 On August 30th, John Fermant, the commander of the Department of the West, instituted martial law in the state of Missouri. With this, much like Maryland, Fermant claimed the authority, with the blessing of President Lincoln, to arrest and try civilians, suspend habeas corpus, and whatever else he deemed necessary to maintain order. But there were two parts of his order that President Lincoln would not stand for. I'll talk about both in this episode, but the more interesting one is the very last point of Fermant's declaration of martial law, which read, quote, The property, real and personal, of all persons in the state of Missouri, who shall take up arms against the United States, and who shall be directly proven to have taken active part with their enemies in the field, is declared to be confiscated to the public use, and their slaves, if they have any, are hereby declared free men, end quote. This was really the first Emancipation Proclamation of the war, and the later, more famous Emancipation Proclamation would largely mirror it, as Lincoln's Proclamation in 1863 only freed slaves owned by Southern rebels in Union-controlled territory. Sometimes you'll hear the claim that Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation freed no slaves, but that isn't actually true, as there were areas occupied by the Union but still considered to be in a state of rebellion, and about 50,000 slaves would be freed under Lincoln's Proclamation, but we aren't quite there yet. In 1861, when Fermant gave his proclamation, Lincoln was not pleased. 1861 was largely the point in the war in which the northern focus was in making sure the last few slave states did not join the Confederacy. Maryland, of course, was the top priority because of its proximity to the nation's capital, but Lincoln was also very concerned about losing Kentucky. A famous but probably apocryphal quote by Lincoln is one in which he allegedly claimed that he wasn't sure if they could win the war without God, but he knew they couldn't win it without Kentucky. Even if the quote isn't true, it probably accurately illustrates Lincoln's priorities in 1861, and Lincoln's fears about the effect of Fermant's proclamation on Kentucky weren't entirely unfounded. One military leader in Kentucky wrote to the president that Fermant's proclamation was, quote, producing most disastrous results, end quote. And that if Lincoln did not overturn it, Kentucky was likely to fall to the Confederacy. A group of Kentucky Unionists reinforced this statement, writing to the president that, quote, there is not a day to lose in disavowing the emancipation, or Kentucky is gone over the mill damn, end quote. So when Fermant declared that all slaves owned by rebels in Missouri were to be freed, the abolitionists of the North hailed the former Republican presidential contender as a hero. But Lincoln was worried about how this might look to the loyal slave owners in other states, particularly Kentucky. Three days after Fermant's emancipation proclamation, Lincoln wrote a letter to Fermant that didn't really chastise him, but addressed Lincoln's concerns. In the letter, Lincoln said, quote, I think there is great danger that the closing paragraph in relation to the confiscation of property and the liberating slaves of traitorous owners will alarm our Southern Union friends and turn them against us. Perhaps ruin our rather fair prospect in Kentucky. Allow me to therefore ask that you will, as of your own motion, modify that paragraph so as to conform to the first and fourth sections of the Act of Congress entitled An Act to Confiscate Property Used for Insurrectionary Purposes, approved August 6th, 1861, and a copy of which act I herewith send you. This letter is written in a spirit of caution and not of censure, end quote. The law that Lincoln referred to and sent a copy of to Fermant was more ambiguous than Fermant's proclamation. Instead of freeing slaves owned by disloyal Southerners, it only allowed for the confiscation of slaves used in the war effort. This idea was originally conceived by Benjamin Butler, who was a staunch unionist despite having supported the Southern Democrat candidate in 1860 and his history of supporting every pro-slavery law during the 1850s. And the idea was based on contraband laws, which declared slaves used for the Confederate war effort to be contraband of war, just as might be the case with arms and ammunition claimed from Confederate soldiers. But the Confiscation Act didn't really stipulate whether contraband slaves were free or not, whereas Fermant's declaration specifically declared that the slaves would be declared free men. In his letter to Fermant, Lincoln did not give any direct order about the Emancipation Proclamation. He simply made a modest request for the general to revise that portion of his decree. Fermant, who wasn't exactly an abolitionist but was more anti-slavery than Lincoln, largely due to the