 Good morning and welcome to Vermont House Judiciary Committee. We are going to be starting with H962, which folks remember was the relief from abuse spill and service. And it has come back from the Senate with some very minor changes. And so I am certainly going to recommend that we concur. But before we do that, I'd like Eric to just walk us through and make sure everybody understands what the Senate did and see if you have any questions or concerns. So welcome. Eric, go ahead. Sure. I'm sorry, it is posted. The changes. Oh, good. I think, yeah. Yeah, I sent it to Lori this morning and she indicated that she had posted it. So I think we should have it. OK, great. Thank you. Great. Well, good morning, everybody. Nice to see you all. As the chair was indicating, Eric Fitzpatrick with the Office of Legislative Council, here to just go through quickly the changes that the Senate made to H962, which you recall is the act relating to temporary relief from abuse orders duration. Remember, the big picture of what was going on there was that it was closing a gap that existed under current law, particularly when defendants did not attend the final hearing, because you have temporary relief from abuse orders and final relief from abuse orders. Temporary order only remains in effect for 14 days. So you had the issue that if the defendant did not turn up at the final hearing, the temporary order expires after 14 days. And there may be no order in effect if the court issues a final order at that final hearing. Well, it isn't in effect until the defendant is served. So if he or she doesn't turn up at that final hearing, temporary order goes away. It's not in effect anymore. The final order is not in effect because it hasn't been served yet. So you have this gap during which time defendant is free to ignore any of the conditions that were in the temporary order. They're not bound by any of the conditions in the final order because they haven't been served yet. So you have this period of time where there's no order in effect that's requiring that the defendant obey with the conditions. So the solution in 962 was to provide that, well, if that temporary order that initially is issued by the court for 14 days remains in effect until the final order is served. So that way, if the defendant doesn't turn up at that final hearing and the court issues that final order, well, the temporary one stays in effect until they locate the defendant and serve him or her. So that way you close the gap. There is no period of time during which the defendant, there's no order in effect on the defendant. So what the House did, sorry, what the Senate did was really two changes, one of which is purely technical. And as the chair said, very minor. The first one was just to provide notice to the defendant about the fact that I just described, the duration that I just described. So in other words, the order, the temporary order when it's issued says right on it to the defendant, hey, and if you look at the language on this, it's highlighted on page one, lines 12 to 15. It's just a notice provision. Let's the defendant know that if you don't turn up at the final hearing, then that temporary order will remain in effect until the final order is served on you, unless for some reason that temporary order gets dismissed by the court, which could happen also. But if that doesn't happen, if the court does not dismiss that temporary order, let's the defendant know. So they have notice that not turning up at that final hearing is not gonna be a way to avoid being under the conditions of that temporary order because it's gonna stay in effect until the final one is served. So it's a notification notice provision. It doesn't change the policy that you enacted in 962. It just provides the defendant with notice of the policy. So that's the first one. Second one, as I mentioned, it's really a technical matter. It's just rewording one of the sentences, and that's on page three. You remember, in addition to this notice, or sorry, the effect of the final order and the temporary order on the defendant, another issue that came up really late in the committee hearings, when you were looking at this in committee before it went to the floor, was what if, because we're all talking about the defendant not turning up at the final hearing. Well, what about if the plaintiff, the person who's seeking the order doesn't turn up at the final hearing? And you remember, you added a sentence late in the committee process to address that, that basically says, well, if the plaintiff doesn't show up, the person seeking the order, then the general rule is gonna be that the petition gets dismissed. So if the plaintiff doesn't show up, the person who's asking for the order, if they don't show, generally gonna be dismissed, but he provided some language that said, well, if the court makes findings on the record why there might be good cause not to dismiss it, then it might keep the order in place, even if the plaintiff doesn't turn up. And I think there was some sense down in the Senate that that language just needed to be clarified a little bit. There was a concern that the way it was written, it might leave open the possibility that this order could be in effect permanently indefinitely. So if the plaintiff didn't turn up, then that temporary order could be in effect forever. And I know that wasn't the intent. So they just clarified that language to say that, well, in those situations where the plaintiff doesn't turn up, the court can still continue the order if it makes good cause, but it defines good cause, but only would be able to continue it until the final hearing. So again, just making clear that, that order doesn't remain in effect infinitely. It's only could be in effect if the plaintiff doesn't turn up until the final hearing, if the court makes good cause to find a reason to extend it. So a more of a clarification in a language, making sure that that ambiguity wasn't there rather than any substantive policy difference, I think, than what had already passed the house. So that's it. Other than that, it's exactly the same as what passed the house. As I say, a notice provision and a language cleanup and that was it. Great, great. Thank you, Eric. And my understanding is that the witnesses that we heard from, the Senate also heard from and that they all support these changes. Yes, that's exactly right. Judge Greerson, Sarah from the crime victims, as well as Matt Valerio and John Campbell as well. All testified that they were fine with those two changes. Great, great. Thank you. Sure. Any questions for Eric? I'm not seeing any hands. Folks, jump in. So this will mean a form change and but apparently that is, there's no problem with that. The court happens all the time and as Eric said, Judge Greerson was fine with this change. So, okay, I'm not seeing any hands. This could come up today for action in terms of whether or not to concur. So I wanted us to be prepared. If the speaker does ask us, I was the reporter of the bill, I believe. So I would entertain a motion that we concur with the, let's see, it's a strike wall amendment but concur with the Senate strike wall amendment to H962. So moved. Thank you. Second? I'll second that. Great, thank you. Okay. Now are you ready? Yep. Great, thank you. Maxine, are you sitting on the state house lawn? Yes. It's not raining in Montpelier. Oh, I think it is. Sunshine and 80 here. Oh, okay. All right, this was a H962, right? Yes. Okay. Christy? Yes. Colburn? Colburn? Yes, sorry, I was muted. Yes, yes. Ghostland? Yeah. Hashim? Yes. Not? Yes. Rachelson? We'll hold it open for her. Oh, she's not here. Okay, sorry. Seymour? Yes. Tali? Yes. Willownd? Yes. Burdett? Yes. Grad? Yes. Okay. Great. Thank you so much. And Barbara, let's see. So yeah, so Barbara, I'll let her know that she can. She wrote her support in an email, but when she comes in, we'll just get her vote on the record. Great. Okay, wonderful. Thank you. Thank you, Eric. Thank you, everybody. Yeah, sure. Okay. All right. Great. I know you guys are working on S119 this morning, so good luck. Thank you so much. Thank you. Thank you. Okay, so this went quicker than I thought. So I believe we have Brynn a little after 12. I think that's still what's going on. I think she's in Senate judiciary right now, actually on this bill. But since we do have the time, I did want to start discussing this bill. In terms of yesterday, we were talking with Commissioner Baker and Representative Emmons regarding the the language from the Department of Corrections. And I know that at that time, we were asked to put it on either 119 or possibly 124, but 119 really seemed to be the best one. But I have spoken to Representative Emmons and I think it's better as a standalone bill that everybody could get their support behind. And so she will be doing a separate bill out of her committee, doing a strike all on a Senate bill that she has. So we don't have to put it on this bill, which I think is probably cleaner and better in terms of process. So they won't be asking for your support on that particular DOC language here. So is that clear? Yeah. No? Yeah. I'm sorry, Ken, what? No? No, it's not clear. Were you... Okay. That's going to be added where? So it's going to be a separate bill coming out of Corrections. Originally, we were asked to put it on 119 and that's why we had the commissioner come and talk to us and then after thinking about it and consulting with Representative Emmons, I just think it's cleaner if it's not on this bill. Yeah, it'll get my support if it's not on this bill. Exactly. Thank you. Yeah, yeah. So... Bless you. Thank you for now, right? I had my hand up, Maxine. I don't know if you saw it or not, but... Sorry, no, thank you. I didn't... Yeah, but I just wanted to say that I appreciate you not tacking that onto this bill, 119. I mean, it's no secret that I'm not a fan of 119, but I am a big fan of that language that the commissioner Baker brought in. I mean, that language is so widespread as far as the good that it'll do through the whole corrections system, not just with inmates, but the work that it can potentially do with the correctional officers, the administration, you know, in corrections. And it'll just... It should be a wave through the whole department. And that's certainly a good thing. And like Ken, it's something that I want to support. And if it was tacked on, I would have voted against it. So appreciation to you for recognizing that and to Alice for putting in it as a separate bill, because there's always the chance that I guess it could have been attached to a