 Hello, I'm Stowe Tatie, and I'm a core faculty at the Harvard Center for Bioethics and editor of the Harvard Medical School of Bioethics Journal. And I am here with James Davison Hunter and Paul Nieleski, the authors of Science and the Good. James Davison Hunter is LeBros Levenson Distinguished Professor of Religion, Culture and Social Theory at the University of Virginia. And Paul Nieleski is a fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies and Culture at the University of Virginia. Thank you both for being here. Thank you. Thanks. The book begins with the description that it traces the origins and development of a centuries-long, passionate, but ultimately failed quest to discover scientific foundations of morality. You begin the story with Aristotelianism and trace that through Scolasticism in the Middle Ages. Could you say a little bit about the initial motivations for what you describe as a tragic quest? So the beginnings of this quest happen at a particular time and place. Context is everything. And the context is the late medieval world where we are watching the erosion of the authority and the fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire, the challenges particularly that are coming from Protestantism, but also global exploration, new knowledge about the natural world and the blood itself, and Scolasticism, Aristotelian Scolasticism simply wasn't adequate to make sense of all of these changes. And so on the one hand, you have increasing conflict in Northern and Western Europe largely due to again the rise and success of Protestantism in conflict with Catholicism and the way that that gets paired with micro-states in Northern Europe, the way in which religion is used to help solidify political power, so on. But you also have, in addition to conflict and promiscuously bloody conflict, you also have the confusion that's coming from increased knowledge of the world and the question was, how do we make sense of all of this knowledge and how do we find a way through our conflict? And clearly Protestantism and Catholicism couldn't sort out their differences. So in a way, religion was failing and failing in morally disastrous ways. What was the alternative? And at the beginning of the scientific revolution, it occurred to some, well, maybe science could become an alternative magisterium to religious faith, to God as a source of moral authority for making sense of the world and all of its complexity. And then by virtue of establishing a scientific foundation of morality upon which everyone could agree, there would be a way forward. We could live at peace. There would be a foundation for human flourishing. That was the quest. And it was honest. It was passionate. It mattered. Or optimistic. And it was very optimistic. I mean, you think about one-third of the German population was killed in the Thirty Years War. Everyone was affected by this. There was a sense of urgency about it. So the context was one that really called forth some kind of alternative solution. And that's where the quest begins. Could you describe the new moral scientists? Sure. New moral scientists are a group of thinkers from different disciplines. Some are philosophers. Some are psychologists. Some are working various fields of neuroscience. But all of them are doing work that is interdisciplinary. They're drawing on from different sources, different disciplines. And their perspective is sort of cobbled together from different views that arose throughout this three or four centuries-long quest to find a scientific basis for morality. And so the basic platform of views that they tend to share are a sort of neglect of the ends in question and moral questions. And so they would say, what are the means, the best means to get us where we want to go? There's a utilitarian structure where they don't think too much about what is the goal that we're pursuing, but instead they say, what's an efficient way to get there? There's also what we would recognize today as a philosophical naturalism. They think everything in reality has to be explainable in scientific terms fundamentally. They see a big role for evolution. Naturalistic evolution explains how we got the suite of moral, cognitive, mental modules, if you will, that help us navigate the world. And you bring all of this together with really huge increases in technological means for studying various aspects of the physical human fMRIs. You can apparently now look inside of the brain and, depending on our view, inside of the mind to see what's happening when people are puzzling through moral questions. So this is kind of the view that they broadly share. Big names from this group would be Jonathan Hyde, Joshua Green, Fiery Cushman, Patricia Churchland, Owen Flanagan. But we talk about 20 or 30 characters in our story, but many more are working in this world as well. And I think one of the big unifying issues for the new world scientists is their belief that because the world fundamentally is the kind of thing that science can study, whatever question we're asking has to square with that. And so we want to know about the phenomenon of morality in large part because of the kinds of dynamics that James described that have been with us since the beginning of modernity. So obviously the best way to do that is going to be look to science to try to address that insofar as it's possible. So do you think that focus prioritized problem solving versus truth or wisdom seeking? I think the answer is yes, because we can't seem to come to any agreement about what is wise or what is true. People are going to have different perspectives on that and so problem solving is the kind of utilitarian term here in combination with the kind of human moral central mentalism, the evolutionary understanding of its sources and so on is a way of addressing moral issues without having to address the problem of