 Thank you very much. First up, we're done to you all. Last session, last day, we're still here. We're still standing. Pen on the back. We're done. Okay, so my presentation has a rather abstract title, Mapping the Informal Jurisprudence. So what we've just heard from Claire is what I would describe as the formal jurisprudence. I think you describe it as soft law, but I call it the informal system, if you like. So what I'll be talking about is actually fairly grounded, although idealistic. So I do have a specific proposal to put to you, which is for a private ordering system that would bring justice to the victims in global supply chains or global production processes, the victims of that process. And more specifically, still, I'll be proposing that there should be something like a global industries ombudsman service. That's a mouthful. Global industries ombudsman service. I've had a lot of experience in the domestic legal systems in which there are ombudsman services, which can take complaints against banks and financial providers and telecommunications industries and so on. So the idea is to take that basic model, map it onto an international forum, but the complainants would be workers and others affected by global industries. And the aim would be to overcome some of the jurisdictional problems that we have with the hard law, some of which has been described by Claire. So if anyone is intrigued or interested in what I talk about today and want to contact me, I'll be very interested in any ideas, any contacts, anything. You can contact me on justin.malban at monash.edu. So here's my pitch. So the idea is to establish this global industries ombudsman service and succeed in that. There's two elements. One is you need the industries on board, which is no easy thing. That's the first step. And the second thing is to map the jurisprudence, the informal jurisprudence, which is somewhat chaotic at this stage, so that there is some basis upon which the system can function. So let's just define the problem a little bit further. The issue is that the victims of human rights abuses in global production processes are four victims, with some rare exceptions that Claire has mentioned, is extremely difficult for them to gain any recompense. I'm focusing on global corporations first because they're great defendants, they've got money. And secondly, they are the throughput of the clothes we wear and many of the other items that we have, which in many cases are produced by slave labour and victims, for which we benefit, the global corporations benefit. And I would think in some ways we are complicit in the abuses that are taking place through the conduit of these global corporations. And the sorts of corporations I'm talking about are those in the areas of apparel, mining companies, food and beverage, and there's an extensive list beyond that. Now, as we've gone, we've heard from Claire, it isn't so difficult for global corporations to elude the formal legal system in terms of redressing any harms. And so they're able to use subcontracting arrangements and a whole range of other processes to avoid any meaningful liability for harms that they do. And as I say, we are complicit in all this. So they cause abuses in their production processes and various ways this is done is through forced labour, child labour, employment of workers in dangerous and unhealthy workplaces, underpayment, deprivation of rights to join unions. For example, in Guatemala, they tend to execute union leaders. That's just their little way of bringing a little order to the situation. And also the subjection of workers to harassment and abuse. And the class of people affected by this is significant. The ILO conservatively estimated that we're dealing with more than 20 million people that are subjected to coercion, deception and human trafficking. More specifically still, not so long ago, the BBC did an investigation. They found that there were Turkish textile factories exploiting child labour to the extent that they were using seven and eight-year-old children working 60-hour weeks. Syrian refugees were a great target for exploitation in these global supply chains. And we can see here a number of UK companies that were found to be linked to production of houses using forced labour. The difficulties with the formal system, some again, which I mentioned by Claire, is the difficulty in seeking remedies in the home country. For a whole lot of reasons, I probably don't need to rehearse. And also trying to bring action in the home country is somewhat difficult. So what is, this is not suggesting we're replacing what we have, but perhaps complimenting what we have, wouldn't be great if we had global corporations first up accepting responsibilities that extend beyond their formal legal liabilities. What if they accepted responsibilities beyond that? That's the first thing. And secondly, what if they voluntarily had a system for compensating the victims of that abuse? The first part, voluntarily accepting responsibility is increasingly occurring, but it's occurring in a way that is somewhat chaotic, as we'll see in a minute. It's somewhat chaotic. So I think we need, and this is a project that I will engage myself with others in, and that is trying to bring some coherence to this outburst that we have at the moment of voluntarily accepting responsibility. But for all the voluntary acceptance of responsibility that's going on, there's very, very few cases in which there's compensation or any form of remedy being provided to the harmed parties. So this is where the latest developments are not succeeding. So we're talking about a voluntary system in which global corporations will commit themselves to providing compensation to harmed parties. So why would they do it? There was a couple of reasons. One is there's a reputational risk that they face at the moment, the tainting of their brand, their brand name. The Rana Plaza is one of the classics in which 1,300 people were killed with a factory collapse