 So now we're going to move on to H133. We don't have any witnesses listed as you can see. But I've asked Eric to discuss some things with us. I do want to let people know. There are some documents posted on our website. There are the new forms from the judiciary's website. The complaint and affidavit and explanation as to how these have changed from before. There is a letter from Will Moore. And I know some of you, if not all of you were copied on that. And then there is an email from the defender general. So with that, I will turn it over to Eric. Thank you. Thank you so much, Eric. Sure. Nice to see everybody. Good afternoon. So Eric Fitzpatrick with the office of legislative council. I'm here to talk some about H133, which as the committee knows is an act relating to emergency relief from abuse orders and relinquishment of firearms. I guess I should ask the chair how, how you want me to go about this first, which I think a couple of topics that I'm thinking over. You wanted to review the state be missed. Depending that was issued last Friday and maybe take a look at. I think it's a little bit different. I think it's a little bit different. Also 20 VSA 2307, which is the storage firearm storage statute. Those are the two things I'm. Thinking that you might want to get to first, but I wasn't sure which order you, you might want to talk about them. Right. I think in terms, maybe do the storage first and, you know, again briefly in terms of. You know, how it works together with, with the RFA statute in terms of referencing the RFA statute and, and. Describes a process. Yeah, that'd be great. Okay. Yeah. Yeah, I'll pull up the statute. I'm going to share the document. I think it's 20 VSA 2307. I think, but we'll see in just a moment. Yeah, actually I have it now. So that is correct. Thank you. Evan, can you make me a co-host, please? Thank you. All right. So let's take a look at the language itself as the, as the chair was mentioning, there is an interplay between this existing statute. And the relief from abuse order. RFA statute. That preexists. The bill that you're looking at now. This is that's current law. And you'll see that. There's an interaction between. The, the existing statute on. Firearm storage. And the. RFA process. So this is 20 VSA 2307, which is the existing statute. You see the title is firearms relinquished pursuant to relieve from abuse order. So that's pretty self-explanatory. The, the, and I'll say in the big picture for a moment before you look at the language, this statute deals with how a firearm that's relinquished pursuant to an RFA, which is also what you've been looking at in section 1104, how a firearm relinquished in the under those circumstances. She has to be stored and handled. Now that's what it does deal. In other words, if a firearm is relinquished pursuant to an RFA, here's what must be done with it. And what it doesn't say is the court, you know, as of this statute hereby has the authority to order relinquishment. It doesn't authorize a relinquishment, but it does provide processes for it have to occur if the relinquishment happens. So that's the idea behind it. Doesn't say courts have the authority to do this. But it sort of assumes that they, that that's going to happen or at least in the case that they do happen, sets out a procedure that has to be followed with the firearm when it's relinquished. So that's the background as to how this, the statute works and what the, the interrelationship that it has with the RFA language. So if you look at skip the definitions for a moment and look at subsection B1 there, it sort of essentially gets into what I was just describing and says that a person who is, who is required to relinquish firearms, ammunition or other weapons by a court order issued under 15 BSA, chapter 21 abuse prevention. And that's where 1103 and 1104 are the statutes that we've been looking at the statute that's proposed to be amended in H133 is right there in chapter 21, the abuse prevention statute. So again, the language here says a person who was required to relinquish a firearm under that statute, in other words is ordered to relinquish pursuant to an RFA or sort of provides an alternative. There are another provision consistent with federal law shall unless the court orders an alternative relinquishment pursuant to subdivision two, and this is key here. So I should again, quick big picture for a second. There's three ways that the person might relinquish or transfer possession of the firearm according to the statute and the three ways are give it up to a law enforcement officer when the order is served. So in other words, the law enforcement officer comes and says here, I'm serving this RFA, this relief from abuse order. And at that time when the order is served, the person, that's one option relinquish the firearms right then. Another option is that the court can order that the person relinquish to a third party. A person, the owner of the firearms can designate and say they want, you know, whatever it could be a family member, could be a friend that can hang on to the weapons for them while the order is in effect. So that's another option. And the third option is that the person can relinquish to a federally licensed firearms dealer. So there's a program in place under which the FFLs, the federally licensed firearms dealers, can store firearms for people who have them have to turn them over because they're subject to relief from abuse order. So those are your options to a law enforcement to an FFL or to some other designated person. If you have somebody who can hold on to it and it can meet the criteria that we're about to see. So that's the big picture. So that's what the language here says that the person says, if you're required to relinquish the firearm under the FFL, you have to either give it to a law enforcement officer when the order is served or to an approved federally licensed firearms dealer, unless the court orders this alternative relinquishment