 Good morning and good afternoon to our viewers in the United States, the Central African Republic, Chad and around the world. My name is Elizabeth Murray and on behalf of the United States Institute of Peace and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Simon Scott Center for the Prevention of Genocide, I am honored to welcome you today. Our event, hate speech and atrocity risks in Central Africa, lessons from Central African Republican Chad is being streamed in both English and French on USIP's website. With the development and spread of new forms of communication, hate speech has become a more serious and widespread issue globally over the past decade. In the Central Africa region, hate speech carries consequences for social cohesion and for citizen security. Hate speech is shared in a variety of methods in private conversations and public forums in print, online, radio and in other forums. And it targets many groups, including youth, women, ethnic or religious communities, people of different political identities, members of the LGBTQ community, persons with disabilities and other groups. The specific triggers for hate speech are also quite varied. These include national political milestones such as Chad's 2022 national dialogue and the constitutional referendum that will be held in the Central African Republic later this month. Beyond national politics, incidents of local violence can trigger hate speech as can conflicts over resources. Hate speech can even be triggered by a simple and completely unfounded rumor. Truly, the range of circumstances that can give rise to hate speech is enormous, and that is why this issue requires our collective attention and our collective vigilance. I'd like to see a few words about the relationship between hate speech and disinformation, which is another important issue in Central Africa and around the world. Hate speech is distinct but can be related to disinformation, which is the deliberate spread of incorrect and misleading information. Hateful language can be part of a disinformation campaign, and disinformation can also lead to hate speech. When that disinformation is believed by other individuals, those individuals can then spread the information as misinformation and the misinformation can contain hate speech or can contribute to an increase in hate speech. The overall political and conflict trends in the Central African Republic and Chad call for focused peacebuilding efforts and particular vigilance around rising hate speech. In Chad, a fragile political transition, a controversial national dialogue last year, and a violent crackdown on protesters last October have all contributed to rising political tensions. And at the same time, in the south of Chad, violence has risen between herders and farmers and between other communities. This often breaks down on ethnic and religious lines, making this a fertile breeding ground for hate speech. The Central African Republic, the anticipated constitutional referendum this month to lift presidential term limits, has greatly exacerbated political tensions across the country. And at the same time, armed groups continue to fight one another and carry out violence against civilians across large swaths of the country. This protracted and very complex conflict in the Central African Republic has also seen a rise in the involvement of external actors over the past five years. Amidst these dynamics, recent analysis by the US Holocaust Memorial Museum's Simon Scott Center for the Prevention of Genocide and Dartmouth College shows that atrocity risks are significant in the region. Specifically, in a statistical risk assessment for the risk of mass killing, Chad is ranked fourth in the world and the Central African Republic is ranked 16th. We are very fortunate that our colleague Dr. Ashley Lando from the Museum is here today with us to brief us on this important research and to help us to understand the links between hate speech and the risk of violence. We are also delighted to have our partners from the region with us. Specifically, Mr. Chauvin, Nagatandang Zolang of the Organization Association Jeunesse en Marche pour le développement en Centrafrique, known by its acronym AGEMEDEC, and Dr. Yaminye Betinwey of the Centre des Ressources en Anthropologie et Science Humaine, known by its acronym CRASH. They will help us understand trends in hate speech in the region. Specifically, what issues are the subject of hate speech? How are different actors contributing to hate speech? And at the same time, how are other actors working to counter hate speech? Our partners are very well versed in the nuanced work of countering hate speech while upholding the importance of free speech at the same time. In short, their work is empowering citizens to claim their right to free speech but to use it responsibly to build peace in their communities. Understanding trends in hate speech is important because it offers us opportunities to intervene and to prevent violence and to reduce tensions. USIP has a long history of working to address hate speech in our many regional and thematic programs around the world. In the Central Africa region, specifically, hate speech has been a central focus of our work since 2020. Our partners in the region are at the forefront of efforts to train citizens, communities, and media on how to address and respond to hate speech. We've partnered with AGEMEDEC and the Peace Tech Lab on the development of a lexicon of hate speech and inflammatory language in the Central African Republic. And since 2020, we've worked with AGEMEDEC as they have carried out a variety of efforts to train and mentor local leaders, bloggers, national political party figures, and others to respond and counter hate speech. Recently, beginning in 2022, we've partnered with CRASH in CHED to support constructive citizen and media engagement in the political transition and the mapping of hate speech on social media. CRASH has recently become involved in a regional coordination on tackling hate speech and disinformation. In fact, just a few months ago, they convened a seminar in Southern CHED involving not only Chadian civil society, but also counterparts from the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to discuss this important issue. At USIP, we are so pleased to partner with these two organizations that are carrying out such innovative and important work. Today's event should be considered a first conversation. We are glad that you are here and we hope that you will join us for our second conversation later this year. Today's conversation is meant to articulate the links between hate speech and atrocity risk. We hope that we will all come out with a better understanding of when hate speech may be an indicator or a driver of violence. We also hope that this can lead us towards stronger locally led prevention and peacebuilding efforts. In the fall, our second event will focus on policy responses to hate speech. These two events will mainly focus on lessons from CHED and the Central African Republic, but this issue goes well beyond. It affects the region, specifically the neighbor to the south, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, other neighboring countries, indeed the entire continent and the entire world. So we hope that you'll join us not just today, but also for our event in the fall. Again, we're pleased to co-host this event and indeed this series with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, given the museum's deep expertise and robust methodology on atrocity risks and prevention. Our event today will begin with interventions from our three panelists, followed by a moderated discussion and question and answer with the audience. During the question and answer, you'll be able to use the chat function on USIP's website to submit your questions in French or English. I will now turn the floor to my colleague Archie Henry. Under Archie's leadership, our hate speech work and our program in Central Africa have grown tremendously over the past year, and he will moderate today's conversation. Archie, over to you. Thank you, Elizabeth, and hello everyone. My name is Archibald Henry. I'm a program officer for Central