 Good afternoon everybody. Thank you so much for coming. What I think to what is it going to be? I think a terrific event this afternoon on Bonnie Glaser. I'm a senior advisor for Asia in the Freeman chair for China Studies here at CSIS and We really have a terrific program today There's been very good scholarship on nationalism in China and some good analysis of Chinese protests But up until now these issues really have not been examined in relation to Chinese diplomacy Dr. Jessica Chun Weiss Has made a significant contribution I think to the study of Chinese foreign policy in her book powerful patriots national protest in China's foreign relations Dr. Weiss is an assistant professor of political science at Yale University and a research fellow at the Macmillan Center for international and area studies and the dissertation on which her book is based won the 2009 American political science Helen Dwight Reed Award for best dissertation in international relations law and politics and in her book Which I recommend highly to all of you and copies will be available for purchase and Dr. Weiss will be signing them after the event Along with the wine and cheese So in her book Dr. Weiss Focuses on the role of diplomatic factors in shaping the Chinese government's response to nationalist Mobilization and she examines not only instances in which protests have taken place in China But also those Instances in which protests have been stifled So her analysis goes beyond some of the traditional theories about protests as a pressure valve Valve that enable disgruntled citizens to let off steam or as diversionary activities That refocus criticism of the government and the party at home to other sources So we're very grateful that Jessica has agreed to share the findings of her research with us today And after her presentation Professor David Lampton who is the Hyman professor and director of the CICE China China studies at the Johns Hopkins will provide Commentary on the book and then the three of us will have a bit of a discussion Amongst ourselves, and then we will open the floor to questions. So please welcome me in please join me in welcoming Dr. Jessica Chun wise Well, thank you all for being here It's really a delight and an honor to be in the presence of so many who have who's read whose work that I have read And admired for many years here now to hear me speak about my recent book Actually, I was a lowly intern at the international security program at CSIS some years ago Where Bonnie was was there at the time so it feels like coming home although the home has moved a little bit across town So the question that I address in my book and I'll very you know in about 20 minutes summarize What I talk about is the question of what role nationalism plays in China's foreign relations and specifically the role of nationalist protest much has in fact been made of Nationalism's role, but a question is when you know Chinese diplomats and others say that the feelings of 1.3 billion Chinese people have been hurt How is it that we should know whether they are bluffing or Whether such remarks are credible and it's this issue of credibility that I want to come back to again throughout the talk In particular my argument in a nutshell is that the role the nationalism plays depends on how China Manages the expression of grassroots popular sentiment in the first place whether protests are on the one hand Allowed to take place in the streets of China cities or by contrast Whether they are repressed or nipped in the bud before they can even materialize in the first place Oftentimes using China's vast web of sensors to prevent things like the terms anti-Japan Beijing from showing up in people's Weibo or Twitter feeds And indeed there's a lot of variation in how China has managed nationalist protest in 1999 China allowed and even encouraged anti-american demonstrations after the US bomb the Chinese embassy in Belgrade But two years later and when an EP3 Reconnaissance plane and a Chinese fighter jet collided near Hainan Students were told to stay on campus and the media told to turn down their rhetoric in covering the incident And we've seen a lot more variation in how China has managed anti-Japanese protests Most recently the large-scale demonstrations of 2012 challenging Japan's purchase of three of the Senkaku Dalu Islands, but on many other occasions including in 2010 during the collision of a Chinese fishing trawler and Japanese coast guard vessels Actually working to restrain large-scale protests against Japan from spilling out into the streets with more or less success Perhaps most puzzling is the absence of protests Nationalist protests over the issue of Taiwan an issue you might imagine that many Chinese nationalists are quite concerned So these are this is the puzzle then that I set out to explain in the book And I think that the book provides a corrective to two very Entrenched wisdoms in the literature and in the popular press one is that these are Jined up as a diversionary scapegoat by a regime trying to distract popular attention from other grievances in society The other is that far from manufacturing or ginning these up the government is helpless or fragile before Explosive popular nationalism that they can't help but let spill out into the streets Now these two views have a lot of insight But I think they only capture a piece of the story in particular They have difficulty explaining why it is that on so many occasions we see nationalist protests Prevented or nipped in the bud activists detained a couple of hours or even the night before The planned protest was to materialize The argument that I make is that China's management of nationalist protest depends on the diplomatic context In which those citizens seek to mobilize in the first place in particular Does China want to tell foreign audiences that we are going to stand tough on this issue? We're unwilling to compromise or is China's government seeking to maintain Greater flexibility as it seeks to diffuse a potential a diplomatic crisis by preventing popular Citizens and activists from putting that added pressure on the Chinese government Now I use this symbol this traffic light red light green light to indicate that The Chinese government isn't in the driver's seat. It's the people And the Chinese government is simply signaling when it is okay or not so okay for protesters to go into the streets And in fact many of the speed signs that the Chinese government puts up I'm saying when it is, you know, how fast to go often are disregarded By Chinese protesters just as drivers often disregard road signs here in the United States And in particular I try to say a word from this word Manipulation don't leave here today thinking that Jessica Chen Weiss thinks that the Chinese government manipulates protests because I think that word makes it sound far too easy For them to simply turn it on and turn it off In fact, it's very difficult and costly for the Chinese government to tell protesters. Look stay at home This is not an appropriate time. They in fact leave themselves vulnerable to charges of being unpatriotic In tamping down popular expressions of nationalism That's not to say the government has no rule, but it is not primarily You know driving people into the streets let alone paying them to be there And I think that Dilemma that the government faces in convincing outsiders that these protests are real and not manufactured is one that you can see here on display This picture was given to me by a Chinese a Japanese consular official in Shanghai during the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations and means literally protesters march this way and I think that outside observers could be forgiven for Misunderstanding or perhaps doubting the sincerity of a protest demonstrations when they see actions like this seeming to point or give official guidance to protesters as they express their sentiments And then again, I'm gonna come back to this issue because it's really one that has dogged the Chinese government So in brief the first substantive case that I dive into in the book Looks at this comparison between two crises and US-China relations in 1999 embassy bombing and the 2001 EP3 incident as I mentioned protests Quickly were allowed and then in some cases stage managed over the several days Following the US accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy during the Kosovo war Again this comparison between protests that were allowed when the Chinese government sought to show the United States and others that China would not be bullied on the international stage Contrast sharply with the crisis that erupted two years later when China and American negotiators sought a face-saving compromise over the terms of American regret for the death of the Chinese pilot that the US not wanting to Record a sort of a certain responsibility But nonetheless of find an off-ramp up to this crisis and in this context when China was still trying to establish a positive rapport with the new Bush administration at the time Told protesters not to take to the streets and again I tried to diffuse that crisis The next five chapters really focus on Sino-Japanese relations from 1985 the first large-scale Anti-Japanese protests to take place in the reform era all the way up to 2012 with the Senkaku Diayu purchase crisis Briefly the first of these in 1985 took place after then Prime Minister Nakasone made an official visit to Yasukuni Shrine where 14 a-class a World War two world criminals are enshrined or have been Since the 1970s and these protests and I think were quite interesting in particular because they helped demonstrate to Nakasone That his actions were making it difficult for his reform-minded counterpart who y'all bong to continue to rule And in in fact who y'all bong is the 1985 demonstrations set the stage for 1986 pro-democracy Demonstrations and ultimately the demonstrations that culminated in the 1989 Crisis at Tiananmen did in fact bring down who y'all bong And lead leaders like Deng