 Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Very happy to be in Dublin. Thank you very much to the Institute of International and European Affairs for inviting me. The first impression is it feels very cozy here. The weather is almost like at home, just a couple of degrees warmer than in Tallinn at the moment. So what I will do in my speech, I will focus on the security situation and the security concerns of the three Baltic states in the regional security environment. But I really look forward to also discussing and comparing the interests and threat perceptions of small states in different parts of Europe. There are similarities, but definitely there are also differences. So the positive starting point looking at the security of the Baltic states is that the three small Baltic states can feel more secure today than actually ever before. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are firmly integrated into European and transatlantic structures, most importantly through their membership in the European Union and NATO. What has happened in the regional security environment since 2014 is not also positive. Namely, Russia's aggression against Ukraine has weakened the regional situation also in the Baltic Sea region, but it led to a united response of the EU and a stronger presence of NATO, which increases stability and predictability. But, of course, there is a big but or a number of dark clouds in the sky. First and foremost, there is a new level of uncertainty about the commitment of the United States to European security and more broadly the rules-based international order. Second, the European Union has been stepping up its efforts in the field of defence cooperation, but the process is slow and there is no shared vision of its goals and priorities. And thirdly, Russia continues to pursue stronger influence in its nearby regions and it tries to deepen political divisions within the EU and NATO. So I will look at each of the dark clouds in a bit more detail and discuss the positions of the Baltic States in the regional security framework. I would like to argue that the most difficult question the Baltic States are facing is how to prepare for a possible withdrawal of the United States without making it more likely to happen. This is a crucial question for the whole Europe, but in particular it has existential importance to the small states that are most dependent on the US security guarantees such as the Baltics. So looking at the transatlantic relations, for the Baltic States it was very much welcome that NATO responded quite clearly to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, which is continuing since 2014. Of course this as such a very negative and shocking development had the positive effect of clarifying the purpose and the focus of NATO. Most importantly for the Baltic States, NATO has launched the multinational combat-ready enhanced forward presence battle groups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland which are led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the US respectively. So this has really increased the deterrence effect of NATO since any military incursion would automatically mean a conflict with the whole alliance. Furthermore it is a positive step for the Baltic States and the Baltic Sea security that our neighbours Finland and Sweden have become increasingly closely engaged with NATO and cooperating on commons threat assessment, contributing to NATO discussions on deterrence and defence and taking part in exercises. Of course as you know Finland and Sweden are not members of a military alliance but increased presence of NATO in the region has actually been welcomed not only by the Baltic States and Poland but also by Finland and Sweden. It is no secret that the Baltic States would prefer seeing their Nordic neighbours as NATO members in order to strengthen the collective defence and deterrence and further reduce the likelihood of potential aggression in our region. However as long as Finland and Sweden prefer not to take the step to full membership which would undeniably be perceived as a hostile move by Moscow a special partnership and close pragmatic cooperation with NATO helped to make the security environment more stable. Now turning to the uncertainty factor and of course we have to talk about the presidency of Donald Trump here his disregard of allies, his dislike of NATO and in particular the European Union his rejection of multilateralism is certainly a cause of serious worries in the Baltic States. In the past the Baltic States have invested a lot not only in strengthening the commitment of NATO in the Baltic Sea region but also their bilateral relations with the United States. And during the Trump presidency this has certainly become a more tricky task it has required an extra effort to work broadly with those forces in the US administration and Congress that hold a consistent approach to the importance of securing the Baltics and deterring Russia in Central and Eastern Europe. The three Baltic presidents made a joint visit to Washington in spring 2018 which had an appearance of continuity on the surface yet later on the media reported about Trump having mixed up the Baltics with the Balkans and accused the former of having started the wars in former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Even more worryingly there are reports that Trump has repeatedly privately suggested the withdrawal of the United States from NATO. The Baltic States are keen to highlight that in spite of Trump's tweets the change of actual US policies towards Europe does not appear radical at all. The US has in fact increased its spending on European security under the European deterrence initiative which provides for more troops, US troops in Europe particularly Poland enhanced prepositioning of equipment, more exercises and training and improved infrastructure. However we also need to look beyond the Trump effect and look at longer-term global change and admit that longer-term global trends are likely to make Europe decreasingly relevant for US foreign policy interests in future. The US is increasingly focused on China and President Trump's mission to constrain China as a systemic adversary is something that is actually broadly supported among the US foreign policy makers. At the same time there is a continuity in US foreign policy since the Obama era with regard to the understanding that the US is suffering from overreach and is paying too much for international security. So Europe in this situation faces a new geopolitical environment where it is much more on its own and threatened to become squeezed between major powers in a future bipolar world order. So these broader trends point to the need for the Baltic States together with their European allies and partners to start preparing for an era of reduced US interests and presence in the region. At the same time this is a scenario that the Baltic States wish to prevent from materializing above all because there are no credible alternatives in sight to the US security guarantees. Europe remains militarily