Africa and the Sahel at the United States Institute of Peace. I'm very pleased to present our panelists for today's discussion. Starting with Dr. Ashley Landau. Ashley is a research associate for the Simon Scott Center for the Prevention of Genocide, where she is responsible for conducting quantitative and qualitative research on a wide range of issues related to atrocity prevention. With a primary focus on the center's early warning project. In graduate school, Ashley and her colleagues at the University of Oregon developed a tool to measure and assess patterns of exclusionary thinking that are associated with mass killing. She has worked with government officials, practitioners and NGOs on these topics. She has an ongoing partnership with the Oxford Consortium for Human Rights and is a recurring speaker at their workshops. She has also co directed and implemented large scale conflict analysis simulations. Ashley has her bachelor of science in psychology from St. Mary's College of California, and her master of science and PhD in social psychology from the University of Oregon. Turning to Dr. Yaminge Betimbaye. Yaminge is a director of research and political analyst at the Center for Research in Anthropology and Human Sciences, also known as CRASH, a Chadian think tank based in N'jamena. Lecturer, researcher with the University of N'jamena and the University of Mundu. In Southern Chad, he holds a PhD in human and political geography from the University of N'Gaundere, Cameroon. Journalists with a degree in information sciences from University of N'jamena, he began his work as managing editor at the Chadian Press Agency. Currently, he is the focal point for CRASH for monitoring and analysis of the Chadian political transition process and regularly leads research on security and political dynamics in Chad in the region. He recently coordinated the study on mechanisms of hate speech content on social media in Chad, conducted by CRASH in coordination with the US Institute of Peace. We also have with us Mr. Rosa N'Gatondang-Zalang, who is the founder and president of Association Jeunesse en Marche pour le développement en Centrafrique, also known as AGMADEC, which he has led since its foundation in 2017. Mr. N'Gatondang-Zalang has become one of the opinion leaders and activists for peace, reconciliation, inter-religious and community dialogue in the Central African Republic. In 2023, he was awarded the gold medal of labor by the Central African Order of Merit as the president and founder of the NGO AGMADEC. Rosa has also spoken at the United Nations Security Council on the situation in CAR and the mandate of the UN multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in the country, MINUSCA. Raised in a modest family in Western CAR and a member of an endangered minority ethnic group, Rosa was unable to attend University of Bangui. However, he became a self-taught individual in systematic botany, financial administration, and project management, as well as organizational leadership by taking a series of professional trainings. Rosa began his professional career as a researcher in ethno-botany, then as financial administrator and then working in development and humanitarian projects. We're very pleased to have this excellent panel with us today and to a very rich discussion. As a reminder, we'll have initial remarks from our panelists, and then we'll go to a moderated discussion followed by a Q&A, and where participants will continue to ask questions in the chats, and the chat function is currently open, as you can see on the USIP website page. I'd like to start by turning it to Ashley for introductory remarks. Ashley, it's a great pleasure to have you with us today, and I wondered if you could tell us a bit more on the work of the Simon Scott Center for the Prevention of Genocide related to atrocity risks and hate speech, maybe your take on the relationship between these two issues and how these dynamics play out in chat and car. Thank you so much. Yes, thank you so much, Archie, and thank you, Elizabeth. It's really such a pleasure to be here today and to also be on the same panel as Yomingue and Rosan. That's a great honor. So I hope to answer some of those questions that you've posed and simply provide some framing remarks that I hope will help to frame and guide our discussion as well. So before I begin, let me quickly give you some brief background information on our organization. The US Holocaust Memorial Museum is an independent establishment of the US government. The museum was created to really be a living memorial to the victims and the survivors of the Holocaust. It was also created to be a catalyst for change, to take the rhetorical commitment to never again and translate that into genuine and sustained political action. The Simon Scott Center for the Prevention of Genocide was formed to be a resource for governments and organizations working to help prevent and respond to genocide and related crimes against humanity. We strive rarely to disrupt systematic mass violence at every stage by identifying ways in which governments and institutions can intervene at the early warning signs of violence and calling for action before atrocities begin by also mobilizing lawmakers and foreign policy leaders to take action to save lives when violence explodes and also by promoting justice and accountability efforts for victim and survivor communities in situations where there is a history of atrocities, where there's ongoing atrocities or high risk of future violence. And so to help prevent mass atrocities, we really need to try to think through how they could plausibly occur and what dynamics create those risks. And I believe discussions like this help to do that. So when we're doing this work, we rarely are looking at a few different but related types of violence. And I thought it might be helpful to actually define some of those terms briefly for everyone. Likely the terms that are familiar to most people are going to be genocide and crimes against humanity. Genocide is a legal term and is defined as a number of specified acts committed with the intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. We also look at crimes against humanity, which is also a legal concept, and they're defined as widespread and systematic criminal acts that grossly violate human rights. But we also often use the term mass atrocities. This is not a legal term and doesn't have a legal definition, but it is a very useful term as it can operate as an umbrella term that encompasses both genocide and crimes against humanity, as well as war crimes. And mass atrocities are defined as large scale systematic attacks on civilian populations. A mass atrocity can be perpetrated by a state, but it can also be perpetrated by non state actors. And it can also occur in the context of armed conflict, as well as during peacetime. So now that we've discussed some of the important terms, I'd like to move to one of the key areas of the Simon Scott Center and what it can tell us about the risks in Chad and the Central African Republic or car. So launched in 2015 in partnership with Dartmouth College, the early warning project uses quantitative and qualitative methods to assess and spotlight the risks of mass atrocities around the world. The statistical risk assessment which Elizabeth mentioned is one of our core components of the early warning project. And the risk assessment allows us to quantitatively forecast the likelihood of a new mass killing in over 160 countries. And it really was developed to be used as an aid to help governments and organizations and individuals really focus time and attention on countries with the highest risk. Our risk assessment specifically focuses on forecasting mass killing, which we define as over 1000 intentional civilian fatalities over 12 month period perpetrated by a group against another group. And in essence, what the risk assessment is doing is we're using historical instances of mass killing to identify the characteristics of states that help distinguish where and when mass killing is most likely to occur. And then we apply that model to the latest data on countries to produce our annual risk assessment. So where do Chad