Xiaoping to say look you know if Troubles between China and Japan are to continue to still further. It's very difficult for us to explain this to students And indeed it was a number of years before Succeeding Japanese Prime Ministers visited Yasukuni Shrine perhaps keeping this warning in mind The 1990s subject to the next chapter really look at how China despite rolling out a Propaganda concerning China's patriotic education that in many cases focused on Japanese behavior in World War two nonetheless on a numerous occasions Prevented anti-Japanese protests from taking place during two crises over the Senkaku Diayu Islands in 1990 and 1990 2006 as well as during visits by the Japanese Emperor to China and Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa as well So again pointing out that though nationalism may be beneficial for the regime's domestic legitimacy Nationalist propaganda does not always translate into Nationalist protests in the streets. I think as we're seeing right now today under Xi Jinping so far We have not seen anti-Japanese or anti-foreign protests The following chapter looks at the first In the 2000s as Koizumi paid annual visits to Yasukuni Shrine and as Japan's bid for a UN Security Council seat a permanent seat on the UN Security Council gained momentum the Chinese government acquiesced to large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in the spring of 2005 these demonstrations helped and convinced others that China's position on the UN and opposing Japan's Seat on the UN Security Council was a principled one and also helped convince Even then Prime Minister Koizumi to make a symbolic concessions including for the first time a multilateral Apology for Japanese war atrocities The following chapter looks at Sino-Japanese relations from the post-koizumi period to the 2010 Trawler collision and it's in this period even though social media and the internet had taken off in China nonetheless the Chinese government kept a lid on Most types of anti-Japanese mobilization. I found this out myself firsthand and interviewing or attending The scene of one of these small-scale demonstrations at Marco Polo Bridge Not five minutes after I showed up police detained me and asked me what I was doing there So once again illustrating the very close tabs that the Chinese government keeps on demonstrations even of this kind Those that are ostensibly patriotic and supportive of the government's position But nonetheless having this a potential for creating greater social instability But during this period from 2006 to 2010 China and Japan embarked on this ice thawing to a warm spring in bilateral relations and during this period things like petitions criticizing the gas accord in the East China Sea or other Cooperative measures were not supported by the government in some cases were detained or told that this was not a convenient time to be doing these things And it was in this context of trying to repair bilateral relations that a Chinese trawler collided with two Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the disputed islands in the East China Sea and Although a lot of attention has been paid to China's measures such as the alleged Restrictions on rare earth exports. Nonetheless, I think what's been missed is during the first stage of this crisis before The Japanese side extended of the detention of the Chinese trawler captain China In sense hoping to treat this incident as an ordinary maritime incident and not eager to inflame this into a full-blown diplomatic crisis and during this first period of his detention in fact Nationalist activists again discouraged from holding large-scale protests and again, this is when we saw that censorship take place in fact, it was during this crisis that Han Han when the liberal Chinese activists found out that he could post the term Senkaku, but not the word value online Now one of the problems I think that emerged from the 2010 trawler crisis was the fact that China's uneven curtailment of these protests didn't extend fully to second and third-tier cities and and in particular Activists said they were being held there to avoid attracting too much attention But this then also I think gave rise to some suspicions on the Japanese side that well the Chinese can control these What's the big deal and in fact in the wake of the then Larger protests that arose some Noted that China had oversold the story on the streets to quote the economist And it was this I think suspicion created by China's uneven management And in fact the appearance of some unrelated slogans over housing prices and corruption in some second and third-tier cities That set the stage for I think a greater set of missteps in 2012 This then we witnessed the largest wave of anti-Japanese mobilization to take place extending to some 200 cities across mainland China and Despite the fact that this was the largest wave of nationalist mobilization Japanese Prime Minister Nota noted two weeks afterwards that he had underestimated the scale of these demonstrations Once again, I turn to this issue of credibility when pictures like this with the policemen sort of leading the charge you may Perhaps forgive observers for wondering the extent to which the Chinese government can easily dial these up and dial these down and so The book concludes really on the battle for credibility the Chinese government faces that by Sort of selectively allowing demonstrations in the way that I have described with a view toward China's diplomatic objectives Either signaling resolve on the one hand or reassurance on the other These efforts to stange manage and selectively allow protests often lead to accusations that the Chinese government is crying wolf when it invokes the popular pressure of nationalist opinion and in particular this local variation with very orderly Demonstrations in Beijing and Shanghai, but perhaps more raucous demonstrations burning down Japanese factories in places like Qingdao or beating up folks in Xi'an This makes it very difficult to understand the extent to which public opinion really constrains the Chinese government Moreover the Chinese government's sort of selective depiction of history And the continuing appearance of patriotic propaganda such as the sort of wartime dramas that are currently being aired Often I think undercut the apparent sincerity of Nationalist opinion in China by letting folks like current Prime Minister Abe pointed these as the reason the root cause behind Chinese people's distrust of Japan rather than the the actual legacy as it's felt at the grassroots So the argument that I make is that nationalism does matter, but it matters in this contingent way It depends on whether or not protesters are in the streets And it matters more when it is raging online than when censors step in to halt that conversation In particular nationalism is quite a dangerous game for the Chinese government to be playing when Nationalists protests fill out into the streets many times that provides a platform for other grievances to be expressed as well And although many may invoke the analogy to safety vows I think that's dangerous unless we recognize that safety vows sometimes break with potentially disastrous consequences for the regime Moreover even if foreign policy can be used to divert domestic attention from social grievances This then requires the government to do something on the international stage Successfully and that may put even more pressure on the Chinese government to stand firm rather than to compromise Finally, I Argue again that nationalism is a potent force, but it is not one that the Chinese government is always handicapped by In particular We've seen no protest thus far over the issue of Taiwan in part because the Chinese government and has dispatched experts on particular occasions to prevent Demonstrators and students from coming out to the streets to protest over the issue of Taiwan independence But we are seeing an increasing number of different targets besides Japan including France most recently in 2008 during the Sort of the period leading up to the Olympics after riots in Tibet prompt international outcry then French president Nicholas Sarkozy entertained the idea of boycotting the Beijing Olympics and Was eventually forced to relent after Anti-french protests spread around China So far the South China Sea and this is a space to watch, but we haven't seen many Instances of attempts to organize anti-Vietnamese or anti of Philippines demonstrations But again, this is very much a space I think that we should watch as we have seen just this year Vietnamese protests against China and Continuing tough actions by the Philippines So in the short run this may be a tactical asset that Beijing can use to signal its Or its willingness to compromise with foreigners, but over the long term this may pose a strategic liability domestically as it Encourages other folks to jump on the nationalist bandwagon to advance other goals It may also increase the level of discontent or disillusionment with nationalism as a viable As a viable form of legitimacy inside China, but most importantly I think it may represent a liability for China's ability to convince outsiders that public opinion in China really does matter and does constrain the government That's all I have, but I'm really again very honored to have been here and look forward to the discussion Okay, we'll now turn to professor Lampden for his comments Well, thank all of you for being here and thank you Bonnie for the Institute setting this up and Thank you, Jessica for writing a terrific book that advances our collective discussion and understanding And congratulations on your read prize. That's terrific. So in all respects I guess the first thing I want to say is this book falls in the long line of a distinguished heritage of Writing about nationalism student nationalism. I think back to one of the first books I wrote I read was by John Israel on student nationalism in the 20s and 30s Of course Alan Whiting wrote several different pieces on