 So this is one of our School of Security Studies new voices seminar series and yeah, we're really proud that we've been able to to roll this out again this year. The aim is really just, I think, you know, to showcase the diversity and the breadth of the research and scholarship that's taking place across the school and to give early career research as an opportunity to showcase their work to get some feedback. And just to, yeah, to to really talk about talk about their research and have hopefully a good conversation. So we've got two speakers today. So we've got Pauline Heinrich Pauline is a lecturer in more studies and his research focuses around international climate diplomacy and the contestation of state security narratives in the context of climate change. Pauline's worked with an international teams in conflict and post-conflict countries, including Ukraine and the Baltic States. She's been selected as an emerging scholar by the Milton Wolf seminar on public diplomacy received. She received her master's in international security from Sciences Po in Paris and her PhD from all the way in London. And Rhiannon M is, is here is a third year PhD candidate in the Department of Law Studies. All this information is correct. She's also the review articles edited for Millennium, the Journal of International Studies and her work engages with ideas of really a shade of home in a global context and the interactions with sovereignty state and nation. So Rhiannon gained her BA in international relations and her MA in international conflict studies from King's and is looking forward to completing the whole set as you put. So, over to you in terms of who would like to go first. So we'd said around 15 minutes and then about 10 per week and then about 10 minutes for the dissonance and then hopefully although we are going to be just running a little bit late. We'll have some time for questions and conversations. So over to you. Very welcome. Thanks everyone for making it down here. I'm going to be talking about a specific bit of my PhD research, which as a general project focuses on, as you can say, the role of home and international relations, which is being kind of overlooked. Both, I think, from a more traditional animal critical perspective, it tends to be something we talk about without ever explaining. And I think that that warrants investigation, right? I think we should try to explain home. So I'm going to talk about home as a challenge to contemporary sovereignty and the state system actually. And I'm going to do that through the case study of the Shargos Islanders. Not many people have heard of the Shargos Islands. They are officially known as the British Indian Ocean Territory. They are here. It's a group of seven atolls, one of which is called Diego Garcia, which is used as a US military base and has been implanted in extraordinary addition. You might think that that's what makes these islands kind of internationally interesting. And I think that does make them internationally interesting. But I'm going to say that it's something else that makes them key importance for me. So the question of how the islands were cleared to create this military base has received kind of relatively little attention. It's kind of increasing, but there's not been loads of work on it. So more than 1000 Shargosians were forced to be removed from the islands over six years, able to take very few possessions. Their dogs were gassed in front of them. And it was generally very brutal. They were placed in Mauritius and the Seychelles, where they had at the time no citizenship rights, they had no jobs, they had no housing. And they were literally dropped. So even message to the claims of the Shargosians in exile to return to the archipelago. And those claims are there and they're very heartfelt. So the arguments for returning are based on a universal right to live and be at home. So within the Shargosian view, Shargos is home. There is an inherent universal right to live there. Home is a term that we often use in international politics, but we don't often define or explore as I've said. And yeah, to me that calls for further interrogation of what home does in global ordering. So I argue that the Shargos archipelago is a global interest, not just because of the potential war crimes carried out there. But because the Shargosians with no sovereign state claim or sovereign state historically of their own, are advancing a new form of international politics based on the right to be at home. This new international politics challenges the state as the foundational unit of the global. In avoiding the sovereign claims of both the UK amateurs of the islands. In order to claim the Shargosian right to return the Shargosians argue that home is more politically salient than the state and also international law based on the state. To demonstrate this, I'll explain the situation in Shargos. Then how Shargosians use home in global politics and what it means. How this creates a new ethical order of the international and then the implications for I think the study of international relations. That's meant to be awesome. So the Shargos archipelago is the site of a battle between two sovereign claims that of Mauritius, whose territory included the islands prior to independence. And that of the UK who excised the islands in exchange for Mauritian independence and turn them into the British Indian Ocean Territory in 1965. So the Shargosians were brought to the archipelago about 200 years ago under colonial saving conditions and then removed between 1965 and 1971 as part of the clearing to create the motor base. They were deported to Mauritius and the Seychelles. To give you some information, Mauritius is here. So it's over 2000 kilometres away, which is quite fast. So the international implications of this case have thus far been kind of confined to the existing mapping of the international. So the very state based, the very law based. They have examined law and how it creates a kind of moral coding of the international and about whether or not law is able to fairly treat the Shargosians. But I think that the Shargosian political claim does something a bit more innovative than this. I think that it goes beyond the law. You know, I think there are questions of post colonial borders, the role of history in drawing these borders, the role of home in the post colonial. The continuation of colonial borders in saying that Mauritius has a sovereign claim to these islands of these people that until they were deported to Mauritius never saw themselves as Mauritian. I think there's a lot of a lot of questions that echo across the international here. And so looking at home as a little claim highlights the Shargosian claim to international subjectivity and to contestation and global politics. So how does home work to bring about the show of us in a struggle. It calls upon both domestic and international legal regimes ideas of what is proper to the state and then what it also property humanity and ethics based on avoiding harmful consequences in order to advance the vision of a global politics. And that includes political ontology, political theology and political normativity that takes neither the state nor law as its ultimate aim or logic. So the global envisioned by the Shargosians functions on a universal rule of respect for indigeneity at home. That is the absolute right of the indigenous to reside in their homeland. And all politics and all