 Good morning. I really appreciate you all coming. It's a great honor for me to introduce an old friend, I mean a friend of many years. He's not old, but he's genuinely exactly the kind of person that we want to have talking about issues at CSIS because he is an absolute true expert on the situation that we'll be discussing today, which is the ITLOS case that's before the court. And Paul Reichler, who has joined us today, is an expert. I'll introduce him in a little bit more detail soon. For those of you sitting back, please fill in at the table. We'd really like to fill all these seats. I think some say reserved, but you're welcome to take these seats, please. It's nice to have everybody up at the table. And for those of you who started your day with a visit to CSIS's old building at 18th and K, sorry about that. We're trying to reprogram everybody's heads that this is indeed the new building, and it's just a great pleasure to have all of you here today. Let me go straight to the topic today and introduce Paul Reichler. He is a partner and co-chair of the International Litigation and Arbitration Department at a Boston-based law firm called Foley-Hoag. Paul has specialized in the representation of sovereign states and disputes with other states and with foreign investors for more than a quarter of a century. He's part of a select group of lawyers with extensive experience in litigating on behalf of sovereign states before the International Court of Justice in the Hague and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea in Hamburg. Among many other cases and clients that Paul has dealt with, he has particular experience representing and advising sovereign states and land and maritime boundary disputes with neighboring states, and these include Nicaragua against Columbia, Bangladesh against Myanmar, and several others that he may reference today. He served as a mediator appointed by the Secretary General of the Organization of American States and Land and Maritime Boundary Disputes between Guatemala and Belize, and I can tell you firsthand when I was starting, actually my business years ago, we actually shared some space with Paul and he is a brilliant tactician, a good lawyer, a fantastic thinker, a very strategic person, and also just a wonderful, a wonderful guy. So please join me in welcoming Paul Reichler and ask you to take it away, Paul. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ernie. I feel like I shouldn't say anything because there's no way I can live up to that. It is a great pleasure for me to be here with you today and it's an honor for me to have been chosen along with my law firm to represent the Republic of the Philippines in its dispute with the People's Republic of China. I plan to speak for 20 minutes or so to give you some background on the issues and the reasons for the case that was brought by the Philippines and then hold the balance of time for questions. So I find that that's usually more interesting to the audience and more lively and I know that at CSIS it's a very sophisticated crowd so I'm sure there will be some very interesting questions. The case is about this. What you see on the screen is a depiction of the South China Sea and you see the red dashes around the perimeter of the South China Sea. To the north is China. To the east is the Philippines. To the west is Vietnam. And the southern rim of the South China Sea is Malaysia, Brunei, Malaysia again, Indonesia, and then Malaysia again. But I ask you to focus on the dashes. This is the so-called nine-dash line that has aroused such interest and controversy. China first asserted this claim in several years ago in a letter to the UN Secretary General opposing the submissions, a joint submission of Malaysia and Vietnam to the UN Commission on the Limits for the Continental Shelf seeking to establish extended continental shelf rights within the South China Sea. And from the moment that this letter surfaced in international discourse it has aroused a great deal of debate and discussion. What China claimed at the time in its letter to the UN Secretary General was that everything land and sea encompassed within the nine-dash line is area over which China exercises sovereignty or sovereign rights. That area encompasses between 70 and 75% of the South China Sea. In the case of the Philippines, just welcome Ambassador Acuisha of the Philippines, in the case of the Philippines the nine-dash line comes within 50 miles, 50 nautical miles of the island of Luzon to the north you see it marked in black on the map and it comes within 30 miles of the southern or southwestern Philippine island of Palawan right over here just north of the Sulu Sea. Now at its farthest extent the nine-dash line is more than 800 miles from China's mainland coast. It extends between 350 and 850 miles from China's mainland coast and as I said if this were a fence it would fence the Philippines in within 50 miles or 30 miles of its coasts. The Philippines position of the Philippines is this. