because of any top-down measure. It is because we made sure that the Q-to-spoke doctor from China explains the science and in a way that incentivizes people based on the idea that you wear the mask to protect yourself against your own washed hands, which is an entirely individualistic incentive and thereby easier to spread than the collectivist incentive, like you do this to avoid a fine or you do this to respect your elders, which is very difficult to fly. And so just getting the incentives right, be very iterative, like anyone calling 1922, gets the science explained to them in a very empathetic way. And their ideas, if new, they can be amplified on the very next stage, central epitaminate commonsense live stream. And so the fast iteration enable collective intelligence. The fair distribution enables this mutual accountability that people queuing in line can take into account the mask availability map so that people queuing before them when they swipe their national health insurance card and get nine or 10 masks. The people queuing after them can indeed see that system is working without any top-down surveillance or control. And finally, it's fun. There's nothing fun about COVID, but there's everything fun about, for example, this two-spokes dog, our head of the cabinet showing his bottoms and say that it doesn't pay to stockpile, saying that there's a lot of instant noodles by as much as you want, but don't forget your vegetables. And all this put in stock to conspiracy theories and panic buying. And that really, really worked. And so that's called humor over rumor. And I think all these individual elements are easy to adapt in other jurisdictions. So Telemoto is not a kind of one-size-fits-all thing. It's rather a very gentle idea that if government trusts the citizens more, citizens can innovate better than government. And then we apply it in various ways, fast, fair and fun. Speaking about Europe and Taiwan, you said you had a quick look at the piece that I wrote. Not a quick look. I read it quite carefully. Thank you so much. I appreciate that. And I also published a similar article in the Taipei Times. But that was about a month or two months ago. We worked together with other fellows in the mofa fellowship program. And we really advocate for stronger look at Taiwan and also, for example, Europe and India to work together to embrace Taiwan with Taiwan's profile on the rise. And having read my article and also being so well informed about global dynamics and global sentiment on China's assertiveness, especially in the European context, and since we speak about infodemic and conspiracy theory, I think this is one of the elements that has contributed to a sharp rise in European minds on the implications of such an increased presence of Chinese actors and state-owned enterprises, state-backed actors on our soil. Because with the past 10 years, Europe has had a rough time, especially after 2008 financial crisis. And then you've seen the migration crisis and also integration, Brexit, so many things that has sharpened divisions and deepened divisions within European countries, that also gave China almost an opportunity to step in. And they were very skillful in recognizing the financial problems but also political crisis and identity crisis. So in all that context, with China's influence rising in Europe, they also established some very interesting tools to fight against misinformation and disinformation. Yeah, I've read the EU versus this info. Exactly, that's one. And then I've done, because I'm not an expert in this field, but I've done some research on our programs. And you know, we have the eased strats caught in the external action service, and that's really focusing on Russia's attempts to undermine us. But we also have the European Digital Media Observatory project, which is a hub for fact-checkers and academics. And we have the 2018 EU action plan against disinformation, so lots of different tools. And I think this is a good indication that we are converging. So do you think this could be an area that Europe could learn more from Taiwan? Yeah, definitely. And in what ways do you see, how would you assess our approach to Taiwan at the moment as a European approach, knowing that the European Union is not a country, but 27 countries, and it's much more difficult to work with, much more complex. So how do you see, or do you see that we could work closer together at the EU? At the short term, or in the long term, like us switching to Euro. That would be an interesting and innovative idea. Shorter, medium term, longer. People to people, beyond health, all these elements. Yeah, I wasn't entirely joking about switching to Europe, because I do see that our data norms are very compatible, and you probably would struggle to find a more European data norm in this part of Indo-Pacific. And so although, of course, the fiat probably cannot be converted to Europe anytime soon, but when we're working on digital currencies, that is to say digital fiat, then the norm around, for example, in Taiwan, our central bank is planning a research, exactly that, a digital fiat. And they design the system, I think one of the design criteria is that unless you're wiring like money laundering level of a lot of money, all transactions must be anonymous, just like cash. But you will not find that norm, not only in PRC, but in many nearby Indo-Pacific regions, because they do think that more state intelligence is a good thing. And not instrumental. It's a net good thing, like core value. But I would easily imagine that from the European single economy, nobody wants the central digital fiat to know all the shocking habits of all European citizens. And so I think our systems are compatible. And although we may not call Euro, if the algorithmic governance is the same principle, then it might as well be compatible, like interchangeable. So I think it's a very concrete thing we can work on. And it also has very similar applications when it comes to this info. In Taiwan, we look at the fact-checking organizations. We make