 Thank you very much for being here promptly and in wonderful numbers we're really thrilled with the turnout for this conference today. Look, I want to begin by acknowledging and celebrating the first Australians on whose traditional lands we meet and pay respects to the elders of the Ngunna war people past and present. My name is Rory Medcalf, I'm the head of the National Security College. It's a real pleasure to welcome you here to the National Security College here at the Australian National University for this conference, this very special conference over the next two days on Indo-Pacific maritime security challenges and cooperation. Now there are many themes, as you know those of you who've taken a look at our program or paid close attention to our program, there are many themes and topics we'll cover in the next few days and many viewpoints I believe that will be brought to bear on those themes and topics. However I think there are some common threads that we look forward to seeing brought out in the discussions. There'll be conceptual and theoretical discussions about issues such as the concept of our region, our maritime region, whether you call it the Indo-Pacific, the Asia-Pacific or what you will and whether this has implications for policy, for policy in security, in foreign policy, strategy, defence, the whole gamut of the national marshalling of resources. There's also I think a lot of scope in this conference to discuss new thinking about partnerships, strategic partnerships in a changing region. And we've brought together for this purpose I think a very spectacular array of prominent speakers not only from throughout Australia but also internationally, a particularly strong Japanese line up of speakers but also speakers from China, from India, from Indonesia and of course our keynote this morning from the United States. In some ways I guess this conference is what I would call bilateral plus. It's part of a wider research and engagement project that is supported at the National Security College by the Embassy of Japan and there is indeed a strong focus on the Australia-Japan partnership. There's also a recognition in the theme of this project that no partnership works in isolation, that we're in essentially a multipolar regional order and there are challenges ahead in how do we, I guess, how do we coordinate the diverse partnerships that are required to prosecute Australia's interests in this Indo-Pacific era. The conference is timely, I daresay, many of the themes whether it's on managing tensions in the South China Sea, whether it's on the future of the Australia-Japan relationship, whether it's on the future of other regional relationships, whether it's on the US rebalance to Asia, many of these themes are very pressing, very relevant. The future of the Indian Ocean, the concept of the maritime Silk Road, there's a real ferment at the moment intellectually and in policy on these issues so I hope that this conference sheds light on those as well. I know there's strong media interest in the conference and we certainly welcome that, particularly in Admiral Swift's speech later this morning. I wanted to say one or two things before I introduce our first opening speakers about not only the National Security College but where we see conferences like this fitting into our mission here at the Australian National University. The college is now six years old. We were founded principally with training and educational missions in mind and we've done I think exceptional work over the past six years in building up executive and professional development training for Australian government officials. Something like two and a half thousand Australian officials have now undertaken courses with us. We've also established a very strong academic program, a Masters and PhD program and of course that is now feeding very closely into the wider work we do and we believe enriching and deepening the quality of policy thinking in the Australian policy community. We also are increasingly a player in policy engagement, a third pillar which is very important to the work of the Australian National University which has a mission in addition to its focus on excellence in research and teaching, has a mission in my view to contribute to policy impact, to contribute to the quality of policy in the Australian National Project. So the college really performs these three sets of activities and this conference is very much I guess overlapping several of those but particularly in the policy engagement space. So I think please expect to see more of the National Security College in the public debate going forward from here. I also wanted to before moving on to introduce our first two speakers say a few things about the ground rules for the conference over the next two days. This is on the public record and we're very pleased that it is. So as you participate in discussions please identify yourselves as you ask questions or make comments. We're on the public record. We're under I guess a rule though where I would appreciate that everyone keeps their mobile phones switched off during the conference because we are recording, we are recording events. So look there the main messages I wanted to impart to get proceedings underway. I won't go into detail, great detail now about our speakers. Their bios are all in the conference program and you'll get to meet them throughout the course throughout the conference and I hope as well through the dinner this evening. But it's my pleasure now to introduce our first two speakers to really kick off proceedings. I want to welcome first Murray McClain, former Australian Ambassador to Japan and the Chairman of the Australia Japan Foundation Murray. Thank you very much Roy for your kind welcome. First of all, may I congratulate you personally and all your colleagues at the National Security College in particular and the ANU as a whole for putting together such an excellent program for this Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Conference. Mid last year this was the same venue for the 2015 Australia Japan Foundation of which I'm chair address given by Professor Takashi Shiraiishi, the President of Japan's National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies and address which we were very pleased to jointly host together with the National Security College. So thank you again Roy for that. Given the topicality and the critical nature of the maritime security issues not only to Australia but to the whole Indo-Pacific future, it is very much in our national interest to ensure that there are regular opportunities for discourse like today's conference where we can examine in depth the dynamic security environment in which we are located. The impressive group of international experts here, especially from Japan and the United States, but also from China, India and Indonesia, as well as representatives from other Indo-Asia-Pacific countries should ensure a lively conversation. As a former career diplomat who spent an entire career virtually involved with the representation of Australia's national interests in Asia as well as analysis and formulation of policy recommendations relating to Australia's interests in Asia, particularly China and Japan, but also in Southeast Asia and in the United States, these issues are extremely familiar to me. For example, when I was on my first posting to Beijing, I recall well the Chinese, well the so-called Battle of the Paracel Islands, which was effectively China's action in January 1974 to remove the South Vietnamese presence from Woody Island and others and take control over that key