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to which both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of the Philippines are parties, a coastal states entitlements are prescribed as an entitlement to a 12-mile territorial sea over which the coastal state is virtually sovereign. It's almost like land and out to a 200-mile exclusive economic zone and continental shelf and what that means is within 200 miles of its coast a state has an exclusive entitlement to the resources. The living resources, the fish in the water and the non-living resources under the seabed, that's the continental shelf whether it's hydrocarbons or some other minerals. The Law of the Sea Convention which in this regard reflects customary international law. So even though for example there are a few states, we know which one is the main one, that are not parties to the Law of the Sea Convention, they are still bound by these principles because they have been adjudicated to reflect customary international law which is applicable to all states. But in this case we're talking about two states that are parties to the convention. So there's an entitlement to exclusive use of the resources out to 200 miles. And as you can see China's claim conflicts with this by claiming sovereignty or sovereign rights, not only more than 200 but more than 800 miles from its mainland coast and within 200 miles but not only that within 50 or 30 miles of the Philippines coasts, you have China claiming entitlements which are not authorized under UNCLOS, under the convention, which overlap with the 200 mile entitlements of the Philippines which are indeed authorized under UNCLOS. The same could be said for Vietnam on the opposite side. Now so from the Philippines perspective, and this is what the main claim in the arbitration is, that China's nine dash line claim, that is its claim of sovereignty and sovereign rights extending far beyond its entitlements under the 1982 United Nations Convention is inconsistent with that convention, unlawful, and it constitutes a trespass or a violation of the Philippines' rights within 200 miles as set forth in the convention. Now this is not simply theoretical. In fact, China has been in the hands of the Philippines and has objected to and prevented the Philippines from enjoying its rights under the convention within its 200 mile exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. There is an area called Reed Bank which is up around here, and this is the area which is within 100 miles from the Philippines coast of Palawan which reports say has a major hydrocarbon potential. But the Philippines until now has been unable to exploit this because of China's objections, indeed because of China's threats that it will not allow the Philippines or Philippines licensee to exploit that potential resources. Similarly, China has prevented the Philippines from exercising fishing rights throughout much of its 200 mile zone. So what the Philippines is seeking first and foremost in the arbitration, and I will come back in a few minutes to talk about the arbitration process. Sorry, I will come back in a few moments and really conclude my remarks without going into boring detail for you, just outlining the legal basis of the arbitration under the convention and the process as it has developed to this point. But fundamentally what the Philippines seeks is a declaration that all of the rights and entitlements in the South China Sea including the rights to the resources living and non-living are governed by the UN convention on the law of the sea. And that under that convention the nine dash line is inconsistent and unlawful. The Philippines is entitled to the full enjoyment of its 200 mile exclusive economic zone and continental shelf and the resources located therein and that it should be free to exploit without interference by China those resources especially where China has no corresponding entitlement. Now there are some other issues in the case which are worth mentioning and those concern the status of the insular features islands and rocks within the South China Sea. I'm going to see if I can operate this successfully. What we have circled here is three insular groups if you will in the South China Sea. To the northwest the Paracel Islands are not involved in the arbitration. They're in dispute between China and Vietnam but the Philippines does not claim rights in the sea extending that far. Scarborough Shoal though is a key element in the case. Let me see if I can go right to the photo. There it is I think I have a better slide for that. This is Scarborough Shoal or a piece of it. Scarborough Shoal consists of six features like this one essentially rocks that protrude above the water at high tide, barely above the water at high tide. This is the largest of the six features. Now sovereignty is disputed between the Philippines and China but in under the law of the sea convention an arbitral tribunal that is constituted does not have jurisdiction to determine sovereignty over land features and that includes islands or insular formations. However what the Philippines has asked of the tribunal is that it determined the status of this feature under the convention. That is is it a true island which would generate like a state with a coastline, a 200 mile exclusive economic zone and continental shelf or is it what the convention refers to as a rock. An insular feature that is above water at high tide which is a definition of an island under the convention but which is so insignificant that it cannot sustain human habitation under