anti-slavery sentiments of his wife, Jesse Fermant, believed that if the president simply understood his reasoning behind the order, he would agree with it. So, Fermant sent his wife to speak to Lincoln in Washington, DC. This might have been unusual for a general's wife at this time, but it was not unusual for the Fermant's, as Jesse really was the woman behind the man's success. Lincoln agreed to meet with Jesse, but he was far more blunt in person. When Jesse entered the president's office, Lincoln didn't even ask her to be seated before he roughly said, well, that Jesse later described as, quote, hard and repelling. But she went on to describe the troubles in Missouri and defended her husband's proclamation. Lincoln was not pleased with Jesse's speech, later writing that she, quote, tasked me so violently with so many things that I had to exercise all the awkward tact I have to avoid quarreling with her, end quote. When John Fermant defended his action and did not meet Lincoln's informal request to modify the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln sent him back a formal order to change it. And, of course, the general had no choice but to comply. Lincoln overturned Fermant's order to manumit Confederate-owned slaves in Missouri. Critics of Lincoln liked to point to this event as evidence that Lincoln's concern when waging the war was not the fate of slaves in the United States. I think this is a valid argument. We can't ignore parts of history just because they are inconvenient to our narrative. And if the narrative is that Lincoln freed the slaves, this order is a pretty relevant piece of history. This doesn't mean that pro-Lincoln people can't defend Lincoln's decision on pragmatic grounds, and some people do exactly this. His fears about Kentucky weren't unfounded. But Lincoln's reaction to Fermant's proclamation is instructive for more reasons than just to illustrate Lincoln's moderate position on slavery. It demonstrates the supreme importance that the president placed on maintaining the border states at the outset of the war. In 1861, Lincoln's priorities in the war were twofold. First, protect Washington DC, which is why the largest portion of union troops were stationed in northeast Virginia. And two, keep the final four slave states from leaving the union, particularly Missouri, Maryland and Kentucky, since Delaware seemed pretty safe. Whatever feelings Lincoln had about the institution of slavery, he was undeniably more concerned with keeping these last few slave states in the union than he was with the status of any actual slave. Lincoln's view on the idea of emancipation shifted over the course of 1862, leading to his own emancipation proclamations issued in September of 1862 and January of 1863. And we will explore that shift in future episodes. But to have any honest understanding of Lincoln's decision to issue his own emancipation proclamation, we have to first understand where his priorities stood in 1861. And it is for that reason, I do believe it is vital to understand this often overlooked event in history. I'm Chris Calton and this is the Mises Institute podcast, Historical Controversies. In the previous five episodes, we've looked at the union operations to control Missouri and keep it from falling to the Confederacy. We left off at the end of the Battle of Wilson's Creek, also known as the Battle of Oak Hills or the Battle of Springfield, in which the Confederate troops drove back the union forces and General Nathaniel Lyon became the first union general officer killed in the Civil War. Shortly before the battle took place, General John Vermont was placed in command of the Department of the West and had to come to St. Louis. It is there that we will pick up the story. John Vermont arrived in St. Louis on July 25th, a few weeks before the Battle of Wilson's Creek, but he paid little attention to Lyon's activities, aside from sending him in order to retreat if need be. But Vermont left St. Louis to inspect other areas of Missouri, so he was away from the city and focused on his own dealings during the battle on August 10th. Days after the union defeat in the Battle of Wilson's Creek, Major John McKinstree declared martial law in St. Louis. The union officers in St. Louis during Vermont's absence immediately took over the police function in the city. Police commissioners were given orders to suppress the sessionist newspapers and arrest their editors so as to avoid spreading information about the Confederate victory. When the police commissioners refused to do this, Major McKinstree ordered his own men to do the job themselves. Within days and after numerous arrests of newspaper editors, there wasn't a single process session newspaper left operating in St. Louis. But the refusal by the police to obey military orders also upset McKinstree, so he had the president of the police board, John Brownlee, arrested as well on a treason charge. He was