part of the Paracel Islands. So I want to make a few reflections more or less as scene-setters for today's conference. First, Australia's relationship with Japan is no flesh in the pan or passing fashion. It's an exemplar of how two countries, bitter enemies in the Pacific War, achieved a remarkable reconciliation in a very short time and in so doing laid a firm basis for a hugely important and mutually beneficial relationship. After the United States, Australia was the second country in 1957 to reach an agreement on commerce and for 40 years until 2008 during the global financial crisis, Japan was Australia's number one trading partner, a relationship which went well beyond commerce to one which built a rich fabric of people to people, cultural and all sorts of other contact. The deep friendships and level of trust developed over these years are the foundation of the fast growing level of security cooperation we are seeing today. Again, this is not something suddenly dreamt up but an evolution of the relationship. But why then did this security cooperation with Japan take so long to develop? Decades of exclusive, constitutionally constrained defence and strategic alliance with the United States alone meant that at the turn of the century, Japan's relations with other like-minded countries scarcely had any elements of security cooperation outside the United Nations umbrella under which Japan contributed to peacekeeping operations including notably with Australia, in Cambodia and East Timor. I can recall well after my arrival in Tokyo in late 2004, there was friendly contact but frankly really only quite minimal engagement between Australia and Japan on the defence and security level. Several developments or trends would change this initially during the 2005 to 2007 period and then after that at a much faster pace. First, from Japan's point of view was its increasing preoccupation with the implications that China's huge economic growth might have on Japan's influence in and its interests in the Indo-Asia Pacific region. This fact riveted Japan on the one hand, it stimulated huge economic activity and mutual engagement but it worried strategists. Note, there is a subtle difference here between Australia and Japan. While Australia was also transfixed by China's huge economic growth and developed a huge economic relationship, there is a difference really because of the geography. China looms much larger to those closer to it geographically and therefore poses more potential threats. Secondly, was the increasing pressure from the United States for Japan to progressively take a more proactive role in contributing to its own and the region's security beyond economic and investment support. The advent of the trilateral security and then became strategic dialogue in 2002 preceded by earlier highly secret high-level officials talks was the context in which Australia became a third party also keen to advocate Japan's greater pro-activism alongside the United States. Thirdly, was the deployment of the ADF to provide the security protection for the Japanese self-defence force contingent in southern Iraq. In the context of the first two points I've just made, this deployment greatly elevated the level of trust and mutual respect between the two defence forces of Australia and Japan. Fourthly, was the signing by Prime Minister's Howard and Abe of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2007. This was strongly pushed on the Australian side and was a first culmination or first substantive major step forward that provided a framework for the nascent security cooperation which has blossomed in the rapid way that post-war reconciliation did economically. Again, as an aside, this occurred under both the Australian Coalition and Labor Party-led governments. Bipartisanship has been important and must be important into the future. By the time of my departure from Japan in August 2011, Australia and Japan Security Cooperation already embraced an information security agreement, the ACSA, joint exercises, and a significant level of practical cooperation experience in disaster relief. For example, the boxing-date tsunami aftermath in Indonesia, but particularly in the aftermath of the triple disaster in 2011, when three of Australia's four functional at that time, C-17s, were in Japan at the same time, albeit performing their role in the context of the US-Japan security arrangements. As we here all know, the most recent past five years has seen much more take place in this space, particularly in the past three years or so, facilitated especially by Prime Minister Abe's changes to Japan's defense posture and the reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution to permit Japan's involvement in collective self-defense and technology exports by Japan to selected countries. Let me make a couple of final observations, where to from here. Quite often we see comment in Australia that suggests Australia-Japan Security Cooperation should be managed or controlled or measured so as not to worry China, or to avoid having an unwanted impact on our relationship with China. After all, it's now our biggest trading partner. Often this sort of opinion appears to suggest, or even directly says, that we should pull back and apparently try to steer some sort of Chamberlain-esque neutral or passive path so as to avoid giving any offence to China. Well, of course it's important that Australian policy makers take account of and are sensitive to any legitimate concerns which other countries may express. And it is important also to be nimble, to use the Prime Minister's oft-used phrase, in our approach to dynamic policy environment in which we are placed. Indeed, ideally all the countries in our region should aim to have practical and productive communications with each other. It should be a given. But it is equally sensible and reasonable that each country confidently can pursue its national interests as it sees fit, which means in Australia's case, we can have confidence, if that's what we want to do, in maintaining the United States alliance, in deepening security cooperation with China, Japan, and building an even more comprehensive relationship. That includes greater security dialogue and exchanges with China and does the same thing with India, Indonesia and other countries in the region. All this can be and should be able to be pursued by a government with a comprehensive policy agenda. Economic issues are obviously important and the level and depth at which any two countries have economic engagement is also relevant. By and large, economic engagement will continue and grow where there are symmetries. However, sometimes perceived, veiled, or even explicit threats about curtailing access for trade, business, or investment do arise. Apparently designed to influence a country's domestic business audience or general audience to bring pressure on their government to refrain from pursuing a particular course. However, perhaps to state the obvious, any government of any country subjected to such pressure simply needs to have the confidence in its own judgments, not other country's judgments, and to pursue its best interests as it sees fit. And they must do this while giving due regard to broader regional context and to the respective relationships they have with other countries. So in conclusion, Australia and Japan, to my mind, can certainly continue to build their security relationship further, including if this is the decision taken by Australia purchasing Japanese submarines, while at the same time sustaining fruitful and productive relationships with all the other countries in their common region. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Murray McClain. And I think your remarks, among other things, set the scene for the aspiration of this conference to generate not only dialogue, but also ideas around policy. I should note before I introduce our second speaker that my admonition about mobile phones doesn't extend having them on silent and tweeting about our conference. And there is a hashtag there, so please keep that in mind. I now want to introduce, it's a great pleasure to introduce Ambassador Sumio Kusaka, the Ambassador of Japan to Australia to offer his opening remarks. Ambassador Kusaka. Thank you, Professor Metcalf, and distinguished guest speakers, ladies and gentlemen. Allow me to begin by expressing my gratitude to all the participants from both within and outside Australia for taking part in this symposium. And to Professor Metcalf and many of the ANU staff, particularly for all their efforts to make this happen. I fully expect that through discussion today and tomorrow, in this symposium we will deepen our understanding and raise awareness of the current state of maritime security in the Indo-Pacific and its prospect for the future. By the way, this word Indo-Pacific still sounds new to Japanese, I think, and maybe not here in Australia because we are very familiar with the concept in the world of Asia Pacific. So I think the word this Indo-Pacific gives us a new angle through which we look at this region, including India. And I think that's a very interesting change of concept, if I may, but today I'm not going into this detail. Rather, I'd like to talk about the Indo-Pacific maritime security challenges and cooperation. The regional situation is becoming more tense and serious here in this region. This has become a source of concern, so much so that we have come to the point where no nation alone can maintain its own peace and security. Based on this belief, the government of Japan last year passed a new legislation for peace and security in the diet. Under a new law, Japan is determined to make a greater contribution to peace and stability in the international community, including through various peacekeeping operations and activities undertaken by the United Nations, including those working with the Australians. I must emphasize here, however, that there will be no change to the basic position and posture that Japan has maintained as a peace-loving nation over the past 70 years after the Pacific War. With this in mind, we'd like to deepen our contribution to the region and the world. In the South China Sea, large-scale land reclamation and materialization activities have been taking place, which in turn have raised tensions in the region. The South China Sea contains Japan's and Australia's vital sea lanes, upon which our mutual transportation of goods and energy resources depend. As such, we have a legitimate right to express our serious concerns about events there. In the Japan-Australian 2-plus-2 joint communique released last November, and in the joint statement issued after the Japan-Australian leaders meeting in December last year, both nations expressed their strong opposition to any coercive and unilateral actions that could alter the status quo in the East China and South China Seas. These concerns were also reflected in joint statement of the US-Australian leaders' special summit held last month in the US, which also reiterated the need for relevant countries to play a constructive and cooperative role when dealing with regional and global issues and the need to respect the rules-based international order. Japan, along with other nations of the region, such as Australia, has emphasized the importance of respecting a rules-based international order and peaceful settlements of territorial disputes through negotiations, rather than relying upon unilateral forceful actions. We support efforts to resolve disputes peacefully in accordance with the international law, including through the use of arbitration. It is for this reason Japan has been supporting the ongoing arbitration case under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea brought on by the Philippines. We are keenly watching this because this arbitration case is about respecting the rule of law and the decision will be legally binding. In order to preserve an open, free and peaceful maritime environment, founded on the rules-based international order, the international community must work together to keep sending a clear and principled message to the countries in the region. Japan as president of the G7 this year will expend every effort in both maintaining and developing open and stable seas. Open and stable seas cannot exist without the means and wills to sustain them. This is why Japan has shown its support for the U.S. freedom of navigation exercises conducted in the South China Sea because maintaining the principles of freedom of navigation and overflight are at the very core of the universal values and interests of the international community. At the U.S. US and leaders meeting last month, President Obama himself demonstrated that he was strongly committed to the U.S. rebalance to the Asia Pacific region. While the U.S. continues to implement its rebalance policy to the Asia Pacific region, it cannot be expected to carry the whole burden of maintaining the peace of the region alone. In this connection, the fact that Australia has increased its patrol activities in the South China Sea based on freedom of navigation and overflight is strongly welcome. Countries in the region, including Australia and Japan must work together to support the U.S. efforts. The stability of the Indian Ocean region is also another important area for us. It has become necessary to work together with India in order to secure this stability. Japan sees enormous potential in its relationship with India as both an economic and strategic partner. When Prime Minister Ava visited India last December, Prime Minister Modi explained about the challenges of maritime security and expressed his interest in building maritime surveillance capacity and further promoting information sharing. Prime Minister Ava expressed his support for the reform activity initiatives under Prime Minister Modi and his strategic connectivity initiative linking South Asia to Southeast Asia through the activist and partnership for quality infrastructure policies. It is with such strong potential for future growth that we will pursue our engagement with India in regional affairs. The recognition by both Japan and Australia of India's latent strengths has produced concrete results. At the Second Japan-Australian-India Securities Meeting, held in February this year, which I attended in Tokyo, the situation in the South China and the East China Seas was discussed from the security point of view over three countries. And an agreement was reached to strengthen cooperation including with regard to maritime security. Since the Pacific and the Indian oceans are becoming more closely connected, the engagement of India to this end is quite welcome. Speaking of Indian Ocean security, one topic of particular importance is that of piracy. The Japanese government, in order to cooperate in anti-piracy measures, established the diplomatic liaison office in Djibouti in 2009 and a defense facility in 2011. This liaison office was later upgraded to an embassy in January, 2012. Japan has been dispatching two maritime self-defense vessels to Djibouti along with two P3C surveillance aircraft since June, 2009. At present, there are around 580 self-defense force personnel and eight Coast