 Section 40, being Chapter 10, Parts 10 and 11 of A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great, Volume 1 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For further information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great, Volume 1, by John Bagnell Bury. Chapter 10, Part 10, The Athenian Capture of Pylos. It was probably through the influence of Cleon that Demosthenes, though he received no official command, was sent to accompany the fleet of forty ships which was now ready to start for the West under Eurymiden and Sophocles. We have already seen this fleet at Corkira assisting the people against the oligarchical exiles who had established themselves on Mount Estoni. Demosthenes accompanied the expedition without any official command. He had a plan in his head for establishing a military post in the western Peloponnesus, and he was allowed to take advantage of the sailing of the fleet and use it according to his discretion. Arriving off the coast of Messenia, Demosthenes asked the commanders to put in at Pylos, but they had heard that the Peloponnesian fleet had already reached Corkira and demurred to any delay. But chance favoured the design of Demosthenes. Stress of weather drove them into the harbour of Pylos, and then Demosthenes pressed them to fortify the place. The task was easy, for the place was naturally strong, and there was an abundance of material, stone and timber at hand. The commanders ridiculed the idea. There are many other desert promontries in the Peloponnesus, they said, if you want to waste the money of the city. But the stormy weather detained the ships, the soldiers were idle, and at length for the sake of something to do, they adopted the project of Demosthenes and fell to the work of fortifying Pylos. The features of the scene, which was now to become illustrious by a striking military episode, must be clearly grasped. The high promontory of Pylos, or Corifassion, was on three sides encompassed by water. Once it had been an island, but at this time it was connected with the mainland on the north side by a low sandbar. If we go further back into prehistoric days, Pylos had been part of a continuous line of coast cliff. In this line three rents were made, which had meted the sea behind the cliff, and isolated the islands of Pylos and Sfacteria. Accumulation of sand gradually covered the most northern breach, and reunited Pylos with the mainland, but the other openings were never filled up, and Sfacteria still remains an island. Originally Pylos and Sfacteria, when they had been severed, formed the seawall of one great landlocked bay, but a curving sandbar has gradually been formed, which now joins the mainland with the southern extremity of Pylos, and secludes a small lagoon of which Pylos forms the western side. It is impossible to say whether the formation of this sandbar had perceptibly begun in the time of Demosthenes, but in any case it seems probable that it had not advanced so far as to hinder the waters behind Pylos from appearing to be part of a continuous bay. This north corner of the bay, now a marshy lagoon, was sheltered and afforded harbourage for ships. The rest of the bay, the modern bay of Navarino, had no good anchorage, but the whole sheet of water, by virtue of the northern corner, was called a harbour. It follows from what has been said that there were two entrances into the bay, the narrow water which divides Pylos from Sfacteria, and the wide passage which severs the southern point of Sfacteria from the opposite mainland. We must distinguish yet another smaller bay on the north side of the Pylos hill. The sandbar, which there connects Pylos with the mainland, is of lunar shape, and forms the little circular basin of Ufras, dominated by the height of Pylos on the south, and a far lower, nameless hill on the north. The length of Pylos is less than a mile. On the seaside it was hard to land, and the harbour side was strongly protected by steep cliffs. Only in three places was it found necessary to build walls. One at the south-east corner, where the cliffs sloped down to the channel for about a hundred yards. Two along the shore on the south-west side, close to the entrance to the bay, for four or five hundred yards. Three, the northern defence of the position consisted of a line of land cliffs, which required no artificial fortification, except at the western extremity, where they declined before they reached the sea. Here another wall was built. One of the soldiers present vividly described to Thucydides the manner in which the fortifications were wrought. Being unprovided with iron tools, they brought stones which they picked out and put them together as they happened to fit. If they required to use mortar, having no hods, they carried it on their backs, which they bent so as to form a resting place for it, clasping their hands behind them so that it might not fall off. In six days the work was finished and the fleet went on its way, leaving Demosthenes with five ships to hold Pylos. The Lacedymonian army under Agis had invaded Attica earlier than usual, before the corn was ripe. Want of food, wet weather, and then perhaps the news from Pylos, decided them to return to Sparta after a sojourn of only two weeks within the Attic borders. They did not proceed immediately to Pylos, but another body of Spartans was sent on. Requisitions for help were dispatched to the Peloponnesian allies, and the sixty ships at Corcyra were hastily summoned. These ships succeeded in eluding the notice of the Athenian fleet which had now reached Zarkintas. In the meantime Demosthenes, beset by the Spartan troops, sent two of his ships to overtake the fleet and beg Eurimidon to return to succor him. The object of the Lacedymonians was to blockade the hill of Pylos by land and sea, and to prevent Athenian suckers from landing. They probably established their camp on the north side of Pylos, so that no ships entering the bay of Bufras could bring help to the fort. They were moreover afraid that the Athenians might use the island of Svacteria as a basis for military operations, and accordingly Epitadas occupied Svacteria with 420 Spartans and their attendant helots. It would have been easy to block the narrow entrance to the bay between Pylos and the island, but there was little use in doing so, as the Athenian ships would be able to enter by the ingress at the south of the island, a passage about three-quarters of a mile wide, far too wide to block with so small a fleet. The Lacedymonians then prepared to attack the place before help could come to the Athenians. Demosthenes posted the greater part of his force to guard the northern line of defense and the southeastern corner, while he himself with sixty hoplites and some archers took his stand on the edge of the south-western shore, which though rocky and perilous, was the spot where the enemy had the best prospect of affecting a landing. Frasimelidas was the name of the Spartan admiral. He had forty-three ships, which he brought up in relays, the crews fighting and resting by turns. The great danger was that of running the vessels on reefs. Frasidas, who commanded one