 I came under severe attack in the interim for not addressing or not recognizing questions from the audience. So I am going to recognize questions from the audience. I should warn you, however, two things. First of all, there are microphones circulating. And the second is that with the brightness of the lights, I can't see very well. So you'll have to raise your hand high. And I think it's, is it, Daniel, does someone have a microphone over here? We do have microphones. Yeah, okay. Thank you. Please identify yourself, Daniel. Tell me what it's from. And I'll hook up with the first panel. What I think has been missing prominently in the first panel was the military component ingredient of strategizing in the global space. It may be when it comes to international trade, trade benefits fine with this logic. But when there is such a clear shift of power in the global space in China, I mean, look how much we focus on China. It's like China is the economic for everybody, primarily the United States. And it may be that there is much more than trade and economic logic. It's military is the balance of power. And in this is the case, it's not only Trump, there could be also the military establishment. So I think it's much more at stake. Secondly, what's also surprising is you have not mentioned, and I'm talking about the first panel as well, climate change. That's more of an existential threat than, I don't know, artificial intelligence not being able to cope with labor dislocation. So this is also something we should pay attention to. And I would have loved the first panel to address these issues. Well, you have a second panel. Would anybody like to address either of those issues? The power shift seemed, or the notion that this is a broader shift in power seems relevant to certainly to the WTO and also to Japan's position. If you have anything you'd like to say about that, Carl or Ito? Okay, we are caught also in this struggle between the US and China. But of course we have no military aspects in this, but I would like to say that our understanding is, or my understanding is that the Chinese internal powers will do whatever is necessary to improve the fate of people internally. This is how they get the legitimacy for staying in power. So I think the military power is only an annex to trying to improve the lot of the Chinese people. It's just a military system, but I'd like to just mention the very related issues. When I was talking to the American politician, not Mr. Trump, more just also Trump, what he said is the tax on export of the car, say, to the United States only 2.5 percent. And the telephone to China is something like 20 to 25 percent. And when Chinese companies make investment in the United States, they can, but when American companies do invest in the United States, in China, they can't have more than 50 percent of the share and so on and so forth. So there seems to be a very difficult conflict between the two big countries. Now if you look back just international trading system in the past, it is more or less just the system among the developed countries. They have a negotiation. And they are very nice to other developing countries to provide just lower tariff and so forth. But when the developing country or emerging country starts challenging the order of that country and system, then there's conflict. We had many experience in Japan for the trade restrictions and forced expansion on the import and so forth. So in the case of the Japanese process of history of adjusting our system to the western type of the liberal, but now because China becomes so big and it is so conflicting with the traditional system, so I think it's very difficult to solve the problem. And then comes just the power issue is very much related to that. I can't address the climate change issue, but I think that in some sense the rise of China is at the root of many of the issues, let's not call them problems because I don't blame China for the problems, but the fact that China has become such an extraordinarily important part of the international economy has had a whole range of effects both domestically and internationally and helps explain why we're seeing such disruption in both domestic and international politics, militarily and economically. So I think you're right to focus on that, but I want to get to the next question over here. Thank you. In fact, my question is for those who don't speak French, you'll have to put on your... Sorry, I don't speak English. That's all right. I don't speak very well English. I prefer to speak French. That's fine. That's fine. All right. Yeah. Patrick, you don't need to... He's going to speak in French, so for those who don't speak French. Yes. No. In fact, my question is more relative to the first panel, but it has a very strong incidence on the second. My friend Thierry, in his intervention, has a little bit opened up a track by wanting an enlargement of the debate, of a depth of the question. So I wonder, by listening to the different friends, the different analysts, if we are not hit by a little bit of shyness, that is to say, if in the critical analysis we may not have to go a little further. And I ask myself the question if this shyness is not illustrative of another question a little deeper. I explain myself. We are, in fact, in my sense, the geopolitical dimension takes an extremely important weight. And then there are worlds that come that we cannot ignore more complex questions. I sum up. The protagonists are no longer the same, because the fear is to believe that we can replace the old USSR, China, for a bipolarity, for a head-to-head, and the problem would be settled. We would analyze the potential, the capacity of the United States and those of China. It seems to me that the question does not go like that, because this one recoups the fact that there is a sort of, it's like the treatment of the economic crisis world. We are convinced that there needs to be adjustments and we avoid questions that are certainly deeper. In my sense, there are worlds that come and that we do not have to ignore at all. I explain myself. The protagonists, China, are totally inserted into the global trade. 