 Thanks very much for coming to the late afternoon session. This is the session on Africa's youth. And I suddenly realized this morning as I was reading the program that, you know, most of the other sessions are called things like developing enterprises and things like that. But there's no verb in this particular session. It's also not, and the only other sessions that don't have verbs in them are things on poverty and inequality and these kinds of issues. So clearly, you just say Africa's youth and you think it's a problem, right? It's one of those global problems. And the reason why is because you're probably used to seeing figures like this, which is the global population, right? And you can see how it's rapidly growing. This is all the way back to 1950 and going all the way to 2100. And you can see the rapid rise of Africa's population. And this is giving rise to this huge stress about Africa's youth bulge, right? And the challenge of trying to create jobs for enough jobs, enough decent jobs for young Africans as they enter the labor force in droves. And so this is the cause for concern figure that you often see. What I want to do is just give a few slides which show some cause for optimism. So we don't completely go into this session panicked. The first is that it's true that Africa's youth bulge is happening late, but it's not particularly large relative to the youth bulge of other developing regions. So what we can see here is the share of youth in the workforce, those people aged 15 to 64. And you can see, and that's on the vertical axis, on the horizontal axis, it's the year in which a country's share of youth, 15 to 24, peaked as a share of the workforce, right? So that's like peak youth bulge in the workforce. And what you can see is a lot of these other developing regions, developing countries, their youth bulge is peaked around about the same time in the late 1970s to the mid-1980s. And what stands out is Africa's youth bulge happening so many decades later. So not much larger, somewhat larger, but not much larger than the youth bulges of previous generations. So it's not the size of Africa's youth bulge, at least as a share, not in absolute terms, but in relative terms to the workforce. It's not the size of Africa's youth bulge per se. That is the problem. It's that it's happening two or three decades later than it happened in other developing regions. And it's happening in a world that is far more globalized. It's happening last, right? And so issues about where in the global economy Africa can fit and given Africa's size at the absolute size of the youth population, where can it fit? But it's not a challenge that hasn't been overcome by other developing countries, at least back in those days. Of course, there's some concern what we're seeing here about structural change, right? And so the challenges of late transformers in a more globalized and competitive world, what is the scope for structural change? We've just been in a session with Justin Lin talking about new structural economics and the shift from agriculture into industry and then into services. To what extent is that possible in this new more globalized space three decades after other countries went through their youth bulges? And what we can see here is the rate in a way, the vertical axis is a rate of structural change, the speed at which workers are leaving agriculture, right? So this is the annual percentage point decline in the agricultural workforce, right? And Luke is going to talk to this in more detail in a minute, but what you can see is that those blue regions are other developing regions of the world and the red are sub-Saharan Africa and the pace of structural change, even though the overall rate of economic growth can be quite similar in Africa and is quite high in many African countries. The pace at which people are leaving agriculture as a primary job and all of these other caveats mentioned, the pace at which Africa is exiting agriculture is much slower than it has been in other developing regions when they were going through the similar transition from low to middle income countries. That's important, right? So it's during a similar stage of development. And so, and Luis will talk about the problems of data for sure, but anyway, so what you can see is there's some indication that A people are staying within agriculture to some extent, but also this reflects much faster rural population growth rates in Africa, continued rural population growth rates at a high, which were much lower beginning to decline in Asia, right? So a much stronger role for agriculture, let's put it that way. Is this necessarily a bad thing? Well, so this is my last slide of substance, which is, I come from Africa, so we talk about food systems, food policy research institute, and so this is giving some indication of the share of agriculture in the overall economy and then the share of all those downstream agriculture related activities, right? So the moving of goods from farms to processing plants to consumers, the processing of food, right? The manufacturing component of the food sector. And what you can see is that while, say, in Ethiopia in 2011, agriculture was 43% of the economy, agriculture proper. Once you add in all those downstream components of the agri-food system, the agri-food system itself, broadly defined, is around, is more than half, 56% of the overall economy. And as we think about what has been driving Africa over the last decade and a half, a lot of it has been a rise of informal trade, particularly around food trade and so on. So a lot of the story around structural change in Africa has been a shift out of agriculture, perhaps, into informal trade services rather than manufacturing. And so then the questions are that we would like to ask, and we've got four panelists who are going to address them, is, in their way, is around, does Africa really have a youth problem or does it have a structural change problem that is particular to this time and place in which Africa is going through its youth bulge, its demographic transition? Then what are the prospects for agriculture-related jobs? Are these all as dreary and as dead-end as many people would have you believe? What about those downstream food sector jobs? Or really does the future still lie around manufacturing? And then what are the challenges to try and promote manufacturing jobs? And then finally, and this is a big one, what should governments do differently for youth that they shouldn't be doing to solve unemployment and rapid population growth anyway? So is there a role for a youth-specific policy, or is this more of a general, like I said, structural transformation employment policy?