and car rank on our risk assessment? Chad continues to move up our risk list, landing at fourth highest among 162 countries. Our statistical model estimates that there is a 9.2% or approximately a one in 11 chance of a new mass killing beginning in Chad in 2022 or 2023. Chad has consistently ranked in the high risk category, which is rarely our top 30 countries with fourth marking its highest ranking to date. Chad is also one of only three countries in our top 12 that did not have an ongoing mass killing at the end of 2022. So the significance of a new mass killing is high. The Central African Republic ranks 16th highest among 162 countries and our statistical model estimates that there is a 5% or approximately a one in 20 chance of a new mass killing beginning in car in 2022 or 2023. And car has also ranked in our top 30 since 2020. Since we consider there to be an ongoing mass killing in car, this risk estimate that I've mentioned corresponds to a new mass killing occurring, not the continuation or escalation of the ongoing episode. And we see this statistical risk assessment really as a starting point. It can help identify countries that merit more attention, analysis, and potentially preventative action. But other kinds of analyses are necessary to help us identify what exactly would be most effective at mitigating risks. Understanding a country's risk of mass killing based on an assessment like our risk assessment should also help inform how we interpret events and developments in that country. In general, observing potential warning signs, including hate speech should raise greater alarms in a country that is near the top of our rankings than if they're observed in one near the bottom. And while most cases of mass atrocities are unique, and while all cases of mass atrocities are unique and context specific, they are often preceded by a range of identifiable risk factors and early warning signs. And recognition of these factors and signs can help the world act before violence begins. Especially in countries facing serious risks of mass violence like Chad and Carr, hate speech can be both a warning sign and an instrument of group targeted violence. Before and during mass atrocities, there is often widespread hate speech. Such hate speech can promote the idea that members of a certain group are evil and dangerous. When that speech comes from influential speakers and leaders and is spread through government propaganda or through popular media, it can condition listeners to believe that violence against that group is justified. It may also incite some people to commit violence against the group. And efforts to detect and counteract hate speech can actually enhance the efforts to prevent mass atrocities. When designing interventions or approaches to addressing hate speech, in addition to analyzing the speech of particular influential leaders, it's also important to look at a number of other key criteria, including the type of media or platforms that are used, the general context, including the historical context, the targeted audiences, the actual messages and content themselves, and so on. And you can read more about this in our guide on defusing hate speech, which I believe will be linked in the Q&A and the chat function on the website. And even if you don't think that hate speech itself will cause violence in a specific situation, it can still be a useful warning sign for the risks of violence. Hate speech can be a warning sign if it reflects the situation or causes increased levels of extreme polarization and conflict. For example, in Chad, harmful content circulating on social media may be deepening an increasingly politicized divide between communities. With the potential to serve both as a warning sign for group targeted violence and also raises concerns that the nature of hate speech spreading could accelerate violence. And while we don't have the deep specialization on car or Chad, seeking to understand and monitor the connections between hate speech and atrocities can help practitioners better prevent and address crises. My co-panelists, Yomingie and Rosan, will certainly have a lot more to say on the specific situations in these two countries. So with that, I'll turn things back over to Archie. Thank you very much. Thank you so much, Ashley, for the very useful background on the risk assessment and your insights on the relationship between hate speech and atrocity risks. And some of the resources you mentioned have been shared in the chat, so we'll be really interested to come back to some of these points in a discussion. So thanks again. I'd like to turn to Dr. Bettin Baye. Yomingie, can you speak to how hate speech has played out in the Chadian context over the years and what have been its main drivers and perhaps also touching on some efforts by civil society on the ground to address this trend. Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Thank you very much for this opportunity for being able to speak with you about trends in hate speech in Chad. Today, in Chad, most tension is present around the political transition that is ongoing. And we are hearing lots of hate speech around this issue across the entire country. And it's a big concern for us. We are focused on three points. I would like to speak to you about the current dynamics in my country, especially with regards to hate speech and how that has changed in recent years. I would also like to speak to you briefly about what we're doing, what Crash is doing to prevent hate speech and to fight back against it. And then I would also like to speak with you about some of the interrelations between hate speech and mass atrocities, which is a real big risk for the security of citizens in the country. And then I would like to end with a few tools that we think are already available to help us better anticipate and better prevent a hate speech in the Chadian context. So, in Chad and the current socio-political atmosphere, there is a great risk of conflict and of violence. And that has been the case since the country gained its independence in 1960. Today, the political context is... In April 2021, the former president, Marshall Idris Debi, who had just been re-elected for a term of six years as president, was killed in a conflict in the Sahara in the north of the country. The army then took control of national institutions and began a political transition process. The goal was to bring the country back to a stable state, and so the army took over this political transition. And we've seen that in other countries in the Sahel, as in Mali, as in Burkina Faso, as in Guinea or in Sudan. We've seen similar things. And this transition was planned to be a transition of 18 months, but it had to be extended. At the end of the national dialogue, which was organized in Jamuna between August and October 2022, this dialogue focused on a few major actions that had taken place during the 18 months of the transition. And there were consultations with political actors and civil society actors, as well as negotiations with different representatives. This national dialogue process, there were a lot of expectations around it. Chadians had many expectations of this process, and we hoped that it would end in recommendations. Some of the recommendations that it ended in were quite unpopular, namely the extension of the transition period to 24 months, and also certain people were not allowed to participate in the elections that were planned for the end of the process. After the national dialogue, various actors from civil society who were not happy, as well as the political opposition called for mass demonstrations in October 2022, these demonstrations were violently repressed by the security forces, and there were up to 128 people who died during these protests. And then there were mass arrests, mass imprisonments, all in the name of security. After these demonstrations were violently repressed, representatives of civil society and the political opposition had to leave for exile or had to hide within the country. And so the political space became more and more closed and closed off within Chad. Now there is almost no political debate in the country, but there's a lot of