truth and how truth then can be applied wisely in the world. Well, the book covers a wide range of philosophers, theologians, scientists and the moral scientists. One name that didn't prop up so much was Immanuel Kant. And I read Kant as basically arguing that there's a limit on what we can know. There's this unreachable distance between our cognitive processes and the external world. And so I take Kant as saying that we have to be sort of agnostic about that. And I read basically philosophy following Kant as assuming that Kant had been atheistic about it when he had it at all. So do you think that issues such as Hume's challenge and Kant's critique of pure reason were just sort of intellectually uncomfortable moments that were bracketed and sort of set aside? Or where does Kant fit into the story here? I think it's exactly right, the bracketed and the setting aside. One way that Kant comes close to the narrative we tell is it was a response to Kant's works that Hegel introduced some ideas that influenced, for example, the British idealists in the late 19th century, Bradley Green, among others. And they were very interested in new evolutionary theories from Darwin and Russell and others. But there weren't very strong links between idealism and evolution. There was a broad structural similarity. The world spirit was groping toward a better state of affairs. And it seemed like there was a, at least early on, Spencer and others thought that evolution was also sort of inexorably producing a better world. And so there was an attempt to marry these ideas at that point in time. But at the origins of what we would recognize as analytic philosophy today, there was a big cultural shift within philosophy starting in England. And idealism was largely neglected, and along with idealism, a lot of Kantian views. And from the analytic side of things, which is definitely the philosophical source for the new world scientists, there isn't a big emphasis on Kant's views or anything that's very anti-realist when it comes to nature. There's more of a presupposition or assumption that science is telling us about the world. And perhaps it's the only thing that's telling us about the world. So Kant was a rationalist, but he wasn't a reductionist. And part of the story is I think the kind of revisionism that we late moderns have of some of these very important figures like Locke and Kant, they are viewed in a particular way through the lens of our own context. We forget that Locke was, wrote in tomes on theism, you know? To read Locke's essay, Concerning Education, is like reading a tract on Sunday school formation. So it's infused with that kind of theism. And I think in the case of Kant, again, in the total fatality of his work, we see a much bigger picture. Kant is used differently today. But in his context, and in the context of his larger writings, he's actually, I think, on our side in this. I'm getting back to science. The other name that popped into my mind reading this book was Thomas Kuhn, which is sort of a reviled figure in analytic philosophy. And, you know, taking that strain of philosophy of science, you know, it's very easy to see how Kuhn was arguing that we can't escape to have any objective view of things. You know, Paul Firerobin goes in further than this. But, you know, Kuhn's admonition that there's no such thing as a bare fact. They were all perspectively bound in self-referencing, self-justifying systems. That would seem to not just contradict the work that the new moral scientists are doing, but also really set out of reach objective moral truths. So what are your thoughts about that? Do you... I mean, in the end of the book, you're not making a prescriptive model of morality, of course. But what are your thoughts about that? I have a couple of thoughts, and James, you should respond as well, if you'd like. One, the new moral scientists, it seems to me, their motivation and the audience that they see for themselves, they're operating the level of sort of public rhetoric. And there's this implicit sense that I think that's pretty widely shared, especially, I would say, outside of the Academy, that science is a good source of knowledge about reality. You know, look at what science has done for us. You know, science has given us flight, you know, the iPhone, put people in outer space. Philosophy, religion, what have they done for us? The history is a little more vexed. And so I think they're attempting to find a path through this very optimistic public perception of science toward addressing some of our deep moral concerns. And so I don't see much of any interaction with a deeper philosophy of science. It's an interesting point that you raise. At the level of, you know, what should want to make of this kind of kumine critique? We don't go into that. Just one quick thought would be that not every fact you think you have in your possession, you are confident about as every other. So there's some things you're more confident, this is correct than other things. And my thought will be, you have to give some kind of priority within your level of beliefs, beliefs, if you will, to the things you're more sure about. And I think it's pretty reasonable to say that there are some of the facts we should be more confident about when things like you shouldn't kill people for fun, you know, they're going to be a little more moral facts. And it's difficult for me to think that this is just sort of emerging out of an anti-realist level of beliefs. It seems that there has to be some kind of connection with reality at that point. And so I would push back on this sort of moral radicaling to realist good review, but we don't get into that issue much at all. No, we don't. And yet both Paul and I would say that we're moral realists and part of that comes out of an inductive social science look around the world. It seems fairly apparent that human