held for a week until he was released after agreeing to resign and move out of Missouri. This was unwelcome news to the police board who resented the action taken by McKinstree, so they immediately elected a fireeater as Brownlee's replacement. This time, McKinstree just ignored the president of the police board and dealt directly with the St. Louis chief of police who was more willing to obey military orders. Police squads were organized to prevent riots, and the sale of firearms was made illegal in the city. In reaction to a bar fight that erupted a few days after the Battle of Wilson's Creek, McKinstree also issued an order that decreed, quote, all saloons and bar rooms, another place is kept for the retelling of spiritists and intoxicating liquors in the city and county of St. Louis, except the saloons connected with the principal hotels in such others as may after due investigation receive special permission to open, be and remained closed. And the sale of any intoxicating liquors or beverages at a retail is hereby expressly forbidden, end quote. This order affected almost 600 saloons, not to mention its effect on retail stores that sold alcohol. Any law against alcohol is going to be controversial, obviously, since alcohol is pretty popular in any area of history. But this one was particularly unpopular because many of the people that punished were loyalists in the city. A large number of saloons were owned by German Americans who really were the core group of the Union Army in Missouri, and they suffered plenty of anti-German sentiment from secessionists already, only to be punished by having their livelihoods threatened by a Union military order. So following this law, after the problem became apparent to McKinstry, he set up a commission that allowed saloon keepers to appeal to him for the stated special permission to reopen so long as the saloon keeper could find two known Unionists to vouch for him as well as taking an oath of loyalty to the United States. Political arrests became commonplace in the city, and a citizen who so much has said something insulting about the Union soldiers would be arrested for treason. When some laborers who'd been hired to build fortifications went on strike, not because they were secessionists, but just because they wanted better pay, 23 of them were arrested and imprisoned for several days. Members of the Missouri House of Delegates were arrested. Not everybody arrested was a secessionist either. There were many people, of course, who simply did not believe the Union military had the right to do what it was doing, but any dissent was considered treasonous at this point. John Fremont returned to Missouri and issued his own statement of martial law to officially extend the policies to the entire state. I won't read the entire statement, but in it, Fremont said, quote, "'In order, therefore, to suppress disorders, "'maintain the public peace, "'and give security to the persons "'and property of loyal citizens, "'I do hereby extend and declare "'established martial law throughout the state of Missouri. "'All persons who shall be taken with arms "'in their hands within Missouri "'shall be tried by court-martial "'and if found guilty will be shot," end quote. Following this, of course, came the portion of the decree that constituted Fremont's emancipation proclamation. Fremont went on to declare that anybody who was found not in their homes would be presumed guilty of treason, he wrote, quote, "'All persons who have been led away from allegiance "'are required to return to their homes fourth-width. "'Any such absence without sufficient cause "'will be held to be presumptive evidence against them. "'The object of this declaration is to place "'in the hands of military authorities "'power to give instantaneous effect to the existing laws "'and supply such deficiencies "'as the conditions of the war demand," end quote. Days later, a Confederate officer named Maryweather Jeff Thompson, nicknamed the Swamp Fox, who as part of the forces camped out in the southeastern corner of Missouri, issued a decree of his own. He said that for every person Fremont executed, Thompson would, quote, "'Hang, draw, and quarter a minion of said Abraham Lincoln," end quote. Thompson also demonstrated that he meant business by following this statement up with the hanging of a horse thief before leading a raid into Charleston, Missouri, where he robbed a bank of $56,000 to help fund his guerrilla operations. I said in the opening anecdote that Fremont's Emancipation Clause was one of two parts of the martial law order that Lincoln took issue with. The Execution Clause was the other one, and it was specifically because Lincoln anticipated the Confederate reaction issued by Thompson. On the very same day that Thompson issued his promise to meet Fremont's execution's man for man, Lincoln wrote his letter to Fremont, expressing his problems with the order. Lincoln