 and separate air forces, supported by equally important service and training commands, are in operation in 10 theaters of war and the continental United States. These air forces cover an operating area of some 19 million square miles, about one tenth of the surface of the globe. In the southwest Pacific area, the fifth air force is playing an important role in softening up the Japanese for the campaigns which are ahead. The personnel strength of this air force is about 110,000. It has over 2,000 airplanes. In an average week, over 3,000 sorties are carried out against the Japs. And during an average week, the Japs feel the destruction of over 1,100 tons of bombs dropped by fifth air force planes. This Jap fighter fell victim to the guns of a P-38. Thousands of others have either been shot down or destroyed on the ground. Statistics show that for every plane we lose, the Japs are losing six. These B-25s are carrying out low-level stropping operations against Jap surface vessels and a Jap-held airfield, killed under dispersal areas, and sorties, and 1,100 tons of bombs per week. These rates measure the current intensity of fifth air force operations. From bases in Great Britain, the eighth and ninth air forces are stepping up both strategic and tactical operations against Germany. Air forces have a personnel strength of over 350,000. Their airplanes number over 7,000. Typical of current operations are days on which 2,000 bombers and fighters dropping over 2,000 tons of bombs are dispatched against Germany. Missions of this size are being executed with increasing regularity, and are now averaging one every three days. I think to intercept the heavy bomber attack are shot down by P-47s. We suffer losses, and these attacks, too. But for every plane we lose, the Germans are losing three. A series of flight paths lead back to the nerve center of all AAF operations. The continental United States. Here is the home base in December 1943. Each point on this map represents some kind of AAF activity. A training field. A technical school. A supply depot. A modification center. All of the elements which must be combined into an air force building and fighting on a worldwide pattern. But operations on such a scale as this have not been an overnight development. To review the story of the AAF growth, let's turn back the calendar to June 1939. Three and a half years ago, the Army Air Corps, as it was then called, was operating on a much smaller scale. We had a total of 36 fields and bases in this country, and four in other parts of the world. Our Air Corps personnel was approaching 25,000, of which about 2,600 were officers. We had some 2,400 planes, about half of which were combat types. Less than 1% of these combat ships were heavy bombers. As for our training program, there were 367 pilots in training at Kelly and Randolph Fields. There were three technical schools with 129 men under instruction. Our expansion plan called for 25 combat groups. In June 1939, we had 10 of the 25. And our plan called for five heavy bomb groups and nine fighter groups. Our first concern was hemisphere defense, and fighters were of prime importance. Operations amounting to $243 million were approved to carry on operations during the remainder of the fiscal year, ending June 30, 1940. This was the brief beginning of our Air Force expansion program. About this time, the RAF had just been voted appropriations of $1,300 million. Airforces of other world powers provided some rather impressive figures. The Germans had 8,000 first-line planes. Japan had 4,000, Great Britain 3,900, Italy 3,000, France 2,000. The United States' strength at this time was 1,200 combat-type planes. Meanwhile, in every capital of Europe, there was the swift unfolding of as big a crisis threat of war could make. To Moscow to sign an unaggression pact with Russia, it was as though a bomb had exploded. Now the democracies could wait, plan, answer and defend, but they could not come through with an action for peace as inspired as Hitler's action for war. While the cold had boiled in Europe, the Army Air Corps celebrated its 30th birthday. It was announced that a Boeing B-17 had just hurtled from coast to coast in 9 1⁄4 hours. An average of almost 260 miles an hour. Till September 1, 1939, a German plane dropped its bombs on Puck, a tiny Polish fishing village. Words were ended, only acts remained. This Great Britain, then France declared war on a German army which had been preparing for it for almost 10 years. During this first great German aerial blitz against Poland, the American aviation scene was beginning to change. Our relative standing with the other nations of the world hadn't changed much. Our plane strength of 2,546 had only increased 24 a month during the last six months of 1939, and 144 planes weren't a lot to add to our total. But orders had been placed for 1,000 military aircraft, the largest peacetime orders in the history of U.S. aviation. And by the end of 1939, Air Corps