Guard officials involved in anti-piracy activities. Recently, the number of piracy incidents has decreased, quite significantly. Or dramatically, according to statistics, in 2008, there were 111 incidents of piracy at sea with 42 vessels seized and 815 crew members taking hostages. But in contrast, in 2015, there were no incidents of piracy, no ships were seized and no hostages were taken. This amazing development has been brought about by anti-piracy cooperation by the global community. Japan will continue to work in earnest with other countries to consolidate peace and stability in their important maritime route. Now, I'd like to talk about Japan-Australia relationship. Both nations see each other as crucial partners in that region. This was reflected in the sentiments expressed during Prime Minister Tombe's recent visit to Japan, where he was warmly welcomed by Prime Minister Abe. I think the underlying reason for this warmth were the clear recognition of the mutually strategic importance of strengthening Japan and Australia's special relationship. The two leaders confirmed that our countries have very special roles to play for peace and prosperity in the Asia Pacific and in the international community. It is quite natural that our two nations have become such partners because geographically we are at the northern and southern end of the western Pacific like bookends to the region. We have been very close economic partners over many decades, but nowadays our relationship has been developing into one of a strategic partnership. In February this year, Foreign Minister Bishop paid a visit to Japan during her visit, both she and the Foreign Minister Kishi that reached an agreement whereby both our nations will implement a Pacific strategy to further develop a specific cooperation between us. This agreement aims to provide support to efforts by Pacific Island nations to bring about their economic prosperity while strengthening the peace and stability of the region by effective governance, economic growth and sustainable development, and defense security cooperation, and diplomatic initiatives. Both Japan and Australia will continue to work together in the Pacific on the priority areas of maritime security and surveillance. We have also placed the seek opportunities to further our cooperation in areas such as capability development, training and joint exercises. On that note, I'd like to briefly touch on Japan's involvement in the Australian Future Submarine Project. In regards to which submarine should be selected, we respect that this matter is a sovereign decision of the Australian government. But you might be allowed to say one thing, Japan is the only country that builds and operates over 4,000 ton conventional submarine, which is sufficiently long range to meet Australian requirements, unlike unfounded criticism to the contrary, and unsurpassed seriousness with proven world-class capabilities. Furthermore, Japanese submarines have been delivered on time and on budget without any glitches whatsoever over the many, many decades. Also, I'd like to stress that Japan is very keen on strengthening industrial cooperation by engaging Australian companies to the maximum extent possible. Mitsubishi Heb Industries, a global conglomerate, will open up an innovation center in Australia in the event that Japan is chosen as a partner in order to supply innovation in Australia's industries. The fact that the top two leaders of Mitsubishi Heb visited Australia within two short weeks of each other recently demonstrated strongly Mitsubishi's willingness and commitment to Australia. I believe it will go a long way for our two nations to maintain and develop our long-term relationship, which would be mutually favorable. And so once again, I'd like to thank you all for very much for your kind attention and for inviting me to speak to you today. Thank you. Thank you. Let me join you in welcoming your Excellency, Ambassador Kasaka, distinguished guests, speakers, and colleagues to what I think is going to be an important and very stimulating conference. And Rory, I'd like to congratulate you and your colleagues at the National Security Center for the work that you've done in bringing us here together. May I also, on your behalf, acknowledge the traditional owners of the land on which we meet, the Ngunnawal people, and on your behalf, pay my respects to their elders past and present. The purpose of this first session is to really interrogate the big questions of the conference. So how, indeed, do we conceptualize the Indo-Pacific? What does the evolving regional balance of power require in terms of adjustments to the U.S.-led strategic order in the Indo-Pacific? What are the options for regional stability and security? As Ambassador Kasaka noted, Japanese and other perceptions of Indo-Pacific may have nuanced differences. So to what extent are they diverging or converging? What does that mean for Australia and Japan strategic relationship and for the other important strategic relationships within the region? So we will hear from three of our speakers in this session on those questions. There'll be time for discussion, but as Rory has pointed out, we will close the session slightly early to allow for maximum conversation in the keynote speech and other sessions that follow today. So we'll hear first from Rory, and then we are delighted that we'll have the opportunity to hear from Dr. Masashi Nishihara, President of the Research Institute for Peace and Security and a key advisor to the other government on security policy. And then we'll close the formal remarks from the panel with a contribution from Graham Fletcher, First Assistant Secretary of the North Asia Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The full bios for each of our distinguished panellists are in your materials, and I invite you to look at those. Rory. Thank you very much, Veronica, and I think I'll speak up at the stage. I'll be brief. It's my fault that we've had the short in the session, so I should at least keep my comments brief. The concept of the Indo-Pacific that I guess underpins this conference is, in my view, it's not a new concept. It is a contested concept, and that's fair enough, as we say in Australia. But it's a concept about which there are a few myths, and I would like in the next few moments to perhaps challenge or dispel a few of those myths to help explain why, in my view, the idea of the Indo-Pacific provides quite a powerful foundation for thinking about Australia's strategic interests and indeed the strategic interests of other significant powers in the region. Now, it's not a new concept in that when you think about linkages between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions, the strategic and economic connections, and indeed cultural connections, this is actually a very, very old story, which in my view was, I guess, interrupted for a few decades in the second half of the 20th century and is now almost reverting to a more, I guess, a more normal dynamic where South Asia and East Asia are not artificially disconnected regions where the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean matter vitally to the interests of countries globally and indeed in East Asia, and where, I guess, emerging powers and established powers are going to have to find a stable balance in a region that is, by its nature, a multipolar and too large for any one country to dominate. And incidentally, I think in looking at some of the sub-regions of the Indo-Pacific, and I know we've got a creative map behind me that tries to get us to look at the region from a slightly new