bill that some people wouldn't have supported the bill and been in the same situation as if we attached it to 119. So I think it's great that it is a separate bill. Thank you. Great. Well, thank you. And I appreciate your comments. Ken. So what Mr. Burdick just said, so politically correct in everything that I can't do, that's what I wanted to say, but he did such a great job. I just want to commend him on it. Thank you. I understood you said it. You said the same thing, but differently. So that's how you take up your five minutes in a debate. I liked your short and sweet much better, Ken, personally. Hey, hey, hey, hey, hey. LaLond, you're up to something if you're agreeing with me. We all know that. So, OK, great. So as I said, I do want to move to draft 3.5. We'll have Britain in about 10 or so minutes. But before we start markup and committee discussion, I just want to say a few remarks. I want to thank the many people and organizations that contributed to our considerations of the use of force reform. We started this process in June with the passing of S219 and continued during our recess three public hearings, a survey that resulted in nearly 1,500 responses and weekly planning meetings with the goal of ensuring an inclusive and comprehensive listening process. I want to especially thank Representative Coach Christie, coach for your leadership on the social equity caucus and the caucus's concurrent discussions about 219 and the issues we are addressing and really keeping those discussions alive with a really diverse caucus. I'm not sure people realize just the time that you and members have put in. I just want to thank Representative Belonde for, so does my dog, for convening the tripartisan planning meetings that also helped us focus on the evolution of the bill and our public hearings and our outreach. And there are many more leaders that I realize that I'm not naming here and I appreciate Representative Van Donahue, Representative Chiena. Many, many folks went into this. And also I want to recognize that we've been doing things differently in this recent session. I appreciate the Senate Judiciary's engagement and possible amendments to the bill. And I thank Senator Sears for taking testimony on these proposed amendments. They've actually been working at the same time that we have and Brynn is going back and forth to just review different drafts, understand their concerns and streamline the process, which has given me a great understanding of their concerns with the hope that we can come to an understanding and find a common ground and hopefully concurrence on 119. Also want to thank many of the witnesses who testified for the committee. I structured the testimony by starting to hear from members of the Black, Indigenous and people of color communities. I appreciate that there was concern at our public hearings that BIPOC members were not given priority. And so I very much intentionally asked to hear from them first. I reached out to over 20 individuals based on a list of witnesses that coach and others gave to me to make sure that we were inclusive. Also want to thank the Attorney General's Office and state's attorneys for meetings, hours of meetings to help us understand their concerns and possible ways to address them. So what felt like a fast process was actually quite comprehensive that really started way before these last few weeks and we'll continue beyond 119. Because certainly this is, as we've always said, just one piece of our ongoing work in terms of racial justice. So given that backdrop, I do want to turn to 3.5. And what I'd like to do is go section by section and I'll help facilitate the conversation that can be discussion and make a recommendation perhaps based on the testimony that I heard and then welcome input by everyone here. And then the hope would be to, based on these changes have a new draft that we can vote on later this, well, I guess it'll be afternoon. And so folks have 3.5. It was posted on Tuesday. Yeah, so we're good? Okay, great. So section one is the statewide use of policy. Okay, I remember this bill has policy and then standard. And I would like to put out for discussion. I would like to see this section come out based on Will de Weitz testimony as well as the ACLU and others. I also think that given the governor's executive order that that work is going on. And that's also acknowledged in S-124 which house government operations is working on. And so I would like to see this section come out that I mean, I'm putting that out for discussion and let that work happen on its own but also recognize that I found Will de Weitz testimony very compelling. So let's open that up for discussion. And folks can jump in, raise hands, whatever works. Selena, great. That makes sense to me. I would say I felt like kind of Morris's remarks really resonated with me as well yesterday about just the, yeah. So I think we know this work is moving forward. We know the legislature in January will have the opportunity to look at what's come forward and consider whether that is the right basis for a statewide policy. But I think I support taking this out too based on the testimony we heard not just yesterday, honestly, but ongoing throughout the process. Great, thank you. I should also add that Senate judiciary yesterday, Martin and I were there, Martin stayed longer but Senator White did say that the executive order in 124 really are addressing some of these issues and that I think she would support this coming out as well. Others, and thanks for mentioning Kaya, thank you. Yeah, others? Okay, well, I'm not seeing anybody. How about just like a show of hands that for the next draft to take section one out. So make sure nobody had any questions or not are you're looking, any thoughts, questions? I'm just thinking. I was perusing over section one one more time. Just to make sure I'm... All right, well, let me give you a few minutes. And again, this is straw poll and if you wanna vote no, that's okay too to take it out. But... One question, that subsection D that's highlighted if law enforcement agency are comfortable to adopt the policy and so on, are we gonna incorporate that anywhere else for the sake of acknowledging that whole departments will have at least adopted the model policy or no? Okay, Martin. Jump in on that question. Cause... So I have a proposal of an alternative for section one and I did get the language posted that would require a report from the Department of Public Safety regarding the process for developing this policy as well as the final policy asking for that by I think the end of January, early February. I can't remember the exact date. The concept being when they report back, the legislature can look at the policy, look at the process and decide at that point if they believe that this is the policy that should become the uniform statewide policy and can then mandate that that policy be adopted. And related to that, I would be suggesting a July 1st effective date for the standards so that the legislature would have the opportunity to look at this policy and decide if they want to mandate it. So that's kind of throwing that out there as something to replace section one as opposed to just completely eliminating the concept of the policy or what we're gonna do with the policy. I don't know if that helps with that question that you have not or not, but. Yeah. Thank you. Madam Chair. Sure, go ahead. I would support that based on the testimony from all of the witnesses that we've heard. You know, I think that that's a reasonable compromise for us as a committee to put forth because everybody realizes we do have the ability to statutorily require. And I think the amendment or addition to the draft that Representative Lalonde is proposing, capsizes those thoughts from across the board. And it seemed that that would be reasonable for all of the parties, at least from what I was hearing unless I heard something, you know, oddly, but I would support it. Great, thank you. Yeah, and I do think the report, I forgot about that, we talked about this yesterday. I do think a report would be helpful because it would help us monitor what's going on. And also it could give, so it would be the training council for the most part, which is also being, I think coaches just said yesterday being restructured. And so it would give them an opportunity to start this process. I started on October one. And so if they came to us in February or something or January or whatever and said, you know, we really, yes, here's this initial report, this is how we're doing, we need more time. There's still time to make changes, you know, to whatever moves forward in 119 if it does. So, Tom, was your hand up to speak or to support? Okay. No, it's been up since earlier, thank you. You're ready, thanks. Selena. Just a logistical question, because I'm looking at Martin's proposed language. Just structurally, it would be like a new section five as opposed to just swapping out for section one. That's how I'm reading your, this proposal, potential proposal of MMA here, Martin. Yeah, I think that that's, yeah, it would go towards the end of the bill, wherever we end up. I'm not sure why section five is what Bryn put in there, but maybe predicting that that's where we would, yeah. Yeah, reordering. The idea would be at the end. Yeah, yeah. Okay, all right, great. I like this language, it's good. Yeah, I'm just actually, I haven't seen it. Yeah, but anyway, yeah. And we can look at that, we'll look at that language separately as well, but yeah, I think that's, okay, great. So let me say this again, just again, raise of hands in support of taking section one out. One, two, three. Hand by my hand. Ken has lost his hand. Oh my, okay. It's not working. There you go, great. All right, wonderful. Thank you. And then again, we can hear from Barbara. All right, great. And so I'm hoping that when Bryn is available, she'll hop on because I think we will need her. All right, so that takes us to section two. And okay, so in terms of section two, in terms of the definition of force, my understanding, and I'll name this now, but then when Bryn comes, I'm gonna ask her legal advice. The AG testified that this language was vague, that it doesn't include a threat. My understanding is that this language, so the physical coercion, the question of whether or not that includes a threat. Julio talked about yielding a knife or something like that. My understanding is that this language tracks, it's not identical, but it's consistent with this 219 that we passed earlier, as well as title 20. But I'm gonna flag that for Bryn. If