wrote, quote, should you shoot a man according to the proclamation that Confederates would very certainly shoot our best man in their hands in retaliation. And so, man for man, indefinitely. It is therefore my order that you allow no man to be shot under the proclamation without first having my approbation or consent, end quote. Since this was written the same day as Thompson's decree, Lincoln was correctly predicting the response rather than reacting to it. And unlike his informal request to alter the Emancipation Proclamation that came in the same letter, Lincoln did make an official order to Fremont to not have unapproved executions. It was only later that Lincoln formally ordered Fremont to change his Emancipation Proclamation as well. Political arrests became widespread enough that St. Louis quickly ran out of places to hold prisoners. The St. Louis Armory was first used as a prison, but this became full almost immediately. The problem of where to hold people was partially solved by converting slave pens used during slave auctions into prisons for political prisoners. The first prisoner confined there being a local artist who had actually become famous in the city for a bust he sculpted of John Fremont's father-in-law, former Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton. He was arrested for making anti-war statements. More common were the newspaper publishers I mentioned earlier, many of whom found a temporary home in the St. Louis slave pens. Other famous prisoners were members of the Missouri legislature and people who participated in the state's secession convention, including people who were elected as unionists and only supported secession because of actions such as the martial law that led to their own arrest. This included Uriel Wright, who had been elected to the Missouri legislature at the beginning of 1861 as an unconditional unionist, but he finally switched to supporting secession after Nathaniel Lyon's behavior during the Cam Jackson affair. This is a good example of how people who considered themselves unconditional unionists sometimes did so because they simply failed to anticipate the drastic measures that the Lincoln administration and his military leaders would take in response to secession. After being released from the prison, Uriel Wright joined the Confederacy. Another telling arrest was that of Reverend David McEnally, who published a paper called the Christian Advocate. His arrest was made for an editorial, he wrote, lamenting the civilian deaths during the St. Louis massacre. Other people were arrested for things as frivolous as saying something that could only be vaguely interpreted as disloyal. One horse trader sought a permit to be able to leave the city and when he was presented the document he had to sign, he said that he'd be, quote, damn, if he'd sign that. This was enough to have him sent to prison, where he was kept until he gave a loyalty oath. The loyalty oath was the basis for most of the prisoner releases. So people were being arrested, imprisoned, and released rather quickly in most cases. In many of these cases, this looked like political theater, a way for the union military leaders to demonstrate to the citizens of Missouri that they were in charge. But in the St. Louis arsenal, things were more serious. There, prisoners arrested for treason were tried under a military tribunal and sentenced to death. Originally, the trials were to take place in the civil courts, which was a guarantee in Vermont's original declaration of martial law. But the civil courts refused to convict them, so they started to be tried under military tribunals, essentially putting civilians through a military court martial. This was the beginnings of the military commission, the ability to try civilians in military courts that was, even according to the assistant attorney general under Lincoln, who wrote the original opinion on Lincoln's ability to suspend habeas corpus was legally dubious at best. But even with the military courts operating, they were reluctant to convict people. There simply wasn't any evidence against most of the people being tried, and many of them were arrested without any charges even being levied. After a few cases, the military commission wrote to general Vermont that, quote, many of the prisoners were found without any charge whatsoever lodged against them. Others had but trivial charges. The commission found many persons charged with being spies and traitors. These charges were not sustained by any evidence whatever. The persons taking them prisoners did, in most cases, send no names of witnesses along. Some were sent here prisoners because one union man considered them dangerous. The commission has felt itself obliged to release most of these prisoners, end quote. Despite the formation of military commissions all over the state of Missouri, nobody was executed. Vermont's actions also started to alienate him from the Blair's, who had