angle, in some of the sub-regions such as the South China Sea, which are, and Maritime Southeast Asia, which are really central to the sea lanes of the region, the tensions, the challenges, managing the issues there is, I think in my view and under the concept of the Indo-Pacific, ultimately everybody's business, certainly the business of powers in the region, but indeed global powers as well. But one of the myths that I want to address is that the Indo-Pacific is all about India. Now, I know I have an Indian colleague or two in the room here. I have a lot of respect for an Indian worldview. However, the Indo-Pacific, in my view, is a lot more about China than it is about India, and indeed it's the interests of China extending into the Indian Ocean, extending towards Africa, towards the Middle East, the interests, and of course the responses to those interests that in many ways drive the idea of the Indo-Pacific. There's a Chinese initiative now, the Maritime Silk Road, which in my view could be seen as the Indo-Pacific with Chinese characteristics. The idea of the Indo-Pacific of these two traditionally or in recent times somewhat separate regions being more connected as a strategic and economic system has more than anything else a lot to do with the rise of China as a trading power and as a power with energy interests and other interests far afield. It's also about the rise of India and it's also about the enduring interests of Japan and indeed of South Korea and other East Asian countries. In fact, the dependence of Japan and South Korea on the Indian Ocean sea lanes for energy is in fact more acute than the dependence of China on those sea lanes. All three of those East Asian powers have legitimate interests in the Indian Ocean. It's also about the rise of India because of course particularly under the current Indian leadership there is a policy of not only Look East but Act East and in many ways India is rediscovering its heritage as I guess in many ways a Pan-Asian country, a country with interests beyond the Indian Ocean, beyond its immediate South Asian neighbourhood, looking to partnerships in Southeast Asia, looking to a very interesting and stronger relationship with Japan, looking to find ways to thicken the relationship with China while also obviously managing the differences between those two countries. Now there's a lot of history behind this and I won't go into all of the history. Suffice to say that if you work through the interactions particularly in the colonial era but even before the colonial era even the deep traditional cultural interactions between South Asia and East Asia, of course Buddhism being South Asia's perhaps greatest cultural export to East Asia, there's been I guess an Indo-Pacific heritage long before the concept of the Asian Pacific in the late 20th century. Now of course what matters here is what all of this means for policy and means for strategy. Yes, speaking as an Australian analyst I think the idea of the Indo-Pacific peculiarly suits Australia. We are a two ocean nation. It I guess helps anchor Australia in the region and interestingly enough in some new polling data that I've seen prepared by the US Study Centre at the University of Sydney, forthcoming poll on attitudes to the US rebalance to Asia. 70% of Australians polled in that poll take the view that Australia is an Indo-Pacific country. Interestingly 78% of green voters think that 70% of Labor and 72% coalition. I'm not sure there's much that I'll read into that particular piece of data but the overall sense that Indo-Pacific is a good fit for Australia's interests in the region and our identity I think is now quite cemented in Australian perceptions. And indeed with the recent defence white paper, the 2016 defence white paper launched under a, prepared under a coalition government, we've seen continuity between the recognition of the Indo-Pacific as Australia's region of strategic interest that first surfaced in the white paper three years ago under the Gillard Labor government. But as I said, what matters is policy. What do mental maps, whether we think about the Asia-Pacific, the Indo-Pacific or something else, you can call it maritime Asia, call it what you will, what does it mean for policy decisions? The choices that leaderships make, the priorities they place, how they allocate resources, the capabilities they acquire in defence terms, the partnerships that they prioritise. Well in my view, in my view the Indo-Pacific does have implications for all of those very, very practical outcomes. Firstly, as I've said, this is principally a maritime region. It's a very clear definition of Australia's region and I would argue the region in which other powers are emerging or sustaining their interests. That is maritime, principally maritime in nature. And that reinforces the view that Australia needs to, and is indeed, I think rightly, focusing more heavily on the maritime in its defence capabilities and in the security partnerships that it develops. Including in the kinds of defence, diplomacy and engagement that it pursues. It's also a very large region and of course that's one of the criticisms of the Indo-Pacific. It's too large a region to be manageable in any kind of regional institution. It's too large a region for every small country to have I guess an equal say in a large institution. If you think the ASEAN Regional Forum is a challenging institution to manage, just try extending it further to the west and that's a fair comment. But I would make the point that it's also a region that's too large for any one country to dominate. So it lends itself automatically to managing our relationships to whether it's multilateralism or strong bilateral ties or this interesting new concept of mini-lateralism, small coalitions forming on the basis of interest and capability. Unilateralism is not going to be the name of the game in the Indo-Pacific. And it provides, I think, interesting opportunity for what I would call players in the middle. I won't call them middle powers. I think India and Japan might wonder a bit about that title. I think it's a reasonable title for Australia, Indonesia and others, but this is a region where the whole strategic game is not going to be just bipolar. It's not going to be only the United States and China. The decisions of middle players will matter a lot in this region and indeed the opportunities for a country like Australia to be a creative hub for new mini-lateral coalitions, for new arrangements among these other powers I think is quite powerful. We have the geography, we have the ability, we have, I think, the networks of trust. And I think we've seen that in examples like the search for MH370 or some of the interesting trilateral dialogues that have evolved. And I would add that Indonesia is going to be an interesting partner for Australia in this space and we look forward to hearing from Dr. Muna on that a bit later on. So, look, they're the key points that I wanted to convey. I think the central question in the Indo-Pacific and the central strategic questions are going to be about China. They are going to be about essentially how do we incorporate China's rise and its legitimate interests, including in the Indian Ocean, without raising the security anxieties of others while respecting the interests of the other powers in this multipolar region. And that depends in many ways on the choices all of these countries make, including China, including Australia. I'll leave it there. Thank you very much. Ladies and gentlemen and distinguished participants, good morning. Appreciate this opportunity very much. It's my special