this whole thing and we have some Michigan connections here That I'm looking at as we speak We have Peter Grease of course at Oklahoma has been been writing on that James Riley here at G That was at GW when he did his dissertation Susan shirk and I know in your book you also mentioned Michael Swain and John Twashong and so forth so there's a long continual interest in this topic and You're certainly one of the major contributions in that long distinguished line. So I want to acknowledge that This book I think is interesting on a number levels Of course one level is just its major topic nationalism and how it plays into Chinese Diplomacy and domestic politics and how it constrains and provides opportunities for Chinese leadership But it also brings some fresh information about the demonstrations and the dynamics in each of these Periods of demonstration that you talk about starting with the bombing of the US Embassy in 1999 certainly the EP3 incident all the anti-Japanese Demonstrations and non demonstrations that occurred as you explained So you bring some interesting information just to bear on those in a factual sense as well as your Interpretation I like this book because it forced me to think about big issues And I may not have always come to the conclusion in all respect that you you think might be warranted But the the title of the book Powerful Patriots. I kept find myself asking myself how powerful are these People and I'm ambivalent and I think in a way you said you come out on both sides depending on the context and so forth You said is this tactically successful, but strategically a liability? I think was the last line and I came away From the last sentence in your book I thought was extremely important and worth her last few sentences if China's leadership wants To prevent a counterbalancing coalition of states from forming against China's rise It will need to temper demonstrations of resolve with credible reassurance a prudent Chinese leadership should also balance the long-term risks of stoking Chinese nationalism against the short-term gains of diplomatic pressure So in the end I sort of I basically came to the conclusion from reading your book They have your last sentence that this is a short term almost Fheric victory for Chinese diplomacy it may give them leverage in any given moment But in the end it keeps building relentlessly a body of Opposition really or doubt or lack of assurance about Chinese foreign policy So I guess I came to the conclusion of patriots want a strong respected China in the world this isn't the tool that's likely to get it for them and then therefore Do they have strength in any sense to achieve their positive goals with this means and I I really wonder so Anyway, this idea of Powerful patriots. I'm not sure powerful in what sense for what end over what time frame are we talking? So that was certainly one set of Methodologically I was very interested in in the book on a number of you first of all Many would look at just the cases of what you might call the unleash Demonstrations, but I was really impressed with the attempt to look at the ones that weren't which almost becomes in an extreme the The cases of something that didn't happen and of course methodologically there is a bit of a problem How do you define what would have happened had they not deflected it? So there is a bit of this what didn't happen and why didn't it happen and how much was the regime responsible for it? Not not happening and I don't have the answer to that Question I also thought that you were trying to make a major attempt as you said to look inside the black box of Chinese decision-making and it seems to me that you basically had and you had a 45 degree Your graph with a 45 degree line and the proposition seems to be that China will repress a demonstration when the risk of Demonstrations is greater than the cost of repression I think that was and that strikes me as a rational almost rational choice kind of model and I get to my Asked myself. Well, that could be and your data. I think are consistent with that conclusion But I'm not sure that there aren't other things going on in that black box beyond the rational calculation Certainly the perceptions. What are the perceptions of this black box? What are the bureaucratic politics going on among members of all of this? So I think you help us understand what's going on in the black box But I think there are probably some other things going on here about which we need to know More and not that you could have provided it in the context of this This also led me to you talked a bit about democratic peace theory In this and I kept asking my myself really okay What it seems to me is more often not the Chinese government is in a sense the responsible party trying to dial this thing back So then if we've got a democratic political system that allows a greater correspondence between popular Emotion and fear or whatever and behavior Is is democracy however, we would define that in this particularly is it likely to produce a more moderate Chinese foreign policy? And I have some doubts about that So it just raised issues for me about democratic peace theory and and under what Circumstances might it hold and so forth I would just end my comments big because I think it's such a wonderfully Constructed book with so much good things to say I was asked to just try to provide a segue to Hong Kong here in the the current Situation and don't be offended by my attempt to develop this this segue but it seems to me that What if I would I've tried to put myself in the mind of the the average Chinese citizen and Look at Hong Kong. It seems to me this could be framed in two ways if I'm a Chinese citizen Once is one is what's going on in Hong Kong is our future and they're out ahead of it But we ought to be basically supported because their present is our future I think that's what a lot of people might either suppose or at least hope But I think there's another frame and it's my sneaking suspicion This might be the dominant frame in China to look and that is that what's going on in China in Hong Kong First of all the government in Beijing has asked for Patriotic people to be elected my guess is the average Chinese doesn't Question that patriotism frame all that much. What's wrong with being? Patriotic might be Secondly the assertion that what's going on there represents the black hand of the foreigners We're already hearing that you might say that's a frame the government puts on it I think that's true, but I'm not sure it's only the government that has that implicit assumption I think many Chinese people probably look at Hong Kong and say they've got it so good. What are they whining about, right? So I think one of the key questions on this nationalism isn't just the impulse of people But how is the issue framed against which that nationalism reacts and I don't know what the frame popular frame in China is I? Have an instinct about what it might be, but I think we need some empirical work But anyway, I think this is a great analysis not only for the past But gives us a really good lens to look at the future and indeed the present. So thank you very much Thank you. That was a terrific set of comments Well before I post some questions Is there anything Jessica you would like to add to or respond to what Mike is right? Well, I think on the subject of Hong Kong I think that's exactly the frame that Beijing is using right now is to try to Delegitimize what's going on in Hong Kong by accusing foreign hands of aiding and abetting these demonstrations rather than Acknowledging their grassroots origins and I think you know the silver lining so far is is that you know We don't know what you know the average citizen in Beijing or Shanghai thinks about these demonstrators Because they're not being really exposed to the full range of images and slogans that are coming out of Hong Kong So you know in terms of whether or not, you know, this could You know blow back against the foreign government say, you know the Cameron administration or the Obama administration I think you know I think it's unlikely that we're going to see the kinds of anti You know the anti-French demonstrations that took place in 2008 and that sort of surge of nationalism took place Against the backdrop of a lot of coverage of what was going on in Tibet and supported the torch relay around the world Whereas by and large, you know, the Chinese public is not aware of what's going on in Hong Kong And so even if you know foreign governments were to take a very pointed stance I don't think that you would fortunately so far although events could change I don't think that you would get the same kind of nationalist backlash So you would hypothesize them if I put it right I would agree with the and that is that this could veer Into a direction that would be so fundamentally threatening that this is going to be one of the cases of let's say the regime Not not only incurred not encouraging but discouraging any expression of organized expression of Viewpoint about what's going on in Hong Kong. Would that be your hypothesis? It certainly seems to be the case thus far Do you think that there's a a genuine concern in the Chinese government? That the United States or other countries are instigating these protests indeed the term color revolution has been used In the Chinese media or do you think this is just a charge that is being made? to tell the people of China that There of course couldn't be such dissatisfaction in Hong Kong that it would be indigenous That it's really a result of dissatisfaction that is occurring in Hong Kong Or is it a bit above I think it's a very cynical ploy to blame this on foreigners rather than to acknowledge that it's Indigenous grassroot sentiment in Hong Kong my paraphrase others I'm saying this as an insult to the people of Hong Kong to think that this is all Sponsored by the foreign government. So this is you know, this is a long-standing concern watching color revolutions in The other parts of the world to blame