too weak in foreseeable future. Thus the Baltic States are faced with the question how to prepare for a possible withdrawal of the US without making it more likely to happen. Here comes then the importance of European defence cooperation as an important part of the answer. The Baltic States have generally been constructive partners in the development of the EU's common security and defence policy. At the same time when they ask what's in it for us, for our national security concerns, the answer is not that much. The importance of the EU for national defence has been marginal although the EU's broader and indirect significance for Baltic security is huge. The recent new defence initiatives of the EU have somewhat increased the EU's role in regional security in the Baltic Sea region in two broad aspects. First, the EU has started to contribute more to member states' defence capabilities and cooperation in developing their defence capabilities. And second, the EU has undertaken a number of new initiatives to counter so-called hybrid threats and the three Baltic States have actively contributed in these activities. I have no time to look at the details of these initiatives. Let me just say that these initiatives of the EU have been pursued under the grand concepts of European sovereignty and Europe's strategic autonomy which have been most vocally promoted by the French President Emmanuel Macron and they have been received with suspicion and concern in the Baltic States and Poland due to what is perceived as the thinly veiled anti-American undercurrent of these initiatives and also the unrealistic level of ambition. The tensions around these concepts have been increased by the hostile attitude of the current US administration towards these concepts. So while France can be seen to actively aim at Europe's reduced ties to the US and thereby increased autonomy and sovereignty, the Eastern Member States in the EU and NATO aim for the opposite ever closer security cooperation with the US or at least maintaining the same level of security cooperation. And the worry is that the French push for strong words and high ambitions has to some extent had a counterproductive effect, making it more difficult to keep the EU united and focused on the shared pragmatic goals to actually strengthen European defence capabilities and the ability of the EU to take more responsibility for Europe's security where necessary. The Baltic States always keep underlining the importance of the EU's defence cooperation to be complementary to NATO and strengthening both organisations. And what is a challenge for the Baltics is to find ways to be proactive to shape the debate and the activities in the pursuit of Europe's strategic autonomy in a manner that then responds also to their security interests and does indeed help to maintain the transatlantic ties. We know that in foreseeable future the European Union will not be able or willing to take responsibility for Europe's territorial defence, which remains the core task of NATO. And this is the starting point that conditions the Baltic States attitude to European defence cooperation. Now finally, a few words about Russia, which is the big neighbour of the Baltic States and always perceived as a potential threat. Speaking about the EU's contribution to regional security, I would say that the EU's most important contribution actually stems not from its activities in the field of defence cooperation, but from its unity and consistency vis-à-vis Russia. Including through maintaining sanctions as long as the reasons for the sanctions that were put in place after the annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of eastern Ukraine by Russia have not been resolved. Now on the positive side one has to say that there are no unresolved conflicts in the Baltic Sea region as such and the likelihood of a military conflict is generally regarded as low. And the effect that Russia's more assertive and aggressive policies over the past years have had is to push smaller countries in the Baltic Sea region closer together in their threat perceptions and views on regional security. Many countries have been stepping up their defence capabilities and cooperation in the frameworks of both the EU and NATO and various B and mini-lateral groupings. The Kremlin has blamed the increased presence of NATO in the Baltic States and Poland and deepening cooperation of Finland and Sweden with the Alliance for the worsening security situation and Russia's increased military activity in the Baltic Sea region. But from the perspective of the other Baltic Sea states the cause-effect relationship does work in the opposite direction. So for example in light of Russia's aim to prevent further enlargement of NATO to Sweden and Finland its actions have appeared rather counterproductive. So what is the main source of vulnerability for the Baltic States is the fact that they are the most exposed part of NATO. Russia might seek to put NATO's unity and resolve into test by provoking instability or intervening on the territory of one of the Baltic States likely through a hybrid scenario where its interference would be hard to verify. So the threat to the Baltic States stems from Russia's broader strategic goals to undermine the unity of the West and discredit organisations such as NATO and the EU and furthermore to destabilise Western societies and discredit the Western democratic model. Now coming to the conclusions I would like to make some very brief, concrete conclusions on each of the three main topics that I covered. First on the transatlantic relations it is clearly in the interest of the Baltic States but also the Nordic countries to maintain strong transatlantic ties in spite of the new tensions in the relationship. The Baltic States have always tried to avoid making choices between Europe and the US or the EU and NATO. Second, as the European Defence Corporation is deepening and the EU is becoming more active in this field the Baltic States need to contribute to this work and take ownership while making efforts to prevent the widening of transatlantic cracks. At worst, the EU's efforts may contribute to the weakening of the transatlantic link but fail to reach a sufficient strengthening of European capabilities. Thirdly, it is a key concern of the Baltic States that Western policies towards Russia should be based on a realistic understanding of Russia's goals to strengthen its great power status and influence on nearby countries. This necessitates a consistent defence of European security order and not lose talk about renegotiating that order. Russia's great power ambitions and geopolitical goals have already been gaining more space and traction due to the overall weakening of the Western political divisions within the EU and NATO. So far, though, we see no tangible negative effects for security in the Baltic Sea region. Strong presence of institutions such as the EU and NATO in the Baltic Sea region is so valuable, namely because it constrains aggressive action and creates stability and predictability. I will finish here. Thank you very much.