personnel had increased to 43,000. The Air Corps had now taken over and expanded existing civilian flying and mechanical schools, and had organized others as a foundation for the needed expansion of its training facilities. In April 1940, with rains and fog providing a protective curtain, the Germans landed troops in Denmark. Because of the world mourned the death of France, the Army Air Corps received appropriations for expansion totaling $692 million. And in September of 1940, another one-and-one-half billion dollars was voted to be spent during the fiscal year ending June 30th, 1941. This last appropriation was almost as large as the total amount of money appropriated for Army aviation during its first 33 years. September 1940 brought about the British-American exchange of island bases for over-aged destroyers. The Selective Service Act was passed, and the Air Corps was now assured of a continuous source of training. And on September 27th, 1940, Japan joined the Axis. More important were signs that the Army Air Corps was beginning to put on weight and muscle. By this time, the total personnel had increased to almost 75,000. Their plane strength had increased 1,000 in the past 14 months, bringing the total to over 3,400. About one-third of these were combat types. In November 1940, the Army Air Corps revised its program upward from 25 to 54 combat groups, the first aviation objective. Actually, we had 31 groups at that time. The new program called for 14 heavy bomb groups and 24 fighter groups, as the Air Corps began to expand sufficiently to consider limited offensive as well as defensive operations. That year end 1940, the Germans totaled up their activities and found they had dropped almost 43,000 tons of bombs on England since August of that year. About 10 tons for every ton the RAF was dropping on them. By May 1941, Air Corps personnel had reached 152,000 and was increasing at a rate of 10,000 a month. We were increasing our plane strength at a rate of 600 a month and the total now stood at over 6,000. The fulfillment of the 54 combat group program was a goal which drew closer with each month that passed. In addition, our training programs were now swinging in to stride to produce the vitally needed specialists. The flying training program had over 7,000 students under instruction of which about 6,900 were pilots. Two, we were beginning to specialize in the training of navigators and bombardiers with 228 of them under instruction. There were almost 22,000 students in the various stages of the technical training program. On June 22, 1941, the German armies moved against their former packed partner, Russia. Also in June, the Air Corps received four and a third billion dollars for the fiscal year 1942. This had been preceded by another one and one half billion voted in April to complete the fiscal year of 1941. The overall total for 1941 had been almost four billion. Together these appropriations made a grand total of eight and one half billion dollars which the Air Corps had received from June 1939 to June 1941. In August 1941, the second aviation objective replaced the first and operations were to scale to meet the demands of 84 combat groups. We actually had 59 groups and our new objective would for the first time give heavy bombers and fighters equal planning emphasis. We were to have 24 groups of each. The end of November 1941 saw the personnel strength of the Air Corps hit 297,000. 25,000 of this total were stationed at bases outside the continental U.S. Under instruction in the flying training program were over 13,500 students including over 12,000 pilots and some 800 bombardiers, navigators and flexible gunners. Almost 30,000 students were under instruction in the network of technical training schools across the country. We now had 96 bases and stations and 41 more had been authorized or were under construction. Our plane strength was almost 11,000, but only 3,000 of this total were combat types and less than 1,200 of these were suitable for immediate action measured by standards at that time. About 525 of these first line combat planes were located in the Pacific area. That's the record to December 7th, two weeks of war, over 350 of the 525 combat planes we had in the Pacific area were destroyed. Over one quarter of our total combat strength was lost. We suddenly found ourselves engaged in a mortal struggle with an enemy who could be counted on for nothing except bitter and fanatic opposition. On December 8th the President asked Congress to declare a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire. Three days later, war was declared on Germany and Italy. January 1942 was our first full month at war. Before the month was up, $10 billion had been added to the funds available for the expansion of the Air Corps. By April another $9 billion had been added which bought the total for the fiscal year 1942 to $23 billion. And additional billions were to be made available as needed to build hours into the most