these on foreigners Whether or not as as my says whether or not there's any Resonance to that charge in greater China as opposed to just from the Chinese regime is I think a question We can't really answer Could you say something perhaps about the protests that took place in Taiwan in the sunflower movement and how the Chinese reacted to those? Of course quite different than the circumstances in Hong Kong, but I wonder if you could sort of apply your framework to that as well Well, it's a very different setting and so you know But it's very interesting to watch as China increasingly deals with protests against China on its borders and in the region We've seen protests against China the Philippines protests in China in Vietnam At least in the case of Vietnam China sort of said at least the propaganda sort of official Party line is that these were this was Hanoi taking a leaf out of Beijing's playbook and essentially discrediting them also as something That was from the grassroots But I think this is something that China is increasingly going to have to grapple with as you mentioned the protests in Taiwan were You know primarily, you know, so some it's about a local issue, which is the process by which these agreements move through the political system and it's You know it I think it would be to Beijing's credit to to listen harder rather than accuse first So that these sort of mutually acceptable compromises can be reached or in the case of Taiwan initially I think there was this reflex reaction to blame it on the DPP It was must be the opposition that stimulating these protests It couldn't be that the students were really angry themselves and organizing it and so in that sense I sort of see a parallel to Hong Kong I think it took a while for the government in Beijing to figure out that this actually was actually the DPP trying to Use this To build support and criticize the Ma Yingzhou regime, but I do see some parallels I wonder if you could comment can I just comment on that that was a really good point and that is to say we're seeing a domino effect of Nationalisms and micro nationalism In other words the way Beijing is handling this in Hong Kong can't do anything. I would hypothesize but make the situation more difficult to handle from Beijing's point of view when it comes to Taiwan and the upcoming election and So you're seeing one nationalist movement in effect and it's handling spillover into even a more important one in the long-term Foreign policy, so you get a kind of domino effect here You mentioned in your presentation that there were no Demonstrations when Prime Minister Abe went to the Yanshikuni shrine and indeed we have seen no protest in China since Xi Jinping came to power So I wonder if you could comment on that What was the reason perhaps why there were no protests where they stifled? Do you did you learn that there were signs of people who are planning to protest and they were they were quelled? And and does this tell us anything about Xi Jinping's? Approach to protest and their relationship to foreign policy. That's an excellent question I think it's an important again reminder that even though many talk about Xi Jinping as this new nationalist leader Actually the large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations and the escalation of the situation that you China see it took place under Hu Jintao toward the end of his administration and in fact I think there's this tendency to want to think about leadership transitions is sort of for example I think that the Japanese side calculated that would be safer to buy the islands under Hu Jintao Rather than do so under and sort of in the beginning of a Xi Jinping administration But that seems to have been mistaken. Yeah, and so we haven't seen anti-Japanese demonstrations I think in part, you know, whether it was right after Abbe's visit to Yasukuni or There was another attempted protest over Japan's proposed revisions to the peace constitution and both occasions Activists in China were discouraged from holding those demonstrations and I think that really is Indicative of the fact that Beijing thinks that things in the East China Sea already quite tense and that they you know they need no additional pressure From a public opinion Because the risk of an accident all these things are things that the Chinese government is trying to walk back not Accelerate further Do you do you think that some of the actions like the air defense zone and sort of putting in more hardware into challenging the Japanese Waters or at least administered waters That this is you said in your book several times that if the Chinese government wants to suppress these at the same time It needs to be tough on the issue So there's a certain amount of sense among the population that China's the government is pursuing China's national interests. So you think this not having Demonstrations goes hands-in-hands with the tougher measures that I think I would see that overall She is has pursued even though it isn't demonstrations. Do you think this is the flip side of the same coin? No, I think that's actually Repressing demonstrations gives the Chinese government more room to take a softer or more compromising stance But by taking a very tough stance in the ways that you pointed out does make it easier and lessens the Incentives for these activists to go out onto the streets They're much more ready to protest the government when the government has just struck compromise with Japan But when the government is already out in front You know activists who I talked with said, you know, we don't you know, we push and then we can retreat and especially when things are Going their way as you would like to see policy go. There is less pressure on the government to be sure There's one takeaway that I have from your book that I wonder if you comment a little bit more on where you talked about the Japanese propensity to really not see Resolve in Chinese foreign policy to misinterpret the protests and indeed I would extend that to say that Many Japanese experts on China. I think tend to attribute The problems that are going on in Sino-Japanese relations and protest that take place in China as a Function of domestic power struggle in China and other you know domestic factors There is a lack of willingness in Japanese scholarship on China for the most part to Acknowledge that there might be a an action reaction dynamic where Japan Takes an action in its foreign policy and then that somehow stimulates these protests and other Reactions and you noted in your book that it was this misreading of China's resolve in 2010 that ultimately contributed to what happened in 2012 the Purchase of the islands and the Japanese misreading of China's Stance so my takeaway here is that crisis management in the Sino-Japanese Relationship is ultimately very difficult Complicated by the fact that perhaps Japan doesn't correctly read protests and other The motivations of Chinese decision-making Whereas perhaps in the US China relationship where we seem to have read the resolve correctly in 1999 and maybe applied that to 2001 that maybe the crisis management Capability is somewhat easier because of that. I'd be interested in your comments on that Well, I don't want to sit here and say we get it all right and they get it all wrong I think there's a very noisy set of I agree very noisy set of signals that the I think that are very difficult for anyone to interpret and most of Those have been directed at Japan But nonetheless, I think there is a cautionary tale to be read into Japan sort of the tendency to see Protests as just the result of patriotic propaganda and not to recognize the underlying Historical legacy that makes a lot of citizens quite angry and angry enough to try to protest even when the government doesn't want them to And so it's not just always the government having the upper hand and so recognizing the volatility of these sentiments is very quite important You know That said I think it's it's certainly something that you know They think we think about what happened last time and so in 2012 what the Japanese government was looking at was 2010 and in 2010 China did reign in and prevent these demonstrations from getting out of hand In part that was because of their diplomatic objectives at the time And so, you know, we have to be careful not to always think about what happened last time and to think about what are the signals being Sent right now, but the problem is a very thorny one because you know China is not always just trying to show resolve and part of the problem in 2012 was that China was looking forward to in trying to Sort of a plan for the celebration of the 40th anniversary of diplomatic Normalization and so on the one hand China said don't go through with that purchase But you know things will be okay And so these this is not just specific to the China Japan relationship But this very thorny problem of on the one hand as signaling strength on the other hand and not trying to You know instill fear in all of China's neighbors Any questions you'd like to ask before we turn to the audience? Oh, I want to hear the public Well, I'm sure that I'm sure that that everybody in the audience has some Pressing questions on their minds. So we'll open up the floor. Please Raise your hands wait for the microphone identify yourselves and your affiliation and Then please do limit yourself to a question. We'll start in the front here with Jonathan Pollack Jessica first Jonathan Pollack from Brookings. I do want to congratulate you on a very very impressive piece of scholarship One comment that I hope you this is one of these cases where it's probably utterly spurious But I know that of the four cases where protest has been allowed It's one per decade It's it's 19 it's 1980 85 19 1999 2005 I think I've got that right. Have I got the right? I suspect one per decade But anyhow, it may be totally spurious, but But but my formula John But my my question actually is a little different you've put things necessarily into two