of the ships, was the leading spirit. Be not sparing of timber, he cried to those who seemed to draw back from the rocks. The enemy has built a fortress in your country. Perish the ships and force a landing. But in trying to disembark he was wounded and lost his shield. It was washed ashore and set up in the trophy, which the Athenians afterwards erected. The Spartan attack, which was renewed on two subsequent days, was repelled. It was a singular turn of fortune, says Thucydides, which drove the Athenians to repel the Lacedemonians, who were attacking them by sea from the Lacedemonian coast, and the Lacedemonians to fight for a landing on their own soil, now hostile to them in the face of the Athenians. For in those days it was the great glory of the Lacedemonians to be an inland people, distinguished for their military prowess, and of the Athenians to be a nation of sailors and the first naval power in Helas. The fleet from Zacanthus now augmented to 50 ships by some reinforcements at length arrived. But finding the shores of the bay of Bufras and the island of Svacteria occupied, they withdrew for the night to the Isle of Proti, which was some miles distant. The next morning they returned, determined to sail into the harbour if the enemy did not come out to meet them. The Lacedemonians were preparing their ships for action, evidently intending to fight in the bay. The Athenians therefore rode in by both entrances. Some of the enemy's vessels which were able to come out to meet them were captured, and a tremendous struggle ensued close to the shore. The Athenians were tying the empty beach ships to their own and endeavouring to drag them away. The Lacedemonians dashed into the sea and were pulling them back. The Lacedemonians knew that if they lost their ships, the party on the island of Svacteria would be cut off. Most of the empty ships were saved, but the fleet was so far damaged and outnumbered that the Athenians were able to blockade Svacteria. The interest of the story now passes from Pylos to Svacteria. The blockade of Demosthenes and his Athenians in Pylos by the Spartans has changed into a blockade of Epitadas and his Spartans in Svacteria by the Athenians. The tidings of this change in the situation caused grave alarm at Svater, and some of the efforts came themselves to see what measures could be taken. They decided that nothing could be done for the relief of the island, and obtained from the Athenian generals a truce for the purpose of sending ambassadors to Athens to ask for peace. The terms of this truce were as follows. The Lacedemonians shall deliver into the hands of the Athenians at Pylos the ships in which they fought, and shall also bring thither and deliver over any other ships of war which are in Laconia, and they shall make no assault upon the fort either by sea or land. The Athenians shall permit the Lacedemonians on the mainland to send to those on the island a fixed quantity of kneaded flour, vis, two attic courts of barley meal for each man, and a pint of wine, and also a piece of meat, for an attendant half these quantities. They shall send them into the island under the inspection of the Athenians, and no vessel shall sail in by stealth. The Athenians shall guard the island as before, but not land, and shall not attack the Peloponnesian forces by land or sea. If either party violate this agreement in any particular, however slight, the truce is to be at an end. The agreement is to last until the Lacedemonian ambassadors return from Athens, and the Athenians are to convey them thither, and bring them back in a triaring. When they return, the truce is to be at an end, and the Athenians are to restore the ships in the same condition in which they received them. In accordance with these terms sixty ships were handed over, and the ambassadors went to Athens. They professed the readiness of Sparta to make peace, and pleaded for generous treatment on the part of Athens. At heart most of the Athenians were probably desirous of peace, but the assembly was under the influence of Cleon, and he, as the opponent of Nikias and the peace party, urged the Athenians to propose terms which could hardly be accepted. It might seem indeed an exceptionally favourable moment to attempt to undo the humiliation of the thirty years peace, and win back some of the possessions which had been lost twenty years ago. Not only Nisia and Pagai, the harbours of the Magyarid, but Akia and Troizine were demanded as the purchase of the lives of the Spartans in Sacteria. The embassy returned to Pylos disappointed, and the truce came to an end. But the Athenians refused to give back the sixty ships, on the pretext of some slight infractions of the truce on the part of the Lacedimonians. The blockade proved a larger and more difficult matter than the Athenians had hoped. Reinforced by twenty more triremes from Athens, they lay round the island, both in the bay, and except when the wind was too high on the seaside, and two ships kept continually cruising round in opposite directions. But their vigilance was eluded, and Sacteria was secretly supplied with provisions. Large sums were offered to any who succeeded in conveying meal, wine, or cheese to the island, and helots, who did such service, were rewarded with freedom. When a strong wind from the west or north drove the Athenian ships into the bay, the daring crews of provision boats beat recklessly into the difficult landing places on the seaside. Moreover, some skillful divers managed to reach the shores of the island, drawing skins with poppy seed mixed with honey, and pounded linseed. But this device was soon discovered and prevented. And besides the difficulty of rendering the blockade complete in a high wind, the maintenance of it was extremely unpleasant. As there was no proper anchorage, the crews were obliged to take their meals on land by turns, generally in the south part of Sacteria, which was not occupied by the Spartans, and they depended for their supply of water on one well, which was in the Fort of Pylos. The supply of food was deficient, for it had to be conveyed round the Peloponnesus. At home the Athenians were disappointed at the protraction of the siege and grew impatient. They were sorry that they had declined the overtures of the Lacedimonians, and there was a reaction of feeling against Clion. That statesman took the bold course of denying the reports from Pylos and said, with a pointed allusion to the strategus Nicias, that if the generals were men, they would sail to the island and capture the garrison. If I were commander, he added, I would do it myself. The scene which follows is described in one of the rare passages, where the most reserved of all historians condescends to display a little political animosity. Seeing that the people were murmuring at Clion, Nicias stood up and offered, on the part of his colleagues, to give Clion any force he asked for and let him try. Clion, says to Sidides, at first imagined that the offer of Nicias was only a pretense and was willing to go, but finding that he was in earnest, he tried to back out, and said that not he, but Nicias, was general. He was now alarmed, for