anybody has any thoughts on that now, but I do wanna hear from Bryn and come back to that, but certainly if anybody has any thoughts or questions about that, can we jump in? Okay, so I'm just keeping a running list. The next thing that, and again, if I skip over something that folks have concerns or questions about, let me know. But the next thing that I see as a decision point based on testimony, I'm on page four, section three. On line seven at the end, we talk about, it says must be instantly confronted and addressed. And Chief Pete raised concern about the word instantly. We also heard from Will de, we talked about the word immediately. And I know Will de, she said preferred immediately because that's really the legal term and is perhaps more consistent. And I believe the AG said that that is consistent with current training. So my proposal would be to change the word instantly to immediately. So I welcome thoughts on that. I have a question. Why don't we just say imminently as we do in the first line, or does it, I'm not sure what huge difference it makes to have immediately or imminently or why we would modify that actually. I'm just kind of thinking out loud. Yeah, that's fine. I'm reading it to an imminent threat is not merely, but then you're defining a word with a, what's that rule? You know what I mean? Right. You're like defining the word with your, defining the word with the same word. I repeated it. Yeah. I thought, would I heard, I'm sorry to just jump in Maxine without being. Actually I see Ken's hand up so. Yeah, yeah. So what line are you on Maxine that you're talking about? Yeah, so I'm on page four. Yeah. And on line seven. Okay. So the very last word of that on that line. Yeah. And so Chief Pete brought it up. I got you on that. I'm sorry. I'm just, I know that part. I was trying to find which line you were talking about because what kind of what Nader just said too. But I mean, I'm looking at line four and we have immediately caused death, which I mean, I think that's kind of what Nader was saying with intimate and immediately, right? So why wouldn't we, I guess what I'm saying is the immediately, why wouldn't that work? Oh, I think I, I think immediately would work. I believe I understood Nader to say, why don't we just repeat imminent up there? And what some of us were thinking is that we're trying to define imminent threat of death or seriously bodily injury. That answer, so. Yeah, well, kind of, but right down below that on line five is such or in the middle there, an intimate threat is not merely a fear. I mean, is that explaining it or am I totally misunderstanding that part? No, no, no, no, you're, you are correct. And that's the part that we're working in and whether or not the instantly confronted, whether or not that work, whether or not that's clear and whether or not it's consistent, also concerned whether or not it was consistent with, with case law. But why don't I let Selena jump in and maybe that will help. Oh, I was just gonna say that I was, I was persuaded by the combination of the police saying, we don't quite recognize that word instantly. And then, I think we did. And then I feel like we definitely heard Wilda and maybe some others say, yeah, that's just like a more consistent language with case law. So to me that combination of feedback just makes sense. Sorry, I'm here, I'm seeing my internet connection is unstable, so I'm probably dropping out some, but. No, okay, no, thank you. Patrick and then Kim will go back to you. I think that immediately definitely is a little more clear than instantly. If it was just for the sake of flow, I would use the word promptly, but then we have to ask if that's an appropriate word. That's my concern. Okay, no, thank you. Thank you. And again, immediately is, as Wilda said, legally is, you know, it's, it's something that is used within the law. So, and again, that's something that my understanding is that law enforcement would be trained to. So, can you, I don't know if that, if that clarified it or any thoughts or? Yeah, I mean, I'm still looking at, I like what Seymour just said too, but that's apparent intent to immediately cause death, immediately cause death. Apparent is not going to work there. What was that word that Seymour used? Or that complicated too much. So get that out of my mind. Yeah, I think, again, Patrick, correct me if I'm wrong, but Patrick too out of word, I forget it was promptly or whatever, but then said that he thought immediately worked and understood why. So when Celine cut out, what was the word she was using? Immediately, she based on the testimony that she heard from law enforcement and Will de Waite and others. She was saying that it immediately did sound like a logical amendment. Can I ask what coach is with that? Sure, yeah, coach is his hand up. Thank you. When I put on my technical hat, I would say I would towards others Will de Waite's explanation not only for terminology component, but listening to the testimony from all sides. One of the things that Commissioner Shirling mentioned was not creating new language that made it more difficult for the courts to process. You know, the judiciary component. So if we're using language that is already consistent with their thinking, it makes it easier to understand where we're headed. And I think that Commissioner Shirling was, you know, part of his explanation has to why certain things needed to happen in a reasonable process was to give the judiciary a chance to kind of be in line, or not so much in line, but understand how things are changing. So if we're using the same terms that the judicial system is used to hearing, we're not making the system more complicated. So I would support immediately. Great, thank you. Thank you. Kelly. I agree with the immediately. And hopefully this is not too problematic. But what about also, it said it must be immediately addressed and confronted. Because I think that, I mean, just the concept that you're addressing it before you're confronting, I don't know if that, it looks like it's more thoughtful in the process, just thought. Yeah, yeah, that's interesting. Yeah, so it'd be immediately addressed and confronted. Thank you. Folks think about that, same thumbs up. So again, straw poll in terms of making these changes on page four by changing instantly to immediately and reordering the address and confronted. Kelly, can you just read that back to me one more time, please? Sure, so let's see. Starting on line seven, but is one that from appearances must be immediately addressed and confronted. Yeah, I think that's okay. I think that's good. I think that's an improvement. Great, all right, thank you. Others? Okay, well. Good, flows nicely that way. Okay, great, I'm not hearing any big opposition. And I appreciate those of you who have said that you don't support the bill. I do appreciate you participating in this discussion. I do, I really do. Okay. Can I just clarify something? Yeah. I'm not saying something doesn't have to be changed. I'm not, I just, I'm not comfortable with everything in this bill. And I feel, I know something has to get done. I think it is being done. I agree, I agree with the governor's 10 point plan and all that stuff. And I just, one of my biggest fears is for lack of a better word, we're trying, we're not trying, we're rushing a bill into place that I am worried about more things consequences that may not happen. And I know on top of this that we have a serious situation with mental health in this. And that's about as, that's about as tactful as, not tactful, but that's about, I'm not politically correct. But diplomatic as I can say it, if that makes sense. All right. Now, I appreciate that. And, you know, having the effective date being pushed out for this, you know, for these standards, I am hoping, and the report I'm hoping will, will give time to see if those unintended consequences or concerns do, do in fact arise. So that's, so, but I do, I appreciate that. Okay. Let's see, the next thing I have. Okay, so also on page four in five, the definition of prohibited restraint. I think it was the attorney general's office that wanted the word may back in there. And the folks remember that putting the putting may back. You said he wanted that. I think the attorney, I think it was the attorney general's office that wanted the word may back in there. Martin, do you have, do you remember or Selena? It was, it was definitely Julio, but I also understand that the Senate judiciary wants to have that word back as well. I like that. Again, I think I'm okay with that one too. Now my connection's breaking up. Did you hear me? Yeah, thank you. Others? Thank you. I like that, because I think it's a little more encompassing. Yeah. Which is important, I think. And consistent with, more consistent with 219 too. Right, right. I think that's perhaps where they said it was, was coming from, or is coming from as well. Okay. Any objection? Not hearing any objection. Again, move on for now. All right. So in six, and this again, this is something that I'm gonna flag for Bryn, the attorney general's office did, means the conduct and decisions. Oh, and I think it was on line 17. So it's all facts known or reasonably available to the law enforcement officer. I think that was a suggestion of the attorney general's office. So I wanna ask Bryn in terms of case law, interpretation, what, you know, et cetera. I wanna hear her thinking on this. And, oh, there you are Bryn. I just saw your name. I think she just got on, just a second. Okay, all right, all right. Hi Bryn. Hi there. Thank you. Sorry, are you good to join us, or do you wanna, a little bit of a break or anything? I know you were in Senate judiciary probably just until this very minute. Yeah, well, I have had about 10 minutes that I was having a call with another legislator, but so I haven't been able to listen and I don't know how long you've been meeting. Okay, but can you join us now or do you need more time? Yeah, okay, I can join you now. Okay, great. So I have my ask Bryn list. And I can, so, so far we have straw poll, go for the next draft. We've decided to take section one out. Okay. And then page four, where we had a question regarding the word instantly. Yeah, we've decided to, for the next draft, change that to immediately. And then Representative Tully had a great suggestion that we all support, having it read immediately addressed and confronted. It just seems more logical you address something and is there any legal reason or why we wouldn't wanna flip those terms? No, I don't think so. That second sentence there does come from the