categories either protests inhibited Crack and not allowed and those that are that are permitted I'm wondering whether the distinctions are necessarily that clear-cut deep from your own research Do you see cases where there may have been indecision confusion divided counsel within leadership about which way to turn? In the in these circumstances or is there some evidence as I suspect would be the case in particular for 1999 where events so quickly moved out of control that even if you would wanted to rep pass it It was almost too late to do it What would your thought about this be and and and one last thought are there lessons learned? You know, it's this crisis management manual that you speculate about Does do those in Beijing think that they have a toolkit now that enables them a methodology if you will that enables them to evaluate these cases Individually or collectively Well, I hope that they've learned this is a methodology. They've also heard me talk about the pathologies of using this particular tool On the question of what do we know about the central government's decision-making? I think actually 1999 as an example of where we probably have the best which is still to say, you know Not necessarily official but records of what what leaders might have been thinking at the time And I think that they're the evidence suggests that they were all on the same page And there was very early warning that students and others wanted to take to the streets And it was something that was allowed to happen In fact, the buses were sent in part to prevent students from going to places the government didn't want them to go And so but you are right to point to the fact that there is even within any given episode of Perhaps one of these once in a decade events, although there are more smaller events on either side Is that the Chinese government's attitude often starts out with sort of a more lenient? Position and then quickly we stripped to repression as the sort of potentially destabilizing Consequences of allowing people into the streets become apparent so even within the episode we have this change But then also over time as social media and the internet have become a sort of more pervasive and a very easy way for Folks to organize even if they've had no ties to long-standing nationalist organizations. I think it's going to be much less Evident this distinction between repression and allowing so for example, you know 1990s You know you had a core group of committed activists who if you sent them out to Ching Hai on an extended vacation There wouldn't be a protest in Beijing but now with you know people coming really from anywhere I think it's much more difficult for the Chinese government to completely silence or repress Expressions of nationalism. I think that's what we saw in 2010 where it wasn't fully repressed. There were demonstrations The number of police in Beijing outnumbered the number of demonstrators in front of the Japanese Embassy But nonetheless the scale was not what it would have been had the government simply opened the floodgates So I think we're going to move much more toward this containment rather than outright blanket repression On on these good cases though of confusion in the decision-making group I had always thought that the night or 2001 EP3 was a very interesting case and Admiral Blair who was the sync pack at that time has Elaborated a little on it, but at the time I had people in China telling me in fact when John's the men came out was over this four points punishment and And and You know backing off on surveillance He had a series of points that in fact John's a men had been Misinformed by his own people as it as to what it happened And it was an I thought by the military and it had unfolded the reality But he he was out now with his tough demands and found out that in fact the demands He issued were in reaction to an event that didn't happen at least that way And then he had the problem in a sense. He had psychologically mobilized the Chinese people not necessarily in the streets But psychologically and now we had to walk it back with And without saying I was wrong right so I think these things There's a lot of complexity there And I don't think China's leaders can always assume they're getting the straight dope even on these kind of things much less Day-to-day administration Sure Another question So you have a lady here. Hi, I'm Nancy Tom from the Carnegie Endowment for international peace Um, so I know professor wise you wrote me about protests and unrealized process But I'm I'm wondering if other forms of um What you think about other forms of the nationalistic expressions on like what kind of impact do they have on China's foreign policy, especially given like on the many venues I think That includes our media social media and just different forms of our nationalistic expression. Thank you Well, yeah, so nationalist protests is really just the like to say the most risky form of this type of Expression, but we see petitions and we see of course people tweeting things on weibo all the time I mean petitions are as well as things that are set online are also subject to the same kind of Repressive apparatus petitions in particular, but even way boys, you know, of course, there's a lot of censorship that goes on And so I tend to think of the nationalist protests having perhaps the most weight when they are in the streets But this is okay, not sort of an everyday tactic But I think that we probably should be a rather skeptical of arguments that the Chinese government You know must do XYZ because you know people on way boy have said this because we don't know You know to what extent that actually represents of opinion that the government must respond to or face, you know A terrible crisis of legitimacy and if they didn't want those Opinions a lot in their hand, you know, they wouldn't be there. So they do reflect something of Especially the range of options that might be Feasible, but you know by and large, I think that you know, it's it's something also to watch as a type of But there's the added confusion I would understand that one way to deal with this is to delete it if you're the great firewall So to speak but the other is it's to guide it and there's a whole Large population of bureaucrats that aren't trying to stifle discussion. They're trying to focus it So I don't think you can sometimes even distinguish between popular opinion and central leading. Is that a fair observation? My understanding is that Chinese netizens can spot a so-called 50 center pretty far away Yes, because they don't have the same kind of slang or the kind of you know, a Colloquialisms that reflect genuine opinion, but I don't always think that line is so clearly drawn But the fact that there are there's this attempt to shape opinion online I think a further you know erodes the credibility of claims That this is something that they are sort of they're bound by all the time Phil Saunders Phil Saunders from National Defense University. I really look forward to digging into this book Erica Strecker Downs, and I did some work on this Guess about 15 years ago Two things a little different from the story that you told we looked at the 7890 and 96 Crises with Japan and one of the things we found was that activists in Hong Kong and Taiwan often played a leading role in Starting that and so I'm curious about your Assessment of whether that's still true or whether was that was because they were more free to mobilize at that time and today Some of the rest of Chinese society on the mainland has caught up And then the second point that we found is once the protests escalated to the point where they started to interfere with economic ties With Japan that was where the government shut it down And it happened at that point in time those particular three crises the Japanese government had particular Economic leverage as they were renewing Lin Lone in loans in 90 and 96 and when Deng was trying to attract Japanese Investment in the earlier period But Bonnie among others has pointed out that that balance may have changed and the Chinese government now feels it has The ability to use economic tools coercibly So what's the role of economic factors? Is that central to the story or or marginal to what you what you described? Thanks so much and indeed your article with with Erica Sanders It's quite seminal and thinking about the repression of these protests rather than those that are allowed on your first question Absolutely, the act. This is again the activism of those in Hong Kong and in Taiwan and even some here in the United States It's value of movement it's further evidence that this is not being ceded by Beijing by the Chinese government It's not instigating this at first it comes through often from the outside in and so for example in 2005 this campaign against Japan's bid for a permanent seat originated with activists in the United States and it was taken up by activists inside China who then got permission to post it on Sina and other major internet portals So regardless of where this grassroots origins comes from whether it's domestic or transnational This is something that the Chinese government then reacts to and either gives it a platform or doesn't So I see that that continues to this day for example the 2012 Demonstrations against Japan that whole campaign was kicked off by the landing of activists from Hong Kong on August 15th Which for the first time in a few years were allowed to set sail from the Hong Kong Harbor? And so even now Hong Kong is now beginning to not just beginning But is today a feeling that structure of Beijing's priorities To your second question about the economic goal that I think starting you know as China has grown more powerful I think that China has tried to have it both ways so for example in recent Anti-Japanese protests the messaging has been you know It's one thing to protest Japan these political issues But boycotting Japanese products makes no sense because most of those products are made in China and