morality is then judged through this ultimate value. The universal rule is read through its frustration in the case of the Shargosians. And I argue that this particular instantiation and its universal rule can usefully be turned right to home. And that the political ontology advanced by the Shargosians is that of the home where this home creates a space for the proper flourishing of those who are able to be at home. Hope that makes sense. So it's home rather than the state that structures the globe. But the key point here is that mapping this right to home and its interactions with the conventional understandings of the state, sovereignty and international normativity shows that it advances a world different to the one that we currently occupy or different to the one that we may think that we currently occupy. There is an underlying layer of people calling upon home that is not hegemonic. And it offers us not a new political imaginary of the global but if we are able to retrieve these mappings it offers us an alternative right that is already existing. So I'll briefly talk you through the work on Shargos. So hopefully convince you that home is not an alternative to understanding of the global. I personally use post structuralist discourse analysis. I'm not going to talk you through what that means, but if you have any questions, let me know. So I'll just share a few of my findings. And again, any questions, just ask. So the morality of home within this discourse is proven by the happiness, self-sufficiency and harmony that the Shargos has experienced while they were on the islands prior to their exile. The poverty and disharmony they experience in exile are that indicative of a fundamental dislocation and of a moral transgression. It's for this reason that any difficulties that existed while they lived on the islands have to be obscured, right. Life on the island was perfect, life after the island is unlivable basically. And that's because the moral claim to birthright is about sustaining humanity and being able to flourish at home and the inability to flourish anywhere else. So any difficulties cannot be admitted. The good life can only be achieved when a person is living on their birthplace and so life on the birthplace has to be perfect. And the home land is the only place in which a subject can flourish. On the other side of the coin, not being at home creates physical harm and is linked with illness. So the Shargosians have a concept called sovereign, which sort of captures this. It's a literal homesickness. So it's a death or I mean quite often actually actual death caused by homesickness and it's attributed as a medical cause or a lot of death in exile of Shargosians. So it's a proven inability to go on living without access to home, which functions as proof both of the existence and of the legitimacy of a birthright claim to home within the discourse. There's a larger claim here that wild politics should be one of sustaining life and wellbeing. And that is achieved through living at home of all people. I think this is something that seems fairly commonsensical, right? Like we go home to relax or to be ourselves or paint the walls a way that reflects. So it feels like it makes sense that home should be somewhere that secures you as an identity, I suppose. So the particular struggle of Shargosians is linked through this universal normative regime and then linked back to the Shargosians in particular. And the logic of the right to live in one's birthplace is that there is a natural congruence between populations and their birthplace and that this congruence is available to all except the Shargosians. So their frustration is what proves this universal rule. The violation of the right creates physical harm and thus there's like a naturalistic consequentialist approach to the international here. The legitimacy of Mauritian and British sovereignty are hierarchised according to their treatment of the Shargosians and the defence of the right to return. They're also hierarchised through the denial of citizenship to second and third generation Shargosians where the British deny second and third generation Shargosians citizenship and the Mauritians don't. So this is despite the fact that Shargosians have a tense relationship with citizenship of other places. Yeah, so the Mauritian sovereignty is placed as more sympathetic to this universal right to home than the British sovereignty is, which is why the Shargosians side with Mauritius in international legal cases rather than with the British. Yeah, so home and sovereignty are not the same here, right, because sovereignty belongs to a state and it does not belong to him. So the naturalised normativity of home is that being at home is the moral telos of the all political legitimacy derived from it. This moral telos is proven by the undesirable consequences of exile. The legitimacy of the totalising claims is read through how they play out initial loss in particular, except the indigenous home claim, which is the ultimate guarantee and value of political normativity. And therefore every claim, including those of the Shargosians is subject to the moral telos of home. Human rights are subject to guaranteeing home indigenous claims to home are absolutely inalienable, and therefore give all normative claims their meaning and position within normative hierarchy. So fulfillment of the indigenous claim to home is the ultimate moral and or global politics within this discourse. Sovereignty and sovereign power are legitimate only insofar as they respect the moral telos of home via the Shargosians. So law is viewed as legitimate only as far as it proceduralises and guarantees the right to be at home. Shargosians have no claims sovereignty and therefore must utilise the state when actions that are reserved for states. When when those are required to challenge the illegitimate global. Because of their indigeneity and their intimate familiarity with the normativity of home and the pain of its frustration. Shargosians are placed as arbitrators of the global telos of indigenous home. They're therefore legitimated in their critique of state sovereignty and where necessary law. I'll finish very quickly. Sorry. So it's true that the Shargosians were essentially dealt away with at the global poker table for the question remains, how was this able to happen? Why is it that populations are able to be subject to a global politics at the state? And that that seems obvious, right? Oh, states are the most important thing. But how did we get to that point? Why does the colonial map continues to limit the possibilities of international politics? These are like essential questions for international relations that a state based theory can't come to terms with. And this matters the studying international relations, because really outside of the state allows us to draw alternative maps of the global and to expand our imaginary of the future of global politics. It highlights that the state is a construction and therefore also open to deconstruction, especially where alternative forms are already being proposed, right? The globe is already full of. It's my contention that home is being mobilized as a claim to global legitimacy, power and moral standing against the hegemony of the state and sovereignty. So, you know, what's at stake is that there's an entire level of global politics functioning on home that is not visible to us through a state based international relations