California statute. So that term addressed and confronted doesn't really come straight from case law. So I think you could switch the order there without causing confusion. Okay, great, great. Thank you. And then same page in five, line 12, to put the May back in there. And then this is where we were. So under six, totality of the circumstances, I know there was, I believe it was the Attorney General's suggested after all facts known, or reasonably available to the law enforcement officer. Wondering what your thoughts on that if we, if it's included in that already, or if that's the standard already, or if we do need that language. Yeah, so that's a decision for the committee. I think that all of these analyses are gonna be done from the reasonable person standard or reasonable law enforcement officer in the same situation. And that reasonable person standard typically involves what facts person, the actual person knew or the person should have known if it's a reasonable person standard. So I think by including that, all facts reasonably available, you kind of narrow that point. You kind of put a finer point on that by explicitly saying it right in the language of totality of the circumstances. I think there is an argument to be made that since these analyses are done from a reasonable person standard, that's already going to be included. But it's up to the committee whether you want to, whether you wanna put that in there and make it abundantly clear that you also are looking at those facts that are reasonably available to the officer or essentially that the officer should have known, a reasonable officer should have known. Thank you. Committee thoughts? A lawyer won't chew that up. I mean, really use that in so many different angles so that they have a tendency to do. I realize that I'm in a room full of lawyers. No disrespect, Brynn. Not taken, but I'm not sure if that was a question for me or not. Direct it where whoever wants to answer it. I guess I like abundant clarity. And if you're clearer in the language, as I think Brynn has just suggested, if we put in that or reasonably available, that takes less arguments away from the lawyers having to make that argument that it should be included. So I mean, I'm for the abundant clarity of putting more reasonably available in there. And Brynn, you said that it would narrow. No, I didn't. I think I can use that word, but what I meant to say is just put a fine point on it that in this analysis of what the totality of the circumstances is, you want to make it abundantly clear that you want to include those facts that a reasonable officer should have known or facts that were reasonably available. Perhaps the officer didn't have them that should have had them because they were reasonably available. I think that's as the representative alone said, it just makes it abundantly clear that that should be a part of that analysis. Okay. And how does that differ from should have known, which we've talked about? I think that it's, it's not typically used in a totality of the circumstances analysis and case law that should have known it is used in other places like the reasonable person standard as you I think heard from the AG's office. So I do believe that that all facts reasonably available was the suggestion of the attorney general's office as sort of as a midpoint. Okay. And do you know if this was in the Senate or not in terms of concern either way or? I don't think that, so they didn't, this is, they didn't have this particular language in front of them in the previous draft. So I am not, I'm not sure where they would stand on this point. Okay. All right. Okay. So, but it's like put it in for the next draft unless I'm hearing any objections. Okay, great. Let's do that. All right. Okay. Page next one. Hi Barbara. Hello. Hi, how you doing? Thanks. Actually, your timing is great. We did vote to concur with the Senate. And so we'll, we'll get your vote, but yeah. So that's like a good, like a yes vote. Okay. So page five lines 10 and 11. I think my understanding is, is that the Senate had some concerns doing their discussion about that. They did their, I would not, I don't want to characterize the committee as a whole that there were members of the Senate Judiciary Committee that expressed some concerns about that language because of how it differs from the language that came over in the Senate version. If you remember, the Senate version of this language was in B five. And it talked about allowing law enforcement to use proportional force in order to effect an arrest of a person that law enforcement reasonably believed had committed a crime. So in essence, the language here in B two, although it's sort of based on that language from the Senate, it does appear to provide that law enforcement can use that proportional, reasonable and necessary force to achieve any other lawful law enforcement objective. So the concern expressed by the Senate was that it may indicate that law enforcement could use force on protest. I think the example that was raised was to clear protesters from the street, people who were peacefully protesting in the street. It would seem to allow officers to use force in those situations. That was just an example that was raised. Right, right. Yeah, and I also, my understanding of Walter White's testimony was that having that committed a crime, which in there is very important. And then the way I read it to put or achieve any other law enforcement, it almost negates the importance of committed a crime or they seem inconsistent to me. So I could see taking out or to achieve any other lawful law enforcement objective and then I'm not sure do we, I guess I would like your thoughts on while protecting the life and safety of all persons, whether we put that back in and just the sort of decision-making around that. Right, so one way to sort of capture more more law enforcement conduct apart from just in order to affect and arrest or prevent escape would be to include some language about protecting the life and safety of any person. So one way you might do that is to include that language either at the end or at the sort of near the beginning of the sentence. So provide the law enforcement officer shall only use the force objectively reasonable and necessary and proportional to protect the life and safety of any person or to affect and arrest prevent escape and et cetera. So that would be one way to include other types of law enforcement conduct. So can I ask maybe not or a question that if he has any examples of where you're not necessarily affecting an arrest or preventing escape where you might need to use force to protect safety or lives of others? Yeah, the thing that comes to mind for this specific example or this topic, years ago there was a person who was about to commit suicide on the Townsend Dam and they were quite literally walking towards the edge. Another trooper got there about 30 seconds before me and was able to restrain them, which was a use of force before they made it to the edge. And then we brought that person to the hospital. Another time that I can think of is when I had to wrestle with a person who was on acid and was having a really bad trip and was close to hurting the people who was in the house with them. So those are different circumstances where you might end up using force that where a crime isn't necessarily being committed. Yeah, so does that kind of answer your question? Yeah, I think that just suggests that we need to have some sort of language to cover that kind of situation. Yes. Ken, are you? Yeah, thank you. So I know what we're trying to do and I get it, but Martin just said the perfect words, some type of language to cover that situation. It seems like we're trying to cover, which I guess is our job, we're trying to cover every situation out there, but every situation is different. And that's what really concerns me a lot with this bill. Does that make sense? And everybody's quiet. Yeah, I understand, Martin. No, that makes sense. And that's why I think we're putting forth standards that number one are consistent with what case law says. I think we're actually clarifying some parts of what case law is in the Second Circuit in Vermont, which is the relevant case law. And we're keeping it broad enough so that it will cover all the situations. It will cover the situation. General enough, but it also is, it walks the line between being specific enough that we're putting forth standards that need to be followed. But it's general enough that once policy is put into place to implement this, we can cover all the, not all the imaginable situations. That's not possible, but I don't know if that made sense. But I think we've walked the line between getting too specific, which is why we backed off some of the things from the last draft is that we were perhaps getting a little too specific, but we wanna have these overarching standards put into place. Yeah, I understand that, but us sitting around the table or in this case behind our desk, I mean, I mean, Nader has just seen a lot of stuff, dealt with a lot of stuff. Law enforcement in general has spurred the moment and in most cases, they, I mean, it shows they do the best that they possibly can. They still have to protect themselves so they can protect others. Can I chime in with something? Sure, yeah. I think that I appreciate the points that Ken is bringing up. I think that when we're looking at the line or to achieve any other law enforcement objective, I'm thinking of the two different scenarios that I described, both of them are very different circumstances, but both of them, in my opinion, required some intervention that did involve force, even though no crime had been committed. You had one person who was suicidal and another person who was an excited delirium and was at risk, very serious risk of hurting, potentially hurting the other people in the house. So I, but I think that the line or to achieve any other law enforcement objective can serve as a catch-all for those scenarios which are different in nature, but involve law enforcement and the usage of force. Let me ask you a question, follow up, Nader. So would it capture if instead we shifted it to a protecting life and safety of others as opposed to the, or achieving the other lawful law enforcement objective? I mean, do we still capture what you're talking about? Because my concern is achieving any other lawful law enforcement objective, yet presumably a law enforcement officer is not going to use force when they're serving legal process, one of the things they're supposed to do. But that's one of the