the convention. Or economic life of its own. I don't think much more needs to be said about whether this feature can sustain human habitation or an economic life of its own. It is barely big enough to support the Philippine flag. Now what is the significance of this? Let's go back. This is where I had difficulty and I might need some help going backward. Is Elka here? In any event I don't want to. Well this is good enough. You can see Scarborough Shoal and where it is. Scarborough Shoal is about 120 miles off the coast of Luzon. Therefore it is within the Philippines exclusive economic zone and continental shelf which would extend another 80 miles beyond. You can see where that blue line is, where the blue area is. The blue area and the blue lines that surround it are the 200 mile lines from the different coasts around the different coastlines of the coastal states that border the South China Sea. So it is well within 200 miles of the Philippines. And if this feature is a rock entitled only to 12 miles, then what would be in dispute between China and the Philippines would be a circle with a 24 mile diameter, a 12 mile radius, 24 mile diameter around Scarborough Shoal. And all of the waters not inside that circle would be part of the Philippines exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. And all that would remain disputed would be the waters, the feature and the waters within that circle. So for the Philippines it is important to have this feature classified as a rock rather than an island because most of the surrounding waters then would be subject to the exclusive entitlement of the Philippines and only a small part of the sea would be subject to dispute, ultimately to be resolved whenever sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal is determined. Now in the, I'm sorry, I want to go back again. Can you do it from there? Let's go back again, one more, that's it. These are part of the islands in the Spratly group. Scarborough Shoal is not part of the Spratlys. The Spratlys is to the south of Scarborough Shoal and you can see very close, the closest, most of them are very close to Palawan, the Philippine island. The Spratlys are about 140 different features. The vast majority of them are underwater. And at all times. Another significant portion of them are underwater except at low tide and they are called low tide elevations. There are relatively few of them that constitute true islands in the sense that they are above water at high tide. And a very, very tiny number of those even have vegetation on them. Now the Spratlys have been the subject of contention among a number of states. All of the Spratlys are claimed by China. All are claimed by Vietnam. A number of them are claimed by the Philippines and some, a few are claimed by Malaysia and one or two by Brunei. In the third element of the Philippines claim, that is the focal point being first, the Nine Dash Line. Second focal point being Scarborough Shoal. And third, the Spratlys. And here, similar to the objective in regard to Scarborough Shoal, what the Philippines is attempting to establish is that these features do not generate more than a 12-mile entitlement. That is, they are, under the terms of the convention, rocks. They do not support human habitation or habitat. They do not support the economic life of their own. And if, again, they have 12-mile entitlements because they are rocks, as opposed to 200-mile entitlements because they are islands capable of sustaining human life or human habitation or economic life, then their significance diminishes. And if they are all confined within 12-mile circles, then the reach of these islands or features does not extend very far. And again, this is a little more complicated than Scarborough Shoal. We're only dealing with one feature. But if these features generate no more than 12 miles, then the, there's a much larger area within 200 miles of land. And that's the area of the Philippines that is not covered by any of these circles and that would fall to the exclusive entitlement of the Philippines. Now, because there are so many features in this case, and it might be too complicated to put them all before the arbitral tribunal, the Philippines has identified seven of them that are occupied by China and claimed by both the Philippines and China, and asked the tribunal to rule on the status of each of those seven features. In fact, four of the seven features are underwater at all times. They're not only not islands, they're not low tide elevations, they are shallow reefs. As such, they are considered under the Convention and under international law to be part of the seabed. And they belong to whichever state has rights over the continental shelf. They cannot be seized and occupied by another state. You don't acquire title by occupation of an underwater feature. That's four of the features, including mischief reef, which I'll come to in a moment. And there are three features occupied by China in this area that look very similar to Scarborough Shoal. They're quite obviously rocks. So the Philippines has asked the tribunal, in the case of all seven features occupied by China, to rule that, well, in the case of the three features occupied by China that look like Scarborough Shoal and stick out above the water at