and retrieving this is really important because there has been a recent rise in the use of home as a political imaginary and understanding and argument. So you see it in my three case studies, which are Tuvalu, Hawaii and Chargos. I think you can see it in an awful lot of places, the role of home in politics. So basically my argument is that it's time for international relations to consider what it might be to find a home for itself. Hi, my name is Martin Silcock. I'm a first year PhD student in the Department of War Studies. So thank you for running to invite me to speak about your paper, which is fascinating, interesting and has enormous salience given that come on many situations where home and its relationship to the international insights of conflict is of central importance. I'm not going to take up too much time, hopefully less than 10 minutes, but I've got a few questions. The first thing I was quite curious about is how you see the Jagossians discourse dealing with this concept called home. And you mentioned a sense in which homes common sensical perhaps implies an appeal to the idea of home that we all have as human individual human beings and that that concept is highly ambiguous. So we're capable of labeling as home more than one place at the same time as any emigrate might be able to attest. But it seems to me that what defines it in that personal sense is its effective concept, the way you feel about it, but also your absolute right to name it to label home as your home. I wonder though, whether you might contrast that with that personal home idea with the concept of a homeland, which I think is similar but not quite the same thing. I mean, I think it also has huge effective content for an individual land, but it has quite a slightly different connotations in relation to its relationship to groups. What this means for the right to label by a group or an individual relationship to indigeneity, which I'll come back to perhaps attachment to a particular territory, perhaps or perhaps more notions of more permits. And I was wondering if Chagosians appealed to both home and homeland concepts, and if they do, what aspects do they appeal and do they distinguish those two concepts or do they like them? And building on that, I was wondering in terms of discourse concept what the Chagosian discourse is actually making the concept of home do. If I've got it right, you're kind of arguing that their discourse is seeking to place home above sovereignty on the basis of an appeal to universal moral values. But in doing so, I wonder if it's also trying to define what home means or what it is or what homeland is. In other words, if home is currently a bit of what we use jargon term an empty signifier, then does the Chagosian discourse seek to fix its meaning? Or is it definitively not trying to fix its meaning and using the ambiguity of the concept in some way to make its case? Or is it simply mobilising in a question of rights and ordering, if you like, in the hierarchy? In terms of home, the international has clearly engaged with and has mobilised concepts of home or homeland in the past, often in the context of for colonising or decolonising processes. That engagement has concrete long term impacts often with enormous and adverse consequences for the affected peoples. I think one of the points of making is that those past events have helped constitute global discourse in which the home is subordinate to sovereignty. But those past examples of the international's engagement with home have resulted in people both gaining and regaining homes, as well as losing or being denied the homes. And given that history seems to confirm or produce that global discourse that we have, and that the Chagosians are seeking to overturn, I was wondering to what extent, if they do, or if so how, mobilising the precedents that are provided by the past engagement with the international and the idea of home. Last year, I was fortunate enough to hear Philippe Sands talk about his involvement in the legal case over many years, which he's described in a recent book called The Last Colony, interestingly. They're obviously mobilising, Chagosians are mobilising in discourse, I think, which makes thinkable that the law itself may be subservient to the moral claim of home. But also having to engage that law at the same time to make their case and with current law and international legal institutions. I wonder if you had any thoughts about how political claims are being mobilised into an effective legal strategy, given that there are, kind of in some sense, contesting the law itself. I said I'd return to Gen A et. It's quite interesting that the Chagosians were kind of brought to their home. These are the Chagos Islands fact two or three hundred years ago, I think it was by a colonial action as slaves. So I think, unlike in saying that it was a previously uninhabited land, so they were definitively the first humans to live on it, but they came from somewhere else. And that seems to me to indicate that intergenerality is quite kind of also quite an ambiguous concept. And it causes you to ask questions about what intergenerality actually means. Sorry, I'm nearly finished today. I just wanted to wonder if the Chagosians are engaged with how what intergenerality is and how they kind of fold that into the way that make their discourse. Yeah, so a few questions. I will stop there. Thank you very much. It was super interesting. Thank you. Questions that I'm rattling with as I invite the thesis. This home, Cromulan thing, I think it's one of the most interesting. So within the Chagosian discourse, they talk about the land and the practices that the land allows them to do. So those practices are what make indigeneity indigeneity understandable. So in performing the indigenous identity, it is the practices that are enabled by the land that make those possible. And home partially functions on this indigenous identity, but it also doesn't complete it. So they actually don't really talk about homeland. And what's interesting for me about the idea of homeland is that we talk about it constantly, right? Like if you have done international relations at university for any length of time, homeland comes up all the time. And no one ever really talks about what it means for home to be part of that word. So we understand that there's a kind of blood and fluid tie to homeland. It feels very nationalist. But what does it mean if home is then performing some sort of ontologically securing function, right? Or is it doing that? If we can have multiple homes, then how ontologically securing is one home. But is there a difference between having multiple homes and being entirely homeless, right? Are those two different states of security? And is having multiple homes less secure than having one home? My argument is that home means very different things in very different contexts, but that it's really important that we look at what it does rather than just take it from. So it's present in the idea of homeland. Cool, right? Everyone knows that. Everyone sort of has an instinctive idea of what that means. But what does it actually mean? What things does it legitimize about a home man? And what things does it legitimize about a state predicated on the idea of a home man to all the people at home? I mean, that doesn't really answer your question, but it just it moves somewhere towards it. And then, yeah, how does home function, I guess, is related to