under subdivision two that you see right there. And we don't need to go through all the details, but that's just the option of the third person. You know, that's the big picture of this court can order that the person relinquish the firearm to a person other than the law enforcement officer of the FFL, if the court makes certain findings with respect to this nominated third party. And they, the court, and if the court finds that that relinquishment to that third party will not adequately protect the safety of the victim. Well, then they can't do it. But the, this third party has to sign an affidavit. And this is subdivision B. They have to sign an affidavit that says they acknowledge receipt. They have to assume responsibility for storage. They specify the manner in which they're going to provide secure storage. They have to attest that they are not prohibited from owning or possessing crimes under state or federal law. So in other words, they themselves are not, you know, convicted felon or convicted of some other crime that would would prohibit a person from possessing. And lastly, in some Roman numeral four that they understand the obligations and requirements of the order of what they're doing. So in other words, if they are subject to sub division C there, they are going to be subject to civil contempt proceedings. If they allow the person who's not supposed to have the weapon, you know, in other words, the person on whom on whose behalf they're holding it. If they let that person take it back, then they can be subject to civil contempt proceedings, or if they don't otherwise follow the requirements of. This third party storage. I think the point of this is that. Fees and skipping subsection C there that this provides that the, the rules for how this program is going to work. Are governed by the Department of Public Safety's. Rules that they issue. And that they have issued already. Or they're supposed to have any, I guess I haven't seen the rules myself, I assume they have. The, but there's fees permitted as well. And now I'm in subsection D here. Law enforcement agencies. And the law enforcement agencies. Firearms dealers can charge fees for this storage. You'll see that there's some. Maximum fees enumerated for law enforcement agencies. In D one. $200 for the first weapon, $50 for each additional weapon up to 15 months. $50 for each year thereafter. The dealers don't have a specified. And that's what I'm saying. And that's what I'm saying. And that just uses the term reasonable amount or. Storage fee that is reasonably related to the expense as it incurs. Yeah. Yeah. I guess this is not necessarily for you, but anybody, I thought I heard last week. Something about. There isn't fees on. Storage of firearms that were, were relinquished. That's, I think, and. Yeah. For the emergency order, which you see. In, in subdivision three there. If you're going to get to it. Yeah, that's great. Okay. Yeah. Yeah. Thank you. But that's a, that's a crucial distinction. That's the next point I was going to get to. Anyway, again, the gets the maxed for, for law enforcement agencies and. FFLs have. The ability to, to charge fees for storage. And that's, that's the next point. But. Under subdivision three, you'll see that. The fees are only permitted after the court issues of final relief from abuse order. So in other words. The temporary order, which is the one that this committee has been looking at. You know, the order that's only in effect for 14 days. There is no. Ability to charge fees for that 14 day window. Remember, so. So there's a 14 day maximum that the emergency order. Can be in effect for, and during that period of time. The authorization for fees is not there. But if at the end of that 14 day period, remember there has to be hearing, and then there's going to be a question of, of whether or not a final. RFA should issue a final order. And that can be, there's no actually maximum amount of time that that has to be for it's often that there for a year is a common amount, but it can vary. From the number of years. The ability to charge fees then kicks in. So if the final order is issued. Then the law enforcement agency or the federal firearms dealer. Can charge the fee. So does that respond to your question representative? Yeah, I've got to learn to be more patient and just listen. Thank you. Yeah, thank you. Yeah, so thank you, Eric. So, you know, that's the, that's the, the, the most of it, the gist of it really the, you know, you have some other provisions are related to the same thing subdivision F makes sure it clarifies that, you know, the final order has to specifically say that once the order expires the person's firearms have to be given back they have to be returned after the order has to say that there are provisions about, you know, what's going to happen if the person doesn't turn up to get them back there's an authorization that they don't turn up within 90 days they can put the firearm up for sale. The, the, there's a three day window for after the after the order expires that the agency or the dealer has to make them available to return to the owner within three days so it has to be a quick turnaround. Yeah, on the may be sold for fair market value piece. Say, somebody doesn't show up for the 90 days and, and, and, you know, during this whole thing had moved say out of state can't make it back. But since it is a may, is it potentially, I mean, not, I don't want to oversimplify it but as simple as a phone call and maybe, of course, you'd have to get it recorded somehow that you made contact but it can it be extended fairly easily. Yes, absolutely. Yeah, I don't, you know, it's a practical matter that, you know, may well depend on the exact types of communication you know did they really, you know, made sure that it actually happened they get the message etc etc but yes, it's, it's at an absolutely it's a may not a shall so that the, the window is there for someone who's making a good faith