 We have a special treat, a luncheon keynote speech with Acting Assistant Secretary Joseph Yun. It's a real pleasure to introduce Joe. He really probably needs not much of an introduction with this crowd, but he is our acting leader of foreign affairs when it comes to Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific generally. He's the current Acting Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs at the Department of State. His previous assignment was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in that bureau. And as you know, Joe is a career member of the Foreign Service, having served in South Korea, Thailand, France, Indonesia, and Hong Kong. And I would say of the leaders who really know the region and have put in the hard yards, Joe would be at the top of that list. Joe, we're honored to have you here. And I'd like to ask everyone to welcome Assistant Secretary Joe Yun. Do we need this computer here? That's all right, yeah. Well, thank you very much, Ernie. It's great to be back at CSIS. I think many of you know what a tremendous job Ernie has done bringing the Southeast Asian program to CSIS. I mean, it is undisputably the leader of Southeast Asian programs, not just in the US, but worldwide. I understand this is the third South China Sea conference, and we're getting more and more people every day, you know, I mean, every time. And it's beautiful weather out there. I don't know. You guys must have something better to do, you know? But it's really a testimony to what he has created that everyone is here today. As Ernie introduced, I am the Acting Assistant Secretary. As you know, our good friend Danny Russell has been nominated to be Assistant Secretary. So my days are somewhat numbered, you know? I've been doing this now for about five months. And so when I became Acting Assistant Secretary, it's a long title. I called my mom and said, mom, I think I got a promotion. I'm not sure what it is. And he said, what are you now? And I said, well, I'm Acting Assistant Secretary. And she said, well, what the hell does that mean? Yeah. Well, there it is. We don't have much time, and I do want to leave a lot of discussion, especially questions from you. So I will do away with my usual introduction on how much we've done in Asia. And let's move straight to South China Sea issues. And really, there are about seven points I want to make on South China Sea. Number one is the United States really does not have a position on competing territorial claims. And those are sovereignty issues. And that's a key fact you should know. And this is true throughout Southeast Asia. And in fact, it's true of a lot of the claims issues. We do not have a position to which a claimant, certain island or rocks or maritime features belong to, that we have no position on claims, particular validity of claims. Second point I want to make is that claims, however, must be based on international law. They have to be consistent with international law, including, of course, the law of the Sea Convention on Clause. And underlying that point is a very important point that claims to maritime space in the South China Sea must be derived from land features, that they have to be justified. If you are making a claim to a maritime domain, maritime space, then it must be justified based on land features. The third point I do want to make is that while the United States has no position on sovereignty, the United States still has enormous interest on how these disputes are addressed and how these disputes are settled. So that's the third point. And so you may ask, well, what is our interest in South China Sea? And I would count foremost in that freedom of navigation. This is an enormous global common in which a lot of commerce, by some account, something like 50% of shipping tonnage goes through, South China Sea goes through. And so we rightly have an interest that these commerce must be protected and that there ought to be freedom of navigation within these global commons. Second interest is, of course, low-full exploitation of resources there. That is, for example, we have companies that are working for oil and hydrocarbon exploitation there. If this is lawful, they ought to continue to do their activity despite whether there are claimants or not. So those are our interests that goes beyond, I would say, sovereignty issues, leaving aside who the sovereignty rightfully belongs to. The fourth point really derives from that. That is, we do not believe any claims ought to be forwarded through coercive measures, through threats, and certainly not through use of force. So that's the fourth point. The fifth point I would mention is that, then, how should those claims be forwarded? And we believe they should be done through peaceful means. Example of peaceful means is diplomatic negotiation. Another peaceful mean is through third-party mediation. I would say another peaceful pursuing of those claims is through recognized international arbitration. So those are peaceful means of pursuing those claims. And if you pursue through peaceful means, then certainly