that? So, yes, I do view it as an empty signifier. It's something that never has to justify itself because it's such a huge part of the underpinning discourse. So we assume that we know what it means. And that's why you're best getting it. And it's filled with all sorts of things from all sorts of different places. But I think the important thing is that those discourses that seek to drag it out and name it, whether they're emancipatory or less emancipatory, which I think home definitely doesn't come fixed politics. It is something that can be used for millions. But what's important is that someone has recognized that it's a fundamental structuring idea within the international and that to draw out is to be able to make a claim on that international that it can't deny because it knows that home is a fundamental claim, but that it has not yet been able to recognize. So that's why it's subversive. That's why it works because it draws on something that is already present within the international discourse. The instrumentization thing I think is interesting. I think there is definitely, you know, there are always practical considerations on a discourse, right? Like material or ideological structures fundamentally shape what we do in some way. Fundamentally, they interact with what we do in some way. And so constructing effective legal strategies is necessary and they are part of building this discourse. I think that what's interesting is when you look at the extra legal narratives that are going on, right? So like you look at those protests outside the rule of course of justice. They're not about the very specific legal ongoing within those legal cases. They're about the right to live at home, right? They're very effective, effective and feelings-based. But they also draw upon something that is seen as collectively understood by home is something that we all have some sort of effective attachment to. And I think that effective structure is really fascinating. And then, yeah, the role of indigeneity, I think it's a complex one. It's very interesting. David Vine has a very, very comprehensive report. I think it's about 300 pages on proving that the Shahgossians meet something like 17 out of 18 internationally recognized criterion of indigeneity. I personally think that that is an interesting project and it's interesting to know what the structures internationally are. I think that indigeneity is much more slippery than that. I think we have to look at it as a politically constructed term rather than a legally or scholarly term. But I do think it does interesting work. And I think the way in which home, I think home land especially constructs a sense of fine module identity relates to indigeneity. And I think the ways in which indigeneity can be reactionary in some ways. So thank you, Toto. We've got a question from Elizabeth Brown in the chat. Does anybody have questions in the room just for managing time? Okay, so I think if we take the question online and then your question and then I suspect, unfortunately, we will have to move on to the next speaker. So Elizabeth says, you spoke a lot about more imperatives which involve the issues of studying. I'm curious whether the realities of the Shahgossians arrival and the Shahgoss have played a role as well, i.e. these people perhaps even more deserving than others having a home because this isn't the first time they've been removed from theirs. Did you want to just take that question and then what? So I think there definitely is, yeah, a lot of truth to that idea. I think this idea of having been forced to be removed from a home does create this, this kind of moral imperative. And I think it is stronger if it's not possible. I think I'm curious about, I think perhaps it does, but I also think that actually the Shahgossians do view themselves as victims of cloning crime. By which they 1000% off their placement on the islands was a crime. But I think the fact that it allowed to develop the community and the home and the identity that they have is not seen as a kind of double betrayal. I think it's seen as part of the structure of the British states in morality, right? So the British state proves itself to be immoral by conducting colonial slavery. And then, oh yeah, look, the British state is still immoral. It removes us from our homes because the British state is inherently unable to respect Indigenous home. I think that is, that's the broader structure of that, that kind of setting. Yeah, I hope that makes sense. Great. Okay, thank you. Do you want to just sort of introduce yourself? Yeah, thank you. My name's Bed. I'm a second year history and now I am a student at Kings. Thank you, fellow. It's really insightful, especially with identity. I kind of want to ask in the sense of the role of humanitarian intervention and stuff. Does that, do you think that does this kind of military interventions? Do you think that when they cite, obviously just war reasons and they cite it for the protection of identity and things, do you think that actually diminishes the concept of bone marrow? Or perhaps it improves it in the sense of a broader scheme. That makes sense. I think it depends what you're looking at it from. Obviously, as an international framework, I suppose if you're talking about home in terms of structuring military intervention, then yes, that bolsters that as a kind of discursive structure. But if you are looking at a military intervention that has destroyed the physicality of your home, then what you're looking at actually is the way in which a dispenser poem operates to cover up how politics. Right. So the idea is that home here still has a legitimacy, but then it is used that legitimacy is used then to justify things that aren't necessarily in the protection of all folks in the same way that kind of broadly justice or liberal international order might be. And so I think that's why I think home is so interesting because it can fulfill that function quite usefully, but it can also be turned the other way. Yeah. Thank you. We've got any we've got any more questions for Rhiannon. I'm apologize to everybody online the camera is not amazing and I'm having to hold it in order to actually get a view of the speakers so it's going to it's going to move a few times I'm sorry about that. So if we've got any more questions online or from. Yeah, yeah. You mentioned you use this course analysis and talk a little bit about what kind of intellectual resources from what specialist. Literary. Yeah, totally. So I do fairly. I'm going to say fairly straightforward who could use this course analysis I view discourse as something that already exists. It is an event. It's like it's something that we can investigate. So the show goes in case that means that I look at the existing speeches of Olivia Bank of who is the kind of major legal and social leader of the show goes in exile. He's a Russian. I'm a bit actually is he's really jealousy shop awesome first right but he has those two situations. And I look at the way in which the things he says either contradict themselves or they seem to adhere to something whilst also adhere to something else right so there's a really interesting interview with him. Where the interviewer is Mauritian and they're quite they haven't quite go in right there like yeah but you're Mauritian right Mauritian so why do you not want Charles to be a Mauritian. And he's like look I'm perfectly happy to be Mauritian for now but like why