examples that I would think of or this moving protesters from one place to another. Unless there's a safety issue or an injury or life issue, it seems like we don't wanna have any kind of crack in the doorway to be using force there. So, but let me, you know, I'm sorry, I added to that question. My question bottom line is that instead of that language and having language along the lines of what Brynn stated as far as protecting life and safety of all persons. So I think I got your question. I mean, I think changing it to protecting life and safety of other persons will narrow it down a little. Drew Bloom would be a good person to ask about this, but I'm not certain. I think that it would narrow it down a little bit if you were to say to protect life and safety of other persons, whereas or to achieve any other law enforcement objectives. I'm thinking of drawing your firearm is technically a use of force, but it doesn't necessarily mean that you'll be using it. But I'm thinking of the circumstance where cops are executing a search warrant or an arrest warrant, and you have different officers in different areas with their firearms drawn in order to have different angles of views on the house or wherever they are. And having those firearms drawn can be considered a use of force. But I think, I suppose that could fall under what you're proposing actually, because it is in order to preserve the safety of the officers or potentially the civilians at the scene. So I don't know if that answers your question. I'm just kind of... Well, I guess I want to, because you have experience in this, in this particular provision can go directly to what you've experienced and such to understand what you think is the better route, even though the Senate doesn't like that language, if you feel that going to the protecting life and safety is not going to cover the situations where it's appropriate to use force. And I guess the other thing I would say in response, I don't want to base what our decisions are in the house judiciary on a Senate example that they raise that, oh, this might be too broad. I mean, like we can walk through a couple, we can walk through that example. Would it be objectively reasonable to be using force of any sort to push people off of, if they're protesting, and you want to move them from point A to point B? You may have a legitimate lawful, you may have a lawful reason for doing that. Actually, I'm not even sure if you have a lawful reason for doing that, but my legal process example, and would it be objectively reasonable for law enforcement officer to pull out the gun when they're going and knocking on a door to deliver a warrant, whatever, when there's no reason to think that there's any kind of danger? Yeah, I'm just trying to ponder this, that is it really a false concern on getting rid of the or to achieve any other lawful law enforcement objective? One other thing, and this is a question for, ponder that a little bit, but this is a question for Bryn, I seem to recall that that language of achieve any other lawful law enforcement objective is something that one finds in case law as well as a standard that they look at for when force can be used. Am I misremembering that? No, that's, I think you're right about that, that pieces look to whether or not law enforcement use of force was reasonable when law enforcement is carrying out any of their lawful objectives. I think the safety of others would be one of the law purpose for law enforcement as well. I'm not sure if that was a follow up question for me. Yeah, maybe that was a rhetorical question, or but I guess it is a question, question. I may have some internet connectivity issues because I didn't hear it, I'm sorry. No, I was just saying that I would assume that protecting the life and safety of others is a lawful law enforcement objective. Yes, yes it is, sorry about that. That's okay. And does the use of while protecting life and safety of all persons, does that in fact narrow this more than if we were to leave in, or to achieve any other lawful law enforcement objective? I think so. I think it narrows it slightly. I mean, I think you, there is a, you could make an argument even that, in the example raised by the senator about moving protesters that that, you know, that could also be protecting the safety of any person if you're clearing them from the street. So I don't think it narrows it significantly. I think it does narrow it however. I hope you can hear me, cause- Yeah, yeah. Okay. Well, why don't we, why don't we put this to the side for now? Cause it seems like maybe I need some more, more thinking, but not her. Think a little bit unless, unless anybody wants to say it, say it was, you know, things to go another way. All right, Brianna, I realized that I, yeah. All right, I can get, like sometimes it's hard to get to the blue. Okay. Clean up. Yeah, I think it makes sense to put it to the side, but I would say I, my impulse is to try to narrow it a bit. I think, I think the Senate's concerns is where does it, express them resonate with me on that. Yeah, I can appreciate that. All right, let's, let's flag that, come back to it. I want to work for a little bit more and then we'll take a break. Brianna, I forgot to ask you about on page three, line 17 talks about force means of physical coercion and employed by law enforcement. The attorney general's office was thinking maybe it was vague. It wasn't sure if it includes a threat. It's wondering what you're, we're thinking if in fact this could include a threat or do we need to put the word threat in there? I think that physical coercion is broad enough to encompass threats. I wouldn't disagree that it's not entirely clear if threats are included, but I think the way it's written, I would read it to include threats, but again, if you want it to include threats explicitly, I don't think there'd be anything wrong with adding some language that would explicitly encompass physical threats. Anybody want to putting it in there or threat? Yeah, I couldn't hear you, did you say is anyone opposed to putting it in there or does anyone want to put it in there? Opposed. No. I guess I would need a little more explanation as far as the ramifications of the change, some intended or unintended consequences, I guess I'd like to hear about. Corinne. So the word force is used in that section we were just talking about in B2. So it talks about when law enforcement is authorized to use force. So if you're contemplating that definition of force to include some kind of threat, for example, drawing a weapon or perhaps using a law enforcement canine, so not actually making physical contact with a person but threatening physical contact. The question is really do you want to make it clear that you're encompassing that kind of force as well? And as I just said, I think that physical coercion implies that it includes threatened force, but I think the question before you now is whether or not you want to add some language to make it explicitly clear that you are including physical threats in the definition. So to me, being the layperson, if a police officer has a gun on his side, could that be interpreted as a physical threat just like the dog would be? I mean, it's just another tool. Right, I think you have heard some testimony from law enforcement that just the presence of a law enforcement officer in a room can be perceived as a threat. Again, I don't think that physical coercion, I don't read physical coercion to include just the actual presence of a law enforcement officer, but you have heard some testimony that conceivably it could. So I think that the question is really, how explicit do you want to be in the definition? Right, so again, a little clarification. So the way it's written now is broad and this would narrow it, is that right? I don't think that's the intent, I think it's to clarify it, right, Bryn? Yeah, I do think it would offer some clarification to make it abundantly clear that you're including threats as a part of physical coercion. I don't necessarily think it would narrow it because as I said earlier, I think that physical coercion could be interpreted to be broad enough to encompass. Right, so that could potentially just be an interpretation by the person who's being investigated, right? Can you, will you clarify that question for me? Is that a question for me? Yeah, yeah, I'll try. So depending on a situation, whether it's a, I don't know if the term is billy club or not, but a taser or a gun or a dog, in some situations, some, I guess depending on the person because everybody's different, some may not take that as a threat, I guess, but others might. And it just potentially could be confusing, I guess. I don't know if that clarifies it or not, but. Right, so you're thinking about like the subject, subjectively what might a subject think is a threat? Yeah. Right, so, you know, that may be a factor that would lead the committee to think that it might be appropriate to add some more language there to make it clearer to law enforcement what it means, what the use of force actually means in the context of carrying out their duties. Okay, Kevin, with something real quick. Yeah. The presence of police officers and canines as has been brought up is something that cops are told to take into consideration. And it's also something that, you know, I work with defense lawyers now and that that's also something we take into consideration is, you know, if you're a suspect sitting in a room with one officer and they're asking you to wave Miranda, that's not exactly a coercive scenario, but I've also seen footage of a person who was on the side of the road who just got yelled at by three cops as well as a canine. And then they're trying to get consent to search the vehicle. That can be considered coercive, but you have to look at the totality of the circumstances and what a reasonable person would think. You know, if a reasonable person is surrounded by three cops and a canine and one of the cops just yelled at you to try to get your voluntary consent to search a vehicle, that can probably be considered a coercive scenario. But if you're in a room with one cop, one suspect and they're trying to get you to wave Miranda, not exactly coercive. So Nader, what do you think about putting the word threat in here? That was, can you just, I got a little bit lost on exactly what page we're on right now, can you? So page three, line 17, it says, right now it says, force means the physical coercion implied by a law enforcement officer to compel a person's compliance with the officer's instructions. So the question