 Walter Slotham is Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and since 1993 has been an ex-official member of the U.S. Institute of Peace Board of Directors. For over seven years, Walt has been in a key position nonstop at the Defense Department and a pivotal actor in the shaping of U.S. policy in the Balkans. He's going to look at the lessons learned from the security engagement in the Balkans during the past eight years and consider what remains to be done to bring about a durable peace. Welcome, Walt. Thanks. For three more days, I still have to say that what I have to say, it does not necessarily reflect the views of the administration. After that, there will be no question. First of all, I think the points that Mordor Brahmowitz have made about the extraordinary improvements in the situation compared to eight years ago are true in each of the areas in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and of course most fundamentally the changes in Serbia which have opened the prospect for a solution reached by political means and by some kind of accommodation and patience as opposed to violence. There's certainly still areas of potential trouble in the most immediate sense, probably in the press of a valley, but more broadly there's lots of unfinished business and as Mordor says, the most fundamental issue is defining the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo. If I understood correctly, having established the dichotomy of two basic approaches, one broadly autonomy and the other broadly, independently wisely counsels that there are sufficient disadvantages to each that insofar as the stark choice, and it is I think fundamentally a stark choice, but can be deferred while Serbia consolidates its democracy and Kosovo establishes institutions which is a process which may in some ways make both results less, may make the choice less stark is certainly important. It's worth making the point that one important piece of unfinished business which, more referred to at least indirectly, is that of which in Pentagon jargon is called PIFWICS. The Pentagon doesn't deal with war criminals, we deal with persons indicted for war crimes. PIFWICS. It is important to bear in mind that of all of the unsealed indictments, and there are presumably still some sealed ones, of all the people who have been indicted, more than two-thirds of cases have been disposed of one way or another, in some case by the departure of these people from this life, but in most cases by either their voluntary surrender and in addition to Madame Plotsich, there have been a significant number of voluntary surrenders, or by their capture, there have been now something like 20 PIFWICS detained in Bosnia or in Croatia and rendered to the Hague. The big fish, at least the very biggest fish, remain at large, and ending that situation will continue to be an issue. There are lots of reasons for the favorable developments, some are largely indigenous. My personal belief has always been that one of the things which made the biggest contribution to the end of the fighting in Bosnia was the success of the Croatians in first, whether brutally, expelling Serbs who had lived for hundreds of years in the Krajina and then sweeping into Bosnia in effect, which both obviously weakened the Serb resistance, demoralized the Bosnian Serbs because it became clear that Milosevic was not going to save them, but perhaps equally important, raised in the minds of the Bosnian government in Sarajevo some serious questions about whether they really wanted to be liberated by the Croatians and thereby created a context on all sides for a more compromised approach. Some are clearly the result of U.S. efforts, in particular in the case of Bosnia, the pressure in 1994 and 1995 for a gradually stiffening NATO stance. There are a lot of interesting what-ifs. What-ifs at the very beginning, the United States had joined unperfor or otherwise had been more involved. What-ifs at the beginning of this administration, the United States had been able to agree on a course of action with its allies earlier. What-if the United Nations had taken a different and more robust stand in Bosnia, not so much in not being neutralized between the parties, but in not being neutralized between people who were shooting at unperformed people who weren't. What-if the United States and NATO had been clearer, or at least more convincing, about what they would do if a Milosevic, in fact, resumed ethnic cleansing in Kosovo? What-if the Congress had imposed fewer de facto, if not de jure limits and given more support and been less inclined either on the one hand to dismiss the whole problem or on the other to espouse attractive but unrealistic solutions? And in this context, I think it's important, particularly given the particular place in the political calendar, we find ourselves to pay tribute to Republicans like Senator Warner, Senator McCain, Senator Dole and presidential candidate and former presidential candidate Dole and Governor Bush, who supported President Clinton at key points on key decisions much as they may have disagreed and obviously disagreed with his general policies, but also disagreed with some details, some important details of his Balkan policies, but were prepared, I think, to accept that the United States had a vital interest in success and provided important support. But I am much happier dealing with or contemplating these what-ifs and the continuing problems, which were outlined and which are very real, compared with a symposium on the situation in the Balkans if the United States had not, in fact, been as active and engaged as it was both in Bosnia and Kosovo. There are some lessons. I think the most important lesson is that it is still true today that security in remote places with less than angelic players can affect a very vital, very important United States interest. The situation in the Balkans in both Bosnia and Kosovo had important humanitarian elements and undoubtedly the humanitarian elements were very important in the public perception, but fundamentally the issue was not simply humanitarian. It was security and stability in Europe, which is an important American interest as well as a European interest. The second is the obvious platitude that the United States, at least in an area like this, the United States has to expect that if its interests are to be defended and vindicated, we are going to have