 I'm going to return to the more parochial immediate as much as I appreciate all of these strategic issues, and I share all of these concerns and analysis. But let me return to the more parochial, which is the recent policy changes, the recent policy speech, and Pakistan's response. The first thing I would say, and both to the U.S. government and to the Pakistani government is this whole debate has gotten far too emotional. The U.S., for understandable reasons, gets very frustrated and talks about the safe havens and double game and all of this kind of thing. And again, for understandable reasons, but what reaction do you get? First of all, you get denial of any safe havens, and then you get the litany of the history of all the sacrifices Pakistan has made. Again, true, but it doesn't really move the whole discussion forward. And so my first point would be both to our government and to the government of Pakistan, try to be more dispassionate and rational about this whole issue. The second point I would make is that it is time to get serious. And getting serious for the U.S. side does not mean wagging our finger more vociferously and saying, this time we really are serious and you have to do what we want or else there will be consequences unspecified but dire. And Pakistan's response to that, which is not the desired response, is, well, we really don't need the United States or their aid. We do stuff on our own and we have options and we'll put off the visits by American officials and we'll go to Moscow and we'll go to Beijing and so on and so forth. And oh, by the way, we will remind the American audience of what they did a million years ago in the 80s of supporting the madrasas and inviting Jalal Adin Hakani to the White House, where Zool was Ambassador Khalil. That's true. Hakani never came to the White House. That's a photoshop. To know that not a photoshop, the misidentification of the person who was Maulvi Khalis was. Okay. But whatever, same kinds of guys and Ambassador Khalilzad had a lot more hair. That was photoshop. My point is neither of these approaches to the problem move the ball ahead. They're not serious. What is serious is for both sides to put on the table some thoughts about the issues that are really concerning here. First one is, what's the appropriate role of India in Afghanistan? When the Pakistani Prime Minister was here and did an interview on CNN, or maybe it was Asia Society, one of these two venues, he said, none. Well, obviously, you know, that's not going to work. On the other hand, on the other side, the United States is encouraging a greater role for India. We all know that India is a key point for Pakistan, and India's role in Afghanistan is what really underscores Pakistan's behavior there. So we really need to think seriously, we and they, about what that appropriate role is. Secondly, we need to think carefully about the Haqqani network. Now it is assumed and implied regularly on the U.S. side that if it weren't for the safe havens in Pakistan, everything would be going well for us in Afghanistan. I recall a few years ago being told by someone at the NSC that they'd done a study to determine how many of the attacks were done by the Haqqani network. And at that point, it was 15 percent. The way we talk, you would think it was 99. Now, I think it's clear that some attacks are different from others, but I think a lot worse, but we need to really look at what it is that's getting in our way in Afghanistan. Clearly, the safe havens is part of it, but another part of it is the issue of the governance in Afghanistan, of how the government particularly outside of Kabul is perceived by the population, which is part of the reason that the Taliban make a bit of headway in Afghanistan. So we need to really look at this dispassionately and clearly. And I think we would conclude that one of the things that we need to do and that everyone in the coalition needs to do is to focus more on governance in Afghanistan, even though this administration has said this isn't about governance. I think a lot of it is about governance. We need to be honest with one another on that. Then there's also the point of, what is it that the Taliban want? We, in most of our statements, many of our statements, conflate the Taliban with al-Qaeda and ISIS. Has the Taliban now adopted an international agenda like ISIS, like al-Qaeda? I don't know. They didn't start out that way, but I think that's something we really need to consider seriously and again dispassionately. And then finally, both sides say, and many others as well, that there's no military solution in Afghanistan. Yet what's on the table is primarily a military solution. So I think both the American side and the Pakistani side need to look seriously to the elements of a political solution. And my own view is that we shouldn't sequence this, because if we wait to get started until we have a military advantage, we could be waiting for months and years. So we need to prioritize on both sides a political process.