 Good afternoon everybody. I'm very pleased to welcome you to this IAA webinar this afternoon and we're delighted to be joined by Jim Cluce, Secretary-General of the Trans-European Policies Studies Association, Tepsa. He has been a good friend to the IAA and has been generous enough to take time out of his schedule to be with us this afternoon. Tepsa, as most of you will know, is a European network of research institutes and think tanks in the field of European affairs and it has founded in 1974. It has 44 member organisations, including one the IAA, which I'm happy to say, and it stretches among 37 countries. So a very influential network. So Mr Cluce will speak for about 20 to 25 minutes and we will move on then to question and answer with our audience. You'll be able to join the discussion using the Q&A function on Zoom, which you should see on your screens and please feel free to send your questions in throughout the session as they occur to you and when we will come to them once Mr Cluce has concluded his presentation. I would request that you try to keep your questions as brief as possible so that we can get through as many as possible during the event. And just a reminder that today's presentation and the Q&A are both on the record and please feel free to join a discussion on Twitter using the hashtag at IIA and we're also live streaming this afternoon's discussion. So a very warm welcome to all of you who are tuning in via YouTube. Let me now introduce Mr Cluce and then hand over to him. And Jim Cluce was appointed Secretary-General of TEPSA in 2021 following a very influential career in the European institutions, serving as Deputy Director-General for a General and Institutional Affairs at the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU. He previously served as Director for Transatlantic Relations, Human Rights and Counterterrorism with the Council of the EU, as well as head of cabinet for the President of the European Commission, President Santair and of the Commission for Agriculture. He was a former member of the Luxembourg Foreign Ministry where he served in Bonn and Brussels and in Brussels as Deputy Permanent Representative, he played an active role in drafting the Maastricht Treaty. I have to give you some of Jim Cluce's background, academic background because it shows the wide experience he has had. He holds a BA in Russian and linguistics from the University of Reading in the UK, a diploma in Soviet and Eastern Studies from Science Po and a diploma in International Trade from University Paris Nif Dauphine. So against that academic and professional background, Jim, I'll hand over to you to give us a talk on this most enigmatic of topics, strategic autonomy. So Jim, the floor is yours. Thank you very much, Mary and say hello to everybody who are watching, who are watching me. A new specter haunts Europe, the specter of strategic autonomy. Specters conjure up fears, uneasiness, sometimes rejection, isn't strategic autonomy a misguided search for autarchy or protectionism, a vicious attempt at undermining NATO. Specters are also difficult to define. Maybe the best way to understand what we are talking about is to reflect on why the debate arose in the first place. It arose because we lived through a string of crises and because the global environment looks quite threatening. So this gives rise to a feeling among many Europeans that Europe needs to become more resilient, more powerful, more capable to act and yes, more autonomous. I like Daniel Fjott's definition of autonomy. He says autonomy on the one hand is freedom to act and on the other hand is freedom from dependence. If you express it in that way, I think we can all find common ground. I will first look at the lessons to draw from the crises. I will then reflect on what strategic autonomy entails in terms of frame of mind. And finally, I'll consider ways of enhancing strategic autonomy across all the policy fields. The first thing is about the crisis. The list of crises we've gone through over the last years reads like a stroll through dentists in Fjerno. They almost all arose outside of the European Union, but they hit the European Union extremely hard. They challenged our unity. They revealed flaws and weaknesses in our system. They made us feel vulnerable and they obliged us to react, to find responses on the hoove, as you say, and to improvise. Interestingly, one of my favorite political authors nowadays is Luc Van Midler. The book he recently published, the French title is exactly that Une Europe qui improvise. I think he's very right on this. In a way, we have been practicing strategic autonomy a bit like Molière, Monsieur Jourdin, faisait de la pause, sans s'en rendre compte, without noticing that we did it. I will quickly walk you through the various crises and looking at what they revealed and how the European Union responded in telegraphic style, of course. The subprime crisis or the sovereign debt crisis, first of all showed something which we knew from the beginning, that there was an imbalance between the economic part of EMU and the monetary part. The economic part only coordinated, very decentralized, the monetary part centralized. The second thing which the crisis revealed was that some of the things we had to do, the principles we introduced for political reasons at the time of Maastricht, like the no bail out clause, could cause real problems in a situation like this one, because it obliged the German government to say we can only intervene as a last resort, and that meant if the euro is in crisis, which of course could have become and nearly became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thirdly, we found out that the ECB had many constraints and for instance could not play the role of lender of last resort. So what happened in the crisis, the response was quite interesting. The first thing is we created the EFSF and ESM, which were mechanisms to