to lead, and that requires clarity and a certain degree of unity. But it is equally true, and what makes in some sense doing that more complicated, in the European region as elsewhere, that the United States cannot realistically act alone, which means not only kind of skillful spin control and diplomacy, but in extremists actually taking account of other people's opinions and interests, even if we don't entirely share them. And in this context, I think in particular, the role of Russia is in the future of the Balkans is important. I would certainly know the experience shows that difficult as it can be. It is not in our interest to try to exclude Russia from the Balkan problem, unless of course they were to adopt policies which are self-excluding or so contrary to the promotion of a solution that they've excluded themselves. But I think the point about taking account of others' interests applies to Russia. Just as much, obviously, to different degrees as it applies to allies. It's also clear the military cannot act alone. The biggest problems after eight years of experience of this are about mobilizing other instruments of national and international policy. Diplomacy, political pressures, intelligence assets and instruments, economic measures, coordinating the work of NGOs and international organizations. The special and immensely frustrating problem of international support for police, whether it's training local police, creating decent local police forces, or sending in international police forces. And as a matter of national policy, we have regrettably and foolishly starved these non-military instruments of policy relative even to the problems we have in maintaining a military capacity. And indeed it is often the case that the use of force will depend on showing that other instruments have been tried and have not been successful. And that obviously focuses on the need to use these instruments. And also another lesson is that you cannot divorce these regional problems, although they have brought international implications from their cultural and historical roots. That is not to say the conflict is inevitable, any more inevitable in the Balkans than it is anywhere else in the world, but that there are real tensions and real problems and that resolution takes understanding and also living with the fact that there are no angels in this play, although there are a few devils. There's a lot of discussion about reduction of the U.S. commitment. I mean, there's no question that over time those reductions are appropriate and should take place. There had been substantial reductions already. But I, and this I guess is one where I should emphasize I speak for myself. I don't think the United States should shrink from the proposition that for a long time into the future, not necessarily forever, but for a long time into the future, U.S. security interests in Europe will require the presence of some NATO military capability in the Balkans. And I think for a variety of reasons, good, bad, and indifferent, that implies the presence of some American military presence in the Balkans. A lot can be shifted, their total level can continue to be reduced as it has been. A lot can be shifted, a lot of the burden can be shifted to non-military instruments. But I think it would be a mistake to set up as an objective that the United States, as opposed, should get out militarily altogether, as opposed to looking to the day when there won't need to be any or at least any significant NATO military presence. And finally, and coming particularly from the perspective of the Department of Defense, the Bosnia-Cossova-Balkan experience underscores that military force is essential as a potential instrument in dealing with truly intractable, brutal, and deep-seated conflicts like these, both as a threat and as an ultimate instrument of policy. Just a few observations about some of the lessons about the use of military force in conflicts like this. The first, and I think the most important, and a lesson which is easier to state than to apply in practice is that there are no magic bullets, there are no particular sets of buttons which if appropriately bombed over the course of the day or so will produce instant dramatic results. Sometimes, they may, but you can't count on it and you should not start on a military use of force in this or any other regional context unless you are prepared to say the course. In connection with that, it is clearly disadvantageous from a lot of perspectives to rule out options, and therefore I think the lesson is don't rule out options, but you have to face the problem that if you announce that all options are open, you may at the outset and mean it in any serious sense, you may create problems domestically and with allies which are intractable and prevent you from dealing with the problem at all. And in the military, as much as with the political, you have to recognize that a coalition campaign is going to involve allies. That has implications about capabilities in which the allies need to improve theirs relative to ours, but it also has implication for decision making and that to some degree, shared burdens imply shared decision making. In this kind of intervention, although I believe they have at stake important national interests do not have national survival at stake, at least in the short term, and therefore they have complex political, diplomatic, and public relations aspects which cannot simply be ignored by announcing that all that the war has started and we'll tell you or the military commanders will tell you when it's over and how it came out and what the bill is. And finally, and I think this is a difficult lesson, again, easy to stay difficult to cope with in practice. War is a, and the use of military force is ultimately war, large or small. War is a brutal, nasty business. It not only kills people, it means to kill people. And it involves risks to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines. And we cannot expect, and as a matter of historical record, the United States did not expect in the Balkan context to have a risk-free war. It is a blessing that there were no direct combat casualties among the American or NATO forces in the coast of a war. That is not what we expected. Almost all of our allies who participated in unprofor had people killed in the course of that conflict. I lost three very good friends. Civilians won an Air Force