 I think we will go back to Italy, probably, because it's a very important point. Of course, eight minutes, something like that, is very short and I will try to be as rapid as possible. First of all, we are speaking of a long-term, historic strategy project. The Euro area is part of the project. It's in certain aspect in economic, monetary and financial dimension the vanguard of the project at a certain moment. But the project itself is a very long term, started like Ashoka said in 50, if I take the Schumann speech, 68 years, and to judge to make an assessment of such a long-term, historic project, one has to take a little time. Like Schoenlai when asked what he thought of the French Revolution, saying, well, maybe it's a little bit too early to judge. So I will be very positive and I think that I can prove my points. First of all, when we started the Euro, skepticism was absolutely generalized. Had we had a conversation on that, I would have been told when you merge the Escudo, the Ratma very soon, the Pezzetta and the lira with good currencies, you cannot get a good currency. So that currency will necessarily be non-credible internationally and non-credible domestically. I don't want to stress too much the thing, but we delivered stability internationally. The Euro is approximately the same level as the dollar at the moment of its start. The domestic stability has been ensured. When I was myself president and when my predecessor was president, the main criticism in Europe was you will not deliver price stability. It was a very strong belief, by the way, not only externally but also in Europe that we would not deliver price stability. Nobody is challenging now that the Euro exists, that the Euro is a credible currency. Maybe too credible at a certain moment. I was accused myself of having too credible a currency and that the price stability was ensured. So we have already that in the past, but for me, for my predecessor and for my successor, it was still very, very challenging and demanding attitude coming crucially, I have to say, as regards domestic stability from large element, large fraction of public opinion in Europe. Second, resilience. We are speaking very negatively from time to time on a concept, the Euro area. For the currency, I already said that it proved resilience in the worst financial circumstances since World War II, could have been the worst financial circumstances since World War I. And what happened to the currency? As I already said, it hold and remain credible. What happened to the Euro area? We were 15 countries in the Euro area on September 15 when we had the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The 15 countries are still there for a concept which was prone to exploding. And I was told that by many of my friends in New York and Washington, clearly it's quite a success that all countries remain. But four new countries came in after Lehman Brothers, as you know. So we are 19 today and not 15. So more than one fourth more countries are in the concept. I don't insist on that, but it's probable that nobody in the room or very few persons in the room knew that we had four new countries coming in after Lehman Brothers, after the drama at the global level started. Popular support. We were told that there was no popular support for the Euro or that the division were augmenting considerably. I'm sorry to say that it's not the case at all, at least according to the survey that are public and the Euro barometer in particular, which is public. At the question, do you tend to trust the European Union? In the last survey published, 42% of the European Union repented, yes we trust. And there were only 34% for the national institutions. So the frustration of our people, the frustration of the so-called populist move, which of course is hitting all advanced economies, is hitting more the national institutions, national governments and parliament than the European institutions. It is never said. As regards the 10 not to trust, it's even more striking. It is 61%, 10 not to trust the national institutions and only 48 if I may. That is not very flattering. It's not flattering at all for the national institutions, not flattering for Europe and the European institutions. Still, it is not rejection of the Euro and of course I could not explain myself the resilience of the currency and the resilience of the concept of the Euro area if there were not strong popular support. As regards the Euro, the popular support is even more striking. There is the same question which is asked by the Euro barometer. Do you approve or disapprove the sentence a European EMU with one single currency in the area, the Euro? The response is 74% against 20%. Approve. In Germany 83% when a lot of my friends on the other side of the Atlantic were telling me the Germans are only waiting for leaving the Euro because of the Greek. In Greece also it is a very high level. It's approximately 70%, 69%. Even in Italy, which we mentioned we will discuss Italy again, 61% vis-à-vis 29%. So a very strong popular support, contrary to, I would say, common wisdom. Now economic success or not? Then I have to say refer to the IMF data mapper GDP per capita current prices. Since the beginning of the Euro, the standard of living per capita, I mean the GDP per capita in Europe grew more or less as fast as in the US. It's not very flattering because we should catch up the United States of America. But the common wisdom being that we are doing very, very poorly. I would like to mention that also, I could also elaborate, but maybe I have no sufficient time, that we did better than the UK, which is very often, I would say, presented as being very happy out of the Euro area. The catching up process is operating. And as regards divergences inside the Euro area, again, I will go back to a very good analysis made by the IMF, which is much more nuanced, of course, than what Ashoka said, taking into account the fact that on some criteria there has been some convergence. On other criteria, no, there is no real convergence, which would be visible. But we have to compare that also perhaps to the expectations. It's true that it was said the Euro will permit to operate a formidable rapprochement between the various countries member, including in terms of GDP per capita. I think it was overdone, personally. And I take the example of the United States. In the United States, the Mississippi is more lower than Massachusetts in terms of GDP per capita than Portugal and Greece vis-à-vis Germany. So it is true that even in a single currency area, by the way, in the case of the US, a 200-year single currency area, the idea that by construction you necessarily have the equalization of the standard of living is naive. And of course you get the equalization if you have very good governance at national level, which was not the case, obviously, and very good governance at the European single currency level. That being said, I will conclude on that. We were not passive in the circumstances. We engage in major structural changes under the heat of the crisis, not before, I fully agree with Ashoka, but in the heat of the crisis we created the Banking Union, we created the so-called macroeconomic imbalance procedure, which was overdue. We reinforced the stability growth pact with the fiscal compact. But to conclude, my dear President, we really did a lot. And a lot has to be achieved in this domain and in many others. I was myself the first, I think, to call for a minister of finance of the euro area. I think that we need much more democratic legitimacies in the euro area with the European Parliament in the euro area format, having the last word on some very important point, including disagreement between one particular country and the European institutions. And I take it that a budget could play also a role, also considering that vis-à-vis the United States, what is lacking in Europe is the absence of full-fledged Banking Union and full-fledged Capital Union, because it plays a more important role in the US in terms of transfers and stability and asymmetric shocks than the fiscal channel itself. Thank you.