beings by nature are normatively inclined, that culture is normatively infused in every single way. It has a lot to do with language itself. And yet there's all this variability. So we're fans of Koon at one level, but we wouldn't take the Koonian critique all the way down. So it seems to me at that point there, you have to begin with some understanding or vision or claims about the nature of flourishing, what constitutes human flourishing. But that's something that science can't provide, but the interaction of our observations and not just of 18 to 22-year-olds at elite universities, but around the world tells us. It's an N equals 9. Yeah, that's exactly right. Tells us something very interesting, and I think it's maybe not fully universal, but profound about what human flourishing looks like over time and across different cultures. It may not be authoritative, but it's something we can work with. Which is interesting because that's basically what's been adopted in bioethics, by Beecham and Childress's work. They talk about a common morality. We're not know what it is. We can't tell you exactly what it is, but there's some things that we can sort of all agree on. It's interesting that the presidential commissions on bioethics, they couldn't agree on higher level principles, but they could agree about what those specifications were. They could agree you shouldn't kill people wantonly and that sort of thing. They just couldn't agree on the reasons for what. Jim Childress was one of my colleagues here for four decades, and so where I would have agreed with Jim at that level, but I wouldn't have left it there. I wouldn't say that that's the end of the conversation. Because we believe that normativity is inherently particular, then we can draw on the claims made by particular traditions and so on to inform what we in fact all share in common, and that enriches our ethical discussions. It doesn't detract from them. So the move towards more narrative ethics is something that's been very helpful in clinical ethics because it allows you to treat two sets of circumstances that you might think of the same differently based on the situation. Just a pre-vanicked note that comes to mind. I remember a patient once who brought their child and the child had some form of leukemia, and the parents just weren't interested in the various options that were available. This was not a sure cure by any chance. There was a 40-50% chance maybe, and we couldn't understand why the parents were so reticent to explore all these different options that were available. Well, it turned out they had had an older child who died of that leukemia. Those situations drastically inform how we view them and their moral capitalists. I absolutely agree on that. In the section on the quest redirected, you talk about a move from skepticism to nihilism. Could you explain what you see as having? Why don't you start Paul and Paul jump in? Sure. The driver for this development in this longer quest really is a radicalization of philosophical naturalism. That's how we see it. Naturalism as a philosophical view of the world was a frequent background component of this narrative right back to the beginnings of the story. In many cases, even those who would say, yeah, I think fundamentally at bottom things have to be explained in scientific terms, in terms of the properties of little pieces of matter or whatever. There was optimism or hope that the world of our experience, the richer world of our experience, which includes, apparently includes the moral phenomenon, would be able to be explained in these nationalistic ways. Maybe someday we'll have the equation that shows us how the value in a state of affairs can be constructed from the fifth to whatever. But the numeral scientists, which is, and there is another piece of a larger view within philosophy, have given up on that possibility and said, we now think we can just tell that there's not going to be any sort of reduction like this. Morality, ethics, value and all of the associated aspects, they can't really, they can't really exist. They can't be a fabric of reality. What I think is especially interesting about the numeral scientists is with two exceptions, they don't want to talk about this. It'll come up in a footnote here and there. You'll hear them talk about it at a conference, but in their public facing work, it's not discussed. So it's kind of this interesting background view that I think is very relevant and interesting for their audience to know. And so they don't think, the lone exception is Sam Harris. He actually is a moral realist, but all the other characters to talk about, so far as we can tell seem to be moral nihilists. So they don't think there's any real moral phenomenon. Nothing really is right or wrong. Nothing really is good or bad. But for whatever reason, they don't want to be upfront about that. So they still use the language route. They still talk about right and wrong, good and bad. They just redefine those terms. So if you, again, coming back to Joshua Green, if you dig into the details, he ultimately wants to cash it out in terms of satisfying certain kinds of preferences, but the real moral content has disappeared. We don't doubt their sincerity, but again, think about the context. Here we are in the late 20th and early 21st century. It's a time of great confusion and of conflict. People are looking for moral sources that can help us make sense of the world as it is and a way forward. And religious authority has been discredited widely and across traditions. Maybe science can offer something. And so you see many of the actors within the new moral science prominently in the Aspen Ideas Festival and giving TED talks that are watched. Millions and millions of people. They're selling books that are selling hundreds of thousands of copies. They have a certain kind of moral authority by