officer role in a civilian military capacity. This was not an example of America expecting a cost-free war, and we cannot expect those in the future. I think we have left, and this is, frankly, in a number of other areas, we have left a good legacy on which the new administration can build, although I certainly agree the challenges are formidable. Thanks. Thank you, Walter. Last official act as a member of the Board of Trustees. Richard Perl is a resident fellow of the American Enterprise Institute, where he has directed its commission on future defenses. He is a member of the Defense Policy Board and a consultant to the Secretary of Defense. He was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy in both the Reagan and Bush administrations and advisor to members of Congress and a frequent commentator in both print and broadcast. Richard is going to reflect on the costs and benefits of US involvement in Balkans security, consider perhaps a recalibration of US interests and what the implications are or are not for a brief definition of the military role in the Balkans. Richard, thank you. Well, thank you very much. Like Walter, I can't speak for the administration. Yet, nor for the next administration. In fact, the next administration can't yet speak for the next administration, so we are much clearer than almost anyone else. I was struck by Walt's summary description of the progress that has been made in bringing war criminals to justice, the big fish or some of the big fish, but really the big fish are still at large. And they are indeed. By the way, I hope that the incoming administration will summarily abandon all acronyms, but especially an acronym that makes it more difficult to say the word war criminal, and I should say the word war criminal. The big fish are indeed still at large. The biggest of those fish is Milosevic himself. And I can't think of a more salutary development than the apprehension and trial of Milosevic. The apprehension and trial of Karatec would do a lot as well. And I hope we don't slip into the view that because he left office the way he did that he should somehow be let off the hook. He's a continuing bad influence, and he's preventing a political catharsis of great importance, as is the failure to apprehend some other war criminals. So I hope that we will redouble our efforts and not consider that diplomacy somehow dictates a different course. One of the vaccine problems of dealing with the Balkans has been the inadequacy of traditional diplomacy. Diplomacy is at best a limited instrument. When dealing with thugs, it is sometimes close to irrelevant. And the essential fact about the Balkans has been the management of a violent process by thugs. I make the point because when we attempt to deal with thugs as though they were diplomats, or when we play such a high regard on the positions of power they occupy as heads of state, we sometimes forget that essential fact. And because traditional diplomacy has limited effects, I believe we need to think about more effective ways of applying force. When force provides an opportunity for a solution, we have fallen into a pattern of regarding force as a last resort. And what that inevitably means is that we go through a series of endeavors prior to the use of force, because we are very often in the end left with no alternative. And that process, which often includes sanctions, has included sanctions with respect to Yugoslavia, almost from the beginning. It includes sanctions 10 years after the end of the Gulf War against Saddam. The process of sanctions is very often ineffective, delays the recognition that something more significant needs to be done, and it can actually produce a situation in which force, when ultimately used, is used at a much greater cost and with necessarily inflated loss of life. And of all the measures that we need seriously to rethink as we look at the Balkans in the future, is the very limited role for such traditional approaches as agreements limiting arms. One of the great tragedies of this century, I think, will be eventually understood as, should be understood even now, as the embargo that prevented Bosnia from defending itself. Without precedent, the United Nations denying a country under attack the means of its own defense, while failing to provide that defense itself. I hope that never happens again, and I hope reflection on it causes us to reconsider the notion that's become popular, that restraint in the provision of arms is always better than the alternative. The alternative might well have been a defense of a kind that proved effective very early in the conflict, where arms were available to the other side, but where they're as in Slovenia. But where there were no arms available, we saw the tragic consequences. So we should be very careful about embargoes and very careful about a failure to permit beleaguered countries, particularly France, from finding the means to defend themselves. This has important implications for the role of the United States because while we all agree that it's best to operate with allies, I would hope that we could agree that it is best to assist those who need our help in helping themselves, and that in turn can limit the involvement of the United States while intentionally advancing the purpose. I want to talk about U.S. military forces in the region, partly because so much attention has been placed on what I think has been misunderstood as an inclination by the incoming administration to withdraw. I think that's a wrong reading of what has been said. The conflict in the Balkans has gone through phases. In Bosnia, clearly there was a moment when military forces of the kind that were dispatched to Bosnia were what we needed, or more or less what we needed. They were what we had. More agile forces might have been better, but we used what we had and we clearly needed military forces. But that conflict has gone through phases, and if I take just Bosnia for the moment, it is now clear that the military force that was needed at the outset is not what is needed today. We need something rather different The issues now are rather more akin to administrative issues and the police functions that have been referred to. And no one should mistake a decision by the United States to revise its presence to reflect the way in which the conflict has changed as a fundamental reorientation of the United States in its role and responsibilities