help countries in trouble. We beefed up economic coordination massively. You will remember Sixpack, the two-pack, the fiscal compact treaty, and of course the ECB interpreted its mandate in a very large and flexible way. They started intervening to buy public bonds on the secondary markets, then they explicitly went into quantitative easing and then of course you all remember Draghi's famous phrase that they would do whatever is required. Then we have a number of external crises, Georgia, Ukraine, Syria and all of that very quickly. There our problem was the following, a certain absence of leadership, an absence of strategic debate within the EU, too much of a gap between the EU and the national levels and rivalries between the member countries. The response there has not been very systematic but I thought it was interesting in 2008 with the Georgian crisis that Tsarkozy, who happened then to chair the European Council, instrumentalised the European Council to play a quick and leading role, which was actually quite positive, which shows that if you use the institutions you can actually do something with them. Another interesting development of course was Minsk because in the Minsk process we in a way delegate our policy to lead nations, France and Germany. Thirdly we adopted sanctions against Russia. Now the sanctions proved that we could find unity even with diverging views. The question arises however whether sanctions is always the right policy. I'll come back to that later. The third big crisis I want to mention is migration, which led to a loss of control of our external borders. It showed that the Dublin system of asylum was a fair weather system and it also showed that we did not have a comprehensive concept of migration and asylum. So what happened again is another leadership of the European Council. The first thing the European Council tried to do was to develop a three-tire concept saying that migration has certain elements. The first one is outside of the European Union, working with countries of transit and origin. The second one is border control and border receptions and the third one is internal reform of the asylum system. The second thing we did is if you look at what happened on the ground is suddenly the union became much more assertive in their relations with the countries of origin and transit. We learned a dose of real politics with the Turkey deal which allowed us to stop some flows of migrants. We beefed up external border control. Frontex became much bigger, has more money, the asylum agency as well. But of course we did and we failed with reforming the asylum and migration policy. We're still working at it. It's one of the big challenges for the future. We have to get it right. Then of course 2016 Brexit and Trump, I take those together, they were major shocks to the system and in many ways a watershed. The reaction was interesting at the time on the part of particularly the European Council. The first one was unity. We had to show that the 27 would not only survive but could manage this, even though we all regretted the exit by the UK. The second reaction was to develop an operational programme of solving issues, the famous Bratislava roadmap and the leaders agenda. And the third reaction was a more theoretical one. It was a global CFSP strategy in 2016 and more importantly tuned 2019 strategic agenda adopted by the European Council, which very interestingly contained language we would not have used a few years before, like autonomy, like resilience, like assertiveness, like reciprocity in trade and things like that. Then of course came the COVID crisis. We're still in the midst of it unfortunately, which revealed a certain lack of preparedness, but of course that we share with many countries in the world, a challenge to our governance system, over dependence on China and India for basic drugs, a need for massive investment and of course very harsh effects on our economies. Again, the leadership of the European Council was absolutely instrumental, it was absolutely vital in this respect. The European Council met by video conferences to adopt stopgap measures. For instance, the state aid rules were relaxed by the Commission. There were green lines installed so that the supply chains wouldn't break down, work was done about masks and about vaccines. Five hundred thousand Europeans were repatriated within a few weeks together. Then of course came the famous July package, the 1.8 trillion package over seven respectively three years. I mean the MFF power plus 750 billion of recovery fund. You have to add to this three safety nets for workers, sovereigns and enterprises for 550 billion. You have to add the huge program by the ECB, 1.3 trillion to buy assets and bonds and of course the national spending. And of course in the end there was an interesting development. It's the joint vaccine strategy. Now there we know there are many problems. It could become a major success, it could also turn into the opposite, the jury's out, but I still think that the approach that the member countries accepted to do this together was actually quite path breaking. So in some the crisis taught us the need for unity, the need for a more assertive stance and innovative ways. But all of this was done of course as I said on the hoof in reaction to a crisis against the background of panic, disorder and improvisation. And this brings me to my second part of the conference and that is to look at what strategic autonomy really entails in terms of almost I could say philosophy. Strategic autonomy of course refers to the capacity to act on the global scene, but in order to do that I think we have to draw the lessons from what happened and go from improvisation to a policy framework. There are various things we need. The first one is a better understanding of the modern world. A global player must see the world as it is, not as it would like it to be. The EU rightly