effort you might say to get the firearm back and say hey I can't get there for another two weeks absolutely permits that the court and the agency or the dealer to say okay we'll hold it for, you know, a little, a little while longer, and they can work out whatever agreement they want to work out essentially. Okay. Great, thank you. Yeah. That's pretty much what I have on on the statute and how it interacts with. That's great. The statute. Sorry, the bill that your committee is looking at. That's great that that's helpful. Thank you. Sure. Thank you. Shall I turn to the state be Mish case with that or do you want to. Yeah. Yeah, I'm not hearing any jumping in or anything so yes please thank you. Okay. Let me see if I can pull this up somewhere. Here we go. So the one thing I just sort of before getting into the case I'm sure most folks have probably heard that the Vermont Supreme Court handed down this decision last Friday only a few days ago now. But you may recall that earlier last week when I walked the committee through. So some due process issues related to to H 133 and some questions about whether or not the, the relinquishment or seizure process that H 133 contemplates would be permissible under the due process clause of the, of the United States Supreme Court. And I mentioned and talked about, you know, the person's right to have notice in a hearing before property is taken and that sort of thing. You may recall the very end of that discussion I said, that to a certain extent, we would find out more about these issues very soon, because I didn't say very soon I said soon, and because that there was both. The United States Supreme Court was due to act in this area but more more immediately that there were these two pending cases before the Vermont Supreme Court, having to do with challenges to the, to the large capacity magazine statute and that we would get a decision about those sometime, and we would know more about what the court had to say about firearms regulation. Well little did I know that 48 hours later, that was when the decision would come out I honestly had no idea when I said that but it came out pretty quickly right after it was, I can't think it was Tuesday I was in the committee talking about and made that made that statement and then the decision came out Friday so. So nice segue I suppose the the court did have plenty to say about the regulation of firearms and I will transition right into now to to a summary of what the decision said and what it how what impact it might have on in 1933, generally. So the case was called state the mission that, in that case the defendant was charged with violating the Vermont statute that prohibits the possession of large capacity magazine or sometimes called LCMs. Large capacity magazines are defined in 13 BSA for 021 or that statute was passed in 2018 just a couple years ago. And they're defined to be 10 rounds of ammunition for a long gun 15 rounds for a handgun and with some exceptions including a grandfather in class and a few other exceptions for law enforcement etc. So if you didn't, if you aren't grandfathered in these LCMs these large capacity magazine possession is illegal. So one year misdemeanor I believe. So the defendant challenge the statute as violating article 16 of Vermont Constitution, which provides and there's the quote quoted language that people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the state I should note right there. The challenge was very specifically under the Vermont Constitution article 16 it was not a second amendment case under the due process clause. Sorry, under the second amendment to the United States Constitution. So it was not a federal constitutional issue. Under article 16 the state constitutional issue on me so whatever the, what the court said here really has no bearing on what a federal court might say with respect to a second amendment challenge, other than it might be, you know, guidance it might be interesting but the courts are separate and would be analyzing it under their own standards and their own tests but under the article 16 of Vermont Constitution. The holding of the Vermont Supreme Court in this case was quite clear and that's what you see highlighted in yellow if you ever want to this is a direct quote from the opinion. So if you ever looking for sort of a paragraph that summarizes exactly what the court said in this case here it is. I'm going to read it verbatim since it is exactly the holding that we first determine that article 16 protects a limited right to individual self defense so that means the first point is that article 16 isn't just protecting a general firearms possession right in connection with the state sponsored militia or something like that it's a individual self defense so they say, yes, the article 16 does protect a limited right to individual self defense, and that the proper standard for article 16 challenges, there's a reasonable regulation test so what they're doing in that first sense is they're having to figure out what is the scope of the right. And I know that's the first clause well the scope of the right scope does include individual self defense, and what's going to be the standard for determining how to review, say a state law, say a law passes or that, you know, has some impact on firearms how does the court decide whether or not a law is okay a permissible regulation or whether it might violate this right that they've just articulated this right to self defense. And it says, alright the standard for reviewing an article 16 challenges statute say that that does that is a reasonable regulation test. So that's what it's called the reasonable regulation test. And then they say under this test, we will uphold the statute implicating the right to bear arms provided is a reasonable exercise of the state's power to protect the public safety and welfare. So that's the reasonable regulation has to be a reasonable regulation of the public health, safety and