sure that we empower them. We have this idea called social sector, which is gaining currency in EU as well. Of course, various EU countries use different terms. Some say civil society organizations and so on, which is a banned term in PRC, by the way. You can't even say civil society organizations. But the empowerment of social sector really is at the core of the Taiwan counter-disinformation playbook. Because if we say that the state can take down anything, hey, speech, you name it, then the journalists and fact-checkers have no way to expand their reach on that particular regard. Because then it will be something between the surveillance capitalists and the state. It will be a kind of bargain. But then the social sector will be less empowered if we adopted such a model. But instead, we say, no, the social sector has higher legitimacy. And our playbook is just to, I don't know, make their fact-checking fun and amplify their voices. But at the end of the day is the Taiwan fact-check sensor. It is the Michael Penn, it is Kofax, it's people in the social sector including middle-schoolers and primary-schoolers fact-checking each and every sentence in our presidential debate and forum. And because they are longer lasting than any four-year government and they are more trustworthy than any surveillance capitalist. And so this empowerment of not only research and academia, but also the social sector, including very young people, is at the core. So a framework about digital competence, not literacy, about media competence, not literacy, meaning that people are no longer just receivers, but co-producers of epistemic input. I think this is something that the EU and Taiwan has a lot in common. And in fact, we actually do learn from one another. For example, when it comes to citizen consultation, our e-petition website is a carbon copy of the Betelgeavik from Iceland. And our participatory budget portal learned a lot from the Barcelona and the Madrid motives. And our digital consultation platform, V-Taiwan, learned a lot from the digital depopulated numeric from the French government. And also there are national consultations and so on. We also watch very closely and so on. So there's a natural affinity of empowering the social sector through co-creation against the infodemic. I think this is really interesting because where I struggle most is when people ask me, also you say Europe and Taiwan should cooperate more. How? Like give us exactly your suggestions because you know Europe and China relations business as usual. European countries do not want to engage openly with Taiwan because they fear that there will be consequences to their business. You mean on democratic consultation? Like the PRC has better democratic consultation tools they want to sell? I don't think so. No, that's what I'm trying to say. Exactly as you point out that this element is at the core of the Taiwan model. And we are natural partners. On the European side because we've already openly said that Russia and China are the biggest source of this information throughout the pandemic. In June I think this year we put this report out on a European level that was backed by our member states. And this was seen as a revolutionary approach because never before have we said that China is also the major source. About Russia, we've said that before. Our relations with Russia and China are different for obvious reasons. The proximity, the Baltic states and Poland feel Russia's breathing on their neck on a daily basis. So relations are different. But I think now that I'm inspired by your views on the misinformation, countering that how we should work more closely together on that front. I think that's one very good element. And also the trust as you described. So the people feel that it's not the government that it's fact-checking, but it's government empowering them to fact-check themselves. Because in Europe also, I don't know how it is in Taiwan, in the public mind, in the public mind of the people on the street, but they really understand the nuances of this information and the implications. Because I think in Europe this is not yet clear. Yeah, well, because you're subject to it later than we are. Of course. The PRC has been saying for decades that they can take care of Taiwan's 23 million people's health in the World Health Organization. And that's disinformation. And we've been subject to that in decades. My point is that it's not just about the vaccination of this information, against this information, like getting the cute spoke stocks into everybody's mind. Or recently I also role-played, cosplayed, but anyway, it's not just about the vaccination. It's also about testing. That's the fact-checking. And it's also about the cure. And that is the kind of digital tools that we work with the global platform economy providers, such as Facebook, to make sure that there is, for example, real-time open data when it comes to election-related social and political targeted advertisements. And you really need to nib it in the butt. You really need to say, you know, foreign people just should not make precision advertisements during our election season. And they also conformed starting last year. And so the vaccination, the testing and the cure, I think are all important. And we are happy to share, just as we shared the biological version of vaccination, testing and cure. So maybe my next piece that I write while I'm here should be to elaborate a little bit more on this. Because I think in Europe, people don't really understand, just simply they don't know how much and in what ways Taiwan, in a collaborative approach between the government and civil society, really fights this information. So I would really love to, you know, myself to write more about this in European audience. Infodemiology. We also use the infodemic term. So the high representative, Joseph Boran, he was quite vocal on the need to fight against this information. And you are familiar with the battle of narratives. As after the Chinese leadership really sent all the help to