long been his allies, and even had helped get him nominated as the Republican presidential candidate in 1856. Two days after Vermont declared martial law, Frank Blair wrote a letter to his brother Montgomery, Lincoln's postmaster general, expressing his dissatisfaction with Vermont's treatment of him. He wrote about union men who tried to meet with Vermont and tell him what was really going on in the state, quote. I have felt at my duty to tell him what they say, and he throws himself behind the reports of his officers who were trying to prevaricate and shield themselves from neglect of duty, and he still clings to them and refuses to see for himself. My decided opinion is that he should be relieved of his command and a man of ability put in his place. The sooner it is done, the better, end quote. The Blair's turning against Vermont was hardly insignificant. Montgomery Blair had once been Vermont's lawyer in defending his title to the gold-rich land in California. They should have been Vermont's closest political allies, but his unwillingness to submit to their will did not go over well. Even as far back as the Jackson administration, the Blair's enjoyed having influence over the people in power, and Vermont's uncooperativeness was insulting to them. Things were only going to get worse for Vermont. In mid-September, Vermont suffered another embarrassment that would only encourage the growing doubts about his ability to command the Department of the West. Sterling Price was leading his Missouri State Guard to different points in the state to reclaim Confederate control. On September 2nd, the very same day that both President Lincoln and the Confederate Maryweather Thompson issued their reaction to Vermont's declaration of martial law, Sterling Price led his men against a small force of Kansans under the command of James Lane, the old military leader of the Free State Forces in Kansas during the 1850s. Lane was not against using harsh tactics against his enemy, but even after Lincoln rescinded Vermont's Emancipation Proclamation, James Lane continued to move about Missouri, freeing slaves, and even forming the first black brigade out of the slaves who came under his protection. But on September 2nd, Lane led 600 men from Fort Scott on the Kansas side of the border into Missouri, where they met and were easily defeated by Sterling Price and his far larger force of Missouri State Guard. Then Sterling Price led his men farther north along the Missouri-Kansas border toward the city of Lexington. Union Colonel James Mulligan was in Jefferson City, the capital in the center of the state, and he learned of Price's movement toward Lexington. He moved in to protect it with a force of about 3,500 men. Price, with an army of upwards of 15,000 men, essentially put the town under siege on September 11th, sending artillery fire against the Union fortifications that were still being built. With Vermont's army on the entire other side of the state, Sterling Price was in no rush, so this went on lazily for about a week while they waited for wagons to arrive with more ammunition. Those came on September 17th, and the next day Price started to attack more aggressively. Price set 16 cannons against the city, firing the first shot at around 10 a.m. on the 18th of September. The infantry pressed forward into the city under the command of General James Reigns. They passed by one building that was being used as a Union hospital, according to the yellow flag being flown on top of it. Normally, this would be ignored, but the infantry started taking fire from snipers positioned inside the building, so a regiment stormed into the building, scattered the Union sharpshooters, and then recognized what a good position the building was in to set snipers, so they decided to use it to themselves to pick off Union soldiers. Inside Lexington, Mulligan asked for volunteers to retake the hospital. Nobody volunteered. The attack on the hospital would require them to be exposed as they moved to 250 yards toward the hospital, but after Mulligan gave a rousing speech about the importance of taking it, a group of soldiers finally agreed to take on the dangerous task. They marched double time toward the hospital, and when they got close enough, they broke into a full-on sprint to charge the building. Some of them fell to sniper fire, but the ones who made it burst through the doors and charged up the stairs, firing at anybody who wasn't lying injured on a cot. The charge was successful. There were only a handful of Southerners stationed in the hospital, and they quickly surrendered to avoid the bayonet. One even jumped into a cot next to an injured Union soldier and pretended to be wounded so as to avoid being killed. But this was only a minor success for the small Union force that was now running short on food and water. The men who retook the hospital were so thirsty, they reduced to themselves to drinking out of the