there ought to be no threat, no intimidation, and certainly not retaliation. That is, for example, if a country decides to go through it lost, then another party who has competing claims should not intimidate that party that goes through arbitration. Then the other party should not retaliate because you have chosen to go through it lost arbitration. And for us, the way ahead, and this is my last point I'll make on South China Sea, is that we believe that given so many claims of South China Sea that it is very important that there be no immediately, no unilateral attempt to change status quo. And second point I would make on that is that what we need is really rules of the road. How the parties should engage. And this is why we support China US attempt, or beginning of negotiations on code of conduct. This code of conduct is very important because that will set the framework on your behavior, on how you pursue claims, and what happens if there is a dispute. And so we're very, very much supportive of that. Thank you. I understand that there was recently a meeting between China and the Asian states. I think it was in last week in Bangkok where they had a working level meeting on the predecessor to COC was, of course, DOC. And on DOC. And I think there seems to be an understanding that at a future date, maybe sometime this year, they will announce a formal beginning of negotiations on COC. If that's the case, we will genuinely welcome it because we see COC as a key piece of puzzle that will bring peaceful resolution, peaceful negotiations, and peaceful pursuant to these claims. This is an issue that goes back a long ways. And I think behind it, a number of historical issues. Behind it, a number of traditional issues. And I would say over the last few years, things have become a little bit more tense. There have been a number of fishing boat incidents. There have been a number of incidents involving exploration vessels from various partners. And last year, around this time, we had a Scarborough Shoal incident. And before that, a number of incidents off the shore of Vietnam. And earlier this year, incidents of Borneo Kalimantan area near Sabah Coast. So this is worrisome for everyone. And I think it is very much up to China and ASEAN to get the issue of COC settled. And certainly, a number of senior US officials, including President Obama in last year's East Asia Summit. And of course, Secretary Clinton has made their views known. And really, on this particular issue, while the negotiations of COC is between ASEAN and China, I would say anyone who uses that global common has an interest in it. And practically, everyone I know of that uses global commons is very supportive of COC. So those are our views on South China Sea. And I'm sure with this many people, there are other views out there. I'll be very happy to entertain them with the help of our friend, Ernie. Thank you very much. Thanks, Joe. Can we sit down? Thank you very much, Joe. I think that was a terrific and very direct outlining of the American, of the US position. Really helpful. And it builds on our discussion this morning. I'd like to open up the floor to questions. After I pose the first one as a chair. And that is that the goal of our discussions over the next two days is to build recommendations that you can use in preparing Secretary Kerry and the president for their trips. And I know Secretary Kerry is planning on a trip to the region in June for the ASEAN regional forum. And the president would plan to go to Brunei and some other places in October for the East Asia summit. Is there, what's the state of current planning and your current thinking on how the United States could be, use these two meetings to advance some of the points that you discussed this morning? I think for us, there are a number of important aspects to it. I think number one is for recognition to everyone to know that this is really, I would say, cockpit of global economy. That any threat there will affect economic growth and development. And I think everyone is trying to understand that. Second thing is high-level engagement. I know that, of course, as you mentioned, Secretary Kerry will be going to ASEAN regional forum. And there will also be, in that venue in Brunei, will also have East Asia summit for a minister's meeting, as well as US ASEAN for a minister's meeting. I think for us, it is important to gain consensus among ASEANs. And of course, over the coming weekend, in fact, Friday and Saturday, President Obama will be seeing President Xi Jinping in California. And so these are broad-level discussions that I think, as our leaders have conveyed their points, I think they will begin to realize the importance of economic stability. And moreover, the importance of what the idea of global commons that is at work here. So I think as we exchange these views, come to an agreement or come to an understanding. To be frank with you, I'm not sure these territorial disputes, whether they're married time or whatever, can ever be fully resolved in the sense one party says, damn, I think you're