frustration. There are a lot of people who are unhappy, who have grievances with the way the situation has been managed. The result is that political debate has moved from physical spaces into virtual spaces. And these virtual spaces have been completely flooded with content that expresses these frustrations, that expresses these grievances, this anger that is present within the country. However, these actions have had consequences that go beyond the realm of politics. In Chad, we have seen an amplification of increasing tensions in between political groups. At Crash, we monitor these kinds of tensions, and we have documented around 27 different conflicts, with a minimum of 200 deaths across them in 2022, and perhaps as many as 455 deaths in 2022. And only in the first quarter of 2023, there have been 11 major conflicts with around 120, 125 people who have died. So the tensions are there. There's a lot of frustration with the political situation. And as a consequence, there is more and more hate speech being spread, especially in social media. Within Crash, we are doing our best to try to understand and fight back against this phenomenon of hate speech. And so we did a study on how this hate speech is spread, how that works. We've also organized various workshops with civil society organizations and media organizations. And we just held a regional seminar, which brought together Chadian actors and also people from the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, so that we could all share our experiences in terms of preventing and fighting back against hate speech. All of these efforts that we have put forth within Crash have started bearing their fruit. In Chad, we have seen a rise in the spread of hate speech after the demonstrations in October 2022, but the hateful messages, the content, focuses on identity issues, things like ethnicity, religion, gender, class, age. All of these aspects of identity are used to exclude and put down certain groups and certain people. There are clear links between hate speech and violence in Chad and the risk of mass violence. In Chad, we have these hate speech, which is present in social media, and it contributes directly to greater mobilization. For example, during the protests in October 2022. And this hate speech can target specific people, specific groups, or can call for community-based violence. And as many other places, we have the conflicts between herdsmen and farmers. And this has been a source for producing and spreading hate speech content. That targets certain identity groups or that calls for violence against these groups. So this kind of content calls for violence, calls for hate, promotes hate, and promotes divisions based on identity. We estimate that the government in Chad can do something to calm down the sociopolitical context, but it is also up to us to advocate for the end of this violence with the government. We need the representatives of the transition to be responsible, to be inclusive. We need the political transition to be a transition that truly focuses on the trends that are present within our country. This is a great challenge. And civil society is there to do it, but we need support, we need support from the media, and we need specific mechanisms that will identify and fight back against hate speech. And within CRASH, we're doing research towards this end, and we have observed that with fact-checking, if we were able to better develop our fact-checking tools and abilities, and better fact-check the media and civil society organizations, that could help limit how much hate speech is amplified and passed along. Thank you very much. For these remarks, I'd like to turn it over to Rozan for some of his observations on hate speech dynamics and how they play out in the Central African Republic. So Rozan, the floor is yours. Thank you. My partners, guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. I am very happy to be participating in this event with you, which will have a great impact on peace and security for citizens in my country. Just as in many other countries in the world, hate speech has led to conflict in the Central African Republic. And it's something that is happening every day. Our country has a great diversity of languages, cultures, ethnicities, and even if we share a national language called Songo, we are also living in very difficult social, economic, political context. Today, the Central African Republic is one of the most impacted countries by hate speech. It has led to much conflict. The citizens of the Central African Republic have realized that disinformation and hate speech is a big problem. And this is true, especially since the elections that were held in December 2020. However, it is... We must recognize that there are dynamics that contribute to this hate speech and disinformation. Over the last, in recent years, we have seen some political projects from the part of the president and others that have tried to increase security and understanding amongst the population. But some of these initiatives have been called unconstitutional by intellectuals in the country. I'll give you an example. One of these projects was the plan to start using cryptocurrency. Or there was another plan to have a constitutional referendum to change the constitution of the country. Not to mention the presence of the Wagner Group and Rwandan soldiers in the Central African Republic. In my country, we are seeing again and again hate speech that leads to conflict and lots of disinformation as well. We see this on social media, in WhatsApp groups, within different communities, in all kinds of public spaces, especially in the run-up to the constitutional referendum that was held on June 30, 2023 by President Toadera. Hate speech and disinformation have been spread by people who support the referendum, who call themselves progressives, as well as members of political groups who do not support the referendum. And I'm not sure if you know, but hate speech and disinformation are a real and present threat and danger for the safety and security of citizens in the Central African Republic. There can be a lot of harm done to people, to their feelings, to the victims of this hate speech. Also, in various communities, and in the country as a whole, hate speech and disinformation have become a plague, a scourge at the national level, but also at the international level. And this hate speech is making the climate of division even worse and leading to violence, to exclusion, and to all kinds of divisions, cultural divisions, professional divisions. In order to better understand hate speech and disinformation at the local level, we have put forth many different kinds of efforts along with our partners, such as USIP. Many efforts have been undertaken in order to counter hate speech. We have had strong strategies that were developed at the local level, and many efforts have been undertaken and the results are visible in our concrete in Central Africa. We are talking here about the protection of lexicon and terms. And of course, it's considered to be a tool today, indispensable for communication. And it is among communities, and it is used. We have had also the mobilization of leaders, community leaders, leaders of communities. And the members of the parties have been involved. We've had media and professionals and we've had members of the government have been mobilized in this struggle and prevention of hate speech that creates misinformation and tension. We've had workshops of training that have been organized among the groups. And in order to fight against hate speech and misinformation at the local level, partners have organized public campaigns or radio waves to reduce the risk of hate speech in order to reduce mistrust among community interreligious and inter-conflict readers. I would like to continue today to work directly with community leaders and of course those of the Third arrondissement of Bangui and another significant impact of those actions and its partners in the fight against hate speech and misinformation is seen today through a platform of actors, bloggers, journalists that have worked together in order to counter hate speech. It is a network that