would hurt China So even you know officials like Boshi live made this statement in 2005 and that idea has been repeated in more recent protests and Certainly with the Philippines and others China has begun to I think Demonstrate that it is willing to use discriminant economic measures to put the pressure potentially on other Countries, although it's you know not officially owned up necessarily to doing so So I don't see economics necessarily is putting the break as firmly on these types of activities Okay, another question State boy Dr. Weiss thank I stapled in Roy with the Wilson Center. Thank you for a very interesting presentation I haven't had a chance to look at your book yet, but does it? even briefly make an effort to link the Nationalistic demonstrations under the PRC to the earlier pre PRC demonstrations going back to May 4th 1919 and During the 30s, etc. I mean there's a long tradition and I just wonder Are the earlier ones different somehow from the ones that occur under the PRC? And of course, we didn't have the same type of demonstrations during the first 30 years of the PRC But it's a more recent phenomenon as I've opened up the Society a bit I would say that the recent demonstrations are more like the ones that we saw in May 4th in the 30s And they were under the sort of the Maoist era of the state sponsored rallies I mean they I think it's this very specter of you know May 4th and other student movements Nationalist movements that rocked and in fact toppled a previous regimes that I think lay the backdrop for the current Fear that nationalism will turn against the regime and take it down I don't know delve into these specific cases empirically The book of the book is really taken up with 1985 to the present, but I in tracing the 1985 protests I look at how they then also set the stage for pro-democracy protests once again tracing this link between pro or sort of anti-foreign Demonstrations and the risk that they might challenge the regime itself so that specter I think very much haunts the regime as it thinks about how to deal with protests today And indeed in an intern informed form of government as they think about the risks of nationalism inside China Laura Silver at the State Department Can you speak a little bit about what tells protesters whether or not it's going to be sanctioned or not? Is it physical police force and arrests and intimidation? Is it change in the media narrative? Is it censorship online? Is it some combination of all of that? What kind of lets people know if the floodgates are going to be opened or closed? It's all of those things and you know the intimidation and repression doesn't take the kind of more nasty form that it does with Democratic dissidents or liberal Activists, but nonetheless, you know activists in talking with them would talk to me about well They would know because you know reporters would come around or not And then it depends on what's being shown in the media and then it comes down to they call up the police a few days ahead of time And the police say go no go And so that a lot of these things are negotiated informally not in paper often with the local security bureau ahead of time and Rarely does this happen completely spontaneously even though that's the The watchword that the Chinese government would like to use I don't I didn't find any evidence that the government was taken completely by surprise by any of these large-scale demonstrations You have this wonderful example in the book of I think it's sort of a passerby that encounters this protest and asks this policeman if ships she can join and She says I haven't applied and he says it's okay You can go because somebody else has applied and gotten approval and then she asks well Can I protest and yell something about anti-corruption and he says oh, no you can only yell dial you So some great anecdotes like that in the book another question yes over here in front Hi, I'm Winsor Robertson. I am a China Africa strategic consultant I was wondering if you could bring up the 88 89 anti-African protests, which are interesting combination of domestic Politics and international repercussions and I know they're not the biggest or most famous was the thing that interests me Yeah, very interesting and I think I show a different side of Chinese nationalism that we don't usually see I think Usually one thinks of national sentiment is reserving its most vitriolic side and almost racist side for its relationship with Japan But the you know anti-americanism doesn't take on that same sort of gut level Essentializing component, but I think that the 88 anti-African riots over this fraternization Jing is an exception to that hopefully when we won't see much more Yeah, I should say see now Hopkins runs. It's part of the joint venture there In that case it seemed like I wasn't there personally But as it's recounted In fact the the provincial authorities and the municipal authorities completely Supplied security So it didn't spill over into the the American Center Let's the Hopkins Nanjing Center and yet they didn't exercise a lot of restraint as I would understand it on the demonstrations on the rest of the campus at least for some period of time so sometimes it seems they get Instructions to on the one hand let the thing run its course as long as it doesn't affect certain sacred institutions or groups or Diplomatic highly valued assets is that accord with your understanding? Yeah, oftentimes in the negotiations over what form these protests can take They will negotiate essentially a contained sort of demonstration Right one activist told me that when they wanted to protest I'm forgetting exactly what But that you know, they could if they wanted to have it Oh, this was to gain to gather signatures in support of the opposition to Japan's permanent Security Council seat bid and there they were told that if they had it in front of the Beijing Embassy They could only have something like 10 to 15 participants for a very short period of time You know 10 minutes, but if they had it in Chaoyang Park, which is large in a very little chance that this will become an incident They could have it, you know for as long as they wanted with many people coming through Robert Griffiths former consul general in Shanghai now at the defense University Following up on Bill Phil's question Now that China has a greater ability to project powerful Economic and military in the region. Is that going to affect their willingness to allow? Demonstrations with I guess my thinking here is that Previously when they really couldn't back up their rhetoric with action Maybe they would you know hold tap tap things down a bit But are there is there going to be a more a greater willingness to allow these things to happen and then couple it perhaps with greater demonstrations of force and Sanctions or military or economic action You know, I think China's rising power cuts both ways because as you say they can do more to back up and to appease the demands of those who might spill into the streets, but on the other hand, you know China's You know growing capabilities military and economic meaning that it has many other levers that they can use to Get others to back down and so they may not need to resort to the case of nationalist protest So maybe you look at the case of China's Sort of counter-tomp with Vietnam over the summer where you had I think I would say all the ingredients for really nasty back-and-forth Chinese protests against Vietnam in response to the Vietnamese protests against China But you know paired with the Philippines you had much more sensationalist or you know provocative Coverage of the dispute with the Philippines and you did with Vietnam where the media really tried to I think preemptively to prevent that kind of sort of anti-Vietnamese sentiment from coming out And so there I think you know the China holds the upper hand and it didn't need to do any more to provoke Vietnam which is already quite incensed over the deployment of the oil rig to the South China Sea Whereas I think that China's far fewer cards given you know, obviously China's also much more powerful than the Philippines But you know faced with this International litigation, there's not a whole lot China has recourse to that other than you know telling the Philippines that this is useless To get back to what another angle on your question Which I took to be if there's more power projection. Is there less incentive or willingness to allow Domestic demonstration It seems to me that's implicitly a bit of it. I don't mean your your hypothesis But that's a little optimistic perhaps because the more there's power projection I mean one of these times China is going to lose or be perceived to lose and that could set off Something I mean just imagine an incident between a Chinese naval vessel or a Coast Guard vessel and a Japanese vessel That could provide the spark for something they would find very hard to control so that then I Could see that really operating both ways and in the negative scenario in a very negative way I mean I think that's one of the real dangers of having this much hardware in such close proximity both air and naval assets That you could inadvertently trigger something that in Chinese domestic politics You really wouldn't want how come after all these years we still lose a ship, you know that that kind of thing. So I Think this is a dangerous world we're in here. I Think we all agree with that over here Thank you for a presentation You mentioned the Yaskini shrine as one of the two sort of touchstones The other dayu Senkaku. My name is Kunio Kikuchi, and I was Washington research Yaskini is dangerous because the perceptions of what Yaskini shrine is is so completely different From what the Chinese and even the Americans think of and what the Japanese considered the shrine to be many Americans think that That's where the remains of the Let's say two dozens of one dozen or so class a War criminals are buried or something, but it's not that it's just a shrine Dedicated to listing