welfare. So they apply that standard we apply in that standard we conclude that section 421 that's the large capacity magazine statute satisfies that reasonable regulation test because the statute has a valid purpose. Alright, step step one's got a valid purpose of reducing the lethality of mass shootings. Point to the legislature was in it was within its authority and concluding that the regulation promotes this purpose. So in other words, the, the pro hit pro prohibition on large capacity magazines does promote their purpose of reducing lethality. We'll get to this in a minute but the reason that they that they reached that conclusion is because they say there was plenty of evidence from which to conclude that making large capacity magazines illegal will make mass shootings, less deadly and cause fewer injuries. So, given that they say alright as you see in that sentence right there that the legislature based on that evidence was within its authority to conclude that alright this prohibition promotes our purpose of reducing lethality. And lastly, the statute leaves ample means for Vermonters to exercise their right to bear arms and self defense so in other words, it's not making illegal all firearms or, or making it impossible to possess any firearm for self defense it's, it's a prohibition on a particular type of large capacity magazine. So, that's the nutshell of what the court held up so we're going to zip through some more details here but as I say it's nice to have that handy dandy one paragraph summary of what the court's result was in the Mish case. As it happened this was the very first case in which the court was was defining the scope of this right to bear arms under under article 16 and to set forth the standard to determine whether a law infringes on that right there had been a couple of cases. Under article 16 before and it had, it had reached decisions based on particular facts and particular a statute in one case and an ordinance and the other, but it never talked about it never gone into the into great detail about, you know, what what is exactly the scope of the right under article 16 doesn't expressly protect an individual right to self defense, which as we just saw it answered that question yes it does. And what is the standard to review and it provided information on that, and it makes some sense if you think about it remember the, the, the federal of the United States Supreme Court case that I mentioned that for the first time recognized an individual right to bear arms for self defense under the Constitution that was only decided in 2008, and, and the, the recent development in how these firearms provisions and constitutions are perceived has been the subject of a lot of litigation, but it's been a lot, you know, mostly over the last, decade or so, roughly, and there've been a lot of cases on it, talking about it, but just in that sense it makes some some sense that the Vermont Supreme Court as well hadn't hadn't had occasion to really talk expressly about, but what is this right. Exactly me know what what are it's, what are its boundaries, and you know how do we analyze statutes that might impact it so the niche case as well as a companion civil case that I'll mention in a moment. At the more or less the same time, provided the court with the opportunity to state quite clearly and analyze in detail. What these, what these provisions mean and to do that the court, what you asked what would the court look at well looked at the text of the you know the language itself. The history and it went back at a lengthy historical discussion I'm not going to go into that in detail now that it's a 51 page very detailed very carefully thought out opinion and you can certainly read some of those provisions yourself but I'm just mentioning sort of what they talked about. So it was the history case on Vermont construction of similar provisions in other state constitutions they talked about that any other empirical relevance, relative evidence sorry if relevant. And on the basis of those factors that the court concluded that article 16 does protect a right to bear arms and individual self defense subject to reasonable regulation. Now that obviously in a sense begs the question right if if it if the the right to bear arms for individual self defense is protected by article 16 subject to some reasonable regulation. Well the question that obviously would would naturally be led to is, well where does that line get drawn right how do you where you know a given statute for example. That may impact the right to their arms. How does one decide whether it's an unconstitutional infringement on that right to self defense, or a reasonable regulation, right, because it could be one or the other. There has to be a line between them somehow. And that's what the court had to figure out next, which is okay what standard of review has to be applied to determine whether you know a regulation is an unconstitutional violation of article 16 because it infringes on this right to bear arms, or whether it's a reasonable regulation. So again looks at the article 16's history, and the court's own previous decisions. And it reaches the conclusion that the state reasonable regulation test which I just mentioned is the appropriate the most appropriate standard for article 16 challenges. It reached that conclusion because it really pointed out that the right to bear arms under article 16 was subject to various reasonable legislative laws and restrictions going back to the mid to late 1800s, and it cited several some of which still exist. Now, in title 13 in the weapon statutes, for example, negligently pointing a fireman or the person, a couple of these, not in exactly the same form verbatim but several of these statutes have been around since the 1800s. And the court used that historical point to say that well this, the right to bear arms then has has not been absolute it's rather it's been subject to legislative restrictions for, you know, 