prides itself on defending multilateralism, on defending values and we should certainly continue doing this, but it must also recognize that the end of history has not arrived. We had hoped it would and everybody would become like us, post-modern, liberal and all of that, but it hasn't. Instead we see a world that is fierce, sometimes brutal and often hostile, a world where China is becoming more assertive, the United States is becoming less predictable, the UK is going its own path, neighbors like Russia and Turkey are difficult, very hostile at times and very autocratic and Africa as always is struggling to find its way. In this context I would like to recommend you a book I like very much which is by Hans Kriber, which is called The Strong Man, about European encounters with sovereign power. It calls for a lucid assessment of the world we're in. I would also like to mention Pocock, who's calling for Machiavellian moment and maybe Hobbes too, who said that the reputation to have power is power. In other words, you have to not only try to be powerful, you also have to project it if you want to be respected. The second major element is a reflection on the used place on the international chessboard. Where should we be between the US and China? Not an obvious question. How can we reconstruct our partnership with the US? Shall we go back to the future or have a more equal relationship? Can we continue to accept US secondary sanctions? One can have different views on North Stream for instance, and many people have different views, but what I find completely unacceptable is when the Americans start threatening a project like North Stream with secondary or direct sanctions even. How do we want to deal with China and with Russia, with Turkey? What should be our future relationship with the UK? It will be an increasingly important question. We had offered them close cooperation in security, defence and foreign policy, which for the time being, they have not responded positively to, but I'm absolutely convinced that they will come round to this because it's in their interest too. Thirdly, we need an honest assessment of our interests and values and the link between them. We have a tendency to say or we had a tendency to say, our foreign policy is based on values. Well, maybe to some extent, but you cannot just have a foreign policy based on values. You have to look at the balance between interests and values. We need more of a debate. I have always been struck that on Turkey or Russia, we do piecemeal decisions, often sanctions, but it's very difficult to get a real assessment on the pros, the cons, the longer term view and all that. I think we have to learn a lot from that. Let me come to my third part, which is about how to enhance our strategic autonomy. And here, we are obviously not talking merely about foreign policy far from it. Strategic autonomy starts at home. It concerns all our policies. And that is why I think we really need a meaningful analysis of our strengths and weaknesses across the spectrum of policies. We can build on what we've done over the last few years, but we've done it in a haphazard way. We need more systematic approach. I would say in this context, and I'm talking to a think tank and I think also of TAPSA, I think in this area, academic work can really help and work on full side should be enhanced. I think this is a magnificent task for the governments and institutions, and maybe it is a way of bridging this big gap, which in Europe exists between the think tank world and the political or petitioners world. This analysis should lead to operational conclusions at some stage. Now, let me just briefly and again, telegraphically say a few words about some of the policies. I start with climate change, which is both an existential issue for all of us, but it's also a geostrategic one. Now, this is an area where the union has assets. We have been leading in it for some time. We have legislation in place. We were instrumental in getting Paris off the ground. We finance about three quarters of the finance money, which is spent in this respect. We have a strong regulation, so we have to, of course, implement our own rules inside, but we also have to work, I hope now, with the Biden administration, but also with the Chinese. It's absolutely essential. Otherwise, we're not going to get anywhere. Second point, digital Europe. Now, there's a lot to be said about this. We are very proud about our regulation. We are proud about the regulation on data protection. I am proud too, but I sometimes tend to think that we have the regulation, and we have the protection, and the Chinese have the data, or the Americans. I think we also have to work on data. We need a much more comprehensive approach to digital. If you look at the 21st IT companies in the world, there's not one European. We're being increasingly dominated by the GAFAM or the BATX Chinese. I really need, I think we need European champions. Of course, if you say that some people say, yeah, they mean French and German ones, but so it's for the French and the Germans to show that they think European. Single market, a big asset we have, a huge asset. You are probably familiar with the book on Brussels Effect by Anu Bradford. Of course, it gives us an important head start, but we should also be honest with ourselves, both in the digital area and in services. The single market is far from being used. I'm shocked. A few days ago, I tried to get TV programs which had been broadcast in France and to watch them later, and I did all these things, created an account. Then when I tried them, I got a little message saying, you are resident in a country where you are not allowed to watch this. French TV programs in Belgium, we have of the population speaks French. It's absolutely crazy. The only ones who don't seem to have a problem working across Europe are the Americans and the Chinese. We have a lot of work