Italy, and they tried to prove that it is not a democratic governance that can successfully fight the virus, but it is their strong authoritarian response. This is why we also say that China is a systemic rival, because they try to put forward an alternative model of governance. So I think that makes it even more urgent that we work with democratic countries as Taiwan in the region, because Europe remains a distant actor. I mean, we understand that the United States is Taiwan's number one and most important. And we also are happy to see them presidentize ambition, aspiration, and not only, but in real terms the administration is looking at reinforcing ties with the Southeast Asian countries in the new South Bank policy. And we understand that she focuses on people to people first, but beyond that as well. And India is getting more attention. But for that reason, I think this is the moment that we push from a European perspective. So I hope that whatever Europeans do on the ground, such as myself, to give more visibility, I would love if we could maybe think about this in the future, how we could, or, you know, your voice has such weight in Taiwanese social sector, as you call it. Thank you. I like that, I like that. And I would be so appreciative if you could maybe bring more Europe in the discussion, especially as we just discussed this infodemic, fighting the infodemic, not just the virus as such, but the information given China's implications, you know, influence in Europe. So maybe we can, maybe we can tweet about this. Yeah, we could, we could. And there's plenty of material. Joe has it all, right? There was a early September meeting called Digital Democracy, where Europe can learn from Taiwan, which is on YouTube, and also a transcript hosted by Dominic Hill-Gleman. And also there's, of course, Taiwan's own counter-disinformation playbook. It's in English, so I can also get Joe a copy. And I wrote a blog about, like, trusting the citizens for both the infodemic and epidemic. So there's plenty of material to work with, and I'm happy to tweet about it. Thank you, thank you. I like it how you say you don't trust the citizen because in Europe, we always say trust the government. You know, we don't talk about how the government trusts its citizens. We always talk about not trusting the government. So not only because of the favor of COVID response, but I live in Belgium, and it is very sad to see how fragmented the country is. Well, as a given, it is a federal state. So this is not a sad part of the story, but the complexity of it means that you have a different plan for restrictions in place for the different regions, and they overlap and they clash, and people are just completely distrustful of the authorities because they say that they don't have a plan, that it's a complete failure. We don't have the experience of SARS or as some Asian countries have had and learned from. Maybe this is our SARS. Exactly, because our municipal and central government was saying completely different thing in 2013. And you've learned. And we've learned. That's why you have a central epidemic control. That's right, that's the command center. Yes, the command center. And I mean, I'm a very good example when I go back to Europe to say that it works, because first of all, I could come to Taiwan in spite of what is happening. I was closely monitored and I had no problem with that because it was for my own good and my own health and for the health of the community. So I have an issue with, you know, Europeans being so even today, even after all these months of dealing with the pandemic, still not wanting to wear a mask and still taking that as something that violates their personal freedom, like in the United States. With this, of course, I think we need to look deeper in why we have such a... Yeah, but I think it also has something to do with how masks are advertised in the first place. When you say it's protecting you from your own wash hands, it's first is individualistic and also it avoids all the unnecessary debates exactly how much does it protect against a respiratory disease because when we came up with this idea masks are here to protect against your own wash hands, the idea about asymptomatic transmission about aerosol and so on, all these are just being investigated. It was like really early, it was January, early February, but nobody disputes that if you touch a surface and put your face to your own hands, that's a very likely vehicle of transmission and masks stops that and then reminds you to wash your hands. And so the WHO at the time was saying that don't wear a mask because it can lead to a false sense of security and then you probably wouldn't wash your hands as much and so that's the main problem of that. And they're not wrong, right? It's the same research you just interpreted in two different ways. You either say you don't trust the citizens so don't bother with the mask or you say you trust the citizens so wear a mask to remind yourself to wash your hands and we choose the later to very good effect. So one side of the point is government trusting citizens, the other side is citizens trusting the government and this side in Europe as I said is very low in Taiwan, it is very high. To give no trust is to get no trust, right? It's very simple and we also thank the people who do not trust the government. So for example the quarantine measures you just talked about, there's many people who are okay with it but there were 9% of people not okay with it and so they found some parliamentarians who did a public hearing where we have no emergency state, right? So everything we do must be pre-approved by the parliament. So in the interpolation the Department of Cybersecurity explained the digital fence very clearly and saying that after 14 days there's no constitutional basis for the data to be kept so you don't have to worry about advertisements targeting you or whatever. And also the telecoms have the data anyway and they're processed within the telecom just like the earthquake and flood warnings so again