380% increase between 2000 and 2009. It retains 23% of the American population. The USA themselves are no longer the leader of a world that had the almost monopoly of technological production, nuclear dissolution, the right to finance. And so we are manifestly on a world that is totally in a mutation, with obviously the question of lending, but above all a major coincidence between the global economic crisis, which has fundamental effects. The end of the cycle of all the big questions of technological process for the world, whether it be on the ecological issues mentioned by my friend, Prime Minister Roumain, etc. And so an eminence of political thought, a weakening of the politics. And there we are in a totally different space that will also impact the instrumentation that the OMC, that are all the others. So will we make an instrumentation that will try to manage the possible compromise between two or three great powers? Or will we actually have a completely different world? We have certain countries, certain spaces, certain velocities, cut back in the bricks or cut back elsewhere, which estimate that they have in front of them, possibly the old triad, that they have qualified as a hegemonic system. And you still have two thirds of the world's population, etc., with capacity. Four of the countries of the bricks have the largest, the highest level of PPA in the world. That is to say that in fact we are in the presence of a huge mutation that concerns different worlds and the worlds that come. And we do not have to only sum it up head to head, head to head, sino-american. In some cases, China is no longer the one that we believed in and certainly not the USSR. The USA, the USA are no longer the one that we imagined and certainly not the USA of that time. The world changes and so shouldn't the debate go further towards its central element? What are these worlds that come? How do we organize ourselves? Because the interior spaces, these great powers, they are the same. They are the same. They are concerned. I mean the elites of these own countries ask themselves questions about how to invent these new worlds. Will we have a debate between those who imagine that the geopolitical power will continue to impose itself, or will those who defend the school of the world partnership with a more open vision will succeed in making a path? Thank you. Thank you. I did not present Mr. Laichubi, a politologist, a researcher, a member of the Royal Academy of Spain and former Algerian minister. Thank you. Okay. Well, who would like to address that? Padre, do you have something? You seem to... I think this raises, I should say, this raises a series of questions that Kemal did raise in the first panel, and to some extent it seems to me that these are questions that will recur throughout our proceedings, because it has to do with what kind of world we are entering into, and what kind of set of world problems we are likely to face, and how to think about them. So I thank you for the intervention. It does go somewhat beyond the breadth or depth of what we're talking about, but it is relevant to some of the issues that have been raised. Padre. I will allow myself to answer in French. I think that the period is extremely, extremely interesting, and that we have the conjunction of major events that accelerate each other. We haven't mentioned India, which is also a great force, a great complexity, which is going to play a major role in the future. I think that the way in which the United States is currently deconstructing the international relations, we saw it in particular with the ICPOE, we saw it when it came out of the Paris Agreement on COP 21, and we see, suddenly, that we are building again in a uncertainty of international conventions. This uncertainty, it impacts all relations, including the relations of affairs, including, in particular, the issue of defence in Asia-Pacific, where we see a redistribution of the cards, which is not the one that we anticipated a few years ago. We see new alliances that did not exist before. We see it in the level of Asia-Pacific, it is also found in the level of Europe. England is the first defence bubble in Europe. Today, they are looking at alliances with countries all over Europe, in Asia and elsewhere, precisely to continue to have defence projects, to have an autonomy and a sovereignty. The United States is working between them. We see it in South America, and we see it in Pacific Asia a lot. Where, before, they were part of a community, I am talking about the state, among other things, which are not great powers. There is a community of states of medium power that is negotiated with great powers. And we see that, suddenly, they are putting themselves on something that is totally asymmetrical, which is to have a relationship and a discussion with a state that is much, much more powerful. And, in fact, it is behind the crisis of passion and resistance, and it is a movement that reinforces the protectionism, because it is even more exposed than it was before. So, I believe that these are phenomena that change in depth, and the phenomenon, contrary to what we have talked about this morning, I think, is the digital revolution to run, which is something that is an accelerator for many of these countries. We see that many countries will, for the moment, they are English, they will leapfrog it, they will go to the next step. It is in Africa. We were just talking about the honor of having the Prime Minister and the Ivory Coast, but other African countries who are also on this very voluntary approach to try to go immediately to the next step, to try, precisely, to not find themselves held in a place of small countries, small powers, serving the great. And so, I think that the two phenomena today are conjugated, and I think that it actually is a very, very great instability. And we see today a little bit the side of those who wish, indeed, a multipolar world who speaks to themselves, and those who look at their domestic market and say to themselves, how can I protect it? And the consequences outside of this domestic market do not interest me, or not. Carl, I think the issue raised here in some sense is highly