virtue of their stature in philosophy departments or in science departments and so on. So they're using the language of morality from these platforms, but they actually don't believe there's anything really there. To acknowledge that in public would be to undermine their whole authority and the kind of popularity that they enjoy. So it would be interesting to have an open discussion and public discussion about that with a number of these very prominent figures. I do want to say and I think Paul and I would agree that we don't gain say their sincerity. We don't gain say their own integrity. But there is at least implicitly a kind of bait and switch going on. And that needs to be called out and that's what we're trying to do in the book. So it just seems anti-common sensible to deny experiences that everybody has. Everybody has these moral responses to things. That's essentially what you're saying that this is, is that we're all mistaken about that. That's in some form of emotivism or preference expression and nothing else. Right. They have a lot more they can and do say about this and a common move is to tie it back to an evolutionary psychological account that's that's asked the question. Well, okay, if you if you think that there really isn't any value out there, there are no real duties or obligations, then how to account for this, you know, parent experience that of morality that we have. And the common frequent answer is, well, it arises from our Stone Age ancestors and hunter gather environments. We, you know, and then there's sort of a just so story that's told, perhaps, and they're clear on this there, they would say these, these are theories intended at this point. But the thought is that it has to be something like it helped group cohesion to have certain kinds of moral responses. And so that was the origin. They are illusory, but they perhaps, they were useful, they're useful. They kept the groups that had they had those those impulses around in ways that the more selfish, individualistic groups couldn't didn't succeed and survive. But yeah, it is. Ultimately, on their view, it is an illusion. And they don't, I think the response would be well, is it really clear that people are sure that they are experiencing moral realm? And for some people, maybe not. Part of the confusion in in culture day gives rise to some people who have questions about whether it will maybe maybe my parent moral experiences and, you know, veretical isn't correct. But it's clear to us that for plenty of folks there, they think they are experiencing, you know, real value and they have real duties and that sort of thing. So it would be helpful for the new moral scientists to address that. A former professor of mine used to say philosophy is the only science to which the addition of no new facts will answer any of the questions. And I think there's there's some truth in that. But it seems that there's this drive towards getting answers that comes across as more important than the process being correct. And from from your study of the new moral scientists, do you think that they are seeing this in terms of, okay, if we can get from A to B, then we can solve all these problems, rather than being concerned with truly understanding what's going on between A and B? Or I mean, do you think denying that there are there are these experiences that there's this type of mental content that we call moral deliberation reasoning is getting in the way of solving problems and that's why we move beyond it or what? How does that cash out? Right, I think the language of problem solving is that's a term that that some of the new moral scientists use themselves. And so I think you're on something with this question. So sometimes the problem is presented as a conflict between what kind of ethical position could conceivably get us all on the same page and resolve our problem problems of conflict versus these recalcitrant, you know, problematic moral impulses that that apparently everyone has. This is sometimes presented as the conflict between the sort of visceral emotional, you know, stone age more moral impulses that give rise, according to the new moral scientists, as deontology sort of these absolute prohibitions and duties that you might have, as opposed to the more, you know, rational or calculative understandings of morality that you might get from some kind of utilitarianism where where, you know, that would be okay, you can abstract from your position, step back, what would really be best for everyone. Something that some of the new moral scientists seem to want to say is, well, at least in principle, everyone could accept a utilitarian sort of view where that could in principle get everyone on the same page because we would have a sort of a common currency, you know, happiness, cashing that out is going to be, you know, the real problem. But if we can all agree, happiness is the goal and we should orient our decisions toward promotion of happiness and move away from these merely stone age impulses of, you know, punishment or or duties, then that might be a path to, you know, solving the problem of our conflicts. But you're right. From our perspective, there hasn't been a lot of attention or effort given to thinking through A, could that it could such a program even in principle succeed because you really persuade any vibrant culture to abandon their sense of obligations and duties that that are essential to it or deeply held. And two, there hasn't been much of a discussion about the actual ethics themselves. Why should we think utilitarianism is correct? And I think part of that is because they they don't think it's all an illusion. So that makes it easier to just sort of take her and solve. Yeah, I mean, I think I would just echo the point and say that that, yes, the content does get in the way and it gets in the way partly because it doesn't those