hospital buckets that surgeons used to clean wounds, which were contaminated with blood. The water shortage inside Lexington was critical. The Missouri heat was at full blast on September 19th, and the carcasses of horses who died from a lack of water were starting to create a stench around the Union camp. The dehydration of the men was starting to show from their cracked and bleeding lips. Their only respite came from a short downpour that allowed them to soak their blankets in rain, which they could then wring out into buckets and drink. At this point, they were trying to survive until Union reinforcements came. They would be disappointed though. Samuel Sturgis, Lyon's replacement as leader of the Missouri forces, was only 15 miles away, but he stopped short of Lexington after a runaway slave came to his camp and warned him that 5,000 Confederates were waiting to ambush them. Sturgis heeded the man's advice and turned his forces away from Lexington, all unknown to Mulligan, who was still under siege in the city. From inside Lexington, Union artillery was destroying and setting fire to various buildings, which had the effect of driving some citizens to volunteer in Price's army. One of them presented an idea. If Sterling Price pushed into the city, he could use bales of hemp as cover. Price liked the idea and he ordered wagons to be set up and loaded with hemp bales, lining the wagons up like a wall in front of the army. On the morning of September 20th, he ordered the advance into the city. Mulligan tried to send hot shots toward the bales of hemp to set them ablaze, but the previous day's rain had left them thoroughly soaked and the hemp wouldn't catch fire. With the Missouri Guard advancing, several of Mulligan's soldiers started to wave white flags, even without their general's permission. Price sent emissaries in to see to the terms of surrender, but Mulligan initially sent them away. But eventually, even he realized that it was the only option. Finally recognizing defeat, the Union forces in Lexington came forward and handed over their firearms. One of them, the captain of the 13th Missouri Union Regiment, handed his sword over to his own brother, who was part of Sterling Price's staff. The siege was over and Sterling Price not only claimed more prisoners than they knew what to do with, but they also took possession of 1,000 horses that still had not yet died from a lack of food or water, as well as 100 wagons, five more cannons and 3,000 firearms. This was a tremendous windfall for the Missouri secessionists. The battle only cost the Southerners around 100 casualties or so, depending on the estimates, and only 25 of them had been killed. With more than 3,000 prisoners, including several officers, Price immediately started negotiating exchanges for the Confederate prisoners captured during the Battle of Wilson's Creek. Back in St. Louis, General Fremont was being blamed for the fall of Lexington as his detractors seized the opportunity to claim that he abandoned Mulligan, an accusation that may or may not have been valid considering the fact that Fremont had need for troops all over the state. But opponents like Frank Blair were looking for any excuse to paint Fremont as unworthy of his command, and the first Battle of Lexington served exactly that purpose. During the siege of Lexington, due to the harassment he was receiving at the hands of Frank Blair, Fremont issued orders to have Blair arrested. Blair wasn't held for long before being released, and he spent his energy smearing Fremont for everything he could for every failure in Missouri, regardless of Fremont's actual role in the state's problems. Knowing that he was on thin ice, Fremont wrote General Winfield Scott to tell him that he was going to take personal command of the field in Missouri. The goal was to win a significant victory quickly to prevent being removed from command. This was pretty much his last hope of holding on to his title. Fremont knew the order for his removal had already been issued, but it wouldn't take effect until it had been formally delivered, so he started to get ready to leave St. Louis for Jefferson City. Before leaving St. Louis, he had Frank Blair arrested a second time. The Union Army in Missouri came to about 40,000 men at this point, not including the 5,000 or so Kansans just on the other side of the border, but these men were spread thin throughout the state. Some of the subordinate commanders in charge of one of the army's division in Missouri had conflicting interests in regards to Fremont as well, so loyalty and cooperation were not guaranteed. One of them, for example, was General David Hunter, who was positioned to be Fremont's replacement. Secretary of War Simon Cameron came to Missouri to personally deliver the orders for Fremont's removal. He was also accompanied by Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas. When Cameron showed Fremont the orders, Fremont begged