relevant to the WTO because, on the one hand, we have concerns from the United States about the role of the WTO, but there have also been concerns such as those expressed by Camille Deverige about the role of the WTO in encouraging, perhaps, perhaps more effectively encouraging development in the poorer parts of the world. What are your thoughts on this? The intervention started with the sentiment that Nussan trotimide. And I don't know when you say Nussan trotimide who's new. Coming from the WTO as a member-driven organization, the Secretariat, unfortunately, has no rights to initiatives, but the setup of the WTO was such, still is such, that one country has one vote. So this was actually the ideal world where the weak, the timid, would have a say. When you say we, me coming from the European Union, I always think of the European Union and here I in fact think we're trotimide. Also this morning in the first panel there was talk of the big powers, US, China. In fact, Europe is the bigger industrial power and Europe, I'm very happy to be a European because the Europeans always come up with very well-balanced proposals, good analysis and trying to invest in, still trying to invest in the global common good. So I would be hoping that they would be less timid and take a stronger leadership role. That would be my wish. I can point out, since you are too modest to do so, that in some ways, perhaps a small way, the dispute settlement system is an extraordinary tool in the hands of the weak. Countries like Costa Rica have prevailed over countries like the United States in the dispute settlement system and when that system was working, which it did for has, really since its inception, the US was obeying rulings against it on the part of Costa Rica. So I think that it doesn't address the broader issues, but I do think that in my humble opinion, a system based on the rule of law tends to work in the interest of the weak, please identify yourself and is there a microphone here up front? Thank you very much. I'm following up with the discussion as my question is to Mr. Browner, the WTO issue. I agree that the dispute settlement mechanism is jewel in the crown of WTO. I am also concerned about the body itself, not only the crown, that is the decision making process. And as you rightly said, it's member driven and it is not secretary arts role to change the system, but in this world to make a consensus of more than 150 countries is almost impossible and last 15 years we were trying to get out of that by making smaller informal groups which led us nowhere. And now we are going to plural groups and things like that, which is also parting from most favored nation Article 1 spirit of WTO. How should we go about with this situation? How should we make a more formalization of green type council like United Nations where they can decide things or introduce majority system? If we just go with this decision making that would lead us nowhere is the lot of people thinking and I know that it's a member driven organization as you rightly said and I just wanted to if you can share your views as well. Thank you very much. Go right ahead Carl. It's very difficult to foresee what the outcome of the current reform process is because there is still this struggle in the membership about how do we handle the Doha development agenda and there are some other members like those who in Buenos Aires in December last year at the 11th ministerial conference decided to move forward with certain topics. So we have now four very intensively working groups of varying member states on e-commerce, on investment facilitation, on micro and small and medium size enterprises and on services regulation. So you mentioned that in the past we had plurilateral agreements but they were MFN like when we concluded I think among 63 member states the extension of the list of IT products that would be a deal traded custom free this was made MFN this follows the most favorite nation principle and all those who are not part of it are the others would say free riders. How we are going to develop the negotiation arm of the WTO in smaller groups with agreements among only a few invitation for everybody to participate or whether we try to maintain a consensus among 164 remains to be seen. Okay well I want to point out that this is only the first session do we have another question? Last question in the middle here I promise Thierry to get us back on track we'll finish more or less on time. This is a short question and as I consider we are still in the preliminary session I would say that I didn't miss it but I notice that you didn't mention among the global contemporary problems today the migrations which happens to be an obsession in Europe for instance does it mean that that type of obsession is not justified? How do you evaluate thank you as a global problem? Would anybody like to address the issue of migration it is related to illegal trade? I will point out in the interest of promotion I suppose that we do have a panel coming up at three o'clock this afternoon on migration in the future multiculturalism but it is true that we have not addressed it in the two panels this morning would someone like to say something about it? Go ahead I'll just say it is an obsession with everyone I believe and I was only going to point out that there are sessions about this directly so I really but you are not alone in your obsession I think it is concerning of everyone and I don't know what's going to happen and I'm waiting to hear I think that it does fit into this broader characterization of the populist upsers that we've seen which varies from country to country where there is concern on the part of many that the ability of national governments to pursue policies that may be in line with the desires of their citizens have been lost either due to globalization or to European integration or to some other factor I don't happen to share those concerns but we know now that even in countries that have virtually no immigrants immigration has become a hot button issue so I too am looking forward to the session later on today and I'm sure that it will come up over and over again during our proceedings