high tide, to rule that they have only 12 mile entitlements. And as to the four features that are permanently underwater, that these are not islands or rocks, and they generate no maritime entitlement. So the waters above them belong to whoever has the exclusive economic zone, and since they would be within 200 miles of the Philippines, they would appertain to the Philippines. Let me show you mischief reef, which is appropriately named. This is an underwater feature that's about 100 miles off, well, what you see is more than the underwater feature here. But underneath this structure, which has been built on top of it, there is a reef that is permanently underwater. This is about 100 miles off the coast of the Philippines and more than 600 miles from the mainland coast of China. In 1995, China seized mischief reef. Even though under the law, it is part of the continental shelf, as I said, it's not an island, it's part of the seabed, and well within the 200 mile continental shelf entitlement of the Philippines. This naturally caused a great deal of protest and led to discussions between China and the ASEAN states. Little by little, China began constructing on top of mischief reef. This is only one of several sites at mischief reef, but what they have done is they built a barracks so that they could station military personnel there, a helipad so that they can resupply with helicopters, and gun emplacements so that they could defend mischief reef. Because of the great disparity in military power, the Philippines was able to do little more than protest and convene its neighbors and engage in discussions, but the result has been an expansion of the facility by China. This is one of the features that is included in the arbitration since this is an underwater feature, and a state cannot transform an underwater feature into an island by building on top of it. This feature, the Philippines claims, is part of the Philippines' continental shelf, and China is there illegally. After the arbitration was filed in January, China sent a rather large flotilla to an island of the Philippines. Another underwater feature, about 30 miles to the east, also within 100 miles of Palawan, the Philippine island, called Second Tamasho, or Ionjin Sho. Although China has not yet constructed anything there, they have made public pronouncements that it is theirs, and they have told the Philippines that no Philippine fisherman may come, no Philippine naval vessels may come, essentially cordoned it off, again expanding. I think one of their generals referred to this in a magazine article as the cabbage strategy, but there is a risk of further expansion because there are many underwater shoals and reefs in this area, even closer to the Philippines, and of course a risk given China's behavior to this point, occupying and fortifying mischief reef, now moving on to Second Tamasho, that there's no indication that they will stop, or if so, where. Now, the Philippines had spent many years, actually negotiations, go back to 1995, mainly bilateral, some multilateral, and at no point was any progress made in reaching any kind of a solution bilaterally. China simply held to the position that China has sovereignty and sovereign rights within the nine-dash line, and that includes sovereignty over all the insular features, reefs, shoals, caves, rocks, within the nine-dash line, and there's no flexibility in that position in the negotiations. So the Philippines was faced with a very difficult situation. That was getting worse. In April 2012, Chinese ships surrounded Scarborough Shoal and excluded Philippine fishing vessels. Tentative agreement was reached that both sides would remove their vessels. The Philippines did remove its vessels, China did not remove its, and China remains in de facto possession of Scarborough Shoal. And then in the spring of this year, China moved in on Second Thomas Shoal to the south in part of the Spratlys. So the Philippines was faced with a very serious situation. One, it could not exploit the resources in the areas to which it has entitlement under international law, including the UN Convention. Two, negotiations had gotten nowhere, and there was no indication of any softening in China's position. In fact, all indications were the opposite after the incidents at Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and Ionjin Shoal this year or Second Thomas Shoal this year. Confronting China militarily was not a viable option. The Philippines doesn't have the kind of economic or commercial influence vis-a-vis China to cause a change in its behavior, and the options were limited. But the one option that appeared was the law, because in a court or before an arbitral tribunal, a small state that is weaker militarily, economically, commercially has the opportunity, at least, to compete on equal terms with a much larger, more powerful state. And there are, there's a growing number of precedents for this, particularly under the Law of the Sea Convention. Diana and Suriname in their arbitration, Mauritius and the U.K. in their arbitration, Bangladesh and Myanmar, and Bangladesh and India, which I'm going over to the Hague to argue next week. In all of these cases, we have smaller, less powerful states unable to do anything to secure what they considered