in Bangladesh where they were making clothes for H&M, Primark, Zara and so on. And also there have been many other successful campaigns by NGOs and other civil society groups that have embarrassed and put at risk the reputation of those major global firms. So that's one reason they might want some fairly high profile and orderly system for providing remedies. Secondly, there's a political and regulatory risk if these corporations do nothing. And we've in recent times seen the California Transparency and Supply Chains Act, the UK Modern Slavery Act, the French Duty of Diligence Legislation, Netherlands Child Labor Duty Diligence Legislation. They're the first step. What's interesting about these measures is they're holding global corporations, at least requiring them to report on what they're doing in their global supply chains. But their extending jurisdiction to firms that aren't even located in Britain. It's just that if they supply goods or services to Britain and their global turnover exceeds a certain threshold, that is sufficient to trigger legislative capture. So there is a concern for business that legislation having reached that beachhead would extend liability. So I've talked about a voluntary remedial system, which I've called this Global Industries Ombudsman Service. This is modeled on very approximately a successful domestic system that's developed over the last four decades in which consumers can run free complaints against a bank or telecommunications company in which they can take their complaint for free at no cost, even if they lose, or funded by industry in which independent, industry-funded Ombudsman will hear their disputes and make a decision and that decision is binding by contract on the firm. And I've been on an Ombudsman Service myself, a financial industry, a financial Ombudsman Service, and we could make orders of compensation in the order of no up to $300,000. So quite serious amounts of money can be ordered. And the company has to comply, but if the consumer loses, that's okay, they can take their matter off to court. So they don't lose their right to take legal proceedings. So the idea of having corporations both responsible and being engaged in some kind of informal system of our firm is that businesses, it is suggested under the UN Guiding Principles or proposed UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights that they should establish and participate in a grievance mechanism for individuals that are affected. There are other international documents that are out there requiring that industries take responsibilities beyond their narrow formal legal liability. They're voluntary codes that are being produced at the moment in which extend beyond formal legal liability. The Guiding Principles point to, even though they don't specifically mention any global industries, Ombudsman Service, but under principle 31, they talk about the sorts of things that a remedial system should have. It should be legitimate, accessible, predictable, and rights compatible. The Ombudsman can be established by a charter, a separate company with a board which would have an equal number of industry members and NGOs on the board. Now, imagine we had this Ombudsman. The next question is, what is the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman? We've got an Ombudsman based somewhere in the world, Singapore, or somewhere in Asia, or Europe, or wherever. So the Ombudsman can hear disputes. It's a contractual thing, which is binding on the corporation. But what's the scope of the jurisdiction? And if we look at the existing documents, like the ILO document, or the OECD, or the UN Guiding Principles, they're kind of vague about the reach of the corporation's responsibility. And for a lawyer, that's unsettling. It's too vague. For example, you can see that under the ILO's document, it says that the corporation should be responsible for abuses that occur within its own competence. What does that mean? With the OECD, with which it is involved, OECD and UN Guiding Principles in the context of its own activities, and finally within its own operations. So the issues that we have is that if there were an Ombudsman, we'd need to establish a charter which would tell the Ombudsman what their jurisdiction is. And the sorts of issues are, how far does the responsibility of the company go? Is it to their subcontractors, or is it go all the way back to the cotton grower for the t-shirt? What are the compensation limits? Is it $102,000, $3,400, $500,000? What kind of harms can be compensated in the case of Barack Gold, a mining company in Papua New Guinea, where the guards of that mining company were raping the local Papua New Guinea women, they set up an informal complaint system in which they were awarded monetary compensation for the affected women. And finally, an issue that has to be dealt with is the evidential requirements. For example, as my last point, the evidential requirements will not always be easy. And this was illustrated in this recent case of US against Guatemala in which the US ran a case against Guatemala for breaching the Central American United States Free Trade Agreement in which it required that Guatemala comply with its own labor laws. And as I mentioned before, Guatemala has a habit of killing labor leaders apart from anything else. And the United States failed in its arbitration and one of the areas it failed was the arbitration of the witness statements. They couldn't put the name of the witnesses because they were too scared that if they had their name on it and that went to the other side, being the Guatemalan government in their arbitration, then the Guatemalan government would signal those witnesses out for intimidation. And so without witness names on those statements, the arbitration body couldn't pay attention, couldn't have regard to them because it couldn't, as a matter of due process, be shown to the other side and be challenged. We also come up when we map out the informal jurisprudence. Thank you.