shouldn't Charles be a country and like to me that question is so interesting because it reveals a fundamental questioning of what makes a country right why should Charles not be a country. And so it's about it's about reading inside the text right you're allowed to read outside the text but it's about realising how many investments there are within that text that only reveal themselves when you really look at them. I don't know that's like a terrible explanation of the structure of the discourse masses, but it's about. It's about looking for things that when you crack them open reveal lots to you. Which I guess all discourse masses is that it's not sort of. Great. Thank you Rihanna and so much for a fascinating talk it's a fascinating subject. And it's kind of really different gives us a really wet thinking about some. Some of the kind of really important questions in such relations so thank you so much Rihanna. I'd like to it actually what I'm working on ties rather surprisingly if not sadly nicely into what you're doing. The idea of that there might be a contestation over existing homes but in the future with climate change there will definitely be a contestation over the availability of future homes. And though my research doesn't explicitly focus on the homeland or connections to land what it does a bit more specifically is ask why both the international relations discipline but also political actors have mobilized action in the way that we know science asks us to. So first of all climate change is both a product of our way of organizing life international politics and our socio economic systems is a symbol of something inherently dysfunctional but it also defies any sort of rationalist logic right the rationalist logic is. That stuff happens we learn more about to collect empirical evidence and then we can improve and then that bad stuff doesn't happen that much longer we know obviously from. Not just research on climate change but any sort of inequality that that logic doesn't really apply to the international system. And to be honest I also don't want to spend too much time on that rationalist logic because I think it's inherently flawed but. Nevertheless what the international nations discipline has not been able to grapple with is that sense of. Inaction why do actors. Fail to act and that is one of the kind of core questions that I'm trying to answer in the specific paper that I'm currently working on and their explanations for inaction but I'm trying to uncover the mechanism. Of inaction which I say is a bit different to the explanation. For inaction so if we're looking at explanations for inaction in the broader literature in terms of international relations literature though sending it out in 2019 or 20. Estimated that 0.76% of the international relations literature in one way or another features climate change so there is not that much to work with but. From the international relations literature on climate change as well as for the literature is an international political economy they're multiple. Competing explanations as to inaction so that can be the collective action problem as one of the explanations of inaction. Which basically means that in principle states have an interest in a stable climate but also have an interest in free writing off the improvements and concerns of others. And though actually in Mildenberger say there's no actually convincing empirical evidence for the collective action problem. They call it the prisoners of a wrong dilemma. And when you substitute that explanatory hypothesis with distributive conflict. So they say anything that can be explained by the collective action problem can be better explained by the possibility of distribution of conflict. And then there are those who have power based explanations for inaction so vested interest the fossil fuel industry. And then there are yet others who say there isn't kind of pragmatism or incrementalism with our resistance to change that change doesn't really. Happen in response to the incremental every day but rather in response to crisis and then that then led me on to ask about. How is change explained in the international relations literature more broadly and their multiple or competing explanations as to why change happens. One of them is the sort of change can happen more as a product of progressivism or some sort of slow but kind of moving forward progress which is what we're talking about in terms of the rationalist logic. Then there's a sort of. Episodical or rather cyclical notion of history happens in patterns. A great power is decline and rise and somehow changes implicated within that. And then there's a third element of episodism so something happens a big crisis happens. And that's how change manifests. In my to actually get to what my paper is about. My paper asks. But what happens if actors as with my read I'll call it. I argue that there is a necessity for change in response to a crisis and into subjectively across a community of people within a country. There is agreement and consensus that changes needed in response to a crisis. But that change doesn't manifest or that change is not being implemented. Why does that happen very often narrative literature for example that well the narrative changes and when the narrative changes stuff will happen afterwards in the context of climate change that doesn't happen. In fact the disparity between narrative and action is increasing as ambitions are rising great but also as in action keeps furthering the problem that we have. And I say this kind of mechanism of inaction is invented by us and how we respond to energy crisis in particular which is what I'm looking at but it can be any climate crisis that you would be looking at. And I say that this mechanism of inaction is the choice and set of routines that we invoke in response to energy crisis. And that is firstly because climate change and energy crisis are often dislocated from each other. So there is an energy crisis and energy secure insecurities characterized as the shortage of fossil fuel supply. And therefore the short term in quotation mark energy security response is to fill up the shortage of this energy security insecurity through fossil fuel supply and more fossil fuel supply. What happens as a consequence of that short term response is however an implementation of a fossil fuel team that serves as a long term infrastructure investment. And whereas what is not happening is a kind of invocation of climate routines and I'm explaining that in this article that I'm working on. And as through a case study of Germany's energy security response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. And I'm saying that what happened in the context of German policymakers in response to this energy crisis was the sort of temporal and spatial displacement or dislodging of climate as a problem that's exogenous to the energy security crisis. So the energy security crisis was characterized as a gas crisis shortage of supply. We need to diversify gas supply we need to build our own gas infrastructure and and we need to do this very quickly and immediately and now also climate change is a problem that happens in the future and yes we need to address that. So you temporarily and spacefully displace it. So your crisis response routine doesn't really work at all in reference to your climate routine. And that sort of discrepancy needs to be politically explained and expressed and I'm saying