to be their rights under international law in negotiations with states that were more powerful or larger militarily, or economically, or both, and the smaller state resorted to arbitration under the Law of the Sea Convention. And that is what the Philippines did here. Now, just a couple more words on this, and I will, this is Article 286 of the Convention, and it provides that, just to interpret it a little bit for you, where the parties have exchanged views on a dispute without resolving it, then either one can submit the dispute to third-party dispute resolution under any of the mechanisms provided for in the Convention. And in the next article, Article 287, it provides that they may take the dispute by agreement to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, which is what Bangladesh and Myanmar did, or to the International Court of Justice, or to an arbitral tribunal that they would constitute by mutual agreement. But failing agreement to go to any of these forums, the fallback, the default mechanism is paragraph five at the bottom. If the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same procedure for the settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to arbitration in accordance with Annex Seven, unless the parties agree otherwise. So, what this means is, if one party initiates a dispute under the Convention, the other party does not want to agree to any particular forum, that does not frustrate or stop the arbitration. The claimant state has the right to take it to arbitration under the rules specified in one of the Annexes to the Convention, and the respondent state, the other state, is obligated to participate, is obligated by that choice, and is obligated by the decision of the arbitral tribunal, I should say. Let me see. I don't think there's anything else here that I want to go into right now. So, under Annex Seven, that is how the arbitration was initiated under those procedures. The way it works is the claimant state appoints an arbitrator. Bangladesh appointed a very distinguished international jurist who's a judge on the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea from Germany, Judge Rudiger Wolfram, and then the other state has the right to appoint an arbitrator, and then the states try to agree on three neutral arbitrators, including the President. If they're unable to agree, the Convention provides that those arbitrators will be appointed by the President of Itlos, the President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg. China took the position from the very beginning that they would not participate in the arbitration, so they did not appoint an arbitrator, and one was appointed in lieu of their choice by the President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and then they refused to negotiate over the other three arbitrators who likewise were appointed by the President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. We have an arbitral tribunal, I've been before many, that is clearly one of the most esteemed, expert, respected group of Law of the Sea experts that could possibly have been assembled. It's provided over by Judge Thomas Mensa of Ghana, who was a President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. It has Judge Wolfram, who I mentioned. It has Judge Jean-Pierre Cotte from France, another esteemed expert and judge on the Itlos Tribunal. The Polish Judge Paulak from the Itlos Tribunal is also a member appointed by the President of the Itlos Tribunal, and the fifth member is a very, very distinguished Dutch expert Alfred Soons, who's the Director of the Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea. It's a very serious, very prominent, very expert tribunal. China still has refused to participate, but the Annex 7 provides in Article 9 that in the event one of the parties refuses to participate, that does not frustrate or stop the arbitration. It proceeds. The members of the tribunal have a particular burden of establishing to their own satisfaction that the claims of the claimant state are supported by facts and law. They cannot simply enter a default judgment, as might happen in a national court in the United States, so it's still a rigorous procedure. Article 11 provides that the award, the judgment of the arbitral tribunal is final, it's not appealable, and it is binding. It's obligatory on all parties as a matter of international law. To this point, the tribunal has met its established rules of procedure, and it has set a schedule, which requires the Philippines to submit its written pleading, what we call its memorial, its arguments on the facts and the law, and supporting documentation by the 30th of March 2014. So the Philippine legal team is hard at work on that as we speak. After that, the tribunal has reserved judgment as to what the next steps will be. It will give every opportunity for China to change its mind and participate. It will keep the door open for as long as possible, but ultimately it will proceed to consider the Philippines claims, its evidence, and its legal arguments, and ultimately render a judgment. We expect that that judgment to be rendered sometime in 2015, probably by the middle of 2015. It will be binding on the Philippines, and it will be binding on China. Whether China adheres to it