to do here. We also need an industrial policy. We've been talking about this for some time. For a long time, it sounded almost like a bad word, but we need an industrial policy. We have to look at our value chains. We have to look at the issue of rare earth materials, strategic metals. We are all talking about electric cars. The problem is electric cars need a lot of those things, and we are dependent. It varies according to the metal to 75 to 100 percent and very often on China. In trade, we are a superpower. Of course, we have to try and defend the multilateral system whenever possible, but we also have to be able to act autonomously wherever necessary. Migration very quickly. We have to pursue the work. We have to sort out this question of the migration and asylum policy. We have to find the right balance between solidarity and responsibility. One other thing I wanted to mention is the external road of the Euro. I was absolutely shocked when Trump walked out of the nuclear deal with Iran. The Europeans, together with the Brits at the time, stuck together, unity perfect. We defended this deal, but we were absolutely powerless against secondary sanctions by the United States because of the dominance of the dollar. I think that over time, we should draw conclusions from the fact that you have the Euro. We should use it more in our trade, and we should strengthen its external road. Finally, let me say a very quick word on security and defence. I take it as the last point on purpose, because if you start with security and defence and you say strategic autonomy, you immediately run a debate about NATO and half of Europe say, no, we don't want to hear about it. I think we have to look at this. I think over the last few years, we've done quite a bit in terms of strengthening our capabilities and all of that. We have PESCO, which is Structured Corporation. We have a coordinated annual review of defence. We have now the possibility to use EU money via the European Defence Fund and the Peace Facility. We have a discussion about strategic compass. Now, that brings me to an article I want to recommend, which I like very much. It's an article by an academic who's called Sven Bisko, who published this at Agmo in Brussels. It's called EU-NATO Relations, Compass, Concept and Concordat. And what he says is, he says in the next two years, the Europeans will adopt the strategic compass. NATO is redefining its strategic concept. And he said, we need to concordat between the two, which is basically a way of dividing labour and responsibility. It's very clear that territorial defence will remain clearly under NATO lead, but we have to be above our capabilities. So in other words, strategic autonomy cannot mean to convert Article 42.7 into a kind of NATO Article 5 type. But it can be used in building resilience against more general cyber threats, non-military threats and all of that. Expeditionary operations, for instance, in our southern neighbourhood, I clearly, I think the EU should be in the lead, but always with the help of NATO. We had an arrangement with NATO some years ago, Berlin Plus, but it was a very restrictive one. And I think it should be reviewed. So I think we need a fresh look at all of this also to prevent people from thinking that if you talk about strategic autonomy, you rip up the whole transatlantic relationship. My conclusions are the following very quickly. The present debate arose out of necessity. Because of the crisis and the complicated world, the strategic autonomy concept was a way of trying to respond to this situation. It's very important to repeat what strategic autonomy is not. It's not an attack on NATO. It's not autarky nor protectionism. That would be completely crazy on the part of an organisation as integrated as we are in the global order. My third point is that the EU has been more resilient than what many people feared and has adapted, but has done so in a haphazard and improvising way. The time has come to change gear and to set up a real policy framework. This will take time. We need a new approach adapted to the world as it is, not as we dreamed that it is. A hard-headed analysis of our strength and weaknesses, operational conclusions from that. And I would add maybe one word here. We need a look at our governance. We have a very decentralized systems. We have 27 heads of state in government. We have many presidents all over the place. We have to look at this. Leading role of the European Council is obvious in this area. We need more of a Team Europe approach. We need a much closer link in foreign policy between what the member countries do and what we do via Brussels. We need links between the policies, between agriculture and defence trade and all of this. We should look into the more use of lead nations like Minsk. Enhanced cooperation could be from time to time also a solution. Maybe we should create a defence council. I don't know. I suppose Ireland won't be very favorable to that, but we should look at it. I would personally even envisage creating some form of EU security council, but that's probably for the longer term. All of this, and this is my final remark, can in my view be done within our present institutional framework, which reflects what we are, a union of states and people with different legitimacies. This does not exclude adjustments. For instance, if we decide that as a follow-up to the Covid crisis, we want to create a union of health, a health union, well, we might have to change something in the treaty that we can always do, but we do not need an institutional revolution. Our diversity is sometimes a bit of a problem, but for me in the long term, it remains a major asset. And so I would say that in the light of what happened particularly over the last year, I am pretty confident that the EU has the potential not only to survive, but to thrive in the future in this modern, difficult world. Thank you very much.