150 years or so, or almost. Yeah, so in that roughly, not going to try and follow through with that math but I think that's right where I was. So, it also distinguished it in that, in that same discussion from other individual rights in the Constitution. Now, for example, whether it's the right to free speech or the right to free exercise of religion or whatever it may be. And sort of articulated this distinction that that the exercise of the right to bear arms and I'm looking at this quoted language here at the end of that paragraph is by its very nature is associated with serious risk to harm to to self and others so in other ways, you know, the firearms right as that potential and for that reason, according to the court, it was subject to reasonable legislative regulation as well. So, court reaches that conclusion and then has to really discuss what does that mean, right, what is the reasonable regulation test me, and the court goes on to explain that he says that the government may regulate firearms under this test, under that power, as long as it's exercise of that power is reasonable, and it's not reasonable, if it effectively abrogates article 16 so in other words if it essentially, you know, makes the article 16 anality makes it, the right to bear arms non existent. And that's obviously not going to be reasonable. I'm continuing on here. The test does analyze whether the statute issue is a reasonable limitation on the right to bear arms, and it focuses on the balance of the interest at stake so it's really looks at the different interest they're going to be involved in a legislative attempt to regulate firearms and under under this test as the court was on to say the right to bear arms may be quote regulated, but not prohibited. That's a key distinction. And then Eric, yeah, yeah. If you had already said it, I apologize, I lost my internet there for a few minutes but so what's the definition of police power, the police, the police power is the right to protect the general health and welfare of the public. It's, it's an inherent legislative power actually you may remember that I think Jennifer's last week or the week before we were talking a little bit about inherent judicial power. The police power is generally recognized as as one of one of the, some many court say it's the most important power that the legislative power branch of government has but it's, it's the power to protect the general health and welfare of the citizens. Eric, thank you. Yeah, actually excuse me, I do see that coaches hand is up Eric. Thank you. Sorry to interrupt this is a great explanation. Is this going to be in your papers for today's testimony. Yes, yeah, and I sent it to to Evan and it's, it's online so you can look at it anytime. Thank you very much. This is really enjoyable. Oh good, glad it's helpful. So yeah so the, the key point that the that the court indicates that has to be looked at when deciding whether or not this is a reasonable exercise of the police power this this power to protect the health and welfare of the citizens is whether there's a reasonable fit on that highlighted yellow language on top there whether there's a reasonable fit between the purpose and the means of legislation. Now this is an important point to that. I noticed as well that the court specifically said this this is a more deferential standard to state legislatures than the standards that are used by federal courts analyzing the second amendment. It provides more deference to findings that the legislatures make that the federal courts using more in the cases since Heller in 2008. And in that case the United States Supreme Court did not articulate by the way, what the standard should be to analyze cases under the Second Amendment they left that to the lower courts to work out and there's been some mix of opinion about that between the lower courts and certainly the standard of review that's used in the federal courts is is more more strict more rigorous than than the reasonable regulation standard that the Vermont Supreme Court is is articulated here and the court specifically said that that this standard was more differential the state legislatures, then the federal federal court standard so that's an interesting point to keep in mind because as I say, this challenge was under article 16 of the Vermont Constitution. So, there could well be separate challenges to to this statute the large capacity Maggie large capacity magazine statute or other state firearms statutes under the Second Amendment in federal court. So, you know, whether or not they would reach the same result is impossible to say but it's just good to keep in mind that we have these two separate constitutional systems going on, and two separate analysis. So, so what is this reasonableness me and when that when the courts talking about that and it goes on to explain that because that's obviously very important to to Eric. Yeah. What you were just saying about the two different constitutions and I had a question on my mind that I think I know the answer to but kind of relates to that so Vermont has the Supreme Court has ruled as far as the high capacity magazines go. And I heard someplace along the way that the US Supreme Court may be looking at it. Sometimes soon what whether that's a year or two I don't know. So if the Supreme Court rules that it's unconstitutional to ban high capacity magazines. And one does does that Trump Vermont, and I guess if it does, I thought states were autonomous. Say that one more. Sorry. Yeah, so does does the Supreme Court ruling Trump Vermont's on that. And if it does, you know if they did overturn the ban on high capacity magazines. Again, do that does it the Supreme Court Trump's Vermont ruling. And if it does just raises another question with me as far as I thought states are autonomous and could do. Not what they want but maybe maybe you understand what I'm saying. Oh, I do. Yes, exactly. And yes, it's, it's an interesting being in a you