that happens through temporarily scaling or rather prioritizing different temporal scales. Benoit Pellupida explains a similar mechanism for in his book called the birth of nuclear eternity where you're so long justifying your short term routines but they are actually manifesting then as long term infrastructures and long term possibilities where whereas you just close or go the possibility of democratically opening short term responses to crisis. And he says that just means that in the context of nuclear weapons. That just means there is a continuous promise as to a possibility of a future without. But whatever you're enacting now implements the impossibility of a kind of without nuclear weapon future. And it perpetuates a continued logic of how we respond to crisis. And by dislodging those kind of climate routines. We are also treating the incumbent fossil fuel identity as. Hydrically superior to a sort of climate identity if you wish whatever that looks like. But it also then means that we are increasing the price and we're increasing the kind of delay to climate action proving itself. Right. We're doing two things here. We're not just saying we're not just making climate action more expensive. We're also delaying the benefits of climate action as they would present themselves to citizens. And therefore in response for instance being probably more critical. At the same time we're confusing the source of the energy crisis in most of the energy and security concerns that German policymakers. Raised they considered the Russian economic war the Russian attack the Russian. Kind of energy warfare and the conduct of that as the exogenous problem and the source of the crisis. Not once did the discourse turn to a the endogenous fossil fuel dependency as the source of crisis. And by dislocating that source of crisis from your own dependency on fossil fuels. You're making it almost impossible to enact short term in long term climate routines in response to that. And so my takeaway is that in this kind of explanation of the temporal politics of routines and how you're justifying and articulating your teams. We're doing something that is normatively kind of building the incumbent fossil fuel identity. And within that I'm also challenging some of the more. Some of the literature that sees routines always an automatic process that just happens. Unreflective, optimized in response to crisis. We're kind of routine animals. And I'm saying we are actually not. We use a lot of critical thinking in deploying routines. If you're thinking about which way to walk to work for example say you have three ways to walk to work. You're doing a lot of calculation. You might pull up Google Maps or might think be thinking about which routine am I going to draw on today? Am I going to take the tube? Am I not? That's a lot of critical thinking skills. And I'm saying that in which routines we're invoking at which time skills in response to crisis. There's actually a lot of agency by far away from automatic behavior and a lot more agency of political actors involved in this process. Which then is inherently linked to the power politics or a lot of the other explanations that we've seen for in action. I'm going to end that here. Over to Rob. Hi everyone, my name is Rob. I'm a post-doctoral research fellow at the Center for Grand Strategy and Macaulay Bullings. I work on I guess questions of world order and great power competition in the 21st century which is marked by climate change. This interesting research is super germane to the stuff I've been doing as well. So thanks very much for this opportunity to read this paper for the second time actually. I really enjoyed it and I feel like I learned a lot. It's really pushed me to I guess think about climate change from new angles, particularly the temporal angle, the time angle, which I really, I think I don't do enough. And so it's something that I find really interesting to sort of learn more about. I really like the point that you made about how attempts to secure energy independence, like within the paper itself, attempts to secure energy independence. How they also produce forms of insecurity over the long term, which is paradoxically based on this kind of this strange dependence on others. So we're looking for energy independence through fossil fuels, but we also end up somehow also being dependent on others through that. I think it's really true. It's something that states and people have begun to wake up to, but it's really strange how we still haven't been able to break away from that fully. And I think one of the things this paper does is really nicely show the mechanism that sort of through which that happens. And I also really liked how you articulated this link between, I guess, hegemonic interests and how they enshrined with these routine practices. So we get very caught up often I think in big denunciations of the bad politics and the bad thinking that goes on. And we often forget to look at how this kind of plays out the actual mechanism through which it occurs. So I guess I have four questions or clusters of questions or challenges, which I think is quite a lot. So feel free to kind of synthesize or ignore them as you see fit. The first concerns these routines that you spoke about. I think you really nicely outlined in the paper what you think their effects are. But I'm still kind of wondering what is a routine for you and who does that? Is it states that bureaucracies? Is it companies? Is it people? And you also talk a bit about the performativity of routines. And I was wondering, okay, cool, who are they being performed for? So who's the audience of the routine? And also, what distinguishes routines from actions? And if I was conceptually hostile for this work, which I'm not, if you agree, right? But if I was, I would probably say something like, okay, well, the decision to, you know, reinvest in fossil fuels in this crisis context. That's an action, really a routine. So I was wondering if you could kind of distinguish between those things. So that's one thing, routines. Who are they? What are they for? Who does them? The second concerns, I guess, this question of time and temporality. And I'm just wondering if you could tease out a bit more what you think about the relationship is between time and security in the context of climate change. Do you think that it's that climate change sort of collapses some of these understandings about looking at progression around time? Or does the problem of time and climate sort of emerge in the way that time is constructed and represented by these various actors which you identify? So that's the second question set. The third, I think you sort of mentioned a bit in the presentation, but you also talked about fossil fuel identities. And it comes on quite strongly at the start of the piece, but then it sort of diminishes. And I was wondering if you can sort of explain a bit more about what you think these are, these fossil fuel identities and how they're embodied in the teams. And in the final, final sort of question, which is about your broader kind of contribution. You did speak about this actually in the presentation, but it was really clear in the paper what you're trying to do normatively, which is to call attention to these kind of perverse ways that we construct relationships in security and energy in the context, or separate them as it were in the context of climate change. But you also signaled this kind