is organized from journalists and online media to counter hate speech in Central Africa and to conclude, given the context of the referendum and its agendas, it is obvious that given all the efforts that were undertaken, it is very sad and regrettable to admit that there are still today very high risks of hate speech, of misinformation that creates, of course, divisions and that leads the African community to enter a new cycle of violence clashes among communities, intercommunity and even interreligious. And this is not a good thing because it is urgent to intervene by major preventive actions in order to counter these conflicts. So we see that this is something very important, a pleasure to thank you very sincerely, not only for your usual collaboration but also for your various and conditional support and waiver support for the peace and security of the civilian populations in my country, the Central African Republic. Thank you very much. Thank you, Rozan, for these insightful remarks, notably on the grassroots and coalition efforts to tackle hate speech really at its core. And I'd like to come back to you as well as Yaminge for some questions. We will also soon move to a question and answer session with members of the audience. Before then, I'd like to ask a few follow-up questions for the panelists. Starting with you, Ashley, if that's okay. You spoke about hate speech as both an instrument for violence and an early warning sign. Given observations from Yaminge and Rozan on the evolution of hate speech in both chat and car, could you reflect on this notion of hate speech as a potential tool for mobilization in these contexts and whether hate speech can also be a risk factor for mass violence where it becomes normalized, maybe alongside other variables? And if so, how can we better track, analyze, understood and integrated in our understanding? Thank you. Yes, thank you, Archie. I'm happy to hopefully provide some comments on those. But yeah, I would be interested to hear Yaminge and Rozan's insights as well. But yeah, first, just to say, of course, that hate speech can certainly mobilize people to take violent action. It's of course important to note that it doesn't always motivate people. So you need other factors as well that need to be present, which is why, of course, examining the whole situation and the context and the other factors at play is also important. But it definitely can. Hate speech can mobilize groups just in itself in the content and the messages. But as others have mentioned, it could also be used by certain actors to strategically mobilize support. So it's important to watch out for that when it's being manipulated and used by certain influential leaders and so on. But the significant thing why it is so important for why it can mobilize people is that what it does is hate speech can rarely make violence seem not only acceptable, which is powerful in itself, but also it can frame it as being necessary and even legitimate. So ultimately hate speech can really provide people with the research has shown this with the sort of necessary motivation, legitimization and rationalization to actually commit violence. And there are a number of reasons why this is hateful speech can really frame the other or the outgroup as outside of our moral community and therefore not deserving of moral consideration. And then it does this by referring to the outgroup as say less than human. And of course, that's where you get these dehumanization terms and language that's used. For example, in Myanmar, Burma, the term dogs was used against the Rohingya community. It can also frame the outgroup as foreigners who might not belong in that area and so are a gain outside of our community. But there is a fairly sort of dangerous and significant point when the outgroup is framed as a threat and a threat that needs to be dealt with. This often perceived and imagined threat can instill fear that that other is going to attack and take over in some way. And so therefore it encourages people or can encourage people to go on the offense and attack first. And oftentimes this leads to messages that are sort of calls to action as I think Yominga mentioned as well. And using sort of language of revenge and referring to a past injustice or even purity language, sort of likening people to a disease or a pest that needs to be cleansed or removed. And that we saw in Rwanda when Tutsis were referred to as cockroaches or even in the Holocaust when Jews were referred to as rats. But then ultimately this can actually lead to direct incitements to violence, which we have seen in some cases on social media where they're explicit incitements to attack specific people at a specific time, at a specific place and this is where it rarely becomes a tool and instrument for violence. And yeah, important to note that even weaker levels of endorsement and internalization of these sorts of beliefs and attitudes is enough to motivate people to indirectly or directly participate in violence. And you'll see that in various atrocity frameworks like the US government's atrocity framework and the UN's atrocity framework, rarely as hate speech is illustrated as this motivating tool. You'll often find it in sections that are labeled as incentives or means and rarely showing you that perpetrators often rely on hate speech to mobilize people to attack civilians. I'll just briefly hopefully talk about some of the other questions you asked as a risk factor. I'll obviously preface this again by saying that hate speech alone is likely not going to lead to genocide or mass atrocities. So other factors will usually be present as well. But you can see hate speech at all stages. You can see it in risk factors. You can see it in early warning signs and then of course as triggers and accelerants and then again as a tool. One of the most commonly acknowledged risk factors is ideology, specifically exclusionary ideology, which is a belief system that justifies efforts to persecute or eliminate certain groups of people. This tends to usually be political in some way and tends to be espoused by leaders. So hate speech can play a role by contributing to this risk factor and leaders might be the ones driving the exclusionary ideology through their hateful rhetoric. But oftentimes those leaders will pull from the pre-existing ideas and views that are held by a society. So the importance of hate speech among a population is also key as well. But yes, as you've mentioned, like our statistical risk assessment, we include a variety of variables into the risk assessment because our model is learning from the past in order to forecast the likelihood of a new mass killing in the future. We rarely need, we have strict criteria on our data that we're able to include and it really needs to go back far enough and to cover many countries over 160, as I've mentioned. So at this point it's difficult for us and other organizations to include variables on hate speech, which I think others have mentioned too. It's a very hard variable to measure and track. But the ideal scenario would be that yes, one would eventually establish a platform that could measure countries and their hate speech and then if we're able to sort of track that and monitor it over time, you could see shifts and changes in a society's level of endorsement or acceptability of these views as well. But it is integrated in a lot of atrocity assessment frameworks, as I've mentioned, the US government's framework and the UN's framework. And we use it of course in our deep dive analyses that we do on countries. But the more we can build out this and the more we can better understand how hate speech operates and how it connects to mass atrocities, the better those risk assessments are going to be. So data is so key and so needed. The more data that we can produce, and especially from these local organizations that Yaminge and Rosana from, the better that's going to be if it can be public data and produced, we'll be able to improve our risk assessments and so on. But hopefully I've covered most of your questions, Archie. Thanks. Thanks, Ashley. I'd like to ask Yaminge if you had any reactions on these really useful remarks especially the