he never imagined that Nicias would go so far as to give up his place to him. Again Nicias bade him take the command of the expedition against Pylos, which he formally gave up to him in the presence of the assembly. And the more Clion declined the prophet command and tried to retract what he had said, so much the more the multitude, as their manner is, urged Nicias to resign, and shouted to Clion that he should sail. At length, not knowing how to escape from his own words, he undertook the expedition, and, coming forward, said that he was not afraid of the Lacedimonians, and that he would sail without withdrawing a single man from the city, if he were allowed to have the Lemnian and Imbrian forces now at Athens, the auxiliaries from Inus, who were targeteers, and 400 archers from other places. With these, and with the troops already at Pylos, he gave his word that he would either bring the Lacedimonians alive, or kill them on the spot. His vain words moved the Athenians to laughter. Nevertheless, the wiser sort of men were pleased, when they reflected, that of two good things they could not fail to obtain one. Either there would be an end of Clion, which they would have greatly preferred, or, if they were disappointed, he would put the Lacedimonians into their hands. The story is almost too good to be true, but whether Clion desired the command, or had it thrust upon him against his will, his words which moved the Athenians to laughter were fully approved by the event. He chose Demosthenes as his colleague, and invested with the command by a formal vote of the Assembly, he immediately set sail with special, light-armed troops. In the meantime, Demosthenes, wishing like Clion to bring matters to an issue, was meditating an attack upon Svacteria. This desert island is about two miles and three quarters long. At the northern extremity rises a height higher than the Acropolis of Pylos over against it, and on the east side descending a sheer cliff into the water of the bay. Some of the Spartans had naturally occupied the summit, but the chief encampment of their small force was in the centre of the island, close to the only well, and an outpost was set on a hill further to the south. An assault was difficult, not only because the landing places on both sides were bad, but because the island was covered with close bush, which gave the Spartans who knew the ground a great advantage. Demosthenes had experienced in Itolia the difficulties of fighting in a wood. But one day when some Athenians were taking their Noonday meal on the south shore of the island, the wood was accidentally kindled, and a wind arising the greater part of the bush was burnt. It was then possible to see more clearly the position and the numbers of the Lacedemonians, and when Clion arrived the plan of attack was matured. Embarking at night all their hoplites in a few ships, Clion and Demosthenes landed before dawn on the south of the island, partly on the seaside, and partly on the harbour side, near the spot where the Lacedemonians had their outpost. The whole number of troops that landed must have been nearly fourteen thousand, against which the Spartans had only four hundred and twenty hoplites, and perhaps as many helots. And yet a high military authority described the Athenian enterprise as mad. The truth seems to be that it could hardly have succeeded if the Spartan commander had disposed his forces to the best advantage, posting watches at all possible landing places, and organising a proper system of signals. The outpost was at once overpowered, and light armed troops advanced towards the main Spartan encampment, along a high ridge on the harbour side of the island. Others moved along the low shore on the seaside, so that when the main body of the Spartans saw their outpost cut to pieces, and began to move southward against the Athenian hoplites, they were harassed on either side by the archers and targetiers, whom, encumbered by their arms and in difficult ground, they were unable to pursue. And the attacks of these light armed troops, as they grew more fully conscious of their own superiority in numbers, and saw that their enemy was growing weary, became more formidable. Clouds of dust arose from the newly-burnt wood, so Thucydides reports the scene from the vivid description of an eyewitness, and there was no possibility of a man seeing what was before him, owing to the showers of arrows and stones, hurled by their assailants, which were flying amid the dust. And now the Lacedemonians began to be sorely distressed, for their felt curasses did not protect them against the arrows, and the points of the javelins broke off where they struck them. They were at their wit's end, not being able to see out of their eyes, or to hear the word of command, which was drowned by the cries of the enemy. Destruction was staring them in the face, and they had no means or hope of deliverance. At length it was determined that the only chance lay in retreating to the high hill at the north of the island. About a mile had to be traversed to the foot of the hill, but the ground was very difficult. The endurance and discipline of the Spartan soldiers was conspicuously displayed in this slow retreat, which was accomplished with but a small loss, under a burning sun, by men who were suffering from thirst and weary with the distress of an unequal battle. When they had reached and found the hill, the battle assumed another aspect. On the high ground no longer exposed to their flanks, and finding a defense in an old Cyclopean wall, which can still be traced around the summit, the Lassidimonians were able to repel their assailants, and they were determined not to surrender. At length the Messinian captain came to the Athenian generals, and said that he knew a path by which he thought he could take some light-armed troops round to the rear of the Spartans. The hill on its eastern side falls precipitously into the bay, but the fall is not direct. The summit slopes down into a hollow about 50 yards wide, and then the hill rises again into the cliff, which falls sheer into the water. But at the south end of the cliff, there is a narrow gorge by which it is possible to climb up into the hollow. Embarking in a boat on the eastern side of the island, the Messinians reached the foot of the gorge and climbed up with difficulty, unseen by the Spartans, who neglected what seemed an impracticable part of the hill, and then ascending the summit suddenly appeared above the Lassidimonians, who were ranged in a semicircle below on the western and northern slopes. The Athenians now invited the defenders to capitulate, and with the consent of their friends on the mainland, they laid down their arms. 292 of the 420 survived, and were brought to Athens. The high opinion, which the Greek world held of the Spartan spirit, was expressed in the universal amazement which was caused by this surrender. Men had thought that nothing could induce the Lassidimonians to give up their arms. Cleon had performed his promise. He brought back the captives within twenty days. The success was of political rather than military importance. The Athenians could indeed