of theoretical contribution, which I'd like to hear a little bit more about, particularly this strategic ontology concept that you were sort of throwing around there. And I'm just wondering how this works in the context of broader debates around energy security. So yeah, thank you very much. Really enjoyed the paper before the hearing can respond. I will say that the paper as it looks currently a major revision from the journal I sent it to. So it currently looks entirely different to what you've read, which in part speaks to some of those elements that you were just outlining. First of all, my contribution to academic scholarship is in part mostly in fact driven by sort of deep frustration with how things are. I think if I weren't an academic, I would probably just run around the entire time being outraged at everything that's happening. But really trying to understand this inherent paradox is that the longer we wait, the more expensive it will be to sort that out, and the more impossible it becomes. But also all the economics are already clear. There is so much illogical and discrepant and dissonant kind of politics around climate change that I'm really not or initially found very difficult to understand. We know there is to make it to be around 12 trillion in net savings if we reach net zero by 2050 according to the IEA, which is by far a progressive agency or historically has not been a very progressive agency. So those are quite conservative estimates. We also know that in a lot of the explanations for reaching net zero, this idea of be very capital intensive now and later will pay out, but we don't have the cash to do this now. We're already investing a lot in austerity politics. That's costing us a lot. The publics have accepted that to some degree post 2008 with the promise that this would pay out, but it hasn't pay out. So why is there such an instance to this investment in climate change policies? The contribution, therefore, theoretically is that I think all the explanations for inaction are valid, but how do states justify this dissonance when it goes contrary to either the security interests or in fact any sort of responsibility. So I'm trying to link or bridge that gap between what some call normative scholarship and sort of a rationalist or some sort of social sciences approach to things. And I'm saying there is no distinction between normative scholarship in that way towards other social sciences and any scholarship is normative. And all of those explanations are rooted in mechanisms that foster that justification for the insecurity that's perpetuated. Likewise, I'm trying to challenge this idea of what the paper was originally called is the politics of maladaptive routines. So I'm trying to create a better theoretical sense of the maladaptive politics that we're creating by continuing to invest in something that's causing our own insecurity. And that's something deeply political because it's actually not just our own insecurity, but in the context of climate change, any domestic student is a foreign political choice, as I always say. And within that context, we are also not just fostering our own insecurity, but for populations in for example, small island nations, we are also saying you have no right to live. It's not just a right to call even it's a right to exist. And within that context, I'm trying to formulate how we can leverage accountability not just against the narratives that have been deployed, i.e. ambition, but also the actions that are being taken. Long-winded way of saying what are fossil fuel identities. I think I link that actually to routines. I think action and routine aren't so far distinguished by how often they're replicated within the mechanism. So an action can in that sense be just a response to something it doesn't yet have to be routine and think routine and time connect as in so far as their actions being continuously or frequently taken to secure a certain identity. So fossil fuel identity in that way is permeated by actions that are routinely done through time that foster or connect a sense of identity to the source of that identity, which is fossil fuels. And leads back to the theoretical contribution that is kind of the big picture research I'm trying to do, which is conceptually our understanding of political power in the international system is so deeply connected to the materiality of fossil fuels that once we remove that materiality of fossil fuels, we have no sense of what political power is actually outside of a fossil fuel power. And I'm quite interested in figuring out what alternative conceptualizations of power are in that future. Or that's at least fingers crossed some of what I want to think about in my book. And lastly, what are routines and you helpfully in reviewing my paper initially appointed me to Eden who looks at organizational routines versus frames. I think frames are ways of perceiving a problem that you leverage solutions at and that you perceive to be within the scope of your agency and to respond to. And friends deal argues that one of the inherent vulnerabilities of the aesthetic self that the state seeks to express is that it needs to see itself play out in action. And the routines are one mechanism of doing that. But as others have documented just because you're acting doesn't actually mean you're doing anything substantively helpful. So, I think lead points to states just creating fantasy documents, but you also actually see this in in some of, and I'm a huge critic of consultancy companies but you're seeing this a lot and consulting companies as well production of stuff that isn't necessarily substantive right so there's a kind of routine mechanism seeing yourself in action that seeks to validate your own actions and in your own sense of self. But realistically doesn't really do anything substantive other than that kind of connection to your identity. Yeah, I think that's the time and security relationship. What does time change due to time and multiple connections there so on the one hand routine and time item if you connected because they play out through time. The other is that climate change and the increasing likelihood of crisis will fully collapse our understanding of time what matters what doesn't matter. But there's also an inherent politics of time who has time to live, but also how are we accountable for future generations and whose future are we enabling versus whose future we are not. There's also something so paradox about climate change which I would love someone to do some research on might be me. I think you're willing courage to do that, and which is that a lot of resistance to climate change politics, by those that don't have much time. Whereas a lot of hope for climate change politics, by those who argue they don't have more time. So there's actually a consultation over how time matters politically and whose time request we are responding to politically that I think is quite palpable. Yeah. I know you said you're typical to it, is that right? Yeah. What time do you need to be? Five to five to. Okay, so I think you've probably got time for a couple of questions. So yes, if you just introduce yourself, please. Thank you very much. My question, I am, my research is completely different from climate change is not very close to me and so sorry about maybe she's an elite and surgeon, but we all know politicians are taking actions differently, their actions depends on societies. Unfortunately, not