the names of all those people who died in the service of the Empire of Japan since 1867 or so and The Empire of Japan ended in 19 precisely I guess 1945 or at the time the signing of the treaty So there are no new names and there are about 2.5 million names there 13 of which as you know class a criminals and In the Shinto rubric if someone dies it's treated equally So the Japanese said this is a pure Japanese Shrine and why can't we go there the danger is many Chinese sake? it's a anti-Chinese shrine and Every time a Japanese politician or even an American politician Wants to raise the tension between Japan and China All they have to do is for the Prime Minister to go to Yasukuni shrine and that's a dangerous situation. Has there been any Effort to educate the Chinese people that Yasukuni is not Anti-Chinese shrine. Thank you The focus on Yasukuni shrine has been surrounding the 14 a class war criminals that were in shrine there in the 1970s many point people point out that why did China put up such a fuss in 1985 when Nakasone went well It was because he paid an official visit that was declared constitutional by a committee that he appointed And this was after these a class war criminals were in shrine there So I think there have been a number of proposals Not by myself But by even Japanese to suggest the creation of a secular a shrine or simply the movement of these particular Spirits that have been in shrine there that are the most offensive not only to China But to Korea and that this might be a way for both sides to get what they want Which is you know a national cemetery where the you know the Prime Minister can Within reason visit, but also to respond to and address the concerns of Japan's Asian neighbors Hi Lauren Hershey, I'm a semi-retired attorney, but I've been an amateur China watcher for about 46 or 47 years I'm 67 Starting to learn a few things And I thank you very much for the presentation I too look forward to getting into your book I have a couple of very simple practical questions and then kind of a philosophical one Will your books circulate in China and will it be translated to Chinese? Well, I welcome the day that it will be circulated and translated into Chinese I can't say yet whether that will be next year or you know some unspecified years down the line I haven't actually Yet gone through that process. So I don't know whether or not it would be deemed too sensitive or not Keep us posted on that second question relates to Well two two parts really Your scholarship Can you share with us what you would like to next look into then I have a third question? Absolutely the brief answers. I'm very interested in the rise of a sentiment that Confronts China on its borders So we might call it the rise of anti-Chinese sentiment the mirror image of what I've looked at here And how China has responded to leaders that have employed this as well as a more cooperative tone In dealing with We'll look forward to that one as well. You have a planned publication date. Oh just getting off the ground We're talking academic years here Okay, the the the long-range kind of philosophical question thinking about the rise of modern China rather than the rise of China is the question about popular Sovereignty do you address that in your book? I haven't looked at the book at all Is there any way in which these protests staged organized Chinese opera style? Whatever is this be the beginning or a renewal of the May 4th movement It's it's as broad as you want to make that if you could Well, I think all Chinese protest movements in some ways see themselves as the sort of the successors of the May 4th Generation, but I see in China actually a fair bifurcation between those who sort of advocate more liberal Reform and those that champion nationalist causes. This is in part. I think because of concerns that linking these two nationalism and more democratic reform become much more sensitive in China today and so those that agitate on foreign policy Do not touch domestic issues and those on the liberal side of the divider are quite concerned about being tarred with this nationalist brush one that seems to be Managed if not manipulated by the Chinese government Here in front Thank you. My name is you that show I'm from GW a second-year graduate student The point you raised in your conclusion that there's no protest against Taiwan really interests me for a long time because I know this is really important issue for China and its core national interests As far as observed the the strategy China used to deal with Taiwan problem many mainly separate in two parts. Well, maybe For example, 1996 the missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait and up till now the Chinese is using Chinese government It's probably using utilizing its economic power Toward Taiwan problem. So there seems to have no room for these kind of national protests to Keep stick to play to play a role in handling this time problem I just wonder if you can extend a bit about why do you think there's no not such kind of national protest toward time problems? Is there is that simply because China has other tools to deal with Taiwan or because China has China has the confidence to deal with Taiwan not utilizing. Well, if it's if it's utilized if the national protest is utilized as a tool China doesn't have to you. It doesn't have to you this kind of tool to deal with Taiwan problem Or it's simply because Chinese government Doesn't regard Taiwan as a forward problem. Thank you very interesting China obviously does not regard Taiwan as a foreign problem But nonetheless, there have been attempts by students and others to try to protest against what they see as flittest or independence minded forces But nonetheless, there's I think a combination of China's confidence as well as the recognition That saber-rattling vis-a-vis Taiwan has been counterproductive has instilled Some sort of restraint in Beijing and relying upon more reassuring gestures as the best way to speed the progress of cross-strait Relations in progress rather than using these more hard-hitting Saber-rattling type of tactics another I think part of this place to the fact that I think from Washington to Tokyo foreign governments recognize just how committed China is To preventing Taiwan from becoming independent and so given that recognition I think there's also less need for China Fewer provocations if you will unless need for China to respond to try to correct Mistaken misperceptions that China might not be willing to fight even a potentially devastating war to prevent that outcome Jessica notes in her book for example when Chen Shui-bian was first elected that there were actually efforts to protest and there are some requests to hold Some some protests that were that were not permitted And I think You know this point that she makes is really Valid about how there are so many other ways that China has that it signals Resolved in the case of Taiwan and we can look back and point for example to the anti-succession law as a very Clear way of signaling China's resolve about Taiwan so that I think there was less sort of need to hold Those kind of protests I do think that for example in the case of the US government any administration Has been quite clear about the sensitivity of this issue To the government in Beijing so I do think that it has been less necessary as it may have been seen on other issues Hi, I'm Shannon Tessie from the diplomat You touched earlier on the role of social media in making protests harder for the government to To discourage but I wonder if you could talk about the role of social media and the internet in Fostering nationalist sentiment outside of the government's control It would seem that Before the internet and the rise of alternative news and social media that Beijing would have a lot more control Not only in the tone of coverage, but also in what information is Available that the public can then react to so are we seeing a rise in non-stainstinction nationalism even before the protest stage as Information that Beijing might not want public or in a tone that Beijing might not agree with is reaching more and more people Yeah, you've touched up on a very important development Which is like you know the commercialization of the media and the proliferation of different news outlets that are really trying to attract eyeballs This is insure flex to say or other image of the Chinese race But at the end of the day these news organizations still you know heed the party's instructions as regards What isn't okay to be reported now once it's okay to report it they then amplify that message And I think it does spread much further and but you know I'm that's not to absolve CCTV of also, you know the very particular angle that it has taken Issues with Japan and so I think it's it's appropriate to call it sort of an echo chamber But it doesn't always echo because the government does you know set certain lines say on Hong Kong or on Vietnam that? Prevent the tone from going in sort of an exorbitant nationalist direction, so I think on the whole the You know the trend has been in a more tough nationalist direction But I do see a lot of variation over time and we should I think that variation is valuable to pay attention to Okay in front Hi, Bill Tucker. I'm a former member of the White House Council's office during the Reagan administration and I've done a lot of work in Taiwan China and Hong Kong also and Why why do you think? China Continues to want to control Hong Kong instead of I mean Hong Kong is a cash cow for the country and so why wouldn't they encourage more entrepreneurship in Hong Kong and They're now by cracking down. They're frightening away businesses Which they have to know that they're that they are doing that most of the of the US and the Western businesses Locate their headquarters in Hong Kong and then send their send their people into interior China And so it's a it's a great arrangement for interior China And so why why would they try to repress that the leadership in Beijing