right. I never thought about that. I don't think that's going to happen, but at least I have a working hypothesis or working idea, operations on how we do not disturb stability in the region. That's the goal. Thank you. Let me open it up. The lady in the red. Hi, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for coming. My name is Nadia Chow, Washington Correspondent for Liberty Times. We know the code of conduct is very important, but Taiwan has never been included during the process of a dialogue. Given the recent incident between the fishing boat incident between the Philippines and Taiwan, do you think it's important to find a way for Taiwan to participate in the dialogue? Will the US encourage that? Thank you. Thank you very much. I'm very aware of course the recent fishing boat incident in which Taiwan's fishing boat captain, I believe, lost his life and has a very, very regretful incident. And that is precisely why I believe we need something like code of conduct. And I think code of conduct, it wends China and the ASEAN agree, is something that becomes operational throughout South China Sea. And certainly, we're not involved and parties other than China and ASEAN are not involved. But there is no reason why other countries cannot say, you know, adhere to that code of conduct. So I'm not sure the importance of actually being on the negotiating table as much as importance between the claimants who are the disputant coming to terms with that. Thank you. OK, I have Chris Nelson and then the gentleman here. Thanks, Joe. Chris Nelson, Nelson Report. Those of us who were just out at the Shangela conference, and forgive me for repeating for those who were here, found it frustrating that in the face of every very explicit question to our Chinese friends about our concerns about the rise of the use of coercion, either explicit or implicit, the basic response was these aren't claims, these are our islands. There's really nothing to discuss. What are you talking about? Are you getting that kind of response when you try to discuss these things with our Chinese friends? Or is there more likelihood of a discussion that recognizes the gravity of the risks that are involved? And what do you anticipate the response may well be out in California when the president does, as they made clear from the NSC briefing last night? They will raise these issues. Thanks. Thank you, Chris. I'm not sure with all the cameras around, I should be commenting what president might say this weekend in California. So I'll stay away from that. But however, in regards to your question, we've discussed this at many levels with our Chinese friends. And of course, they recognize there is a problem here. And I think this is not a secret that we have discussed with them. We press them on the importance of getting code of conduct done. So at every level, and I do expect this issue to come up, I mean, maritime disputes, of course, not unique to South China Sea. We have another one in East China Sea. We have one, for example, Dr. Takeshima between Korea and Japan. I mean, the United States has one, more than one, with Canada, for example. So this is not a unique situation. But I think what is a little bit different on this is that this is a dispute that has such enormous impact on everyone in the region. And this is a dispute that affects livelihood so much, including fishing, hydrocarbon exploitation, and of course, the shipping component. So this is where it is a little bit different and where the international community, I believe, has a stake in a peaceful resolution. I've got a question in from Twitter, actually. This is from Kuala Lumpur. And the question is that there's been a lot of praise for Brunei's diplomacy as ASEAN chair this year. Will they be able to handle the pressure and raise these issues about maritime security at the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit? And how do you see Myanmar's handling of these issues when it chairs ASEAN next year? Well, thank you very much from our fan in KL. ASEAN is, I would say, something of a unique organization. And now I've been doing ASEAN work for four years. And in the beginning, I was totally clueless. They'll probably say I'm clueless now, but I think I've gotten to know it a little bit better over the last few years. And there is a very important search for consensus in ASEAN. And I think that's a really attractive quality about Southeast Asians, that you want to form consensus. And they will search long time. And to me, their capacity for patience is amazing. And so I really do admire ASEAN's about that. And so you will get criticism, especially from non-ASEAN's, that it is moving very slowly, whether it be code of conduct, whether it be connectivity issues, creating single market issues. But I think that's a search for consensus. And given the history, they've had tough history in Southeast Asia, for those of you old enough to remember. And so to me, even the code of conduct, they are deliberating. For example, on DOC, Declaration on Conduct of the Parties, that was signed in 