know federal system where where two different constitutions apply you know the states are independent sovereigns. But you know conduct can't violate either the state constitution or the federal constitution. So if, if the United States Supreme Court were to hold that the, that the large capacity magazine prohibition violated the Second Constitution, then yes that would, that would essentially Trump that would say that even though it but the Vermont Supreme Court had found that it was okay under the state state constitution, it nevertheless violated the federal constitution and would still be unconstitutional for that reason. So I said, autonomous and you said sovereign I think we're talking about the same thing so so in a case like this. Why wouldn't the state. Oh, because it's forget it, because it's violating US constitution or us. Okay. All right. And just a little confusing to the lay person but I think I got it. No, it's, it's, you know, it's one of the complications of living in a sort of a dual system of dual sovereignty, you know you have independent sovereigns both state and federal. Right, right. Thank you. Yeah. Okay, so the court goes on to explain that that it's talking about reasonable this now because remember all of this is sort of based on this issue of reasonableness. It says in the exercise of the state's police power reasonable requires that the purpose of the enactment be in the interest of the public welfare. That's what I was mentioning has to be the public safety and welfare, and that the methods that are utilized, they're a rational, a rational relationship to the attended intended goals. So it has to be this connection between the goal and whatever method the legislature chose to use and it goes on this highlighted section here I think it's very important in assessing reasonableness, therefore, and the quote from the court's opinion. The court should consider the importance of the state's goals, the reasonableness of the connection between the goals and the means chosen, and the degree to which the regulation burdens the exercise of the right to bear arms for self defense so there's three things to think about in the analysis of whether it's reasonableness. Well how what's the state's stated goal. What's the connection is there reasonable connection between the state's goal and the legislation in other words the statute that the legislature enacted to say here's how we're going to try and address this problem here's how we're going to try and meet this goal is there a connection between what the goal is and what the, what the legislation does, and, you know to what extent does it burden the right to bear arms for self defense. As I mentioned that this test doesn't tolerate a statute that effectively abrogates article 16 and renders the right to bear arms annulity so it can't go that far. But reasonable regulation according to the court is is going to be okay and and it's interesting here and this goes back to the point I just made about how the court said that their standard is more deferential to the legislature, then the federal standard talks quite a bit about how deference to the legislature is a key component here. They say, you know that although our inquiry looks to an actual balance of interest, remember that kind of look at the interest, the competing interest here, rather than actual interest rather than merely a hypothetical conceivable one. It does not override our general deference to the legislature on matters within its authority. And this next sentence is very, very key to that the question for courts is not whether we would strike the same balance as the legislature. They don't have to say oh well we would we would weigh those facts differently, but it's whether the legislators choices are anchored to a real, as opposed to a hypothetical foundation. So in other words, if there's a basis for the legislature's conclusion as to why it's enacting the statute and the connection that it has to the to remedying the problem addressing the purpose, then the courts probably not going to disturb that. And they go on to say, you know, again they're distinguishing between some hypothetical conceivable purpose and some actual connection. They say although, you know, will not we will not uphold the law restricting the right to bear arms on the basis of hypothetical rationales for which there is no basis, or which are overwhelmingly, overwhelmingly refuted by contrary evidence. Vermont courts will not second guess the legislature's weighing of the facts and information supporting its enactments. So legislation is supported by adequate evidence in light of the constitutional rights potentially implicated by its legislation. So it's very differential to a fact gathering process that the legislature undergoes when it's passing a statute. It takes these principles that we just described and applies them to section 421 the prohibition on on large capacity magazines and it goes through the test that we just described they conclude that the legislature had this purpose of reducing the potential for injury and mass shootings. All right, that was the purpose by by prohibiting LCMs. And I say this was a proper legislative purpose within the police power to protect the public welfare. So I was protecting public health and well being by it was the purpose was the goal. And they say that is a proper exercise of the protection of the general public which is the police power. And they say, and that this large capacity magazine band had a rational relationship to that purpose. Why? Well, because there was sufficient evidence to permit the legislature to conclude that limiting magazine capacity would further that goal by reducing the potential for injury and injuries and mass shootings. So one of the words, and they say this specifically in the opinion, they're not saying the evidence absolutely supports that conclusion. They're meal, they're being deferential to the legislature and saying there was