powerful airports in the world. We had the funds, now the problem was one of planning and executing. In this first month of 1942, the Air Corps faced three tremendous jobs, jobs which had to be done immediately. Time was the one thing we didn't have. The first job, fighting a war. Second, sharing our airplane production with our allies. Third, expanding on a gigantic scale. What problems were involved in this expansion? The number of combat groups was one of the first problems. How many heavy bomber groups? How many fighters? Troop carrier. How many and what kind of supporting units such as service groups, air depot groups, repair squadrons would be needed? And consideration of the different types of combat groups was only a small part of the problem. Air forces have some 800 different kinds of supporting units. It had to be determined when each individual unit was to be activated and a plan had to be projected showing where each individual unit was to go, in what theater it would be needed. And each unit had to have a table of organization showing how many men it should have, what job each man was to do and what rating each man should hold. How about personnel to man these units? Training through induction centers were men with every imaginable type of experience. These men had to be fitted into one of over a thousand different types of jobs in the air forces. Peace time jobs don't coincide too closely with the functions of war, so most of these men had to be trained. Training courses had to be established, instructors selected. How long does it take to train a man in a particular job? We were in a hurry, but thoroughness was all important. Training facilities were not available, so they had to be built. Buildings, training fields, barracks. Obviously, sites had to be selected first, contracts led, construction time allowed, and speed was essential. The length of training courses was a vital factor. Men had to be started in training soon enough so they would be fully trained when they were needed. It takes almost two years from the time a potential pilot is inducted until he's ready to participate in the combat mission. It takes 89 weeks for a navigator, 89 weeks for a bombardier, 39 weeks for a gunner. The time to train factor alone makes planning two years or more an advance necessary. And training these men as combat teams was another problem. How many men should be trained for each type of job? Some types require over 100,000 men, others less than 100. The number of men who could be expected to wash out in certain courses had to be considered, and the enrollment increased accordingly. Attrition had to be considered, as did the returning to this country of men who had served their tour of duty in a war theater. The length of this tour of duty had to be decided. Men's lives hung on these decisions. These are only a few of the personnel problems. All the men, yes, and the waxed two who are playing a very important role in the air forces, had to be housed, fed, clothed, and trained. Hospitals and adequate medical care were essential. Huge stores of food were necessary. Arrangements had to be made to pay each man, insure him. And yes, entertain him, too. What problems were involved in the airplane picture? Airplane production had to be planned by type, model, and series. It had to be determined when these planes were needed and where. This involved consideration of over 450 different kinds of airplanes. The number of airplanes needed required analysis of the percentage which would be grounded for repair, modification, and other causes. In the average theater, over 40% of the total planes are grounded at all time. An appropriate reserve also had to be planned. Losses had to be anticipated. Replacements must be made and the time required to produce an airplane makes anticipation of our losses essential. The length of time required to send a replacement plane to a given theater is an important factor. We could only plan on about 50% of this country's productive capacity in placing orders for airplanes. The other 50% was going to the Navy or to our allies. What about the problem of spare parts? An adequate stock of spare parts speeds repair work and keeps planes flying. Overstocks mean critical materials wasted. Stock room space wasted and man hours lost. Decisions had to be made as to what kinds of spare parts. For what type, model, and series of airplanes should be stocked in each individual stock room? Yes and when? What about equipment and supplies? Each individual unit of the Air Forces had to have a table of equipment, setting forth in detail just what items it would need. And the individual items of equipment which had to be covered numbered over 500,000 and varied from a nut or bolt to a multi-ton truck. The quantities of each of these items had to be determined and orders placed. How about bombs? Some 18 different types varying from a 2,000 pound general purpose bomb to a four pound incendiary. The types needed for different