2002. The implementing agreements were agreed in 2012. So it took 10 years from the signing to get to implementing agreement. So I have no illusion, really, even if the code of conduct begin discussion soon, it will take a while. And by that time, Ernie, you and I could be retired. But still, I think the process of doing it is very important for ASEAN. And coming back to question, I think that is the role of the chair, to be an honest broker, to make sure the process and consensus is observed, and really have full admiration of Brunei's friends for that. I mean, as you know, Salton of Brunei has been busy traveling to go to all countries. And he came to Washington, I believe, was in February or March, about two, three months ago. And he's really been getting frequent fly miles doing this. Well, he's on plane, but you know, yeah. And so I think that's a great thing, even a relatively small country like Brunei is pursuing that. Myanmar, as you know, Myanmar will be chair next year. Right now, they are also what we call our dialogue coordinator. Now, how many of you know what a dialogue coordinator is? Very few, yeah, you know? What dialogue, I'd actually play a very important role. What dialogue coordinator is that for non-Aseans that have dialogue with ASEAN, like the US, like China, Japan, Korea, they have a coordinator who act as an intermediary. And so it's a turn of Myanmar to be the US dialogue coordinator, and they're doing a great job. I mean, let me tell you the importance of dialogue coordinator. Right now, Thailand is the dialogue coordinator between ASEAN and China, which is why the meetings were held in Bangkok between ASEAN and China last week. And they are doing a great job trying to move this process along, you know, being the go-between, between ASEAN and China on code of conduct, especially. So, you know, our hats are off to ASEAN. And for us, engaging ASEAN is a very important pillar of what we call rebalance to Asia. And we've expended considerable effort in that. As you know, we now have two missions in Jakarta, one for Indonesia, one for ASEAN. We've joined all the, you know, conferences and summits that go with ASEAN, including East Asia Summit, you know, Defense Minister's Dialogue and so on. So, ASEAN of today is not the ASEAN of, say, 20 years ago. It's much more dynamic and it is much more inclusive. And I would say much more strategic. Thank you, Joe. The gentleman here. My name is Vishnu Podil, National Advisory Council South Asian Affairs. My observation over the years have been that when these head of states meet, very pleasant, all problems are solved. And they depart with a very beautiful, agreeable communication. And I'm speaking, especially in the context of presidency and President Obama meeting in Los Angeles in a couple of days. And then I'm afraid after that meeting is over, beautiful communication are issued and the whole world is happy. Now everything is going to be great. Then when they go back, after sometime the situation remains as is and nothing much is changed just as Secretary Joseph said that code of conduct was passed 12 years ago, it took 12 years. So is there any strategic plan that we, the United States of America are thinking through about those issues, be it with Putin, be it with Xi or be it with anybody? Thank you very much. I think what you should probably realize, I'm sure many people do, is summits are kind of what the two leaders do. And but there are a lot of work that go on before the summit. And for example, before President Xi comes to Washington, I mean, sorry, to California, you'll notice that Tom Donilon went to Beijing and even before that we had number of exchanges, number of exchanges on agenda and so on. But I would say just sticking with California item for a second, this is something quite different. And to have really day and a half of two leaders sitting down. And this is a little bit different from other summits where deliverables are already there. I think in this case, really the goal is for President Obama and President Xi to get to know each other and to have a broad agenda. I mean, you can imagine, I'm sure you can guess what the agenda will be. They'll range from security issues like North Korea, Syria, maritime security issues, to some economic issues, cyber security being example, trade and investment being example, to some of the tougher issues like human rights issues and so on. So it's really, if us, the working level is to do our work properly, then we must have proper guidance from our leaders. So at once it's for each president to give guidance. And but more than that, to get to know each other, to get to know familiar. And so I would say this is a different setting than the usual summit. In a usual summit, you're gonna meet for one hour. And in one hour, you will go through the list and in the end come out and as you say, we had great meeting and we accomplished X, Y, and Z. But I will tell you, I've been to some summits which were not as smooth. If the camera won't here, I would tell you more. But I think this is fairly unique in that