with respect to the rest of the world. It would be a great mistake to regard a rational substitution of the role we've been playing in the past to the role now required in this period of relative calm. As far as I know, there's been very little violence in Bosnia, and it's not at all clear that the United States Army is the most effective instrument for the continuing role of the United States in Bosnia. And we shouldn't be prevented from a rational assumption of responsibility by a fear that we will be misunderstood as abandoning the world. There is a great danger in accepting the view that we will need to be there for a very long time. And the danger is that it becomes self-fulfilling that we do not take, and others do not take those steps that will in time permit the region to handle its own affairs. I suppose the clearest example of this may be the extent to which the parties are able to defend themselves and protect their own interests going forward. We have had a program far too small in my view of equipping and training the Bosnians, for example, so they can defend themselves. We need to think more seriously about how we can assist friends in the region in providing for their own defense because we will never extricate ourselves as long as extrication will produce a catastrophic change in the situation. So if we become the source of stability and others become dependent on us as a source of stability, it's like welfare dependence. It never ends. And so one needs transitional plans. And the point is not that you leave after a certain period of time or you promise to leave after a certain period of time. You can leave when the job is done. And the job is done in part when you can leave safely because you have left behind communities that are capable of doing for themselves what we would otherwise be doing for them. And if we don't take that prospect seriously, we won't put those programs in place. We need to ask ourselves what we can do uniquely. What is it the United States can do that the Germans can't do or the British or the French? When we send an American to the Balkans, it won't correct me if this is wrong. It's at least a year-long engagement, separation of the young soldier from his or her family, and it's quite costly. A German can go home for the weekend. It probably hits a ride going home for the weekend, but you're 45 minutes away by air. It makes sense in a rational division of responsibility for the German who can go home for the weekend to assume some of the responsibilities that might otherwise be assumed by American soldiers, where soldiers are necessary. And for the United States to do those things that the Germans can't do or the British or the French can't do. And we are uniquely equipped, unfortunately, in many ways, to provide logistics, communications, intelligence, and other capital-intensive capabilities. And as we sit down with our European allies to discuss the way forward, it's not a matter of America shirking its responsibility, it's a matter of a more rational division of responsibility in which we do those things that we can do best and we call upon friends and allies to do the things that they can do best. And so in recalibrating, we should be thinking along those lines, not to facilitate a withdrawal from the world, but to make more rational the way in which we relate to our friends and allies in the troubled part of the world, where I believe we will remain deeply involved. Anyone who expects the incoming administration to abandon the Balkans has not paid attention to the people who were putting that administration together, including the President-elect himself. Finally, let me throw out a suggestion. It's not unique, but I think the time has come to face it seriously. Much of the objection to the American military presence, not only in the Balkans but elsewhere, has had to do with the role that we expect military forces to play in peacekeeping operations. And very frequently, the activities associated with those peacekeeping operations are not the things for which our soldiers, sailors and airmen have been trained. They don't reflect the missions that cause them to sign up for a career as professional military people. It is a source of frustration for them and even demoralization. If we are going to be in the peacekeeping business, and I think inevitably we will, then it's time to consider establishing a peacekeeping institution that is not the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, that has some of the capabilities of fairly protecting itself and even protecting others, but that is organized, equipped, and trained and optimized for peacekeeping operations that are different from the combat operations for which we train and equip our troops at great expense. The new institution would be a good deal more contempt in its labor. The Department of Defense would be happily freed of a burden that it has taken on by default because it's been the only capability at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, and I hope the new Commander-in-Chief will consider that perhaps we need a new capability that is not part of the Department of Defense, but that can play, continue to play an important peacekeeping role. Thank you, Richard. We're going to try to stay on schedule, but I would like to allow an opportunity for a few questions, so if you have one, if you would step up to the microphones, identify yourself, and please be brief. Do you want to say anything for the question? Mark would like to add something before the question. I want to go to this question of the overall U.S. role, which has been raised by Richard, and particularly the military role in the Balkans. It seems to me the question here is that there remains, for an unforeseen time, a number of very neurologic problems. The situation is better, but it is not complete, and we have to face those neurologic problems, and those neurologic problems may be the source of violence. Now, no one is holding to any particular level of U.S. forces. They're way down already. We provide roughly 15% of the forces. What I was trying to convey was that it is the overall American weight in determining what should be done that is most important, and that these things, with all due respect to my European colleagues, simply should not be left for Europeans alone to resolve. And one of my deep concerns is that, and I hope it does not happen, that the new