wants one country two systems in Hong Kong to succeed But on their own terms and they've been very inflexible about those terms Standing firmly and unwaveringly behind the August 31 decision And of course this is to great frustration of those in Hong Kong who see this is not genuine democracy That was promised to them but from Beijing perspective I think that they would like to see this gradual and orderly progress and they see this as in keeping with their past promises And so there's a real tension over you know What's going on it's resulted in the protests that have you know ground Hong Kong to a standstill over the past week Although the signs are that this these nascent talks between the opposition and the Hong Kong authorities will proceed I'm hopeful that they will make some sort of progress, but I don't think that China wants to Stamp out. What is in Hong Kong? I think Hong Kong's vibrance and the rule of law there benefit China's overall economic development, and I think Beijing would be foolish not to recognize that so I would Sort of cast the situation in a little bit of a different light than the one that you've portrayed, but I Am worried and I and I'm concerned that the Beijing won't be willing to show the flexibility necessary to meet the demands of those who are in the streets if the Chinese were to make some small concessions and there are many I think different proposals that have been made in Hong Kong as well as by some academics here of different ways that a compromise could be reached It if China were to make even a small concession I think the government in Beijing fears that this would have a sort of spillover effect In the mainland that this would lead to greater Demand for political reform and democracy. Do you think that is in fact a genuine fear? I Think that that the fear of contagion is actually a little bit overblown I think that China also stands to lose and Set precedent simply by allowing the stalemate to go on I think that making this all go away very quickly would be in Beijing's interest in terms of the overall stability its objectives in mainland China and so One of the I think beauties of one country two systems that it is regarded as a separate system And so I'm not sure again. This is a question. What do people in Beijing Shanghai? I think I don't think we really know but I think many anecdotally many think that Hong Kong is separate is different And so if Hong Kong even were to become a fully fledged, you know direct democracy overnight I'm not sure that you would find you know people in Beijing and Shanghai necessarily saying now it's ours Because I think the Chinese women is very well equipped to deal with that showing itself time and time again to be very willing to crush that kind of descent so Actually, I think that Compromise is certainly in the interest of Beijing and I don't think that this fear of contagion needs to be as Overwhelming as quite as large as it seems to be and far worse. I think as the precedent being set for Taiwan Might just take a stab at that Question is why are they pursuing policies that business that might drive business away seem to be the core of the question? Well, of course, you have to ask what Beijing is listening to until in terms of Representation from Hong Kong and it's hearing from the we'll say the large end of the business community So it is hearing a business a business view I'm not saying the business view, but a powerful business view that puts a high priority on gradual change of the political system the key word in the sentence is gradual And so I think Beijing is listening to the part of the community that's very economically motivated and has big stakes in Some arrangement that looks quite close to what they have And so it isn't that they aren't listening to the business community in some sense. They are listening to the business community I'd say that's the first thing So second thing is Wang Yang has been appointed as I'm given to understand to to be sort of trying to broker this Crisis deal with it and he was the leader in Guangdong with a buddy in province with Hong Kong and Resolved several conflicts Wukong among them that will say resolve that's a complicated managed managed And so it seems to me they've they've picked somebody who has a reasonable understanding of the totality of What's at stake here? I take that to be a good sign in and of itself I'm not predicting this will end happily. I'm just saying that seems to be a good sign and Thirdly, I don't think we should misunderstand exactly probably how Beijing understands its own actions I mean in the joint declaration and then the basic law they promised us general suffrage election and It isn't our idea of what the full spirit and meaning of that would mean Universal but the fact of the matter is this is a step forward by given where they were before And it's not as far as me or a lot of other people might have a hoped But China could have had a less I hate to say forward leaning But a more restrictive policy, so I think there is you can see in there It's partly how they can see if what they've done and what and then secondly who they're hearing from And I would agree very much with Jessica. I think there's some moves that Beijing could agree to like what's the nature of this nominating committee, right? Okay We're not going to change the the character of the election in terms of nominating this time but maybe in 20 You know 2015 I mean in the next election cycle will move one step further in other words I think there are a lot of things that creative minds could come up with if they wanted to I Hope the other way in the framework frame of mind to think of these things. Well, of course another way to dealing it To dealing with this would be to lower the percentage of people in the selection committee that have to choose the candidates So right now it has to be more than 50% so if that we're lowered to something less than 50% Then that would give the potential for somebody that is not that popular to be In Beijing's eyes to actually be among the candidates But again, there's many different proposals that are out there So we'll have to see if any of them are adopted I think we have time for one last question if there is one. All right in back on the right Okay, I take a last chance if they're both short we'll take both of them since I have really pointed to the other gentle Let's go ahead. We'll be very short. I am a research fellow from Taiwan a seas ice my question is in terms of nationalism or Chinese nationalism as we all know is shaped by code Century humiliation and seeing now Japanese war but in terms of these two factors As we all know Taiwan and the mainland China we share the same culture, but the nationalism are very different to one another so from your Point of view do you think how Chinese government? Educate their people for the certain nationalism as as being very powerful and also For this nationalism from your book from what I understand it's talking about how to deal with the problematic issues Internationally, but the problem is this nationalism has been kind of like a backfire to Chinese government So do you think how Chinese government are going to deal with this problem? I mean for against the Chinese Government please pass the microphone to the other gentlemen Ask your question. Oh, well, thank you very much. My name is Stanley siden I am a student with Johns Hopkins University SICE I'm curious about your approach with regard to these ideas of nationalism So my questions are what is nationalism and who are the nationalists and I mean that from your perspective So what was sort of your working definition going in of nationalism? And then who are the people participating in these nationalist protests in your experience? Were their lines drawn between ethnicities between genders between classes? In general those those are my topics that I'm interested in. Thank you Great. Well, thanks so much again for all your attention I will refer you to the book for the specific definition that I use of nationalism But in terms of who participates in these protests It typically is Han Chinese and by and large they are male Although there are certainly women involved in the protests and it crosses all different Generations not all of them are very young and many of these committed activists are you know, you know 50 or at some Case is 60 years old. Some of them remember the war other than don't and you know This is really an involving I think Space and certainly the composition of these protests who comes out You know is oftentimes it's migrant workers It's you know, it's office White-collar workers some of whom have designed their own flashy signs that they use their own printing process to do so You obviously students represent a large bulk of the protests these tend not to take place In more heavily minority areas in part I think because the government is worried about any sort of instability even Expressions of anti-foreign nationalism because who knows if this is a Han Chinese nationalism What other types of nationalism? You might incite. I think in general the nationalism China would like to see is one that is inclusive And celebrates the Chinese state of course the state around which the CCP is leading But nonetheless that all these other strands of nationalism by For prominence and I think this is a very difficult message for the Chinese government to control It's one of the most volatile aspects of the nationalist protest is keeping people on message Chanting about the Diao use as opposed to other things that they might like Including a more accountable or responsive government domestically Maybe we can talk afterwards, okay, we'll leave that for a conversation afterwards So we do have first of all a table set up with books and Dr. Weiss will be signing so I encourage you to go purchase a book if you're interested in reading it and Secondly, it's been a terrific discussion, and I'd like you pleased to join me in thanking dr Jessica Chun Weiss and professor my