metaphysical claims made by different actors, communities and individuals that they're illusory anyway, what we can agree on, at least for the most part, at least find more consensus on or what is the problem itself. So if the problem is real, and it's and and we can see the consequences of this problem, let's ignore the other stuff. Focus on how do we solve the problem? I call it a kind of a metaphysics of realist anti realism. The problem is real. What's behind it is unreal. There's nothing it's aiming toward. But the problem is real and we can agree on that for the most part. So let's just solve that problem. And that's not just a philosophical issue. I mean, that's that is playing out in our economy and our politics and our technology. The problems are real. We just have no larger framework to make sense of those problems. So let's just focus on a very practical utilitarian. Just set the rest aside. That's right. That's right. Because we will never agree on that stuff. So without a deity or metaphysics, it seems impossible to ground realist morality. Do you think there are gains in knowledge through science that can yield normative content? Only only the only the level of put it this way. Science isn't going to tell us the principles around or what the source or the the basic outlines of what a true ethical theory would be. And nor would it generate those. Right. And neither will sort of arise out of the practice of science or something like that. But if you already have some ethical perspective that you think is correct, then you can, you know, as any other information about the world, what science tells us can be relevant. If you know that life is valuable and you can tell that a certain proposed medicine helps, you know, helps in that way, you know, saves lives, prolongs lives, you know, at least the simplistic, you know, toy example level, you can tell, oh, that's a that's an advance. That's a good thing. You know, we've learned something. This pill, if you take it, isn't going to kill you. It's going to help keep you alive in these circumstances. That would be an instance of science telling you something ethically relevant. But it didn't give us that prior ethical commitment that human life is valuable. And so I think a lot of what really everything that science can tell us that's valuable for knowing what to do in an ethical sense happens at that level, not the level of we did an experiment speaks implicitly. And this shows utilitarianism is true. Okay. So to push back on that a bit, if it turns out mirror neurons are a thing, what kind of information, what kind of utility does that have for morality? Like, do you think that that's information we can use with existing beliefs we already have about morality to better inform how we act or better inform how we explain? Or is that just merely descriptive? Can you say a little more about what you're well, like the idea of mirror neurons that we in a sense experience with others, you know, that we can immediate we have an immediate visceral comprehension of another person's say suffering. We sort of feel it ourselves and we see someone suffering sort of feel it yourself. And that some people are attributing to these mirror neurons that allows us to actually put ourselves in the other person's place and experience that some degree. And maybe that can explain compassion, for example. Yeah, the phenomenological tradition would call that intersubjectivity. Right. And it doesn't reduce it to the kind of neuroscience. But there is a comparable way of talking about that and and intersubjectivity, the language of intersubjectivity becomes a phenomenology is rooted in shared language, shared biographies, and so on. So if it's if mirror neurons are understood in light of or in conjunction with a philosophical theoretical perspective, like phenomenology, I think it can help us understand. I don't think by itself mirror neurons are going to tell us that much. I agree with James. If I get out of something to this point, I think this is could be a good example of where we would say science could be very helpful at a descriptive level. So the way I think we would think of it is the mirror neuron approach is one proposed way of understanding how we have access to the the moral experience, perhaps of someone else, or at least their their state, what they're feeling in a given circumstance. And as James pointed out, there's been a further question. Well, do we think these experiences have an implication for value? And just knowing that mirror neurons and the role they play in human interaction give us access to something doesn't answer that that deeper meta ethical question. But it may well be that mirror neurons are the they are the it's some some sense physical access point we have to someone else's experience of the world. Because we know there is some connection. There's some connection between physicality and the ethical realm. So that's and intersubjectivity. Yeah, we would never we would never dispute that. So maybe the mirror neurons are a promising approach to better understand. Well, how is this access happening? What what is happening at the neural level? So in the book, you discuss Rawls. But like lock rolls also believe that people were moral actors, they have moral beliefs, and that living a moral life was something sort of inherent to human beings. So it seems to me that if you're denying that if that's illusory, and the moral science and moral scientists are correct, then it would seem to lend itself to a sort of very undemocratic way of looking at the world. And what I mean by that is if you look at say, Hobbes, Lock, their theories of human nature informed their theories of justice. So it seems that the new moral scientists theories of human nature would also inform their theories of justice or governor of the state. Do you think that's a threat that way