honor to be invited to speak before this distinguished group and their conferences. Because of the interest of time, I would like to just present my views along the lines of the two questions that were raised for this forum. One is whether I think, how I think the changing balance of power in the region? The second question was about Japanese-Australian partnership. Let me just briefly say it for three points. First, I would say the balance of power in this region is changing rather substantially. I would say since about 2008, when the Beijing finished successfully, it's Olympics games. Until then, China was very much interested in keeping the area very peaceful so that they can conduct and sponsor the Olympics very successfully. But since then, China has changed, has expanded its military activities, particularly naval activities in the Pacific. And in that sense, there is a rising power there. We now see the core of the tensions in this changing balance of power is the China-U.S. rivalry. China's sustained military strength over the last 20 years has been really affecting the perception on our side if not the reality of the balance of power in the region. The tension between the rising power and the rising power in the region is seriously that sense. We can refer to President Xi Jinping's proposal that the Pacific should be divided into two and the western part of the Pacific should be controlled by the China while the eastern part is controlled by the United States. President Xi Jinping also mentioned in 2014 that the Asian security should be discussed and consulted, decided among the Asians. This means the Americans should be stay out. This is also a new move on the path of China. China has also established ADIZ in 2014 over the East China Seas. China has also been talking about the extending the power into the Pacific through the first island chains and second island chains. Now second, I would say the United States and its partners have moved to force their security ties among themselves. This is a new development in that sense. Traditionally United States and its partners, like buying partners have been in good terms with each other but since the last 10 years or less than 10 years the United States and its partners have strengthened their contacts, security ties among themselves. This is a new development of which I don't have to mention about this but since then we have had the multilateral arrangements or ties or the naval exercises together among Japan, Australia, Japan and the India, US and India, US and Asian countries as well. And there's a multilateral arrangements or exercises among the like-minded countries and the partner states and its partners in the region have been rather prominent. This is the second phenomenon. I would say in the third that the United States and Japan have seen the strategic implications of the trans-Pacific partnership. The economic arrangement, but it's not just an economic arrangement, it's a kind of club of like-minded international, open-minded, liberal, rule-based countries. It is also a club of free flow of ideas not since it is in contrast to the past other programs that have been developing in the region. If the TPP succeeds in itself, it will produce about 40% of the world GDP. This very significant in that sense. There are other emerging security issues in this region, North Korea, maybe Russia. Russia is also becoming more aggressive in the region. Could also mention about the Islamic States and so forth but I've not mentioned about that because of the internship time. Next point I want to mention is Mr. Obama's rebalance strategy. I think rebalance strategy has had the weakness. Perhaps not just because of Mr. Obama's personal interest I'm not using the force in solving settling international tensions but also probably the overriding issues he must have felt in the Middle East and other places like Ukraine. This has drew his attention away from Asia to a great extent and therefore the rebalance strategy Mr. Obama has tried to push, has had the face setbacks in that sense. It has failed to prevent China from encroaching maritime hegemony and to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear and missile programs. So the basic question we are facing today is how to, whether we should assume, sorry, whether we should assume that we can have a eventual partnership with China or eventually we would have to have tensions with China. Can we expect China to become a constructive partnership partners for us or can we expect China to become a more difficult partner for us? This is the basic question we are all facing. There was a book called by the Americans about a hundred year marathon that is also popular in Japan that would also extensive provide one side of stories. Two nations in North Korea, excuse me, two nations North East Asia that the China and North Korea do not observe international rules such as unclossed and UN Security Council resolutions. Mr. Warrant's diplomacy in that sense has a weak point. He has created power vacuums in the South China Seas and North Korea. The next point I want to mention about Japan and Australia. Already the ambassadors and others have mentioned about the relationship between the two countries so I don't have to go far in that. I would also, I will simply mention about the Indo-Pacific term. It's a new term for me and for us. I am a bit inhibited to use Asia-Pacific since I came to Australia yesterday. But in fact, this university still has a college called the Asia-Pacific. Asia-Pacific affairs, the Wunderer Professor Taylor's college just has that. In that sense, I don't know what the Australia really is trying to wrap with this concept. For us, however, it does provide a new insight for the regions. Australia and Japan are maritime nations in the Western Pacific. There are many things we can discuss, count, count, count, strategic implications of the partnership of the two countries will probably increase in the, under the concept of Indo-Pacific. But for us, one of the difficulties for Indo-Pacific, at least for me, is how far without the concept extent will it end in India? We are quite concerned about the sea lanes that will stretch out to the Middle East because of oil and others. Therefore, if you haven't talked about the safety of sea lanes, we would rather like to see a Pacific and the Middle East Gulf and Gulf Aden. We have some peacekeeping forces in Egypt, Sudan, in that sense, you'd like to see the whole areas as a strategic importance. Mr. Abe has talked about the Indo-Pacific, perhaps not using specifically that term. He also spoke a lot in the Pacific in the speech in the CSIS in 2013 in India. So United States uses the term Indo-Pacific from time to time, but last year when they produced the famous Asia Pacific, my time security review that you did use the term Asia Pacific. So we'll see how the next session speaker will talk about Indo-Pacific. Few issues will rise, as I said, as I mentioned, Japan would like to, if you have to extend the area for strategic purposes, we'd like to, I would like to say Japan, extend the far to the Middle East as well. Indo-Pacific and the West has awakened the need to see the whole nation. It is a strategic partnership that will help us to strengthen our relations. In that sense, Indo-Pacific has a strong point, an important agenda for Japanese-Australian dialogue. Thank you very much. Well, good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and thank you to Professor Taylor and Professor Medkaaf and Dr. Nishi Hara for setting up this conference and this session this morning. I'm afraid I may