sense. Thank you. Okay, I've got four hands. I've recognized Dr. DeCastro. Without the mic. I would like to express basically my appreciation for your very candid analysis. Trying not to be candid. Frank, that there's an increase in tension. And as we're discussing the issue right now, you have a situation where you have a standoff at a Yuning Shoal. You have a Yuning Shoal? Well, you have several Chinese vessels, including a frigate, confronting a group of Philippine Marines, of course, occupying a shoal. And the Philippines had received several warnings from the Chinese embassy in Manila that we better vacate that area or else. And the concern is basically this will be a template as China would force the Philippines out of the several islands it occupied in the South China Sea. This is clearly a violation of the principles that we have laid down, unilateral action, coercive diplomacy, and of course, the possible use of force. How is this viewed in Washington? Well, I think I would reiterate the point I made, which is that no party should take unilateral action that would threaten or be coercive and certainly not use of force. And so we do understand the trouble surrounding this shoal and we are in communication with both parties. And so let's see what happens. But again, I think as long as nobody takes the first unilateral action, I think that's what we want for now. Ultimately resolution to this has to wait for negotiations and settlement. But again, it's often the case, I'm not talking about this particular case, that someone feels someone else has taken action first. So there is some element of misunderstanding if you look at examining all these particular incidents. So I think they need clarification, certainly more discussion between the two capitals. And so we are well aware and we have been in touch with both parties. Mike McDevitt. Thanks, Joe, for your clarity with regard to US policy. The question I have for you has to do with something the State Department used to do during the 80s and 90s, issued a series of legal bulletins on excessive claims and what have you with regard to violations of law of the sea. And I think I've forgotten the name of them, but I think the last of them was issued in 1999. It seems to me the South China Sea is a perfect locale for those sorts of legal interpretations of what's going on to be reissued. So are there any plans for the Department of State to start issuing US judgments on excessive claims, excessive baselines, nine dash lines, et cetera? I didn't know we did that in the 80s and 90s. Yeah, go on, yeah. Could you, in the 1980s, and there were very useful law of the sea bulletins that were put out by the office of the geographer and then unfortunately the department ran out of money, which is so often the case. So that's why that was lost. While I'm up, I might make one observation. I had the privilege of serving as the agent of the United States in the Gulf of Maine Maritime boundary delimitation case with Canada, which was the first case to draw a single maritime line for both the water column and the seabed. So in effect, it was the first exclusive economic zone case. And in the world of maritime boundaries and international law, one of the most significant problems, and I very much appreciate your comment on this, because while I understand that the United States does not want to take any position on the validity of the claims or on sovereignty, one of the biggest problems is always whether a nation will even recognize the right of another nation to assert a claim in the first place. And I would argue that in the South China Sea, the United States should be more proactive in encouraging the right of the literal states to at least assert a claim in an area which is so obviously in dispute. Yeah, thank you very much. Very much appreciate, Mike, and your comment on the usefulness of this kind of notes that our legal department used to doubt. Certainly take that back and see whether this is also appropriate for the new century. On your view on whether, especially in South China Sea, countries should have the right to assert their claims and how US will support that. That's, I mean, certainly a good point, but as far as I can tell, I think every country that has claims on South China Sea have asserted their claims. And so I'm not sure we're missing anyone, you know, in terms of claimants. But it's a fair point, thank you. Peter, you had a two finger on this. Thank you very much. Peter Dutton Naval War College, I'll just be brief. The series is called Limits in the Seas. It's still resident on the State Department website and it's extremely useful. One of the reasons that it was discontinued in addition to money is that the two principal authors, Ashley Roach and Robert Smith both retired, actually. They are however both active in writing and retirement and have continued, I urge you to look in, I urge anyone interested to reach out to them because they're doing a wonderful job in continuing the research. This seems to be a fertile ground for recruiting the recruitment for those