thinking? Yes. Yeah, I think the answer is yes. We're, I mean, I think the difference between say, Rawls and the new moral scientists is that while Rawls is a rationalist and a naturalist, he's not a reductionist. And so his baseline understandings of what human beings are don't finally distill into the kind of reductionism that you find in the new moral science. He has a richer conception of human beings that then from which he can build a larger theory of the political social and political order. But on the new moral science side, and large part because of the kind of radical turn in their naturalism, it you end up with a highly reductionist view of human beings that human beings are objects to be manipulated rather than engaged that their claims are not to be taken seriously, that we can safely ignore them and that scientists themselves, partly because of their superior access to knowledge, information, the science itself are in a much better position to say what is good for society, what is good for people. And it's, yeah, it's a kind of deeply disturbing idea. I think quite frankly, this is the gesture we make toward the end of the book is that the new moral science provides the highest levels of intellectual rationalization for what is in fact an emerging technocratic order. And that's part of what's so interesting about this, and it's one of the central reasons why we took this project on. You don't have a society without some kind of common culture. And in a world and in a society like ours that is as deeply fragmented, politically polarized as ours, on what grounds do we find some kind of common culture? Well, it's technocratic, managerial, professional, and so on. What is the idiom by which people speak through across all these differences? Well, it's quantification, right? It's a certain kind of rationality. And so even while most people are not on the same page with the new moral scientists, the very nature of modern life and public discourse in finance, in politics, in education, we're all looking for a common language. The new moral science provides intellectual legitimations for what is already, in fact, emerging. And it's deeply troubling. And I think that's right. And again, just to reiterate, not that any of the new moral scientists have any explicit ambition, but they will learn about these things. It's our concern as sort of as you put it, what might the consequences be for a moral viewpoint or an ethical perspective if your view of human nature is what theirs is? There's a fundamental incoherence, it seems to me, in the view of the new moral scientists, because they have this metaphysics that doesn't permit any sort of moral or ethical basis, any sort of handhold or toehold, we're saying, well, this is wrong, we can't go there. But at the same time, as a matter of happenstance, their perspective on what we should be pursuing as a society, as a Western educated elite, if you've ever heard of weird morality, that's a camera of which each letter of the acronym stands for, but that's their perspective. But it doesn't have any final justification or basis in their metaphysical view. When thinking about marginalized groups, there's quite a hubris of epistemic injustice in this, in denying what we feel, experience, know is correct, but that's illusory. We're going to tell you what you really think. That's right. Partly because of the vaunted platforms from which many of these people speak, and because of the esoteric of science and philosophy itself, who is the ordinary person to question on what grounds are they going to take challenge with the kinds of overreaching claims made by these individuals and by the larger discourse. So that's a problem. So you touched on this a bit, James, but I was curious if there was a tipping point that motivated this project, or is it something that's been in the works for a while, or what sort of motivated you to take this on? Well, I would say that the my work, but also the work of the Institute for Advanced Studies and Culture is supremely interested in what we call the deep structures of culture. Think about the difference between weather and climate. Most people who are commenting on the world in politics and on technology and in the arts and so on, they're really talking about the weather. We're interested in climatological changes, the things that are not seen that are more implicit than explicit. It's our sense that underneath the culture wars, it's underneath all the histrionics that we see in our public culture about technology, the seemingly rapid change or in fact slower movements of culture. And we think that the kind of scientism that is explicitly articulated within the new moral science is actually reflecting a kind of latent functional scientism within the larger culture and I would say within the larger culture of the dominant institutions of the emerging technocracy that we see. And we think that these larger developments, both the explicit, but especially the implicit, raise serious challenges to what many people in the world would consider human flourishing. As it bears on medicine, education, health policy, you name it. And if what the new moral scientists are doing is giving an explicit expression to something that's much larger, but much more implicit, then it seems to me that we need, we shouldn't go into the future naively or to simply imagine that what the new moral scientists are doing is just this kind of hyper-philosophic, hyper-abstruse that it's actually a window into deep changes in our civilization. If they are in fact pointing in the directions that we think they're pointing, then we need to understand them. And to understand them is the first step, it seems to me, in engaging them in an ethically responsible way. James and Paul, thank you very much. It's been an illuminating discussion and it's a fascinating book. Thank you. Thank you.