many people are very climate change. Scientists believe some are still arguing. So we criticize politicians for many things. One of them is they are taking actions, but their actions really depends on societies ideas, what the government need to do. So how much your work influence society. And not just politicians. Maybe. Some ways for efficiency before means society. So. What do you think society. I need us about. Okay, we understand some may, may, problems affects climate change. But this will have a climate change, like centuries ago and so on and so forth. But for example, if I can't use pesticides and if I can't have this farming, which also affects climate change, many people will die because we don't have, I mean, population raised quite rapidly and doing something on your soil backside of your house, it's not enough to survive. So how we can convince those people who don't believe much about climate change, may make climate change easier or just for communist politicians and not from this society which politicians reaction mainly with the social services and social services. No, good. Fundamentally believe that politicians don't just react to society. I think they react to fractions within societies that they consider electorally valuable. Yeah. But I also think there is another inverse relationship with politicians steer society or discourses within society that is quite important in the context of climate change. I think the interesting thing here is that we see often climate politics being politicized and mobilized despite an overall consensus that more needs to be done. At least, for example, in the UK, we have around two thirds of the UK, populists who largely agree with the notion that more needs to be done. And we have very regressive and aggressive anti-climate change politics being perpetuated by the UK government at the moment that doesn't actually reflect the overall two third issue consensus. So I think there is something around the accountability element, but also who are you doing politics for that matters in this context? Then my dad is a farmer, so he and I have a lot of difficult conversations about the politics. And we have a lot of difficult conversations about the distributional effect of the politics of climate change. But this is also something that I think is fundamentally the responsibility of governments. And frankly, I don't think the only way you don't believe in climate change is by closing your eyes, closing off your ears, and by sitting in a cellar. So either you reject the notion of climate change as in so far that you were completely close to the world around you. And secondly, it's spatially and temporally displacing it. Because people are already experiencing it, you don't need to believe it in order to experience climate change. The fact that it is hotter in London over the summer months, but likewise for populations who are already being displaced or in Bangladesh who are experiencing the floods, couldn't care less about people who don't believe in climate change because they're experiencing it. So how can you make people believe? I wouldn't consider my dad a hard core climate change denier, but he's very much like we need to feed and therefore these systems need to be in place that have always been in place. So there's a resistance to change that I hear in him. But the thing we can agree on is kind of land principles, sort of some sense of taking care of land. There's also somehow a connection to conservational values that are in some way able to bridge divide to climate deniers. Frankly, I think the way to convince the hard core climate deniers is maybe you don't convince them, but at least don't make politics for them. And the way you make politics for people is, first of all, don't tax subsistence emissions, start taxing luxury emissions. I keep saying that there's a lot of politics around taxation. We tax a lot of subsistence emissions, which the poorest in a society will feel most whereas the problem is often with luxury emissions. Having a third car should be expensive, rather than driving a car somewhere in rural England. Right? So there's discrepancy of taxation, that's the problem. And then again, let the positive effects of climate action be felt. You can't make them felt if you don't actually do the politics around it. Electricity would have been significantly cheaper if countries had already invested in a renewable energy share. There would have been less susceptible to the price volatility of fossil fuels. And ultimately, if you're yearning for politics of stability, that politics is not in the politics of fossil fuels in the future. Thank you so much. I think it's very surprising if you say, and then possibly it will be cheaper for people than it is kind of safe, but maybe you can say, okay, it's cheaper for me here by the US, India, UK, but why I should invest somewhere in India or in Middle East or in Africa? What benefit I could have as a taxpayer in the UK, why I should ask my government to go and invest there? What makes it cheaper for me, because it is here in my home, but in the UK. So how can you tell me these kinds of functions? And they can tell me also, okay, we see, this is a situation that I'm going to share with you today because in the UK, but climate has been changing historically. Lots of plants, we are flooded. They are not, they are not species anymore. They are in the world and so forth. And it's a natural thing. So how can you make their minds changing and believe these different things? I mean, I'm not on a, because we need to call these people. I don't have a mind, but I think more about people to change their ideas, what should be valued more. And I'm just trying to, yeah, sorry. No, no. I mean, I'm not on a mission to convince in the sense that I think trying to convince has something so desperate about it. What I am trying instead to do is show that some of the assumptions that we have about stability, well-being, politics itself are so rooted in fossil fuels that we can't even conceive of. I think Andreas Malm still live from someone. I don't know who, but we are better positioned to imagine the end of the world than we are to position, to imagine the end of fossil fuels. And that's the absurdity we are, that's the absurdity of the politics we're facing currently. So I want to be more hopeful in the sense that, cool, if we are not able to imagine the end of fossil fuels, let's do that. And in that imagination, there are a lot of catastrophic consequences for at least how climate denialists envisage it. But if you know that there are actual grievances, then that's the grievance of loss around livelihood, the daily cost of living, prices intermingled with, of course, racism and class communities and kind of superiority complexes and a lot of stuff that's really difficult to undo. But ultimately, it's a grievance. And I think a lot of positive imaginations of a post-fossil pure world would actually address those grievances way more than in your austerity politics or class, what wars or racism will be into. I'm going to close there and I'm going to make a morning note for our teacher. I just said thank you all so much. Yeah, please join me in to ask fascinating papers asking some really important questions, particularly around change in two very different ways, but actually there were some interesting commonalities, I think, emerging as you develop. So yeah, thank you to everybody for coming.