sufficient evidence for the legislature to reach that conclusion. And they're not going to as they say they're not going to substitute their judgment to the for that of the legislature as to whether they would strike the same balance they're not going to do that. And I guess the legislature's weighing of their of the facts and information and not going to do that either. As long as there is adequate evidence now again, it's not, they're saying you can't just have hypothetical rationales or no evidence you can't do that. But if there's evidence from which the legislature could reach that conclusion, you know, they're not going to disturb that that conclusion by by the General Assembly. In this case they said there was evidence that the legislature had when it passed act 55 or S 55 I should say in 2019 and as well it goes on to finally conclude that the burden on the right to bear arms for self defense was minimal, because other types of firearms were not prohibited. In other words, it was a ban on large capacity magazine but not other types of firearms. And therefore, the statute did not violate article 16. And I just want to this is my very last last point here I just want to make here because this sort of segues us into h 133 a little bit, because in a footnote. The court specifically said in the opinion, and this is verbatim this is a quote and in fact most of this outline that you're looked at looked at I mean I've done little bits of, you know, minor editing here and there and paraphrasing here and there but but a good chunk of this is just quotes from the opinion itself. And this is one right here from footnote 21 and page 35 the court says we do not address in this decision. The factors to be considered and then put it should say pausing for a moment what they're doing here is they're saying they're telling us what kinds of cases they are not deciding. This is a case about large capacity magazines in other words, and whether or not those a prohibition on those devices would violate article 16. The court is explaining here but here's what we're not deciding here's what is not before us and they say, we're not addressing. In this decision, the factors to be considered and determining whether other kinds of predict provisions potentially impacting the right to bear arms and then it lists some specifically such as limitations on where individuals that can possess firearms. If you've got it, you have those in Vermont statute already right you have them for pro hit, you can't possess firearms in schools or on school grounds or in court houses for example those are both in Vermont statute already those sorts of limitations are not being decided here, or regulations concerning the sale or transfer of firearms again you have those in statute as well for example, firearms can't be sold to persons under 21. There's one checks whenever firearms or so those are all parts of their legislation that was passed in 2018 those are also not being decided here requirements relating to securing or carrying firearms, or and here's the one I've highlighted, or limitations concerning who may possess firearms. I highlighted because that is really the type of legislation you're looking at an h133 right that is about who can possess firearms and their proposal in h133 is to make clear that people who are subject to emergency relief from abuse orders can't have firearms and that's again within the within the category of types of cases that the courts not addressing here and whether or not those would violate article 16 remains an open question, but I think the analysis that that the court review in the Mitch case does, I think, probably reminds people of the same discussion that the committee has had with respect to h133 in other words the, the test some testimony that you've heard about the connection between people who are subject to relief from abuse orders and whether or not those firearms are used in lethal circumstances or circumstances that injure people when they are in danger of having to come to court and get an RFA. So I say that that evidence has been before the committee and that probably will have a bearing on whether or not a similar challenge under article 16 to the language that the committee is looking at would be upheld because again the legislature, the case certainly was very differential to the legislature to the to the conclusions that the legislature could reach based on evidence that it heard. And in this case I think the committee probably is able to recollect well the evidence that it's that it's heard already with respect to relief from abuse orders and potential lethal and injurious situations and probably using the Mitch standard that's a good a good argument that that would that would support legislative regulation in this in this case as well. Again, not clear can't say that for certain. And the court specifically said they weren't deciding those kind of cases, but I think certainly that's the, the argument that one would make if one were defending the H 133 legislation as well. So, that kind of brings me to my end of that discussion. Well, thank you. Thank you. Very helpful. I see coaches hand is up but I'm not sure if that's from before. And that was from before. Okay, great. And I me just, okay. Tom's hand is up as a little. Okay, once I'm. Okay, now I can see everybody. Great. Okay. Tom. Yeah, me again. No, just a question that came to my mind Eric. Got the case against Max mesh. Is it mesh. Is that the way it's pronounced, I guess, I think. I always thought there was an end in it, but so I saw this. But anyway, so let's, let's say he is a case against him. He was found guilty. And then say a year that whatever his punishment is, say, sake argument, he's halfway through the punishment. And then the Supreme Court. Reverses the Vermont decision in a sense, what happens to a case like his. You understand what I'm saying. You can say no. Right. No, I think I understand what I'm not sure the answer. It's a