ravage Lassidimonian territory from Pylos, but it was a greater thing that they had in the prisoners a security against future invasions of Attica, and a means of making an advantageous peace when they chose. It was the most important success gained in the war, and it was a brilliant example of the valuable successes that can be gained, as it were, accidentally, in following that system of strategy which Pericles had laid down at the beginning of the war. This stroke of luck increased the influence of Cleon. It was necessary for Nikias to do something to maintain his reputation. Shortly afterwards he led an army into the Corinthian territory, gained a partial victory at Soligia, and then went on to the peninsula of Methoni, between Troizin and Epidaurus. He built a wall across the Isthmus and left a garrison in Methoni. In the following year he made the more important acquisition of the island of Kithara, from which he was able to make dissents upon Laconia. The loss of Kithara was in itself more serious for Sparta than the loss of Pylos, but owing to the attendant circumstances, the earlier event made far greater stir. The Athenians had now three bases of operation in the Peloponnesus, Pylos, Kithara, and Methoni. To none was the discomfort of the Spartans in Messenia sweeter than to the Messenian exiles who had borne their part in the work of that memorable day. At Olympia there is a figure of victory, hovering aloft in the air amid wind-blown drapery, while an eagle flies below her. It is the work of the sculptor Pionius, and it was dedicated by the Messenians in the Altis of Zeus with part of the spoil they stripped from the hated usurpers of their land. Section 11. Athenian Capture of Nisaya In each of the first seven years of the war Attica was invaded, except twice. On one occasion the attack on Platia had taken the place of the incursion into Attica, and on another the Peloponnesian army was hindered by earthquakes from advancing beyond the Isthmus. Every year, by way of reply, the Athenians invaded the Megurid twice, in spring and in autumn. The capture of Pylos affected both these annual events. The invasion of Attica was discontinued because Athens held the Spartan hostages, and the elation of the Athenians at their success induced them to undertake a bolder enterprise against Megura. Minoa, now a hill on the mainland, but then an island, lay at the entrance to the harbour of Nisaya. It was separated from Nisaya by a narrow channel, protected by two projecting towers. Nikias had destroyed these towers three years before, and had fortified Minoa, so as to blockade completely the port of Nisaya. The Megarians then depended entirely on the port of Pagai, and their communications with the Christian Gulf. They were hard-pressed, their distress was vividly portrayed in the comedy of the Akhanians, which was put on the stage two years later. The situation became almost intolerable when a domestic sedition led to the expulsion of a small party who seized Pagai and cut off Megura from importing food on that side too. It became a question between allowing the Exiles to return or submitting to Athens. Those who knew that the return of their rivals from Pagai would mean their own doom, open secret negotiations with Athens, and offered to betray Megura and Nisaya. The long walls and Nisaya were held by a Polyponetian garrison. The General's Hippocrates and Demosthenes organised the enterprise. While a force of 4,000 hoplites and 600 horse marched overland by Eleusis, the General sailed to Minoa. When night fell they crossed to the mainland. There was a gate in the eastern wall close to the spot where it joined the fortification of Nisaya, and near the gate there was a hollow out of which earth to make bricks had been dug. Here Hippocrates and 600 hoplites concealed themselves, while Demosthenes, with some light armed plateans, and a band of the youthful peripalloi or patrollers of Attica, took up a position still nearer the gate in the sacred enclosure of the war god Anualios. The conspirators had long matured their plan for admitting the Athenians, as no boat could openly leave the harbour owing to the occupation of Minoa, they had easily obtained permission of the commander of the Polyponetian garrison to carry out through this gate a small boat on a cart at night for the alleged purpose of privateering. They used to convey the boat to the sea along the ditch which surrounded Nisaya, and after a midnight row returned before dawn and re-entered the long walls by the same gate. This became a regular practice, so that they carried out the boat without exciting any suspicion on the night fixed for executing the conspiracy. When the boat returned the gate was opened and Demosthenes, who had been watching for the moment, leapt forward and forced his way in, assisted by the Magarians. They kept the gate open till Hippocrates arrived with his hoplites, and when these were inside the long walls were easily secured, the garrison retreating into Nisaya. In the morning the main body of the Athenians arrived. A scheme for the betrayal of Megara had been concerted. The conspirators urged their fellow citizens to sally forth and do battle with the Athenians. They had secretly arranged that the Athenians should rush in and had anointed themselves with oil as a mark by which they should be known and spared in the assault. But their political opponents, informed of the scheme, immediately rushed to the gates and declared decisively that they should not be opened. The battle would have to be first fought inside. The delay apprised the Athenians that their friends had been baffled, and they set about blockading Nisaya. Their energy was such that in two days the circumvalation was practically completed, and the garrison, in want of food, for their supplies were derived from Megara, capitulated. Thus the long walls which they had built themselves and the port of Nisaya had passed again into the hands of the Athenians. They were not, however, destined to take the city on the hill. The Spartan general Brassidas, who was recruiting in the north-east regions of the Peloponnesus for an expedition to Thrace, hastened to the relief of Megara, and was joined by forces from Corinth and Beotia, to whom the defence of Megara was vital. An indecisive skirmish took place. The Athenians did not care to risk a battle, and they resolved to be content with the acquisition of Nisaya. Soon afterwards there was a revolution in Megara. The exiles from Pagai were received back. They soon got the power into their hands and murdered their enemies. A narrow oligarchical constitution was established. The new order of things, says Thucydides, lasted a very long time, considering the small number of its authors. End of Part 11 Section 41 Being Chapter 10 Parts 12 and 13 of A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great Volume 1 Section 41 This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For further information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great Volume 1 by John Bagnell Bury Chapter 10 Part 12 Athens Fails in Beotia The recovery of Nisaya, which had been lost by the 30 years