they're not shipping the data to any commercial vendor or anything like that and after he explained all this the approval rate grew to 94% so 3% more people understood the explanation. We still thank the other 6% because they keep us honest and accountable. In Europe people don't, they really fear about their data being misused by the government. Justifiably so, yeah. Yes, of course. But they think that the geolocation with the app, they download the app but already as you said the telecom companies already have that. That's right, which is why we don't introduce any apps because the telecoms already know to a very rough degree like 50 meters radius where your phone is but it doesn't need to know which room you are in which would be a breach of privacy norms. So the point is that we do not collect data that we were not already collecting before the pandemic and then people understand of course it's not very precise but of course that's all we need anyway and so just by reusing the data in a way that are pro-social instead of asking people to wear Bluetooth longer or something with audio respect to Singaporeans anything that is introduced after the pandemic is subject to more scrutiny and for a very good reason because people did not know it's security and privacy properties. So it really comes down to explaining to people that what you're doing is transparent and open and the data management is not a revolutionary difference. It's the same data collectors. It's processed in the same data sensors. So if you worry about of course we give an account but it's not like that we collect new data. Yeah, I think this is another point that is crucial in the Taiwan model to really explain in an open and transparent way and to communicate because having daily press conferences as Taiwan has had for months that was not the case in Europe. That's right. It's another very important element to pick out in addition to, you know, for Europe. I'm speaking. Yeah, I think New Zealand also did the same, right? They also have those briefings from the quint, right? From the five medical offices. I'm just checking, mindful of the time. I'm checking because I don't want to overstay my welcome here. So, yes, we discussed about what Europe can learn from the response and oh yes, how about Taiwanese soft power as a concept? How do you see that concept in the post-pandemic world? Yeah, basically we just say Taiwan can help. Our Taiwan is helping. And I think this is a lot of this idea of soft power was in contrast of the kind of hard power in terms of military, right? So it's like a cultural response to a military situation. But nowadays when we say Taiwan can help, it's something more. It's not just about a culture which for all the goods like bubble tea and so on, they did for Taiwan. And it, of course, probably I guess also helps because it's not innovative and tastes really good. But the point is that in more serious topics, right, we talk about data governance, open government, social nations, and so on, and all these, Taiwan can also help. But it kind of extends beyond the idea of soft power, which is why I translate Taiwan can help to Mandarin or a warm power. But we don't say warm power in English because it sounds like climate change. But that's the idea. It's a power to help and with no string attached. And I think this with no string attached is the main distinguishing factor because when we do open innovation, like literally every innovation that I described to you counter-independent and infodemic, it only gets stronger if more people practice it. It's not a rival good. It's a communal common good. And so it's in our best interest to relinquish all the capitalized trademarks, patterns, whatever, around it. And I think that's a defining character. So I would say that Taiwan's soft power nowadays is defined by open innovation than any particular product or process. And you see challenges to it because of the... Or do you see more opportunity, of course, with the pandemic unfolding? Opportunities for sure because open innovation thrives if more people engage in the digital commerce. And the pandemic has convinced even the people who 10 or 20 years ago had a really bad experience with video conferencing to reevaluate the digital commerce and found that it's actually pretty good nowadays. So we get to meet more senior journalists, more senior decision makers over the cyberspace simply because we can see each other more clearly if we meet face to face, we have to wear masks. So the point is that the diplomatic norm has changed. It used to be quite a stir when I spoke through a telepresence robot at UN Geneva Building in the Internet Governance Forum to the protest of the PRC ambassador, but he did not leave the room. And my words are on the record. And so it's a new norm, right? So according to a certain UN resolution, if they cannot expel our representatives from a UN meeting, they have to leave the room because I want China and all that, right? But then by tacitly agreeing to remain in the room and for me to finish my talk, it means that they don't see this robot as a representative of Taiwan. It's a rather re-presenting, right? Like literally presenting like a PowerPoint presentation of Taiwan. And so I think these norms are now being reinforced by those video conferencing meetings, by immersive realities, extended realities. When everybody is just a rectangle, there is no member seat or observer seat and so on. And so I think multistakeholderism is now augmenting multilateralism. And while Taiwan has no seat in the Westphalian arrangement in many organizations, those same organizations are becoming hybrid, like also multistakeholder. And so when I entered the UN Geneva building, my robot entered without requiring a passport, bypassing the multilateral norm. But once they're in the Internet Governance Forum that works on the multistakeholder norm, and of course we are a stakeholder to the internet, my name card actually has no country name on it, but just a domain name. And obviously .tw results to my