two, you know? Yeah. Okay, I had Bonnie Glazier next. Thanks so much Joe for your thoughtful remarks. I'd like to ask a question about the issue of using international law and arbitration. I very much support the effort of the Philippines and I'm very pleased that the US government has spoken out in support of this case that's being taken to unclose. Recently Japan has also come out and endorsed this effort and Vietnam has also supported it but no other states have. And I wonder if the United States is encouraging other countries, whether they be claimants or non-claimants to back this process. Because I think that if there are a lot of countries that are endorsing this particular case, maybe we could get China to rethink its approach, which I mean there's an ongoing debate in China about how the nine dashed line should be defined. And if we could tip the balance in favor of a decision to clarify their position, that would be really helpful. And the fact that so few countries have really come out in support of it to me is worrisome and makes it less likely that China is going to feel pressured to do so. Once the decision is handed down by the court, if China doesn't recognize it, then to me that has negative implications for how the dispute is being handled. So I'm curious as to what the US position is on that and what we're doing, thanks. Bonnie, that's a great point. And I think besides Vietnam, there may be a couple of other countries who have come out and supported Philippines arbitration. I think the issue of ASEAN unity on this particular issue is a key one, you know? And as is in many ASEAN things. And I think this gets us back to the kind of consensus that ASEAN is seeking. And I mean, to be frank with you, I'm not sure there is all that much wrong for outside parties to urge ASEAN unity in this. I think they'll take their time on this issue as in other issues. And I mean, certainly it will be interesting to see in the upcoming ministerial meetings what the ASEAN views are. I mean, as you know, this is an issue that I think ASEAN is having a lot of difficulty coming to consensus on, because there are claimants, there are non-claimants, and even within claimants, there is very differing view for the simple reason that for example, you know, Spratlys is disputed among many ASEAN countries. But I mean, you know, to me, there is no ultimate solution in the sense someone says, oh, I give up, you know? So to me, the process matters and keeping the process alive, keeping the talks alive. I mean, you can say it's for talk for talk's sake, but you know, that's not bad either, you know? And keeping dialogue going and meanwhile making sure that most egregious coercion, threats, and certainly use of force is very much avoided. Dr. Thank you. You just made a sixth very important point on US South China's policy. I would like to introduce myself, my position from China. My question is related to your fifth point. In this point, you mentioned that the South China Sea should be resolved by peaceful means out of the state's right to both from China and other claimant states' perspectives. And also US supports to solve the South China Sea through the third party approach, for instance, it lost. So my question is that, what's your opinion? If I say that the Philippine arbitration initiative was encouraged or instructed by the United States, if so, is it still consistent with the US policy of taking North side? Thank you. I think, number one, I would fundamentally disagree that we had any role in any party going to it lost arbitration. I think that is not the case. And so I would say that is absolutely not the case. Okay, Christian? Thank you. You mentioned the Code of Conduct several times and its importance. How confident are you that the COC will be a robust and substantive document that will actually restrain the actors from coercive or assertive actions in the South China Sea? And specifically, what would you like to see in there to make sure that actually happens? I think suddenly there have been several drafts and I think there is a strong feeling among ASEAN that for Code of Conduct to be meaningful, it has to have some teeth. It cannot be just DLC version two, you know? And so, number one, that it has to be somehow legally binding, I think that's a key point. And second point is, because this is about what to do when there are disputes, there has to be some kind of dispute resolution mechanism. And certainly, I know some ASEANs are thinking that way and as I mentioned, this is also about global commons. It's not just between the parties. And so, I would hope at some point, they would reopen to outside views that's beyond China and ASEAN to make it effective so that as we say, everyone's goal is to have peaceful resolution of this issue. So it affords everyone something to really use as they become engaged in economic activity, trade activity, fishing activity and so on. The gentleman at the far right table, I can't see you because of the podium, I'm sorry. Could you please identify yourself? Yes, my name is Lam, I'm a lawyer