disappoint. I had a quick look through my notes and Indo-Pacific does not appear once. Never mind. I'm going to address three questions. Firstly, how to view the evolution that's taking place? Second, what factors will influence its outcome? And third, how should we proceed? Firstly, how to view this evolution? Well, let's look on the bright side. This is the problem our grandparents were looking forward to. Seven decades ago, this region was a complete mess. We had the devastation of war, we had some civil wars ongoing, we had decolonisation and we had looming overhead the shadow of the Cold War and the urgent need to provide basic human needs in all societies. Stability and prosperity didn't come easily, but over succeeding decades, peace and development gradually took hold, enabling most societies to flourish. The role of the United States, of course, was crucial in enabling and supporting this transformation. So now we have a vibrant and dynamic region. And with, from now, looking back to 1945, those problems seem a distant memory. And with economic success comes power and confidence and aspirations. And now we find governments and their people are exerting themselves in various ways. They now have the resources to acquire and deploy advanced military capability. So how should we regard all this? Well, as the welcome fruit of our success. And under these circumstances, the regional order cannot remain static. Changes in power will lead, in due course, to some repositioning among the major players. Think of it, if you like, as a rearrangement of the seating plan at the top table of regional affairs. The process is now underway, won't necessarily displace any of the current players. It's not as though anyone already at that top table is planning to leave. What we're now seeing is that more chairs are being added. Elbow room becomes constricted. How will they cope with that? And quite apart from who is at the table or where they sit or how much elbow room they have, the real question is whether these changes are going to affect the way in which the regional rules-based order operates. Will we still keep the same rules? Will they be followed? If not, what will be our responses? No simple answers. Second, what are the main factors shaping the evolution of the security order? You could summarise them simply as economics and physics. That is, the accumulation of productive and innovative capacities of each economy, how much influence is derived from that and how much raw power can be brought to bear at a particular geographic point. That's a very mechanistic, mechanical assessment, probably a bit too glib, because we're part of a broad society of states and communities and opinion makers and interest groups. We all have our histories, memories, sentiments, dreams and aspirations. They have property to safeguard, money to invest, they have opinions they voice and feet to vote with. And states aren't operating in a real political vacuum where prime ministers survey each other's economic output and the size of their respective missiles and shift their chef's pieces in some kind of isolation. No, we're in a far more dynamic environment and you could call this factor, or one of a better word, poetry. That is, it's the cumulative impact of our community's aspirations and prejudices, including how they want their governments to behave internationally. And although it encompasses soft power, it's broader than that, since it also includes the relationship a government has with its own community and how that impacts on its international activity. Most governments are not particularly adept at managing the interplay of domestic views and external pressures. Sometimes it's easier to nurture prejudices rather than steer them in more constructive directions. Nationalism is a dangerous pet to keep feeding, especially if it's a narrow kind of nationalism. That is the one that believes that we are right, they are wrong, we've been cheated but will not let that happen again. We will never give an inch, we want it to be great again. These views echo from various quarters and they're not helpful to our purposes, but we need to acknowledge them and their power. So if there is this kind of poetical factor at play in the way governments deal with their populations and each other, what might it mean for the evolution of the security order in our region? What might be some of the consequences? Well, one, there's a valuable inertia in the familiar. There's a strong recognition in the region that the security order underwritten by the US is the foundation on which our prosperity has been built. And our region's people have more than nostalgia for that status quo, they have a strong desire for change not to be disruptive and threaten the gains they've come to enjoy. Second, attitudes towards the past matter. For Japan, this means that the carefully negotiated words in a communique won't completely remove the difficulties left over from its recent past. This will require more effort, patience and time. Third, rule of law matters. For China, it means that to disregard the pending outcome of the arbitration relating to the application of UNCLOS provisions in the South China Sea would be a mistake. As you will know, the case lodged by the Philippines was crafted in such a way that it would come within the scope of compulsory arbitration under UNCLOS. This approach has been accepted by the tribunal for seven of the 15 matters put before it. The nations and peoples of this region expect that the tribunals decisions, whatever they may be, will be followed. And to do otherwise for China will be to incur lasting reputational damage in the eyes of the Indo-Pacific region and the international community more broadly. Fourth, friendship matters. Genuine friendship is a rare commodity in international affairs, but for those dealing with Australia and seeking to understand our strategic alignment and behavior, one has to factor in the depth of our friendships with New Zealand and the United States. This certainly belongs to this realm I've labeled poetry. It is no matter of economics. We would like to develop more of these friendships, but they can't be created just through speeches. Fifth, I'm sure you can come up with some more, including negative things like passion and recklessness and the grim determination that sets in once a conflict commences, which makes finishing a war much harder than starting one. Third, how should we proceed? Well, as they say on the roads, with abundant caution. Australia is not pressing for change to the regional security order, but we recognize that it would be short-sighted to imagine that things will stay the way that we've become used to. We will try and shake the evolution to the extent that we can in ways we believe will suit both ourselves and the overall interests of the region, and our preferred mechanism is a gradual evolution, not sweeping change. There are times when sudden change seems attractive, so the gardener or the architect sends in a bulldozer and the political activist plans a revolution, but it is much more manageable to proceed step by step, and this way change is more easily adjusted to. And in order to ease this process forward, we have put substantial effort into fostering institutions and dialogues of all descriptions. We've been enthusiastic supporters of regionalism in all its variants. The main ones relevant to this are the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus process, and the East Asia Summit. We want these groupings to build levels of confidence and habits of cooperation among the region's players so the