peace, was a solid success, and it seemed to the ambitious hopes of the two generals, who had achieved it, the first step in the recovery of all the former conquests of their city. Hippocrates and Demosthenes induced Athens to strive to win back what she had lost at Coronia, but Beotia was not like Megara, and an attempt on Beotia was an unwise reversion to the early continental policy of Pericles, which Pericles had himself definitely abandoned. The dream of a second Oinofita was far less likely to come true than the threat of a second Coronia, and the enterprise was a departure from the Periclean strategy of which Nikias was the chief exponent, and it is significant that Nikias took no part in it. Moreover, at this moment Athens, as we shall see, ought to have concentrated her forces on the defence of her Thracian possessions, which were in grave jeopardy. The Beotian, like the Megarian plan, was formed in concert with native Malcontents, who wished to overthrow the oligarchies in the cities to establish democratic governments, and probably dissolve the Beotian Confederacy. At this time the Confederacy was governed by eleven Beotax, four of whom were chosen by Thebes, and a federal council representing the various districts of Beotia, and divided into four panels. The new Beotian plan, in which Demosthenes was now concerned, did not involve such extensive operations and combinations as that which he had conceived when he invaded Itolia, but the two plans resembled each other in so far as each involved operations from the Chrysian Gulf. Demosthenes, having sailed to now Pactus and gathered a force of Achananians, was to go on to secure Sifai, the port of Thespii, on the shore of the promontory beneath Mount Helican. On the same day the Athenian army, under Hippocrates, was to enter Beotia on the northeast and seize the temple of Apollo at Delium, which stood on the seacoast over against the Lelantain plain in Ubya. At the same time Coronia, the extreme west town of the land, was to be seized by domestic conspirators. Thus on three sides the Beotian government was to be threatened, and the same day was fixed for the three attacks. But the scheme was betrayed by Afokian and frustrated by the Beotax, who occupied Sifai and Coronia with strong forces, and made a general levy of the Beotians to oppose the army of Hippocrates. It mattered little that Demosthenes made a mistake about the day fixed for the attack. He found himself opposed by a Beotian force, and could only retire. None of the internal movements in the Beotian cities, on which the Athenians had counted, took place. Hippocrates, however, had time to reach and fortify Delium. He had a force of 7,000 hoplites, and over 20,000 light armed troops. A trench with a strong rampart and palisade was drawn round the temple, and at noon on the fifth day from their departure from Athens, the work was completed. The army then left Delium to return home. When they crossed the frontier and entered the Athenian territory of Oropus at about a mile from Delium, the hoplites halted, to wait for Hippocrates, who had remained behind, to give final directions to the garrison of the temple. The light armed troops proceeded on their way to Athens. The hoplites were interrupted in their rest by a message from Hippocrates, ordering them to form instantly in a ray of battle, as the enemy were upon them. The Beotian forces had been concentrated at Tanagra, about five miles from Delium, and they had been persuaded by Pagondas, one of the Theban Beotarks, to follow and attack the Athenians in their retreat, although they had left Beotia. After a rapid march Pagondas halted where a hill concealed him from the view of the Athenians, and drew up his army. It consisted of 7,000 hoplites, the same number as that of the enemy, 1,000 cavalry, and over 10,000 light armed men. The Thebans occupied the right wing in the unique formation of a mass 25 shields deep, the other contingents buried in depth. The Athenian line was formed with a uniform and regular depth of 8 shields. Hippocrates had arrived, and was moving along the lines, encouraging his men, when the enemy, who had for some time been visible on the crest of the hill, raised the peon and charged down. The extreme parts of the wings never met for watercourses lay between them, but the rest pushed shield against shield and fought fiercely. On the right the Athenians were victorious, but on the left they could not sustain the enormous pressure of the Mashed Theban Force, especially as the Thebans were probably man for man, stronger than the Athenians, through a laborious athletic training. But even the victory on the right was made of none effect, through the sudden appearance of a squadron of cavalry which Pagondas, seeing the situation, had sent unobserved round the hill. The Athenians thought it was the vanguard of another army, and fled. Hippocrates was slain, and the army completely dispersed. The Battle of Delium confirmed the verdict of Coronia. The Biosians were left masters of the field, but Delium itself was still held by the invader. This led to a curious negotiation. The Athenians demanded their dead, and the Biosians refused permission to take them, unless they evacuated the temple of Apollo. Now, if there was an international custom which was universally recognised among the Greeks, even among the barbarous Italians, it was the obligation of the victor to allow his defeated opponents to remove and bury their dead, unconditionally. This custom had the sanction of religious feeling, and was seldom violated, but in this case the Biosians had a pretext for departing from the usual practice. They alleged that the Athenians had on their side violated the laws of Hellenic warfare by seizing and fortifying the sanctuary of Delium, and living in it, as if it were unconsecrated, using even the sacred water. There seems little doubt that the conduct of the Biosians was a greater departure from recognised custom than the conduct of the Athenians. The Herald of the Athenians made what seems a foolish reply to the effect that Delium, having been occupied by the Athenians, was now part of Attic soil, and that they showed the customary respect for the temple so far as was possible in the circumstances. You cannot tell us to quit Biosia, he said, for the garrison of Delium is not in Biosia. The Biosians made an appropriate answer to the quibble. If you are in Biosia, take what is yours. If you are in your own land, do as you like. The dead were not surrendered, and the Biosians betook themselves to the blockade of Delium. They took the place by a curious device. They soared in to and hollowed out a great beam, which they joined together again very exactly like a flute, and suspended a vessel by chains at the end of the beam. The iron mouth of a bellows directed downwards into the vessel was attached to the beam, of which a great part was itself overlaid with iron. This machine they brought up from a distance on carts to various points of the rampart, where vine stems and wood had been most extensively used, and when it was quite near the wall, they applied a large bellows to their own end of the beam and