is, should we say physical coercion or threat? Brenda's saying she thinks that threat is included here, but we also could put it in if we wanted to make it abundantly clear that it is included. Yeah, I don't know if it's entirely necessary. My instinct is to defer to case law as it relates to that, but I know that it's entirely necessary to, I think it would be redundant if we included the word threat, I think it covers it. Okay, so I'm gonna see, let's hear from Ken. Ken? Did I just hear, I hope I can ask this question, did I just hear Nodder say that he's working for defense attorneys now? Yep, about a year and a half now. Is that new? It is to me. Welcome. So that's not where I'm going, don't get nervous. So it just gives me a new perspective of a different way of looking, more of an open mind to look at things. That's not a bad thing, I just wanted clarification. Thanks. Okay. Okay, thank you, so let's not add the word threat then. Okay, so in terms of my list, so page five or we'll come back to that, we'll leave it as it is now. And come back to that. So page seven, I think this is where yesterday we were talking with Will, where there was language that was proposed, that she really felt like if that was in there, that would be a win, I believe that was her testimony. Bryn, do we have, I know we have it somewhere. It would be under my name yesterday online on the website. Okay. Does anybody have it right in front of them to read it while I? I do. Yeah. And representable alone will correct me if this is wrong, but what I have is that it would fall under subdivision B five and it would be one. Right, so basically B, right, so right now B five results, page six is out, and then okay, page seven, so it would go, right? So if you're looking at draft 3.5, it would be that language in yellow at the top of page seven. That's where, so it wouldn't be actually that language, it would be the substitute language proposed yesterday. Yeah. So it would read when a law enforcement officer knows or reasonably should know that a subject's conduct is the result of a medical condition, mental impairment, developmental disability, physical limitation, language barrier, drug or alcohol impairment, or other factor beyond the subject's control. The officer shall take that information into account and determining the amount of force appropriate to use on the subject if any. So let me just jump in real quick because that language is slightly different from what I had posted yesterday. And it adds that or reasonably should know. And my understanding is that that was something, Brenda, you can correct me if I'm wrong, that the Senate looked at this language and wanted to add the language or reasonably should know, which I certainly accept as proposing this as an amendment to that. Okay, and so that, so lines for what you just read, lines four through nine that I'm looking at would also come out. Right, that would replace the language on. Okay, lines four through nine. Okay, folks wanna hear it again? That would be great. Again, yeah, so should know it. So yeah, Brenda, go ahead. So I'll read it with that should have known language then. And where exactly are we in the 3.5? We're at the top of page seven. There's language that's in yellow on lines four through nine at the top of page seven, that what I'm about to read would be substitute language for those lines nine through 12, or I'm sorry, four through nine. So instead of saying a law enforcement's failure, it would say when a law enforcement officer knows or reasonably should know that a subject's conduct is the result of, and then there's that list of factors, medical condition, mental impairment, developmental disability, physical limitation, language barrier, drug or alcohol impairment, or other factor beyond the subject's control, the officer shall take that information into account in determining the amount of force appropriate to use on the subject, if any. And then the should, I'm sorry, the should have known language. Right, so that's, that would be in the first part of the sentence. And that was, I believe that representable alone is correct, that there was some conversation in the Senate when representable alone presented that substitute language to the senators. There was a desire on their part to include that reasonably should know clause as well. Okay, all right, well, I again, I know that we had compelling testimony from Will DeWyte on this section. This is very important. So I think that along with the should have known language, I would like to see that that substitution here. Maxine should have known replacing the officer's failure to take into account. So I don't have that. I don't have the language in front of me. So I'm trying to remember while looking at the 3.5. Yeah, so Bryn, do you want to read it again or tell us again? Bryn, could you also, could you email just that language to Lori so she can post it so folks can see it as well? I'm running out of devices here. And I can send it to everyone's email as well. So that would be helpful. Sure, thank you. Yeah, great. Thank you. So this is going to be on a or law enforcement has prior history on that. Ken, I don't know if anyone else can hear you. Correct. Ken, we missed about three quarters of that. Ken, can you turn off your video and maybe that'll work a little better. You were breaking up. Just see how I already did that. So this is on a reoccurring situation with law enforcement that has passed history with this subject, correct? That's really what you're dealing with for this part. Bryn, so I don't think so, not necessarily because it provides that if law enforcement knew or they reasonably should have known that one of these factors was responsible for the subject's conduct, then the law enforcement that essentially imposes a duty that the law enforcement officer has to consider that information and deciding whether or not to use force. And if so, what amount of force to use? So it again imposes that reasonable law enforcement officer standard. So even if the law enforcement officer doesn't have a prior history with these kind of factors, if a reasonable person should have known that one of these factors was present and responsible for the subject's conduct and then it does impose that duty on law enforcement to consider that information and determining whether or not to use force. So again, we're right back to where law enforcement is supposed to make a split decision about what's reasonable and what's not. And I know I'm treading on gray area, but sometimes there's no time for that split second reaction to for protection of everyone. And that's what concerns me. So just to make clear, I think that the bill and the standards here and Brent can interject on this. If there's only a split second to make that kind of decision, the law enforcement officer can make that decision and should make that decision, but it accounts for other situations where there's plenty of time, like the Grenin situation. There's a case that at the end of May in the second circuit, not second surface. Apologize for that second circuit. We do say the ninth circuit actually, but any event that the, in that situation during the course of an hour, over an hour, it became very clear the individual had mental health crisis happening and was not a danger to anybody. So it doesn't prevent Ken, I don't think. I'm quite sure. Again, Brent can comment on this. It's the totality of the circumstances, which definitely includes timing, definitely from the perspective of law enforcement officer. And if they come upon a situation and the person has a gun and the law enforcement has a split second, they don't have to ponder whether the behavior of the individual is because of any kind of impairment when the gun is pointed at them. It's simply not providing or requiring that in this bill. Right. Brent, did you want to add anything or? I was just gonna say, I think that's a good explanation of the context here and all of these decisions are, all these factors are being evaluated in the totality of the circumstances. So that's an important point to remember. Okay, great. So for the next draft, I'd like to have this substitute language is folks good. Not hearing any objections. Okay, we're getting there, at least for my list. Okay, the next one I have on page eight. My understanding is that there was concern, let's see line 14 with the word surrenders. So law enforcement officer shall cease these deadly force as soon as the subject surrender or no longer poses an imminent danger of death or seriously bodily injury to the officer. Brent, any help us with that one? Let me just interject real quickly, Maxine, if I could. In the document that's posted under my name today, has the alternative language that Brent is gonna be pointing to, I believe that she provided to me at my request to address this particular issue on that paragraph three. So posted today and it's, all right. Oh, it's with the report language maybe or? Yeah, it's in the same document, but it's at the bottom of that document. All right, so law enforcement officer shall cease these, no longer poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. Yeah, so thank you for that introduction there. So I just sort of reworded the section a little bit to try and address the concerns that were raised in the Senate committee meeting and also to address a concern that I think the Attorney General's office raised about there being some different words in this section that may or that there was a possibility that they could conflict with the actual standard set out in C1. So I just changed some of the wording to, so it provides that law enforcement has to stop using deadly force as soon as the person is under the officer's control or no longer poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. So that language corresponds more closely to the actual standard for the use of deadly force in C1B. It uses that same more closely aligned language there. Yeah, that's good. Can I ask a follow up question on that? So the concern, and I don't think you were in the committee at the time when it was raised by William Thompson, I don't think the concern was that it was inconsistent particularly with C1B that in the language is a little bit different, but can you comment on whether somehow this new, the subsection C3 doesn't apply or does apply to C1B, the fleeing felon situation? Right, so I mean, I think that this new language corresponds a little bit more closely with that, with C1B. So again, just as a reminder, what the standard does is allow law enforcement to use deadly force in those