incoming administration will serve to organize itself so as to diminish its involvement in the decision-making of the Balkans. And I think that the American military presence and its, or some American military presence and its, is important in negotiating with our allies what needs to be done to resolve some of these or to how to handle some of these neurologic problems. I don't think we simply can make that a burden-sharing exercise as to what U.S. forces does do. All right. We'll start with Landon in that question, and that will be all we have time for. This question comes out of the kind of worms I view grassroots experience in the Balkans over the last five years. The question is, how can we arouse sufficient public interest and support and congressional support for staying the course and doing the job that has to be done? Just a month ago, I was in Bosnia and visited some of the villages that I've been acquainted with over the last several years to see what had happened about the return of refugees. There was a time in which many of the experts said these people will never come home. They are coming home, but they are still very, very in a very precarious situation. They need more financial support if they're going to be expected to really establish a new life there. It seems to me here is the key question that we have to address. The new administration has to address. How do we build up support for providing the funds that need to be made available to carry through the economic development programs that we've talked about, partially undertaken, but still have a long way to go in carrying out? Thank you. Who would like to answer that? Waltz, you look ready? One of the most hopeful things that's been said by the Spokesman for the New Incoming Administration is what Colin Powell said when he was nominated, which is that he accepts that we need to make sure that the non-military instruments of national influence are properly funded, properly resourced. He's talked specifically about the Department of State that it's a general proposition. Hopefully the new administration, which could not have a worse relationship with the Republican-controlled Congress than ours, will be more influential. But I think you hit on a key point. The other thing is this is a place where I'm enthusiastic agreement with Richard on the point about getting the Europeans to do what the Europeans can do better than we can. The Europeans are embarked on a mad plan to pay European taxpayers money, and riddively raised by voluntary contributions to raise the Corsque. I would think that until every Bosnian has an adequate and every Kosovar, for that matter, every Serb and all the other refugees have an adequate meal a day, the Russians might be allowed to pay the cost of their own folly on the Corsque. Could I simply correct one? It was originally the case that we had one-year rotations. Now it's basically a six-month rotation. As far as I know, German soldiers do not go home for the weekend. That's both, I think, probably many of the militaries there have various kinds of leave programs, but I don't think the Germans go home. I know they do not routine they go home for the weekend. German soldiers cannot in general casually walk down to the airport and buy a ticket home. All right, we have time for one more question. I'm sorry. Trudy Rubin from the Philadelphia Inquart. I'd like to ask Mr. Abramowitz and Mr. Slocum whether you think that a new kind of peacekeepers, U.S. peacekeepers light who were not military would have the kind of heft and reflect the kind of U.S. stature that would enable them to play the kind of stabilizing role that they do now. And to Mr. Pearl, you said you thought that U.S. would be involved in peacekeeping under the new administration. Does that mean we can interpret the famous we're not going to be 9-1-1 remark to mean sometimes but not all the time? I think in this I agree. I wouldn't call it a peacekeeping core. I think one of the real and most serious lacks on the international security armamenture, so to speak is the lack of essentially kind of gendarme capability which in some sense I think is what Richard is talking about. People who are trained in some sense both as policemen and as light infantry and have some of that equipment. I'm not sure that's the place where the United States comparative advantage lies highest but I think it's a basically good idea. However, as those of you who have been there know, the United States made a deliberate and I think very wise decision that we are to quote Secretary Perry, at the beginning we are going to be the meanest dog on the block. The reason the M1A1 tanks are there is not because we fear a heavy armored assault from the remnants of the Serbska Army but because they are in fact a very good deterrent, a very good intimidating factor. They may not be necessary in the future but there was a good reason to go in very heavy at the beginning which I think Richard can see. Just on 9-1-1. The trouble with 9-1-1 is it's intended to deal oh, I'm sorry. It's intended to deal with real emergencies but the number of frivolous calls that go to 9-1-1 greatly outweighs the number of real emergencies so we need to be discriminating about where there's an emergency that requires the United States and where it's unnecessary and I think what you've seen in some of the reflections is a sense that we have been indiscriminate in the alacrity with which we've responded and we've sometimes responded if it wasn't necessary and we were not the responder of choice. Mark, you're going to have the last word. In regard to Judy's question I think one of the biggest lacuna has been shown to be the absence of instrumentalities of justice, of people, police force, protection of judiciary all those forces that are necessary once you've established some sense of peace to keep the entity developing but in many cases I don't think they can substitute for force, for real forces. A lot depends on the situation and as long as the cost of issue is unresolved I don't believe there's any possibility of building up costable forces that could take care of any resurgence which I don't expect for real forces. So the maintenance of real forces remains very important cannot be substituted by police or John Johnnery in a number of situations. In many situations they can certainly take over some responsibility. Join me in thanking my colleagues for stimulating