machine, not a machine in Shanghai or in Beijing. And so the stakeholder status is undisputed. Even if you type this web address from Shanghai or Beijing, it goes to this machine. It doesn't go to their machine, right? So that part is not Westphalian, but it is still multistakeholder. And so I think the opportunity is that people will think in a more multistakeholder kind of way to tackle truly global problems, whereas the pandemic is maybe the first truly global problem that has the same level of urgency, more or less in all countries. But of course, as you just mentioned, the infodemic, the data norms like climate change, all these are also in the same category of truly global problems that can only be tackling in a multistakeholder instead of just multilateral fashion. And I think this is a tremendous opportunity for Taiwan. So what is the biggest challenge to switching to this new reality? Yeah, to this new norm, right? I already mentioned, right, if people subscribe to authoritarian intelligence, if people think AI and think the state should know everything, then this model doesn't have a breathing room because all the data will be belong to the state. And also, if surveillance capitalism expands unchecked, if the surveillance capitalists say that they know the people better than the people know themselves, by bothering with people power or collective intelligence, the AI can predict everything, then there's little room for the social sector, too. So basically, for the social sector to grow as a sector, we need to think beyond it being the third sector. Otherwise, the other two sectors still dominate. And for the social sector to work, I think there need to be a tested understanding that there's strengths in plurality. And if the plurality is the strength, then the social sector maximizes strength and maximizes the communicational powers of the various plural actors, whereas a single state or a single multinational company would just be more homogeneous. So if we truly believe plurality is power and diversity and inclusion are needed, then the social sector needs to be the dominant sector. So then I would say that part of the Taiwan model as a core element is empowering the social sector. Exactly. Based as a conclusion to everything you said. Definitely. Other than the more tangible elements about the data and how exactly Taiwan is doing to fight the pandemic, but a more abstract but very important element would be this empowering the social sector. Yeah, I would even say it's the social sector first approach. Maybe we call it the zero sector. Okay, so in light of the growing US-China tension, how realistic do you think the prospect that Taiwan could define its future for itself? How realistic do you see this? And how can Europe help? Maybe that could be our last question. Sure. First of all, I think, as I said, Taiwan offers a third way outside of this state knows everything or the companies knows everything dilemma. And in this vein, we show every person on the planet really that you don't need to trade economic growth to public health or the other way around. And so it's very realistic because we make this argument without alluding to US-China tension. This argument has nothing to do with the US-China tension. And this argument is profoundly universal. And so I'm optimistic about it. And how could Europe help? I guess the Europe can be resilient and hold to the humanistic tradition of empowering not only individual human dignity, which is what the EU is all about anyway, but also the social sector. That is to say, not just individual's dignity, but individual as association, individual as a unity, individual as unions, but still plural, like many different joint data controllers in GDPR parlance. And Taiwan has many such data coalitions already around air box, which is for environmental measurements, the civil IOT system, the collaborative fact-shacking system, and so on. And all these are the kind of joint data control issue that GDPR is designed to empower. And so whereas the EU is still figuring out how to make such data co-op slash unions work, we already have some working models. So you can help by, first of all, list us as case studies, and also the other way around to when we're negotiating for GDPR adequacy, which we are doing so right now, and also think about how the key GDPR clauses can also have a Taiwanese contribution and interpretation. That's very interesting. And also what I find fascinating is in Europe, the debate about what to do about COVID-19 or the pandemic is whether it's the economy or the human. Yeah, it's a false dilemma. But it's so difficult to break away from that, because they will say, okay, so we have a lockdown in many European countries now. So then the reaction is, it's our economy will suffer, but that's not the priority. It's that the Taiwanese priority has always been to protect human health. Yes, and also to empower the social sector, namely the community pharmacists that are trusted by the elders, and also to make sure our masquerading are the same experience as renewing chronic prescriptions and so on. And that is a lot of care put into empowering the existing social relationships because we understand that's the only way that people would voluntarily devise new ideas using traditional rice cookers to disinfect the mask and all that without any top-down measurement. Okay, I think we've covered most things. Thank you so much. Thank you. It was really a pleasure to get access to you and to your views. And as I mentioned, 9-Line is really trying to do more to connect Europe with Asia. And I was wondering if you can refer me to any entity here in Taiwan, in the civil sector, where I could connect with actors who would be interested in... Sure, Jo has the complete list. Actually, more complete than me. Yes, maybe if I approach some entity... Sure, you can see me. I can see you as your email. Yeah, you can see my email. Or you're... You have all my three cards, but the same email. Same email, yes. Okay, thank you so much. I think we should do a picture.