comment on the notion of outgroup as threats and exclusionary ideology. And I wondered if you could elaborate on some findings perhaps from the recent social media study. Are there like illustrative recurring messages that you've seen in chat and to what extent do young populations internalize these messages that are that are vehicles on these different platforms. Thank you very much Archie. I think the internet is relatively bad. The study has allowed us to do a lot. We've had the spread of content and we've had like that during the transition period. So one of the conclusions that we've reached. But also we've had a conclusion. We've had a reinforcement and amplification of of course of hate speech after the national dialogue and of course after the protest of October 20. And as Ashley said very clear, starting from that moment and starting from October 2022, these the hate speech were very prominent. And we've also observed in addition to that, of course, the reinforcement of certain reinforcement of hate speech from from leaders, political leaders also community has been involved. So we've had inter communities who who have the power of we have communities that were targeted by the power. So this reinforced this division and we've had at the political level and community level. I would like here insist upon the fact that what was was observed during the national dialogue and since the protests of October 2020 22. Was that this my great at the public public space towards the virtual public so we've seen hate speech we've seen. We've seen factors of risks that that perturbed peace and and of course we've had during this. We've had certain things that were manifested during this period. For example, there was a vague of conflicts and inter community tension during the last month's social media through a number of hate content have been mobilized to reinforce those mobilizations in the community. The study allowed us to realize that in terms of of of hate speech. We've noticed that there are platforms that have been developed and let's that's the case of Facebook. And it's like a lab, a hate lab. It's a Facebook has been considered like a hate lab and we've seen that this is within the dynamic of spreading this. So the first factor that we've noticed is that this functions like a group of selection of members that are close to one another and that that know each other that have selected one another. Second is that we've seen that there is this usage of of certain terms and the use of certain terminology. This created this means that we can spread some content. And and we've had manifestation of certain speech. So we say so people that know each other say we are between us and we can really say things among us and this reinforces this risks of mobilization for the mass violence in terms of recommendation or in terms of of advice. You've mentioned several recommendations. I think a pedagogical work has should be undertaken among the civil society, among the media is necessary. We can move towards the sense and we can very well look at this logic. We are logic. We can look at a content that is elaborated and that can be, for example, set up in cooperation with with certain groups. It's very important to sensitize actors like religious leaders or traditional communities in order to interfere to intervene and help to inverse the tendency. We see that the judicial tendency is very important as well the legal that we estimate that. So if the bearers of hate speech are present and are there, we need to do something about it. They can be identified. They have to prosecuted. They have to condemned and they have to be, of course, arrested. This is very important. This reinforces the legal framework. And we see that this is something very important. We need a track also tracking is very important. We can identify through tracking and shed light on those leaders. Hate speech leaders and then, of course, try to let the Association for Human Rights say something about it. This is very important and that can inverse the tendency. Now in terms of research, I can say that there are so many things that we can say. We can certainly work together with Ashley. We can work with other groups regarding the chat. We do a lot of research. So the factor of research is very important. It's useful to do case studies, for instance. If in the case of intercommunity tensions, we've observed that that mobilization of hate speech is undertaken in different ways. There are nuances that we have to understand in the context of case studies. And this will understand to help us to better understand those tendencies. Thank you so much for your attention. Thank you. I mean gay was on. I'd like to turn to you as a key civil society leader and activists in the Central African Republic and the region. You know, you've really taken on this fight against hate speech at the local level. And, you know, what would you make of all this from from the conceptual issues to the local level. What are the necessary ingredients to effectively combat or tackle hate speech and from the local to the national policy level in car for example and what are the key partnerships that need to be built for this work to be successful. Thanks. Rosa, are you are you with us? We're able to hear the question. Thank you. Yes, I am. Thank you very much. I heard the question. Thank you very much for giving me the floor. First, I think it's important to understand that right now it's a very sensitive situation in the Central African Republic. Why? Because we have just had this constitutional referendum. Imagine that, you know, you have the people of the country has been divided into two groups that are antagonistic, the one towards the other. And this plan for a constitutional referendum has divided the people. And since we have a very low level of education in general in the country, it's easy for people to use manipulation tactics. And so, you know, there's this referendum going on, but given people's poverty and low level of education, they don't necessarily have the tools to properly interpret the information they're hearing. And there's a lot of hate speech coming out from both sides. And we believe that we need to work on communicating better and communicating better with the population and helping the community be aware of what's going on. We need to involve all parts of the population, including people with disabilities, different religious groups, men, women. We need to involve everyone in our communication efforts so that we can better fight against hate speech altogether within the Central African Republic. I would also like to focus in on the point that with better civil education, that's what we need. We need to develop antibodies within the body politic of the country against hate speech. And if we can connect actions for peace, you know, with other initiatives to support agriculture, for example, that's something that would have a positive effect. And maybe for people who don't have any access to financial resources, they are more likely to turn to hate speech if they're looking for resources and someone who's putting out hate speech is able to provide them with those resources. And then there's also the question of cross-border instability. The border with Chad, it's a complicated situation right now. And all around the Central African Republic, we also have the DRC and other bordering countries where there are other conflicts going on. And so as we study the risk of hate speech, we need to look at the cross-border effects as well. That's what we're doing in a fire organization. Thank you very much. Thank you, Joseon. Very, very useful. And we also, I noticed that you touched on cross-border dynamics. It looks like we had a question in the chat around regional dynamics of hate speech with Sudan. And perhaps we can get to that with Yamenge, but first, you know, moving to the Q&A now, feel free to ask questions in English or French using the Q&A function to our members of the audience. We have one question on the linkages between hate speech and disinformation. And are there differences between two or do they become intermingled? So let's see if maybe Yamenge and Ashley could take