two situations, either to defend against an imminent risk or an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer, to another person or to apprehend a fleeing person for any felony. And then there's those additional criteria that have to be met, like the felony has to have threatened or resulted in death or serious bodily injury. And the officer also has to believe that the subject would cause death or serious bodily injury if they weren't immediately apprehended. So I think that the way it's redrafted here is intended to encompass both A and B. So once the person is under control, the control of the officer, I think that would apply in C1B, then the officer can't use deadly force any longer, they have to stop their use of deadly force or as soon as the person no longer poses that imminent threat as provided in C1A, then the officer has to stop the use of deadly force. Does that answer your question? Yeah, and Selena has a question. I just wondered, Bryn, if you could read us, again, the proposed change just to this language, just trying to catch a little. So it's largely similar. So it starts a law enforcement officer, shall cease the use of deadly force as soon as the subject is under the officer's control or no longer poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to another person. Oh, hey, thank you. Yeah, and again, it's posted as part of section five. Well, I mean, it's posted under the report language as well. So it's there. There's really only a couple of words that have changed if you're looking at the language in 3.5. So it says as soon as the subject surrenders in draft 3.5 on line 14 of page eight. So that word surrenders has changed to under the officer's control or no longer poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury as opposed to an imminent danger because then we're corresponding more closely to the standard set forth in C1. Thank you, Barbara. Thank you. Okay, so under the part about under the officer's control, is it the person that we want under the officer's control or the situation is under control? I mean, I just went at under an officer's control that just seems, I mean, and it's important that it's or. So if they're no longer a threat, then that shouldn't matter, but it just sits with me funny. And I'm wondering if that's maybe it's just me, but I wanted to see if we really mean the person is under the officer's control or something else. So it does refer, I don't know if that's a question for me or for the committee, but I would just say it does refer to the subject, the subject under the officer's control. And I think that the reason it's written that way is because of the standard as it set forth in C1B, which is to apprehend that fleeing person because there are those criteria for when deadly force is authorized to apprehend a fleeing person. And you can find that language in C1B. The person has to have committed a felony, a violent felony and the officer has to reasonably believe that the person will cause death or serious bodily injury if they're not immediately apprehended. So then aren't saying they've been apprehended? Is that the same thing as under control? I think that, no, I don't necessarily. All right. I think apprehended often means that the person is placed under arrest. So the person may not be handcuffed yet. Representative Hashim can correct me if I'm wrong, but I would read apprehended as actually arrested and under control may be prior to arrest. Okay. I just was worried about how submissive under control might be. And again, I might be off base here. Okay. Tom. Thank you. Yeah, I was gonna kind of defer to Nader on that also because it just seems to me that there could be different levels of under control. Telling somebody to sit down maybe one level of under control and another level maybe wrestling with them and getting them in handcuffs, I guess. But I guess I would like to hear Nader's perspective on that. First half of this, somebody was ringing my doorbell to drop off a package. So I missed part of the conversation, but is your question, can you repeat your question for me? Yeah, I guess, I think you're, are you talking to me? I assume. Or, I mean, yes, if you were. Yeah, I guess examples or definition of under control because to me it seems like it could have a, be a pretty big umbrella, I guess. And the examples that I used is you potentially could have somebody under control just by, you know, telling him to go sit over on the curb that to me that would be a type of being under control or to get somebody under control maybe wrestling with them and getting them in handcuffs. And that ends with a question mark. Yeah, I mean, you, you know, you have verbal commands in which you can tell someone or order someone to sit down and then you speak with them for a while and they start calming down if they're in some sort of excited state prior to that. And the issue with those verbal commands, whether they're orders or you're asking someone to do something, that can be form of control. Just as wrestling with someone and putting them in handcuffs is also a form of control. Okay. Great, thank you. Ken. So going back to what Barbara was saying about an officer has control or I believe that's what she said, somebody has to have control and it's going to be the officer that's trying to get the situation under control. So why would that be questionable if I understood what she was saying correctly? Can I answer that? I hope so. Sure. Okay. So many times we're all under our own self-control and the situation is under control. So I don't know. All right, well, let's keep moving. Okay, so we've got that language. You know, everybody is tired, but we're close. So the next note that I have is on page nine, line eight and let's see. Brin, can you help me? I guess it's maybe the last sentence we were talking about emitting and I don't know if we do this now or we go on to section three or if you can refresh my memory on the issue here. Sure. So there was in the Senate hearing about draft 3.5 yesterday there was some concern that was raised about subdivision C8 as the committee sort of got stuck on this section and in connection with this, there's the language here in C8 about law enforcement's right to self-defense, raise the self-defense, defense under common law or justifiable homicide. There's some additional language on page 10, which is in the next section, section three, the prohibited restraint crime. These are the two areas of the Senate have some concern. So I can talk a little bit about how I floated an idea to the Senate about some different language there. Would you like me to talk about that? Sure, thank you. Okay. So the way C8 is drafted now is it provides law enforcement doesn't lose the right to self-defense if they use deadly force in compliance with C1 through C4. So those are the standards that are set out that refer to the standards for use of deadly force in C1. C2 is sort of the description of the word necessary in the context of the use of deadly force. C3 is the section we were just talking about ceasing the use of deadly force once the subject is under the officer's control or there's no longer an imminent threat to the officer or to anyone else. And then C4 is that the law enforcement officer can't use deadly force against somebody who only poses a threat to themselves and not to another person. So essentially what the way this section is crafted is it says that law enforcement isn't going to lose their right to self-defense as long as that use of force was in compliance with those specific subdivisions. And you'll note it doesn't include the subdivisions, for example, about prohibited restraint. So I think the idea here was to provide that if the law enforcement officer does use a prohibited restraint, but that the use of that restraint is in compliance with C1 through C4, then they would not lose their right to common law self-defense or raising a justifiable homicide defense. So because the Senate got hung up on this language a little bit, I floated the idea of instead putting a specific directive in the justifiable homicide statute. So it might be a little bit tricky to talk about that without the statute in front of you. But essentially you do have it in the bill in draft 3.5, you have that justifiable homicide statute in section five on page 11. So what draft 3.5 does is in on lines 15 and 16 of page 11 is recraft that subdivision three that provides the justifiable homicide defense for law enforcement. And it says as long as law enforcement use force or deadly force in compliance with the standard, that whole standard in section two of the bill right now, then they shall be guiltless under the justifiable homicide statute. So the other, the way I floated to the Senate, the other way you could do this essentially achieve the same objective is to provide that law enforcement who uses force and compliance with subdivision B2 of the standard or deadly force in compliance with subdivision C1 of the standard could raise the justifiable homicide defense. So that way it sort of leaves out that prohibition on prohibited restraints. So I know that's a little complicated especially when you don't have the language right in front of you. I'm sorry about that. So, and then the subsection eight would be deleted, right? On page nine, subsection eight. So this is in lieu of that, right? That would replace that subdivision eight exactly. Again, this is not, so, this is just a suggestion. Can I just step up, Maxine, just to one step higher level on this question because it's gonna take into account a couple other possible changes I understand from the Senate. And that's really my understanding with respect to prohibited restraint. What we want to do is make sure that a law enforcement officer who is in a situation where it's really being used for self-defense, it's being used in a situation where there's deadly force is justified. That in fact, that law enforcement officer, presumably the prosecutor would not even charge a law enforcement officer with homicide under the, or with the prohibited restraint crime if in fact that's the case. And I think that we've wanted to, I think there's been an interest certainly in ensuring that that situation is covered. And it's been a matter of how do we cover that without twisting ourselves into a pretzel. So I think that this is the idea of how to cover that is to, you know, we've tried this paragraph eight, which was awkward and I guess once the Senate started pointing that out, I can see that it's awkward. We've provided it in this new page 10 subsection C, that new