targets was a big factor. The number of each type had to be decided and orders placed. Soon enough to ensure that our bombers would have enough of the right kind of bombs to drop on a given target at the right time. And gasoline. A heavy bomber in the United Kingdom averages some 240 gallons per hour of flight. A fighter in India will use about 50 gallons per hour. In three months of 1943, over 100 million gallons of gasoline were consumed by overseas units. This is high octane aviation fuel. Again, decision had to be made as to how much would be needed, when and in what figure. Facilities to produce this gasoline had to be built. Transportation was another problem. Not only the gasoline, but the men, the planes, the equipment, the supplies, the spare parts, the bombs, all had to be moved within this country and more important overseas. These are just a few of the problems involved in the expansion of our air forces. But they all had to be solved. February 1942 brought the latest revision of the combat group program. This time it was upward from 84 to 115. We actually had 71 groups. And now for the first time, heavy bomb groups were to outnumber fighter groups. It was to be 34 to 30. In March, the complete streamlining of the United States Army created the Army Air Forces with General Arnold in command. In June 1942, a smashing defeat from the sky was dealt the Japanese fleet in the Battle of Midway. Army Air Force planes joined United States naval forces in the decisive repulse of an enemy task force, bent upon seizing Midway and Hawaii as a prelude to the invasion of our West Coast. The decisive role in turning back this seaborn enemy force. But a full understanding of the importance of winning this battle comes only with the realization of the disastrous consequences which might well have followed its loss. Signs of rapid expansion were evident in June 1942 when the total personnel assigned to the Air Forces had jumped upward to well over 750,000. Our total aircraft was now almost 22,000. In June, headless fortress Europe rocked under the terrific pounding of RAF bombers. The first and were among the first on the list of vital German industrial targets scheduled for destruction. It was in the air on August 17th. B-17s was on its way to attack Rwanda, provided fighter cover for to intercept the bombers and are driven off by the Spitfires. Bombers returned to their base. At home, the combat group plan was revised for the second time in three months. To follow up the 224 figure established in July, a new objective of 273 groups was set. In September, we actually had 109 groups. Of outstanding interest was the fact that this newest plan called for 104 heavy bomb groups and 90 fighter groups. Clearly, future planning was concerned a great deal with the offensive punch which the heavy bombers could deliver. The African campaign furnished full proof of the terrific wallet packed by the heavy bomber. American B-24s, which the British fondly called pink pigs because of their desert camouflage, and B-25s were joining the RAF in hammering at access supply depots, trucks, mobile guns, and tanks. Coordination with the ground forces in this full scale campaign. In other parts of the world, other men and other planes were carrying out missions to clear the skies, to soften up the enemy for future attacks. This is the year that combat operations swung into full stride. Yes, Italy, Germany, and Japan can attest to that. First quarter. American Air Force's planes flew more sorties in this quarter in just three months than they did in all of our previous war activity. They dropped more bombs from January through March than they did from Pearl Harbor to the end of 1942. Our personnel was now in excess of two million, and it had been increasing at a rate of 150,000 a month during this first quarter. In the matter of aircraft strength, our total figure as of March 31, 1943, was almost 43,000, and we were adding to this at a rate of about 2,700 planes a month, net. Our combat losses of 381 planes, compared to the Axis losses of 1,206, showed a ratio in our favor of a little better than three to one, not to mention 459 enemy planes probably lost. The training picture at the close of this first quarter showed new peaks of activity. There were over 98,000 men under instruction in the flying training program, including over 72,000 pilots and almost 8,000 each of bombardiers, navigators, and gunners. Technical training now had 185,000 students under instruction. At 1515, March 1, 1943, a lone B-24 of the 321st heavy bomber squadron sighted a Jap convoy in the Bismarck Sea. Whatever the mission of that convoy, it was never completed. Our air power saw it to that. The smashing defeat hand of the Japs was the fact that the skip bombing technique used for the first time on such a scale proved to be an effective method of destroying enemy ships. In May, the island of Pantelleria became the target for our bombers. The first mission over this target was flown on May 8 at noon. 33 medium bombers dropped 43 tons of explosives. These later, on June 11, after almost 6,000 tons of bombs had been dropped by our planes, Pantelleria surrendered. 