him not to issue them until he had a chance to redeem himself with a military victory. Cameron agreed to give him the chance and held on to the orders for the time being. He and Thomas went back to Washington, D.C., but Thomas then published a report that was entirely critical of Fremont's leadership. The Blair's were delighted. On October 25th, Fremont got his victory when some of his troops stormed into Springfield and retook the city, which had been serving as the Confederate capital of the state. Two days later, Fremont led his own army into the city where it found no opposition. Fremont was elated and he was certain that this victory would crowd out the criticisms being levied by the Blair's, but on November 2nd, a messenger showed up to the general's tent and handed him the order, formally removing Fremont from command and appointing General Hunter as the new commander of the Department of the West. But Hunter lasted barely more than two weeks. He ordered some of the Union divisions out of the cities that looked like they might be attacked by Sterling Price and with their retreat, hordes of Missouri Unionists became refugees, flocking to St. Louis for protection from secessionists. This behavior didn't sit well with anybody, so on November 19th, Hunter was replaced with Henry Halleck. Halleck had a plan for how to deal with the refugees. On December 12th, he issued General Order 24, which read, quote, the suffering families driven by rebels from Southwestern Missouri have been supplied by voluntary contributions made by Union men. Others are on their way to arrive in a few days. These must be supplied by the charity of men known to be hostile to the Union. A list will be prepared for the names of persons of this class who do not voluntarily furnish their quota, and a contribution will be levied on them of $10,000 in clothing, provisions, and quarters, or money in lieu thereof. This levy will be upon the following classes of persons in proportion to the guilt and property of each individual. First, those in arms with the enemy who have property in this city. Second, those who have furnished pecuniary and other aid to the enemy, or to persons in the enemy's service. Third, those who have verbally, in writing, or by publication, given encouragement to insurgents and rebels. Anyone who shall resist, or attempt to resist the execution of these orders will be immediately arrested and imprisoned and will be tried by a military commission. End quote. This order quickly became known as the secess levy being attacks on anybody with alleged secessionist sympathies. Names were drawn up of anybody that was assumed to fit any of Halleck's description of guilty parties, and they were sent letters notifying them of their required contribution, which varied between $100 and $800 due by the end of the year. On December 26th, 23 men and two women sent word to Halleck that they refused to pay, claiming that the decree was illegal. In response, Halleck confiscated their belongings and sold it at auction. Other citizens who fell to pay were arrested, just as Halleck promised would be the case. One of the people arrested was a business owner named John Kinnerd, who ran a very large business out of New York City, but he was a philanthropist. He refused to maintain a net worth of anything more than $50,000, so everything he earned in excess of this amount was given to charity, but he was still expected to pay his dues to Halleck, and when he failed to do so, he was arrested and property from his business was seized. A slew of arrests took place in January and February of 1862, and confiscated property was sold in one of three auctions. The goal of raising $10,000 was met this way, and Halleck didn't pursue the levy any further, but his idea was later copied by other people in other states and would also later be revived in St. Louis by subsequent commanders. Halleck also increased the political arrests for anything interpreted as procession speech. By the beginning of 1862, the state of Missouri was firmly under union control, but the war would continue as angry Southerners, such as William Clark Quantrill, who would join bands of raiders and continue to make trouble for the Union Army in Missouri and Kansas over the course of the war. We will eventually come back to the story of the Missouri-Kansas border war, but for now, we will end the story of Missouri here, with it safely in union hands. In the next episode, we will return briefly to Maryland where we will see how Lincoln's administration secured the state for the Union by engineering the September elections. Historical Controversies is a production of the Ludwig von Mises Institute. If you would like to support the show, please subscribe on iTunes, Google Play, or Stitcher, and leave a positive review. You can also support the show financially by donating at Mises.org slash Support HC. 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