blew through it. The blast, prevented from escaping, passed into the vessel, which contained burning coals and sulfur and pitch. These made a huge flame and set fire to the rampart, so that no one could remain upon it. The garrison took flight, and the fort was taken. The Biosians no longer refused to surrender the dead, who included rather less than one thousand hoplites. Part 13 The War in Thrace Athens Loses Amphipolis The defeat of Delium eclipsed the prestige of Athens, but did not seriously impair her strength. Yet it was a fatal year, and a much greater blow, entailing a permanent loss, was dealt to her in her Thracian dominion. The war in Thrace was always complicated by the neighbourhood of the kingdoms of Thrace and Macedonia. Before the fall of Potidaea, the Athenians had formed an alliance with Sitalchis, king of Thrace, and made his son Sadochus an Athenian citizen. The realm of Sitalchis extended from the Strymon to the Uxion. Its coastline began at Abdera and ended at the mouth of the Istha. His revenue of tribute, both from Greek towns and barbarians, amounted in the reign of his successor to more than four hundred talents, counting only what was paid in the shape of coin. The alliance with Athens seems to have lasted till the king's death. An Athenian ambassador from Thrace in the Arcanians of Aristophanes reports to the assembly, We passed our time in drinking with Sitalchis. He's your friend, your friend and lover, if ever there was one, and writes the name of Athens on his walls. Pyrdicus, the shifty king of Macedonia, played a double game between Athens and Sparta. At one time he helped the Calchidians against Athens, and another he sided with Athens against her revolted allies. In 429 combined operations had been planned between Athens and Sitalchis. Sitalchis was to lead the Thracian tribesmen against Pyrdicus, and to help in the reduction of the Calchidic rebels. A huge Thracian army was mustered and invaded Macedonia. The territory was laid waste, but for some reason which Thucydides does not adequately explain, the Athenian force did not arrive and the Thracians withdrew. Throughout all changes of fortune the city of Methoni, situated to the south of the mouth of the Haleakmon, held to Athens with unshaken fidelity, though the varying relations between Athens and Pyrdicus must have seriously affected the welfare of the Methonians. Some decrees relating to Methoni have been preserved on a marble, adorned with the relief of the Athenian Demos seated, stretching out his hand to the Demos of Methoni, who stands accompanied by a dog. Pyrdicus and the Calchidians of Alintus feared that the success of Pylos might be followed by increased activity of the Athenians in Thrace, and they sent an embassy to Sparta, requesting help and expressing a wish that Bracidas might be the commander of whatever auxiliary force should be sent. It was wise policy for Sparta to threaten her rival in Thrace at this juncture, though the prospect of any abiding success was faint. No Spartans went, but 700 Hallots were armed as hoplites. The government was glad to take the opportunity of removing another portion of this dangerous element in the population. Having obtained some Peloponnesian recruits, and having incidentally, as we have already seen, saved Megara, Bracidas marched northward to the new colony of Heraclea. Bracidas was a Spartan by mistake. He had nothing in common with his fellows except personal bravery, which was the least of his virtues. He had a restless energy and a spirit of enterprise which received small encouragement from the slow and hesitating authorities of his country. He had an oratorical ability which distinguished him above the Lacedemonians, who were notoriously unready of speech. He was free from political prejudices and always showed himself tolerant, just and moderate in dealing with political questions. Besides this, he was simple and straightforward. Men knew that they could trust his word implicitly. But the quality which most effectually contributed to his brilliant career, and perhaps most strikingly, belieied his Spartan origin, was his power of winning popularity abroad and making himself personally liked by strangers. In Greece the Spartan abroad was a proverb for insolence and misbehaviour. Bracidas shone out on a dark background by his frank and winning manners. His own tact and rapid movements, as well as the influence of Perdicus, enabled Bracidas to march through Thessaly, which was by no means well disposed to the Lacedemonians. When he reached Macedonia, Perdicus required his assistance against Arhabeus, the king of the Lincestians in Upper Macedonia. Bracidas was impatient to reach Chalkidiki, and he contrived to make a separate arrangement with Arhabeus and abstained from invading Lincestis to the disappointment of Perdicus. He then marched against Acanthus, situated on the base of the peninsula of Acti. The mass of the Acanthians were perfectly content with the position of their city as a member of the Athenian Confederacy. They had no grievance against Athens, and they were unwilling to receive the overtures of Bracidas. They were, however, induced by a small party to admit Bracidas alone into the city, and give him a hearing in the assembly. From his lips the Acanthians learnt the Lacedemonian program, and Thucydides has given the substance of what he said. We declared at the beginning of the war that we were taking up arms to protect the liberties of Helas against Athens, and for this purpose we are here now. You have a high repute for power and wisdom, and therefore a refusal from you will retard the good cause. Every city which joins me will retain her autonomy. The Lacedemonians have pledged themselves to me on this point by solemn oaths, and I have not come to be the tool of affection, or to enslave the many to the few. In that case we should be committing an act worse than the oppression of the Athenians. If you refuse, and say that I have no right to thrust an alliance on a people against its will, I will ravage your land and force you to consent, and for two reasons I am justified in doing so. The tribute you pay to Athens is a direct and material injury to Sparta, for it contributes to strengthen her foe, and secondly your example may prevent others from embracing freedom. When Brassidas retired there was a long debate, much was said on both sides. The manner of Brassidas had produced a favourable impression, and the fear of losing the vintage was a powerful motive with many for exceeding to his demand. The vote was taken secretly, and the majority determined to detach themselves from Athens, though they had no practical grievance, and were not enthusiastic for the change. Sparta's natural friends here as in other cities were the oligarchs. Akanthus was an Andrian colony, and its action led to the adhesion of two other Andrian colonies, Stagira and Argyllus, and the relations which Brassidas established with Argyllus led to the capture of the most important of all Athenian posts in Thrace, and among the most important in the whole Athenian Empire, the city of Amphipolis. This place, of which the foundation has been