13 American aircraft were lost. Second quarter. The number of sorties flown in this quarter was more than double the total in the year's first quarter. The bomb tonnage dropped was two and one half times is great. While offensive activity was doubling itself in intensity, the personnel picture in the air forces was starting to level off toward the completion of the 273 combat group plan. The actual strength was about 2,200,000. Our total aircraft inventory was, for the first time, in excess of 50,000 planes. In the matter of combat losses, our quarterly tally was 507, as compared to the enemy's 2,352. An advantage now for us of better than four and a half to one. In addition, 700 enemy planes were listed as probably lost. In August, the sorties against Germany had begun to follow around the clock schedule. The RAF was hitting with all its power and area bombing attacks at night. The AAF was concentrating on daylight precision raids. Spread by these B-24s was a serious blow to Germany's vital fuel supply. Italy surrendered in September, and our task in Europe was one step near a completion. Third quarter. AAF activity in the third quarter again surpassed all previous records for intensity. The number of sorties was about 80% more than the second quarter. The tonnage of bombs dropped was more than twice that of the previous quarter. Personnel strength had now risen to over 2,300,000, and we had almost 57,000 planes on hand. In this quarter, our combat losses totaled 850, against 3,871 enemy certans, and 873 probables. An advantage in certain losses of over four and a half to one. It was six to one against the Japs. As the final three months of 1943 began to roll off the calendar, air mocks will hung up every day. The first week in October, the 8th Air Force had over 1,000 each of heavy bombers and fighters. There were now more than 1,000 B-24s outside the continental United States. The P-47 was now almost numerous fighter planes. On October 8, 855 planes left Great Britain for a raid on Bremen and Beggiside. The effort and planning necessary to accomplish a mission of this size can hardly be realized simply in the number of planes involved. The planes flew a distance of at least 850,000 miles and traveled over 1,400 miles just on the ground in takeoffs, landings, and taxiing. They used almost a million gallons of gasoline and 25,000 gallons of oil. They were loaded with 2 and a half million pounds of bombs, 2 and 3 quarter million rounds of ammunition, and perhaps 800 pounds of maps. More than 5,000 crew members were over enemy territory for periods of from two to six hours. In October, United States production went over 8,000 planes per month. We were producing 1,000 heavy bombers per month for the first time. Also, a rate of 50,000 sorties per month was reached in October. In November, 1 million crossings over enemy lines had been made by Air Force crew members. In December, the Air Forces were dropping over one ton of bombs per minute of daylight on the enemy. At the end of December, 1943, the Air Forces could look back on a year of tremendous activity, on a year which provided unmistakable trends of increasing intensity and strength. In the first half of the year, the Air Forces performed 104,000 sorties. Almost 2 and 1 half times as many were performed in the second half. We dropped 46,000 tons of bombs during the first half of the year. For the second half, it was almost three times as many. Our combat losses during the first half total less than 900. The Axis lost over 3,500. We lost 1,700 planes during the second half, more than the first, yes. But the Axis lost almost 7,800. Their losses increased over five times as much as ours. At year end, our personnel strength stood at about 2,400,000. Our airplane strength had risen to over 65,000. Yes, the trends are unmistakable. In the months ahead, offensive actions are destined to become so sweeping and so intensive in all theaters that statistics will double and redouble. In 1944, planned operations called for 1 and 1 half million sorties against the enemy. That's 3 and 1 half times the number flown in 1943. Our planes will drop 700,000 tons of bombs on enemy targets in 1944. That's 3 and 1 half times the destruction they dropped in 1943. And in 1944, about 6 million crossings over enemy lines will be made by Air Force's crew members. That's five times the total number of crew members who have flown offensive missions during the last two years we've been at war. The middle of the year, we'll see two tons of bombs per minute of daylight being dropped on our enemies. In the fiscal year 1945, the Air Forces will amass a total of 60 million flying hours. This means that Army Air Force's planes will fly over 164,000 hours each day throughout the year. Tokyo have a lot to look forward to.