from Canada and it's for my personal interest. In the same family of a question with the lady in front of me, she suggests that the, on the country in the Southeast Asia, use it loss to solve the problem. But actually, China have a tool because China have used provision 298 of Anglo and the provision 298 of Anglo allow China before the ratification to declare that China doesn't want to be submit to any arbitration. Therefore, we have a problem. I humbly suggest another way to solve the problem. You remember in 1973, there is nine country who signed a final act of international conference on Vietnam in Paris. And on this country, guarantee the integrity of Vietnam. And China is one of the signatory. Therefore, when China invite Paracel in 1974 and spread late in 1988, China in French violate this international treaty that they have signed. Therefore, using the provision seven of these final act, you can reconvoke the conference and try to solve the problem and invite all the other country to join. Thank you. That's a good point. Yeah. We'll certainly, good advice. Thank you very much, Mr. Lam. I'm Tui from Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. Thank you very much for a very clear position about US interest and position in the South China Sea. But you know from my observation about situation in the South China Sea, we see a lot of point just to lay out disregarded by China. For example, no unilateral attempt, no changing status quo, no freedom of navigation, no about issue of lawful commercial oil and gas activity. One of these issue had been regarded, disregarded by China. You know a lot of issue, right? And my question is, my observation is US strategy and policy in the South China Sea, maybe it's not working well in this aspect. And the South China Sea is not only relating to US interest as you mentioned, but also on US credibility because you lay out the position and other party disregarded. And my question is, whether US should think to add more elements in the current strategy and policy towards the South China Sea. Thank you. I think whether US policies are working or not, I mean that's an interesting question. I mean certainly we've had number of incidents there. And but let's not make it so black and white as any policy issues are. You know, whether it's to do with Middle East, whether it's to do development goals, global health and so on. Our policy is commiserate with the situation. And so I would say that certainly awareness of South China Sea issues and participation of ASEAN in this important issue have greatly increased. And this also counts to success of South China Sea conference Ernie's having. And so I would say there is much more awareness. And I would also go one step further and saying this is not just the US thing, it's an international community thing. And I, you know, as I go to big international meetings and so on, there is tremendous support on the concept that we have laid out which is rule of law, observance of rule of law support for COC. So these incidents as you know will happen, they have happened and so we need a way to deal with it. So I'm not quite sure what you're suggesting, but at the moment also to go to draconian end, I don't think that's helpful either. Yeah, I just wanted to add to that. I have to say, speaking with the ASEAN countries, I'm not sure that if the US implemented its strategy, quote, that you mentioned there fully, that the, I'm not sure all of ASEAN would support that. You know, it's, again, it's this Goldilocks, we're trying to, I think, I see Joe and his team trying to thread the needle a bit here. And it does take some compromise and careful steps. The gentleman from Taiwan. Thank you, Mr. Yuan, for your speech. I'm Yeng Hui Song from Academia Seneca. My question is about related to code of conduct. From Taiwan's perspective, in my view, President Ma would like to see an early conclusion of the COC in the South China Sea with the invitation to Taiwan to participate. But now if the negotiation process for adoption of the COC takes too long, do you think it is consistent with US national interests in the South China Sea to have any parties to the dispute to propose peace initiative in the South China Sea? Certainly including an outsider to the dispute that United States to propose a peace initiative in the South China Sea. Thank you. Personally, I don't see anything wrong with any proposal for peace initiative. I mean, who doesn't like peace, you know? Yeah. And so I think everyone ought to be free to pursue and propose peace initiative. This one doesn't, yeah. That could be the house of representatives calling him. He's got to testify in an hour or two. Dr. Emerson. Don Emerson, Don Emerson, Stanford. You know, the question that I think is lurking between the lines of this conversation, to use Ernie's phrase. Please don't call me Dr. Emerson. Thank you. Is this, is ASEAN the Goldilocks bed? The bed that is neither too long nor too short, okay? Now there are several comments that suggest that although we can regret the impatience of outsiders and we