already recorded, had diminished the importance of Argyllus and roused the jealousy of the Argyllians, although some of the colonists were of Argyllian origin. The coming of Brassidas offered Argyllus an opportunity for which he had been waiting against the Athenians of Amphipolis. After a cold, wintry night march, Brassidas found the bridge of the Strymon, defended only by a small guard which he easily overpowered. Amphipolis was completely unprepared, but Brassidas did not venture to attack the city at once. He expected the gates to be opened by conspirators within, and meanwhile he made himself master of the territory. That a place of such first-rate importance as Amphipolis should be found unprepared at a time when an energetic enemy like Brassidas was actively engaged against other Athenian cities in the neighbourhood, seemed a criminal negligence on the part of the two strategoi to whom defence of the Thracian interests of Athens was entrusted. These were Thucydides, the son of Olorus, and Euclides. It was inexcusable in Euclides who was in Amphipolis to leave the bridge without an adequate garrison, and it was considered culpable of Thucydides, who had mining interests in the district, not to have moved up the Athenian squadron from the island of Thassos. A message was sent at once to Thucydides. That officer hastened back with seven triremes and reached the mouth of the Strymon in the evening of the same day. But in the meantime Brassidas had offered the inhabitants of Amphipolis such easy terms that they were accepted. He promised every citizen who chose to remain equal political rights without any loss of property, while all who preferred to go were allowed five days to remove their possessions. Had the Amphipolitans known how near Thucydides was, they would probably have declined to surrender. Thucydides arrived just too late. But he preserved Aeon at the mouth of the river and repelled an attack of Brassidas. The true blame for the loss of Amphipolis probably rests not on the general, who was in a very difficult position, but on the Athenians who, instead of making adequate provision for the defense of Thrace, were misled by the new strategy of Demosthenes into the unsuccessful expedition to Beotia. It must be remembered that Thucydides was responsible for the safety of the whole coast of Kalkidiki and Thrace, that at any moment he might be summoned to defend any part of it from Potidaea to the Cursonese, and that therefore either Aeon or Thassos was a suitable centre for his headquarters, and that Aeon had the disadvantage of having no harbour. It may be that we are indebted to the fall of Amphipolis for the great history of the war. The Athenians accused the neglect of their generals, as having cost them one of their most valuable possessions. Thucydides was sentenced to banishment, and it is probable that Cleon, to whom he bore no good will, was instrumental in drawing down upon him a punishment which possibly was not deserved. But in his exile the discredited general became the greatest of Greek historians. If he had remained at Athens and continued his official career, he might not have concentrated his whole mind on his history, by travelling in foreign lands among the enemies of Athens, and in neutral states, Thucydides gained a large knowledge of the Hellenic world, and wrote from a wider point of view than he could have done if he had only had an Athenian experience. Associating, he says himself, with both sides, with the Peloponnesians quite as much as with the Athenians because of my exile, I was thus enabled to watch quietly the course of events. Judged in this way, the fall of Amphipolis, a great loss to Athens, may have been a great gain to the world. Having secured the Strymon, Brassidas retraced his steps and subdued the small towns on the high eastern tongue of Chalkidiki. The Andrian Sane and another place held out, and their obscurity saved them. Brassidas hastened on to gain possession of Turoni, the strongest city of Sithonia. A small party of the citizens invited and expected him, but the rest of the inhabitants and the Athenian garrison knew nothing of his coming until the place was in his hands. Turoni was a hill-city by the sea. Besides its walls, it had the protection of a fort on a height, which rose out of the water and was connected with the city by a narrow neck of land. This fortress, known as Lechithus, was occupied by an Athenian garrison. Brassidas halted within about half a mile from the city before daybreak. Seven bold soldiers, light-armed and carrying daggers, were secretly introduced by the conspirators. They killed the sentinels on the top of the hill, and then broke down a post and gate, and undid the bars of the great gate near the marketplace, in order that the men without might rush in from two sides. A hundred targetiers who had drawn near to the walls dashed in first, and when a signal was given, Brassidas followed with the rest. The surprise was complete. Fifty Athenian hoplites were sleeping in the Agora. A few were cut down, most escaped to the fort of Lechithus, which was held for some days, and then captured. Brassidas called an assembly of the Turonians, and spoke to them in words which sounded strange indeed, falling from the mouth of a Hellenic victor. He told them that he had not come to injure the city or the citizens, that those who had not aided in the conspiracy to admit him would be treated on a perfect equality with the others, that the Lassidimonians had never suffered any wrong from Turoni, and that he did not think the worse of those who opposed him. End of Part 13 This recording is in the public domain. Section 42, being Chapter 10, Parts 14 and 15 of A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great, Volume 1. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For further information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great, Volume 1 by John Bagnell Bury. Chapter 10, Part 14 Negotiations for Peace In the meantime the Athenians had taken no measures to check the victorious winter campaign of Brassidas. Their inactivity was due to two causes. The disaster of Delium had disheartened them, and rendered the citizens unwilling to undertake fresh toil in Thrace. In Greekian history we must steadfastly keep in view that we are reading about citizen soldiers, not about professional soldiers, and that the temper of the time, whether of confidence or dismay, modifies all the calculations of military and political prudence. Secondly, the peace party, especially represented by the generals Nikias and Larkis, took advantage of this depression to work in the direction of peace. The possession of the Spartan captives gave the means of coming to terms with Sparta at any moment, but it was clear that they could not now conclude a peace on such favourable terms as would have been possible a year before. If an able statesman, like Pericles, had at this time possessed the confidence and guided the councils of the Athenians, he would have persuaded them to postpone all thoughts of peace until the success of Brassidas had been decisively checked and the prestige of Athens in some degree