that. And then we'll have another question prepared. Thanks. Maybe starting with Yamenge, if you had thoughts on the disinformation hate speech links. Okay, maybe the connection is slow. I can see if Ashley, if you had any reactions on that, how are hate speech and disinformation linked or not? Is there overlap between the two? Yes, certainly I can start if it makes sense. So yes, I think Elizabeth mentioned it in the beginning just that there can definitely be overlap between hate speech and disinformation and misinformation. And I think building on something that Yamenge said actually, and also something Roseanne said about the manipulation. So specifically disinformation and misinformation can be used to manipulate and instill fear and create these false ideas of an outgroup. So for instance, they could spread messages that an outgroup was saying something or doing something or had done something. And we can also see that disinformation and misinformation can be seen now in videos and images as well. So that has the potential to be very dangerous. So when, as Roseanne said, when we don't have enough training, digital literacy training of training to understand when something might be fake, when it might be misinformation, that can really be dangerous as it can foster a false image of the either the situation itself or an outgroup as well. So I think I'll leave it at that and hopefully Yamenge can expand on that. Thanks. Thanks, Ashley. Yamenge, if you wanted to expand on that, especially with the recent social media study and the linkages between hate speech is information. And if you also wanted to take this opportunity for any reflections on the question regarding Sudan. So do you feel there is a role of hate speech playing in Sudan's current conflicts? And obviously with the developments between the two countries, there may be some insights that you could share on the link between the Sudan war and the Chad context. Yamenge, did you manage to see that question? Thank you. Sorry, I was having a bit of a connection issue, but I'm here now. To answer your question, especially with regard to Chad, disinformation is often a catalyst for hate speech. And people get involved on purpose. They start spreading false information on purpose. Why? To target people who belong to a specific identity group or ethnic group. And the goal is to produce and to spread hateful content. So that's the connection between the two. If we can reduce the amount of disinformation out there in Chad, that will go a long way to reducing the transmission of hateful content as well, I think. Great. Thank you, Yamenge. I wondered if, like on the question regarding Sudan, I believe there were some recent findings in Chad around the impact of the Sudan war on some communities in Chad. And if you could speak to disinformation hate speech regarding the Sudan conflict, if you had a few, few thoughts on that as well. I'm sorry. I'm not sure that I've got the question. So the question that I have using a question from the chat here is, how does the Sudan conflict and the war in Sudan currently? How does that play out? How does disinformation and hate speech play out in the Chadian context, especially in eastern Chad, for example? Can you speak about the effect of the Sudan war on this information space in Chad? Yes, of course. There is a big influence, especially in the eastern part of Chad. There's a big influence. For example, recently in Abish, which is very close to Sudan, there are similar communities on both sides of the border and people who belong to the same ethnic group, the same identity groups on both sides of the border. And what's going on in Sudan today, and this was the same thing that happened in the 2010s, has a direct impact on Sudan because of these affinities, these connections that cross the border. And often people say, oh, I'm for or against this politician, this general. And that kind of, you know, because part of the general public opinion. But in the east and the north of Chad, there are many armed groups, rebellious groups. And, you know, many of them have never come and sat around the negotiation table with the government. And they have links with the groups that are fighting in Sudan. So even groups of fighting armed groups, there's connections across the border. And so the government has tried to close the border. And conflict, which is taking place mostly in Sudan is having spillover effects. And there's lots of incorrect information that's being spread around. There are even WhatsApp groups that have been created. And the members of these groups, you know, they're pro this figure or anti that figure. So it brings them together in the WhatsApp group. And this way, with social media, it actually contributes to greater conflict. It stirs up people's sentiments. I'm sorry, it seems we have lost the connection. Okay, I think we have another question in the chat for that. I think we can ask Rosanne. So the question is focused on trainings. And I wondered, Rosanne, if you could speak about the types of training topics or programs that are useful in preparing communities to respond to hate speech. Are there are topics like empathy and non violence useful or other topics that are useful. Thank you very much for your question. There are a lot of different themes that we focus on. And what helps a community live together better? That's really the big question. And the interpreter would like to excuse himself. There seem to be some connection issues. Yes, we need a civil response to these issues. We need to think about it in terms of civil society. Thank you Rosanne, I think we lost you. Yes, I'm sorry. So yes, civic education is incredibly important. And many of the politicians in our country are able to say that they want to educate the people, but they really want to keep them in their ignorance because that makes them easier to manipulate. And so we need to focus on civics education, not only in schools, but also in cultural institutions and churches. And I think that that is something that will advance the transformation and help people become more aware and hopefully better protect peace. Thank you. Thank you, Rosanne for for this. And we have another question in the chat around the shifting trends in hate speech in Central Africa. I think you both addressed this in your opening remarks, but I'd like to ask Yaminge follow up question on this. Who are the most widely circulated producers of this speech? And which groups are the most vulnerable in Chad? So I think you touched a bit on this, but if you wanted to elaborate on the main actors and targets. Yes. In general, the producers of this hate speech are mostly young people and especially young students in high school and in university. Also, politicians and political leaders. We have been able to show that there are two levels of authors, two levels of groups that are producing this hate speech. Some are doing it voluntarily, others involuntarily. And it depends on what they say depends on which group they belong to. When you have a political leader, for example, when they make a certain statement that can lead to a whole cascade of other comments that are made. And people say, oh, this politician said this said that and that means this or that. And then there are also major some major producers of hateful content in Chad. And then the people who are targeted are especially people who come from minority groups. Over the last 30 years in Chad, state power has been head that was held by Marshall DB. And at his death, when the political transition began, his son was designated transition president. And the opponents to this political power are often targeted by hate speech. And we have recurring conflicts that target Fulani or Arab herders at the expense of other farmer groups. And so you have, you know, Arab and Fulani groups that are regularly targeted by hate speech. That's a big problem that we have. And I hope I've answered your question there. Thanks. Yeah, that was very clear and useful to have that granularity indeed. I'd like to come back to Ashley, perhaps on the training question in, you know, from your perspective and where you sit, both an expert and a practitioner. What