can celebrate the ASEAN way as many of us in the room have done, we can also ask whether the inclusion of outsiders that are marginally less patient and less committed to the ASEAN way. And remember that that is one of the main issues at stake in the effort of the Philippines to move to a codified way that is un-close, right? Then, you know, what comment would you make as to the threshold of impatience beyond which one might really begin to think more creatively with all due respect to ASEAN and its achievements to date as to how we could speed the process and how also the points that you mentioned in your remarks could be included in a COC because some of them, I mean, what has happened to the zero draft? What has happened to the non-paper, right? There is a kind of stunning deafening silence with regard to this and all we are told is that at some future point, perhaps before the end of this year, negotiations on a COC would begin whereas we know that in fact, informally those conversations go back to a time preceding 2002 when the DOC was born. So if you measure it by that status, this is really slow progress. And finally, when Marty Nathalagawa was in town and most recently today at the Asia Pacific Ground Table in Kuala Lumpur, he reiterated his proposal for an Indo-Pacific frame of cooperation based on the TAC, the Treaty of Amity in Cooperation. Now, when we think of expanding beyond ASEAN, you know, two possibilities arise. One is we improve progress by including folks that are a little bit impatient, including perhaps some in the Indian Ocean, I don't know, including conceivably the United States or Taiwan, I don't know, right? The other possibility is that the more cooks are in the kitchen, the worse the broth is going to taste. Could you comment? Thank you very much, Don. As always, very sharp. You know, what Philippines has done, I believe, going to it loss is that they have chosen not to pursue the same thing through the ASEAN. So it's keenly a decision, I believe, that they made is that they are going to pursue this issue through means other than U.S. ASEAN route. And so, and they've also made it clear that pursuing through it loss should not hurt COC either and pursuing through it loss should not, you know, or so these are two independent mechanism. So Philippines is probably among the most frustrated of the parties. And so it's really, I think, a reflection of their pent-up frustration that they are going to it loss route. Now, I think their decision to have, to pursue both ways is, you know, we can respect that. But your question gets to, if they have done it both ways, should there be a linkage or at least, shouldn't ASEAN have something to say about the other paths they have chosen? And again, I mean, I think it is entirely independent. We certainly have supported or have made a case that pursuing it loss is everyone's right. And you certainly would count as part of peaceful resolution or peaceful manner in which that is pursued. And so I think as far as I know, again, ASEANs have not come to a consensus decision. Whether they will or not, I don't know because they also see it as not, you know, it is not part of the ASEAN process. Gregory Ho from Radio Free Asia. Since the China side is forging a little type of relationship with the U.S. in the coming summit, I'm not sure what is the State Department's talking point in response to this so-called little type of power relationship with the U.S. Will the U.S. ignore it, confund it, co-operate it? Or what kind of talking points the State Department would advise the President, Obama, in response to this so-called new theory? Thank you. Not getting into the conversation they will have later in the week. I mean, of course, this new type of relationship or new type of great power relationship is something the Chinese leadership have said they wanted for some time now. I think with probably one of the earlier mention of this phrase was when then Vice President Xi Jinping was in Washington what about 18 months ago or so and it has continued, of course. I think, you know, we are all trying to put flesh on what that might mean. You know, between China and U.S. we have tremendous array of agenda. You know, we just discussed one today, maritime agenda, we have North Korea agenda, we have economic agenda, IP agenda, cybersecurity, what we do in global, outside the region, Syria, Iran and so on. So when we talk about new type of relationship for us it means more cooperative relationship. It means there ought to be understanding and cooperation that we work together not just in the region but outside. We work towards established norms to respect international law and so that is the broadest I can give you on what this means for us and I'm sure the two leaders will have a great discussion on this. Okay, I'd like to thank you Joe for taking the time. Thank you very much for your testimony. Please join me in thanking Acting Assistant Secretary Julian. We have a 15 minute break. Stretch your legs and we're coming back with a panel on recent developments in the South China Sea.