is an entirely different question, maybe one that some of you have comments about, but right now our task is to present the claims to the tribunal and to obtain the relief that the Philippines has requested. And with that, I will turn it back over to you, and I'm sure we'll invite your question. I will. Thank you, Paul. That was fantastic. And I want to start with a question, but just to get everybody ready, if you have questions, please identify yourself and your affiliation and ask the question. I'd like to start with a question of how would it be enforced? How would the judgment be enforced if China disagrees with the judgment, and if it were awarded to the Philippines? Well, it's, of course, a very good question, and it's not something that is, how can I say, unanticipated by the Philippines. There's no Pasi, there's no police force, there's no sheriff who might be ordered by a local judge to go and make the defendant comply with the order. It is largely a question of whether a state that is subject to a judicial order, or an arbitral award, chooses to comply or not. But having said that, I should point out, number one, that in 95% or more of cases decided by the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, or arbitral tribunals that have been convened for interstate disputes, in at least 95% of those cases, the states that are, quote, unquote, the losing party comply. We see this also in investor state arbitrations, although the compliance rate may be a little bit lower, but still, it's a little lower. Still, in the vast majority of investor state arbitrations under bilateral or multilateral investment treaties, which may involve judgments of hundreds of millions of dollars, in the vast majority of these cases, the states comply. The question is, if there's nobody who can force, if there's no army, there's no police who can force a state to comply, why did they do it in the vast majority of cases? And I think that part of the explanation is that there is a heavy price to pay for a state that defies an international court order or a judgment of an arbitral tribunal that is seen, that is recognized in the international community, as legitimate, as fair, as correct, as appropriate. There's a price to be paid for branding yourself as an international outlaw, as a state that doesn't respect, that doesn't comply with international law. There is something to be said for soft power and for the ability, the component of soft power that is composed of a state's ability to defend its actions as legal in the international system, as explaining and defending itself as respectful of international norms. It becomes an important part of a state's ability to influence other states. Now, it is important, therefore, not only for the Philippines to obtain a judgment in its favor, but for that judgment to be seen as impeccable in terms of its integrity, its honesty, its fairness, and its legal correctness. It may be that it takes some time before China adopts a more flexible position, but it's not unreasonable to think, at least I would say, it's not unreasonable to think, that in the ultimate resolution of this dispute or these disputes or parts of these disputes, the fact that the Philippines has a legal judgment in its favor that's recognized internationally as valid and binding and legitimate and correct, will play some role in the evolutionary process toward an acceptable solution. I'm Larry Nicks from CSIS. A very interesting talk, Mr. Reichler. I have two questions. First, on the definition of these above water objects or whatever you want to call them, you mentioned rocks and islands. Is this basically the only distinction under the law of the sea between rocks and islands, or are there other classifications as well? Secondly, when this case is heard before the tribunal, will other law of the sea country signatories be able to give testimony or submit briefs to the tribunal? I'm thinking especially of Japan in this case. In response to the first question, Article 121 of the Convention defines an island. An island is a naturally occurring feature that is at least part of which is above water and high tide. Article 121, paragraph 3, says rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life on their own are not entitled to an exclusive economic zone or a continental shelf. So the Article 121 distinguishes between islands being the island and the island between different types of islands. If a rock meets the definition of an island, if it's above water at high tide, but it doesn't get all the rights of an island, doesn't generate all the maritime entitlements, that is beyond 12 miles, of an island that is capable of supporting human habitation or economic life. There are other features. I mentioned a low tide elevation, which is a feature that is above water only at low tide. And there are features like reefs and shoals, which are mainly below, sometimes they dry in patches, but mainly below water even at low tide. It's only an island or a land mass that generates a maritime entitlement. There's an old phrase, the land dominates the sea. What that means to those of us who work on this every day, it means that a state's entitlement in the sea is generated by its land, if it has its coast, so to speak. So if it, and an island