are the types of training topics that that are useful? And questions around empathy and so forth. And also would love to see if you had further ideas or key takeaways from the diffusing hate speech guide that you mentioned that was shared in the chat related to this question too. Great. Yeah, happy to help provide some info on that. So definitely the question that we received earlier on empathy and sort of nonviolent training as well. That's absolutely important and necessary and programs that are designed more along those lines, you know, whether it's trying to bridge connections and social cohesion between communities are always very important. I know they've, for instance, done actual work on the ground where you'll make the connection as to what what the human impact or the human consequences of hate speech was to various groups. So they'll actually send these sort of direct messages to people who are espousing hate speech and show them, you know, what was the consequence, how did it make people feel. And so those have shown some success as well, but definitely the social cohesion bringing groups together. As you mentioned, you know, a lot of the time people might be putting out hate speech or might it might appeal to them because it's creating this community that's belonging. And so it's important for us when we're designing interventions to try to reduce hate speech that we actually create, you know, other types of communities and safe spaces where people feel like they can come and leave the sort of communities that might be radicalizing them. I will say the other sort of the types of interventions which Rosanne has very clearly articulated are these training efforts and especially trainings to influential speakers and those might be influences. So those might be, as Rosanne mentioned, bloggers or journalists and so on. And when you are designing interventions to reduce hate speech and trying to teach people how to do it, you rarely are, and this is in our Diffusing Hate Speech Guide, you're trying to design interventions that aim to reduce the likelihood that audiences will accept or spread the speech, also reducing the likelihood that audiences will condone or participate in group targeted violence. And then also something Yomengue said as well, but increase the willingness among audience members to speak out against hate speech and group targeted violence and that can obviously be a tricky thing because groups might be at risk. And so more people in positions of power as well can speak out against hate speech is important, but yes, I really would encourage people to take a look at the Diffusing Hate Speech Guide, as it really can walk you through how to better understand the context that hate speech is important, but also to design interventions that might work. Thank you. Thank you, Ashley, for this. I'd like to see if perhaps maybe Elizabeth had any reactions on this discussion or maybe some key takeaways or insights from the conversation that you'd like to share reaction to, you know, remarks from the field and from Ashley, before we start wrapping up. Sure, absolutely. So I can share some closing remarks now, just some general points as well. In response to the question of what types of, what types of topics, what types of interventions are most useful. I have been struck during our years of partnership with Ajama Deg and our more recent partnerships with Crash that this, the, our partners interventions are so strong because they respond to very local dynamics. I think this is what Ashley was getting at. The partnership, not just with civil society at the provincial or play factor level, but very local civil society at the community level allows for a response that is appropriate to the very, very specific ways that hate speech can differ from community to community. So I admire that our partners are always consulting with the beneficiaries and community leaders and designing responses that really respond to their needs and allowing them in turn to take any training or capacity building that they might receive from Crash or Ajama Deg and then create very local projects reaching out to communities on their own terms, so to speak. So I think that that local dimension, we have to resist the idea that we can have a one size fits all approach and really trying to respond to local realities and local leaders makes these interventions most effective. I found, I'll say just very briefly a few closing points. I found this conversation today so informative, very sobering and very energizing at the same time. I was struck by the discussion of hate speech and its impacts as contributing not only to being a risk factor for violence but also contributing to long term exclusion, which I think speaks to the fact that our efforts to counter hate speech are important not only to prevent acute and very deadly episodes of violence but to work against the long term exclusive patterns that have kept certain groups of citizens on the outside. So I think that countering hate speech in short has a role in can help us to promote more inclusive governance and on that same vein. I think it's very important to bring these excluded groups into the forefront of efforts to counter and respond to hate speech. It is much harder to spread a false rumor about a targeted group say Fulani. When you see Fulani leaders who are actively working to counter hate speech so I think having excluded groups at the forefront of efforts to counter hate speech and to lead peace building can be very effective here. I thought Hosan's point on holistic interventions, antibodies as he said was so important. Ashley mentioned digital literacy training. Hosan mentioned that we have to train people to consume information to be responsible to receive information responsibly to know how to respond to it. So holistic interventions are quite important. Lastly I'll say that I'm very glad that we have included Central African Republic and Chad in this conversation together because the dimensions really are regional. Yamenge really spoke articulately to the ways in which Sudan conflict is exacerbating hate speech in Chad. And so I hope that future conversations can broaden even beyond the sub region because this is truly a problem that does not respect borders. So consequently I think that our analysis and our interventions should span borders as well. I'm so grateful to Ashley, to Yamenge, to Hosan for their partnership, for their outstanding work. And it's been an honor to co-sponsor this event with the Holocaust Memorial Museum and to have our esteemed partners Crash and Najem-Evek present with us today. Thanks Elizabeth and also thanks to members of the audience really for some really great questions as well. I wonder if perhaps, Ashley, you had some parting thoughts following Elizabeth's remarks. Yes, thank you. It has been a great pleasure. I've learned a lot so very happy to be here. But yeah, just three quick remarks. Just want to stress the importance of obviously learning from past instances where hate speech went unheeded and of course from where I'm coming from, the Holocaust can serve as a prime example of this. But then secondly, also the importance of early warning efforts, like everyone here is doing today, hate speech can often be one of the first and early warning signs that something is escalating. So just stressing that importance of doing this early warning work and these intervention efforts and programs is so important. And then just finally echoing something that Elizabeth said, but the importance of including local communities, that local communities are really they're doing the heavy lifting here and providing the rich nuanced details for us. And the importance of including vulnerable groups like women and stuff in these and especially at risk communities in these conversations. But yes, it really is civil society groups that are doing some of the best work there so the more we can support their efforts, the better. But yeah, thank you so much. This has been wonderful. Thank you so much, Ashley and all. This was a great discussion. And yeah, I think I think that this was the end of the events. So, have a great day everyone. Thank you. Bye.