section, which frankly, I think is a little awkward and I think it's also unnecessary. And let me, this is not an argument we've heard, but let me throw it out there because it's kind of the broad subject that's kind of is really the last one we have, I think here. It's awkward because there are other crimes including assaults, aggravated assault, homicide, et cetera. And none of those in those statutes or in those offenses do they talk about what the defense is. You know, the defense is under the justified homicide statute currently or it's under common law. So it's a little odd that in this one instance, we're putting a defense in here that is available but it's available in the appropriate place which is in the justified homicide statute, which we would be amending as Bryn suggested as well as the common law defense. So I think, you know, as I understand it, getting rid of paragraph eight and then frankly, getting rid of all of the changes that we have in subsection three, the law enforcement use of prohibited restraint by eliminating that, meaning that we're just keeping what we passed in 219. And then this change that Bryn has talked about in the justifiable homicide, that gives law enforcement the coverage that presumably prosecutors will look at in the first instance on whether to even charge such a crime. So that kind of encompasses a lot of the changes but I do have one comment though when we get to it as far as what your proposal is as well Bryn, but I kind of will leave that out there and see if I've made any sense whatsoever on what we're trying to do here. Right, and so Martin in terms of, so the, if we go that way, the entirety of section three, right, would come out and I know that ACLU in terms of section three, the testimony from ACLU and AG's office, I think they all said, you know, in or out, it didn't matter. So I think if we do take three out, it will be consistent with the testimony that we heard. And then I think it does clarify that that defense is still there. And that's important, you know, my understanding that's important to law enforcement. So Bryn, did I get that right? You did. And, you know, I think that you and I had that conversation earlier that typically we, as a general matter legislative council doesn't like to specifically refer to defenses in one statute and not another because then it may get confusing about why you're not explicitly providing that a person has access to the common law and the defense of self-defense and other assault statutes, for example. So the one comment I would have as far as your proposal on, that's not your proposal, you don't propose anything, but you floated this to try to deal with the Senate's issue is I think for 2368 on page 11, line 16, I think it's a little too narrow to say just for deadly force pointing to C1. I think at a minimum, one needs to point to C1 and two or maybe even C1 through four because, you know, it's not, you know, the standard is further delineated in the paragraph that talks about what necessary means and also the situation as far as dealing with somebody who's only a danger to themselves, et cetera. So is there a reason not to extend it to C1 to four for the deadly force? No, I don't think that there is. If, you know, again, it's up to the committee what particular aspects of the policy you would want or the standard you would want to include it. I named C1 because that's sort of the standard for the use of deadly force. But again, you're right that the other, the two, three and four provide some more particulars to that standard. And it would just be a policy committee whether or not to leave out the other portion. Policy decision, sorry. Right. Maybe I'm looking at the time and we actually need to make sure that we, you know, around quarter of 10 of we get on the floor and then we haven't had a break. So what I'm gonna, so two things I just checked with the speaker. What I'm gonna suggest is I'm gonna just quickly because we're very close, finish up, ask Bryn to do another, to do the next draft to get it to us. And then can folks come in tomorrow morning from 830 to 915 to review it and vote as opposed to asking for, you know, leave from the house and, yes. All right, okay. So let's, so a few things back on, you know, that language that we're talking about that we've put to the side, let's just leave it as is the, you know, law enforcement purposes, whatever. Go with what Nodder was more comfortable with. We were talking about now take out eight and then all of section three and then add in the, sorry, I was talking to the speaker. So I'm not sure where we landed in terms of C124 or whatever, but it sounded like there was a recommendation there. And so then, let's see. So then Bryn, that would, that would be, let's see, so section, yeah, I don't think I had anything on section four. I think section four needs to be deleted. Deleted, okay, all right, got it. Thank you, okay. Just for consistency with the other changes. Right, okay. And so then Bryn, you would grab all the repeals and all of that stuff, right? I mean, I'm not going to go into that now, but that stuff would have to be changed. The repeals would stay in, but it sounds like you may want to change the effective date as well. I'm not sure if you, if you didn't want to change the effective date right now, you have it set to take effect on September 1st of next year. Right, I think earlier we talked about having this report that has been posted and then maybe do, maybe in July, is that, am I right? I mean, I floated that as an idea. I don't think others pushed back one way or another on that. Okay. No, it seemed fine. Otherwise we would have. Okay. Okay. So one real quick thing, Maxie, is in deleting section three, also section seven would on page 12 would have to be deleted as well. I don't know if Bryn knows that, but just to flag that for everybody else. The only reason why section seven is in there is because we were changing the prohibitive restraint crime and from 219 and there's a technical reason that I don't understand, but that we had to have that in there if we were going to be going back and modifying that. Yeah. Yeah. Nader? One thing I wanted to revisit that I heard in the current version or not, but the topic of using force on someone if they only pose a threat to themselves, is that still in this version? Page eight, line four. I mean, paragraph four, line 16 to 20. Deadly force, not just other force. That's just deadly force, right? Just wanted some clarity there. Thank you. Okay. Okay. So Bryn, do you have what you need from us? I do. Okay. And so, yeah. So I think we're gonna be on the floor for a long time, which is why I'm not recommending coming back later. Yeah, I suppose we can see how it goes and Tommy and I can kind of check in with each other to see if we can go come back as a committee, but let's hold on to 830 to 830 to 930 tomorrow and Bryn, when you do have a draft, if you could send it to the committee to take a look at, that would be great and I understand that, like other times it won't be edited and that before, but that way and every, you know, take a look and, you know, with any questions, sorry. Oh, I guess I'd never ask this question. Is there a difference between a clean copy and a new draft at this point? And I realize it won't be proof read, so there could be, you know, some very minor stuff in it, but I guess I would like as clean a copy as possible and I don't know if you could give us or give me because I'm the one that's asking, I guess. It's a timeline of when do you think that might happen, Bryn? I can get it out probably within the next 30 minutes. Oh, okay, yeah. So, not that I was pushing, it was just inquiring. When you say a clean copy, typically I put the changes between the versions and yellow highlight. Is that something that the committees would like to see or are you hoping to have just a clean draft without any highlighting? I would like a changes versus what we got over from the Senate because I think that's what's most relevant at this point. Oh, an updated side-by-side? No, not even updated side-by-side, but any changes that we made in the previous versions of my proposed amendments, I'd throw those out and it's only relevant, relative to what the Senate's version that we, because none of those proposals were adopted. So I'm sorry, Bryn Boyd. That would, I think that would require some annotation because you did a lot of moving things around as well. It's not just a straight highlighted differences. But so that would probably take a little bit longer. Well, I guess the question is what we would precisely vote on because we wouldn't vote on something that has a proposed amendment that we never adopted. I know myself, I would like a clean copy to vote on if that's possible. Right, so Tom, when you say clean copy, what do you mean by that? I guess just the language that we're voting on. Right, the actual language, no highlighting, just... Yeah, no highlighting, nothing. The bill as it's gonna be moved along but realizing that it may not have been proof read in some, you know, some commas and eyes, dot type things. Re-edited. Right, so for instance, right now on page six, all the language that's struck out in page six, that shouldn't be in this next version, right? Because that, right, okay, all right. Yeah, that's what I would assume, yeah. Right. Okay, all right. I knew that you ought to do this, Brent. It's just not what you could have said in my head. No, I wouldn't make sure everyone has what they need, so. Okay, great, and so, and Brent, you'll be available for folks to email if you have questions, right? And we'll all be on the floor. All right, and then that will give us more time to read it, have questions, talk to each other, whatever, and then come back tomorrow. Nader, do you have a, your hand is up? Okay, no, okay. All right, great, well thank you everybody. I'm sorry that we didn't get to have a break, but I do appreciate everybody's input. I think it's great work. The House Corrections did vote out the bill, and actually I think they put it on a bill that renamed one of the courthouses. I don't, I wanna get that correct, but anyway, I think it's a happy resolution. That's the bill with the commissioner's language? Yeah, yeah, and. That's a good one. Yeah, and I'm sorry, I'm just not seeing it, but somewhere in my text, I know that representatives found that committee was quite happy that they could do a strike all and put it on, so thank you. All right, see everybody soon. Thank you so much everybody. Great, and so I'll work with Lori to put the 830 to 930 tomorrow. Great.