is land. So islands generate maritime entitlements just as a large, just as the U.S. Atlantic coast would generate it. And that includes a 200-mile entitlement in terms of continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. But features like rocks only generate 12 miles, features that are not even islands at all have no maritime entitlement. And so there, control over an underwater feature does not give you any rights in the sea. I didn't answer the other question, but I can, can I do that? Whether other states will be able to participate, normally it is, in arbitration there is no opportunity for intervention. And before an international court like ITLOS or the ICJ, there is a right, well there is a procedure for intervention by a third party. Of course it's subject to the discretion of the court to allow it. Normally there is no right to third party intervention in arbitration. However, we, we raised this with the tribunal in the discussion of the rules of procedure in this case. And third party intervention was not precluded by the rules. So we interpret that to mean in this case that the tribunal would consider an application by a third state to either intervene or to submit its comments. And we, we know that there are a number of states in the region that have coasts on the South China Sea that share the Philippines concerns and indeed have the same interpretations of the convention as, as, as the Philippines. And their participation would not be unwelcome. Hi, Mike McDevitt from CNA. To follow up on Larry's question about islands, one of the things that I think many of us who've looked at the South China Sea are have in mind is the issue of many islands that do not have natural water supplies but are occupied like the Vietnamese around 22 and everybody, everybody's squatting on pieces of rock around the South China Sea has a law evolved in a way that would allow you to essentially go ahead and occupy, build a runway, put a desal plant on there and essentially claim then that that can in fact support human habitation or all of these people actually on fools there and squatting on rocks that are, or islands that aren't going to, in a, in a scheme of things pay off. Well, it's a very good question and it has inspired debate in the, among academics who study this, study this issue. I, I think the, the, should point out just as a fact that Vietnam has the same position as the Philippines in regard to the none, that none of these features in the Spratlys, none of them is entitled to more than 12 miles. So they would at most be classified as rocks under the convention. Although there may be some difference of view between the Philippines and, and Vietnam over whether certain low tide elevations are rocks or not, but, but where the Philippines and Vietnam coincide is that nothing in the Spratlys is entitled to more than 12 miles. But the question that you raise is a very good one. I, I think the answer probably is, I wouldn't, I would not say that anybody is on a fool's errand. I wouldn't use that terminology. But, but I, I think that there is a, there is a concept in international law and particularly in regard to issues of sovereignty or status of features called the critical date. And, and once a dispute arises over the status of a feature, any state that unilaterally takes action to enhance its own claims after the dispute has arisen, it is not improving its legal position. Let me put it that way. So I, I think here with the, all of the Spratlys being notoriously disputed, as a legal matter, these artificial installations, whether you're talking about living facilities or desal plants, are not enhancing the rights of any of the states. Okay. And we have a question here. Thank you. My name is Paul Lewis. I work for the Guardian Newspaper. I was interested in the non-participation of China and wondered if you could speak to any other examples where the arbitration tribunal has ruled in which one state has refused to participate and what the consequences have been in terms of perceived legitimacy of that state not participating? This, this is also a very good question. It happens very, very, very rarely. And the, the case that comes immediately to mind is the, is the diplomatic hostages case, the United States against Iran in the, in 1980, that Iran did not appear in that case. The ICJ went ahead and found that it had jurisdiction and that Iran had violated international conventions in its seizure and, and imprisonment, if you will, of U.S. diplomatic and consular personnel. And that decision, that judgment by the court was widely recognized as legitimate. And, and indeed it may have, I, I, this is a question of personal opinion, so I, I can't give you concrete proof, but I think many who were involved at the time would say that the ICJ judgment did play a role in the ultimate negotiation and, and agreement which was brokered by the Algerians. There have been a few other cases. There was another one involving Iran in the early 1950s, U.K. against Iran, the Anglo-American oil case. Iran did not appear, initially the court found it had primate fascist jurisdiction, but then decided it did not have jurisdiction and vacated its, its earlier ruling. But these are, these are, of course you have the Nicaragua against the United