problems are not ignored or left to fester. We've promoted regional economic integration. Two important mechanisms here are the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, ASEAN, which brings together all states from India through to New Zealand and Japan, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which links the more ambitious countries of maritime East Asia with their counterparts in the Americas. In parallel, we've got consultations between a few countries, often three at a time. This format is more intimate than a full-scale regional meeting and is a helpful mechanism to explore ideas. The best known of these for us is the trilateral between Australia, Japan, and the US. There are other consultations developing between India, Japan, and Australia. There's another between Australia, Korea, Japan, and the US, which focuses on proliferation concerns with regard to North Korea. And also consultations between Australia, China, and Malaysia, deriving from the search for the missing aircraft in the Southern Indian Ocean. And then there are others we're not part of, China, Japan, Korea, Japan, Korea, and the US, and so on. These networks support the framework of consultation existing at the regional level, and we are open to doing more of this kind of thing as circumstances may permit. Then we have our bilateral relationships in the region, and other speakers have referred to these. Our links with ASEAN and the South Pacific neighbors have always been closest, and we continue to invest in them. But over the past decade, we have been adding greater substance to our relationships further afield. This began with Japan, but also includes Korea, China, India, and Vietnam. We want to thicken and strengthen our security relationships with all these partners to the extent possible, and the extent will vary, so as to enable practical cooperation as well as policy dialogue. Through these links, regional institutions, small group consultations, and bilateral relationships, we want to help manage and shape processes of change in our regional security order. As Professor Michael Lestrange, the inaugural head of this fine institution used to say, our attitude will be one of optimism without illusions. Thank you. APPLAUSE Three different but equally stimulating framings of the issues. We have a few minutes for reactions and questions from the floor, so I'm going to open it up to you. I'd ask you to identify yourself first. We'll take two or three questions, and then I'll put them to the panel. We'd like to start. I'm Doug Keen from the Office of National Assessments. The word evolution evolving has been used a lot, but Charles Darwin recognised that there were discontinuities in evolution. People have said the world, our part of the world has changed a lot in the last 10 years. It may well change a lot in the next 10. I'd be interested in hearing from the speakers what their thoughts are either about the future or the uncertainties in the future, perhaps reflecting on the fact that probably both Japan and India will have different leaders, perhaps changing those countries' world views to some extent. The South China Sea may have settled down a bit and be less of a galvanising force in the region, so I'm just asking for some thoughts on what region we might be talking about if we gathered here again in 2026. Thank you. Other questions or comments? Greg Elliott from the Australian Civil Military Centre. You talked about the uncloss arbitration in that process. What are some of the ways that might pan out and the options for China? Is it too early to think how that might go? Perhaps one more. Anyone has a pressing question or comment at this point? If not, we'll take those two and put them to the panel. So the first question was uncertainties about the future. What will we be deliberating on if we are to meet in 2026, possibly with changed leadership in Japan and India, possibly with a settled South China Sea? Who'd like to say that first? I'll go first. Look, thank you. And I think Dr Keane's question goes to, I guess, the continuing change or evolution of the regional order. An interesting question I would pose, certainly 20, maybe not 10, but maybe 20, 30 years from now, we may well be talking about a different regional construct. I mean, the things that, to me, would change the regional order significantly, barring a great strategic shock, armed conflict or prolonged confrontation, would be major internal changes in one or more of the major countries of the region, whether it's India, whether it's Japan or whether it's China. A major change in economic patterns such that, for example, if we could envisage a rapid decrease in dependence on the Indian Ocean for energy imports or other inputs, then, of course, that would put a different gloss on things or indeed a different substance to things. I think the big question about discontinuities for me is not so much about internal change in India or Japan, it's about internal change in China. And I would argue that there are going to be challenges in dealing with a China that is increasingly powerful and active and influential in the region. There would also be challenges in dealing with a China that stumbles in some ways. And so for a country like Australia or for other middle powers, in some ways, I think the recipe for policy is going to be the same and that is going to be diversify relationships. It's going to be hedge against possibilities and hedging is not, in a sense, interpreted as automatically military balancing or automatically having a bet on every other option, but it's having multiple options to govern the future, hedge against the possibility that China will continue to rise, hedge against the possibility that China will stumble. And I certainly take the point that we can't be certain about the pathways in some other countries, perhaps India more so than Japan. On the South China Sea, I'm going to take the easy way out. I recently put a question to a visiting Chinese delegation. What do they think motivates the Philippines and Vietnam to take the positions they take in the South China Sea? And they said, you should ask them. I'm going to take the same response on how China would respond to the tribunals' ruling. Thank you. Well, internal changes in Japan and India may be important, but I would also say that internal changes in the U.S. will be very important. If Mr. Trump becomes president, he will be against the Japanese U.S. security treaty. He's against TPP. So it will have big changes in the region. And so I do pray that he will not be in the Russian... Another reason to diversify. That's one example. We may see some change in North Korea. We may see changes in Korea, peninsula, therefore. So we have to assume that many changes will affect the balance of power. But basically, we should really maintain our partnership among ourselves to sustain our liberal, open-minded, and rule-based order in the region. I could just add, in relation to one class, we don't know what the tribunal will decide. But from a rules-based principle, whatever the tribunal decides is binding. And that is an important decision point for China, which I tried to make clear. Thank you on that rather somber note. We've reached the limits of our time for this session. Before we thank our speakers, I'm going to invite our colleague from the National Security sent at this college to present a token of appreciation to Ambassador Kasaka, to Murray McLean, and to each of our speakers. And as he does so, I'd invite you to thank them all for their contributions to start us off. Thank you. Thanks a lot. Thank you. Good job.