 Okay, good morning everybody. This is the first science at 10th event and we are experimenting so I'm very pleased to have William here and then you can see there is a big crowd turning out so that's he's really a superstar so I think he's very pleased. So this one is about science, it's short, snappy to the point and I'm really pleased that there are so many of you turning because William is going to present us a very interesting study that has been developed in occasional paper recently published by C4 on the study of 23 subnational initiative under the red plus mechanism and I will tell us everything we need to know about this and where does it bring us in terms of achievement in terms of greenhouse gases and climate change. Having said that William, please. Okay, thank you for that. It's an honor to be at this inaugural event and it's nice to see such a big turnout. I want to present to you the results of this study that was begun in mid-2012 and it was launched yesterday as a C4 occasional paper and the title I guess is up there the challenge of establishing red on the ground insights from 23 subnational initiatives in six countries. There are 12 co-authors other than myself, four of those are C4 people, Andini Desita, Erin Sills, Amy Duchel, Demetrius Cueca and the other eight co-authors are representatives of red proponent organizations that we have been collaborating with in the last five years. Before I get into the substance of the findings, let me give you a bit of background. In 2007, after decades of failure in various approaches to stopping deforestation and forest degradation, there was much excitement about red. Implicitly it held a lot of promise as the Norwegian Prime Minister at the time said everybody knows how not to cut down trees. The key to the approach was to give conditional performance-based rewards to stakeholders entrusted with protecting and enhancing and restoring forests. Different from past efforts, a very substantial amount of funding would be mobilized first through bilateral and multilateral aid and eventually through the marketing of verified forest carbon credits. Since 2009, Module 2 of the global comparative study on red has been doing research at 23 initiatives in six countries, those being Brazil, Peru, Cameroon, Tanzania, Indonesia and Vietnam. Our aim has been to collect two rounds of data at 170 villages and 4,600 households, half of them within the sphere of red and half outside. The first round of data collection was done in 2010 and 2011 before the presumed introduction of conditional red incentives and the second round is being collected now. Our aim has been to measure the impact of these conditional incentives in red with regard to the three E's, effectiveness, efficiency and equity and the co-benefits specifically as regards while being rights and biodiversity. Yet in 2012, in the midst of the research, we realized that five years after the onset of red, it was barely moving ahead. A very small number of initiatives had begun to market forest carbon offsets and informal communications with our proponent collaborators revealed that they were experiencing a wide range of difficulties and it's in this context that we decided to conduct an in-depth survey of the challenges that they were facing. The approach of the survey was to interview representatives of all 23 organizations to assess their experience in protecting forests in the five following areas of inquiry. Number one, background on forest pressures and the nature of interventions both before red and during the period of red. Two, measurement of the level of satisfaction of the proponents about what they were doing. Third, an in-depth assessment of the challenges experienced in setting up red with answers quantified on a likered scale. Fourth, discussion of the problems encountered and solutions attempted by proponents. And fifth, the proponent views on policy solutions at various governance scales. And now to the results. The overarching result is this. There is serious grounds for concern about how and whether the red concept can persist and evolve based on the following four findings. Number one, conditional incentives might not be as central as it was once assumed it would be in red. Eighteen of the 23 proponent respondents have or will implement conditional incentives. However, only nine of them went asked to identify the single most important type of intervention for saving forest. Only nine of them identified conditional incentives as key. Now this all could be explained relatively easily. It's partly a function of timing with multiple factors causing delay of effective implementation of conditional incentives. Relatedly, many proponents have hesitated to talk with local stakeholders about conditional incentives for fear of raising expectations unnecessarily. Adding to the need for caution is that conditional incentives are experimental, so people want to go carefully. And very importantly, some proponents have decided to move away from conditional incentives at the site level to individuals, but instead go up the stale of governance. The second finding is that there are indication that some initiatives are evolving away from red. When asked the percentage chance that in the year 2015 they would continue to function as red, 11 of the respondents said there was a 90 to 100 percent chance. Five said it was a 50 to 70 percent chance. Three said zero, but in fact in all three of those situations it's because they were transferring responsibility to another organization and four already review themselves as not being red. The third main finding is that initiatives are operating as a hybrid of integrated conservation and development projects or ICDPs and red, and this has both advantages and disadvantages. At 15 of the 23 sites forest protection activities began 10 or more years ago, meaning long before red. Most of the sites involve implementation of ICDP in the sense of a combination of negative incentives, which is to say restrictions on forest access and conversion, and a positive incentive, mainly in the form of non-conditional livelihood rewards. The positive side of this approach is that it gives proponents an ability to move ahead while waiting for the conditions for red to fall in place, but the negative side of this is that in as much as ICDP is viewed to have failed in the 1980s and 1990s, then it's clearly a liability. The fourth finding has to do with the proponents perceptions of the main challenges that they are facing, and we single out two, the top two in the list. The top one is tenure, tenure and security, and tenure is a big problem for red for the following reasons. Red is unfolding in a landscape where quite often land tenure is contested and therefore insecure. From the point of view of the proponent, there's an absolute need to identify the legal right folder to the plan stream of benefits in red, as well as the bearer of responsibility for conditional outcomes. Other research that we've done has shown that external planes on local red forests are a major threat to future red stability, and proponents are faced with tenure problems not just locally but nationally, as exemplified by the effect of the agricultural lobby on the Brazil forest code and on the Indonesian forest moratorium. With the exception of Brazil, all proponents in our study have limited leverage trying to resolve within their boundaries tenure problems that are nationally in origin and in scope. The second problem is the disadvantageous economics of red, and this is a huge problem because in many cases red simply cannot compete with alternative forest converting land uses, such as soy or livestock in Brazil or oil palm in Indonesia. In the language of economics, red is simply unable in most cases to pay the opportunity cost of forest land conversion. To pay the opportunity cost of forest land conversion, it is estimated will require anywhere from 5 to 12.5 billion US dollars per year, yet until now the total amount of public sector funding has been 6 billion dollars not per year but across all the years to date. And the main reason for that we assess is the inability to date to forge a binding international climate change mitigation agreement necessary to create the regulatory environment that would in turn serve to propel a robust forest carbon market. And in closing, let me turn to our recommendations that are at the international level and the national level. At the international level, consistent with what we found in our book, our last book on red, we argue for a turn away from the policies and interests that support deforestation and degradation, as well as those that support continued reliance on fossil fuels. We recommend acceleration of efforts towards achieving a global climate change agreement. At the national level, we suggest policies targeted at the tenure insecurity problem. In regard to that, we recommend following the example of Brazil, which has a direct linkage between forest tenure reform and targeted environmental outcomes. We recommend following the example of Indonesia, where there's integration of national forest land use planning among ministries and sectors in their one map policy. We propose incorporation of participatory tenure mapping into national tenure institutions, resolution of contestation between statutory and customary claims, enforcement of existing rights for the exclusion for local stakeholders, clarification of forest carbon tenure rights, and enabling, as in Brazil, collaboration between proponent organizations and government institutions in resolving tenure issues. In addressing the disadvantageous economics of red, we recommend decoupling agricultural growth from agricultural area expansion, development of sustainable agricultural supply change, improved forest land use decision making through reduction of corruption and cronyism and enforcement of laws against illegal logging, among other legal reforms. Very lastly, our study points out that although the current circumstances are weighted heavily against success for red, we need to bear in mind the following fact that might or might not be a basis for optimism. Overall, Brazil in the last nine years has had dramatic success in reducing its rate of deforestation in spite of the fact that enabling conditions for red are not yet in place. And in fact, it has delivered the single biggest national contribution to climate change mitigation around the world. I will stop there. Thank you. Thank you.