States. The United States did appear both to oppose Nicaragua's request for provisional measures and it did appear to challenge the jurisdiction of the court. After the court, this is the ICJ, decided that it did have jurisdiction and proceeded to the merits. The United States did not appear for the merits of the case. The court proceeded to enter a judgment and while there may be some sectors in Washington that continued to argue about it, the rest of the world and in fact a lot of informed and academic opinion in the United States considers that judgment to be a landmark and classic in, in international law. So there are very, very, very few examples of this because states do participate, but it's always a danger to the system when a major state like the United States in 1984, but when a major state that, that especially, well, a major power defies the international legal order. And what we have seen, I don't, I don't know if there is a connection or not, but an argument can be made that there is. In, in really the very next case brought under the UN convention after Philippines-China was Netherlands against the, against Russia over the seizure of the Arctic sunrise and the holding of the, of the prisoners, the crew as prisoners. And the Netherlands, it brought it as an arbitration, but under the convention you can seek provisional measures from the tribunal in Hamburg pending the establishment of the arbitral tribunal and the Russians refused to appear. And I, I question if, if China hadn't done this a few months earlier, would the Russians have wanted to be the first? And my answer to that is probably not. When Georgia sued Russia over the 2008 invasion of Georgia under the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination because of the ethnic cleansing that the Russians carried out, Russia appeared. They opposed the request for provisional measures which were issued by the court. They opposed jurisdiction and they won. And I would have assumed they would, they might have done the same thing here had it not been for China's example. Thank you very much Mark Rosen from CNA. What will be the precedential effect of this? Will there be a written opinion? My understanding is that arbitral tribunal decisions are sources of international law under the statute of the International Court of Justice. But I'd like your view on that. And then also to the extent that you get a favorable ruling, would that be the legal basis for so-called provisional measures under the statute for the at-lose to get something akin to a restraining order if China was to prevent the Philippines from developing resources within their EEZ? Also very good questions. The, technically speaking, an arbitral award is binding only between the parties to the case. However, these awards in interstate cases usually issued by very prestigious world-class experts, legal experts on the law of the sea, become published. And they are cited in other cases. The International Court of Justice, as you said, cites arbitral awards as well as its own decisions when it issues opinions in support of its judgments. Arbitral tribunals cite other arbitral tribunals. And especially if you have a tribunal with people like Mensa, Kot, Wolfram, Paulak, Fred Soones, one would expect a very, very well-reasoned opinion. One would expect that anyway from five arbitrators like that. You can be sure in a case like this, which is going to receive a lot of attention and a lot of scrutiny, they're going to be extremely careful to issue an award which is very, very carefully and thoroughly justified. And I think it will be cited frequently in other cases. It will be taken as a statement, as an interpretation of the law. It presents some novel questions, but some questions which are rather clear or should be clearly answered under the very clear and expressed terms of the convention. So I think it will have a huge impact on the international legal community and hopefully on the international community in general. And hopefully that will create the kind of environment which over time will permit China as it evolves to become more of a law cognizant country to incorporate, to digest, and to find a way to accommodate. When I say it's evolution toward a law cognizant country, there was a time nobody thought that China would ever comply with adverse WTO awards. But it's doing that largely. So the world isn't static, China isn't static, and there's reason to believe that over time and with persistent diplomacy and support from the international community, if an award is issued that favors the Philippines, it will have some impact. Now, as to going to ITLOS, let me say, it's a very interesting idea for provisional measures, some sort of restraining order. It's not one that we have had occasion to study yet, and for that reason I would be hesitant to offer an opinion now without fully knowing what I'm talking about. But it's a very interesting idea. Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in thanking Paul. And I think we would all agree, Paul, we're going to ask you to come back from time to time. Now that I know where you are. We've been very embarrassing here talking about the South China Sea if I couldn't even find it through Diamond Avenue after going to 18th and K. But I made it.