good question. I think I see what you're getting at is if. Let's say he's a. You know, convicted under this statute. Yeah. And then, and then two years down the road. The United States Supreme Court says, oh no, that, that large capacity magazine statute violates the second amendment. Then what happens to this particular conviction. Right. Yeah. That's a good question. I'm not, I'm not sure the answer at the time I had certainly they would be a good, a good ground for an expungement petition, I would think. But I'm just sort of thinking off the top of my head with that. I'm not 100% sure, but it's an interesting one to look into. Right. So what, I mean, we've changed, we've changed laws before penalties before, and I got to believe someplace along, along those, those times that somebody was, was serving a sentence. You know, and then we changed a penalty. Did anything happen with them. I mean that you may not even know or recall. You know, in general, you can't, you can't make a penalty more severe, because that's an ex post facto clause violation. So you can't, you can't make a penalty more severe retroactively. No, no, no, I'm thinking if the penalty was less. And generally, there is a statute on that that generally, when, when penalties are are made less severe. So that they would, you know, retroactively reduce somebody's punishment there is usually. I'm not sure exactly how the statutory process unfolds but there is some allowance for that being applied retroactively, it can be. Okay. So then it just crossed my mind that the thing that would that changes at all it's going from a state to a federal thing. Right. Yeah, where that's where the big question would be, I guess, is because of that. Small detail. Right, what do you have any impact. Right. Okay, great. Thank you. Okay, great. Eric, thank you. I think that that was really helpful. Appreciate that. I'm not seeing any other questions so. Okay. All right. Committee what I'm going to do now is I'm going to if it works for Michelle have her do a walkthrough on the changes to 195. Then we'll take our break and then we'll hear from witnesses because Michelle is double booked and so does that work for you Michelle, and then you'll be able to hear the committee. Okay, great. I'll go check in and then I'll come back. Okay. Thank you. And Evan, would you mind sharing the screen. With the amendment. Thank you. So committee, this is H 195 and we're looking at language that attempted to narrow the, the bill is as introduced. Right. And Tom, I see your hand is up. Right. So just as a little refresher from our discussion last week. So the attorney general's office that put forth a proposal. Asking for the legislature to explicitly authorize the use of facial recognition technology with the respect to certain types of crimes, but the way that they had originally presented it was encompassing several different crimes, but then once we heard testimony, it was that those crimes were supposed to be only in the situations where the original investigation started out as an investigation into child exploitation under chapter 64 of title 13. So you'll see there the new language. So I tried to keep everything the same but just clarify that the, that the only way that it could be used in those additional offenses, which are sexual assault, homicide, or kidnapping was that if they originated with the investigation originated with an investigation into child sexual exploitation. So you'll see online 12 and subsection a. So that's the notwithstanding language for the act last year that put the moratorium in place for facial recognition. So this is creating an exemption to that moratorium and specific authorization for these for the use of facial recognition in these circumstances. And you'll see that that it can be used by law enforcement during a criminal investigation into any of the following offenses, some subject to the limitations of subsection be. So the first one is the sexual exploitation of children, and then subdivision to is the crimes that I just mentioned, provided that the investigation into these offenses originated with an investigation into sexual exploitation of children. And then, Evan, would you mind going to the next page. So in subsection B has further limitations on the use of facial recognition technology, which is that if it's used in the circumstances that are authorized in subsection a. It can only be utilized if law enforcement is in possession of an image of an individual who they believe to be a victim, a potential victim or a suspect in the investigation. It is solely confined to locating images, including videos of that individual within electronic media legally seized by law enforcement in relation to the specific investigation so that was part of it I've just kind of reorganized the structure there to get in the various elements and make it clear that you can't use it in cases of homicide kidnapping or sexual assault. So that originally ties back to the investigation for child sexual exploitation. And then section two is that it's effective on passage. And, and so because of the narrowing of this language as opposed to the way that the bill was introduced I've retitled it so the title does not change until the act actually passed and so the new folks this is just it seems kind of weird little dangly language there at the end. That's not underlined or have a section number but if that's the way we do it is that after passage, the bill would be retitled and after relating to use of facial recognition technology by law enforcement in cases related to sexual exploitation of children. Great. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thanks Evan. Any questions for Michelle we after the break we will be hearing from witnesses but in terms of the language. Any questions for Michelle committee. Nope. Okay. Thank you, Michelle. Not seeing any. Okay, so let's take a break please and come back at 230 and then we'll start with our witnesses on this.