retrieved. This was obviously the true policy which would have enabled Athens to win the full advantage of the captives of Svacteria. It was a policy which Cleon, a far abler politician than any of his opponents, must have preached loudly in the assembly, but the Athenians were not in a mood to weigh considerations of policy. They were swayed by the feelings of the hour, which were flattered by the arguments of the military experts, and they decisively inclined to peace. The Lastimonians were more deliberately set on peace than the Athenians, their anxiety to recover the Svacterian captives increased, and on the other hand they desired to set a term to the career of Brassidas in Kalkedi-ki. They wished to take advantage of the considerable successes he had already won to extort favourable conditions from Athens before any defeat should undo or reverse his triumphs. Nor was the news of his exploits received at Sparta with unmixed feelings of pleasure. They were rather regarded with jealousy and distrust. The victories had not been won by an army of Spartan citizens, but by the brilliant unspartan qualities of Brassidas, and a force of which the effectiveness entirely depended on its leader. Brassidas had broken through the fetters of Lacedimonian method, and his fellow citizens felt that he was a man of different fibre from themselves, and suspected and disliked him accordingly. Moreover, the personal influence of King Place to Anax was thrown weightily into the scale of peace. This King had been banished just before the Thirty Years' Peace on the ground that he had taken bribes to spare Attica when he invaded it after the deliverance of Megara. He had lived for nearly twenty years in western Arcadia on the mountain of Lycaion beside the dread sanctuary of Zeus, of which it was told that whosoever entered it lost his shadow and died before the year was out. Even here Place to Anax was afraid for his life. His house was half within the precincts, so that in case of danger he could retire into the sacred place without passing his door. But he had influence at Delphi, and whenever the Spartans consulted that oracle they were always bidden to take back into their own land the seed of the demigod, the son of Zeus, or else they would have to plow with the silver share. The Lassidimonians at length recalled him and re-enthroned him as King with ancient and most solemn ceremonies. But his enemies now vexed him with the charge of having bribed the Pythian priestess to procure his recall. Place to Anax conceived that such charges would fall to the ground if he satisfied the people by negotiating a permanent peace and restoring as speedily as possible the prisoners from their captivity in Athens to their impatient friends at home. And as a matter of fact, Sparta had everything to gain from making peace at once, unless she was prepared to adopt the imperial policy of Athens against which it had been hitherto her role to protest. Such a policy might for a time have met with some success if she had put her whole confidence in Brassidas, but must soon have been checked by the naval superiority of her rival. Place to Anax and Nikias understood each other, and Nikias, a man of common place ability and possessed by one idea, played into the hands of Sparta. It was not, however, an easy matter to arrange the exact terms of a durable pacification, while it was important for Athens that the negotiation should be made before she experienced any further losses in Thrace. Accordingly the two states agreed on a truce for a year, which would give them time to arrange quietly and at leisure the conditions of a permanent peace. The truce and some of its conditions were suggested by Athens. The terms were drawn up at Sparta and accepted by the Spartan assembly, and were then conveyed to Athens, where they were proposed for the acceptance of the Athenian assembly by lackeys. The clauses were the following, 1. Free access to the Delphic Oracle was ensured to all, for Athens had been debarred from consulting it during the war. 2. Both parties guaranteed the protection of the treasures of Delphi. 3. During the truce, both parties should keep what they had, the Athenians retaining Pylos, Kithura, Argolic Methoni, Nisire and Minoa. 4. The Lacedaemonians were not to sail even along their own coasts, in warships or in merchant vessels exceeding a certain size, 12 tons. 5. The free passage of envoys for the purpose of arranging a peace was provided for. 6. Neither party was to receive deserters, and 7. Disputes, in case there arose, were to be decided by arbitration. The truce was sworn to, but in the meantime an event happened in Calchidiki, which was to disappoint the pacific calculations of the statesmen at Athens and Sparta. The city of Skioni, on the western prong of the Calchidian fork, revolted from Athens and invited Brasidas, much to that general surprise. For it was far more hazardous for the towns on the peninsula of Palini to defy the authority of Athens than for any others, since by the strong city of Potidaia, which stretched entirely across the narrow Isthmus, they were isolated and as much exposed to the full force of Athenian power as if they had been islanders. The arrival of Brasidas and the words he spoke to them wound up the men of Skioni to the highest pitch of enthusiasm. They set a golden crown on his head as the liberator of Helas, and their admiration for him personally was shown by casting garlands on him as if he were a victorious athlete, so great was his popularity. At this point an Athenian and a Lacedemonian commissioner arrived to announce the truce, which had in fact been concluded two days before Skioni revolted. The Athenians refused to admit Skioni to the benefit of the armistice until the authorities at home had been consulted. There was deep indignation at Athens when the news of the defection of Skioni arrived. It was practically the rebellion of islanders relying on the land power of Sparta. Cleon was able to take advantage of this exasperation and carry a decree that Skioni should be destroyed and all the male inhabitants slain. This incident brings out in an interesting way the geographical difference between the three seagirt promontries of Kalkiri-ki as to their degrees of participation in the insular character. Acti, with its steep inhospitable shores, is far more continental than insular. Sithonia, partakes of both natures more equally, is more strictly a half island. Palini is more an island than part of the mainland. And we see the political importance of such geographical differences. The loss of Skioni produces an irritation at Athens, which the loss of Toroni could not inspire. The revolt of Skioni was followed by that of the neighbouring town of Mende. And although this happened distinctly after the truce had been made, Brassidas did not hesitate to accept the alliance of Mende, his plea being that in certain points the Athenians themselves had broken the truce. The case of Mende differed from that of Skioni, for the revolt was the doing not of the people, but of an oligarchical faction. Brassidas was then obliged to join Perdicus in another expedition against Arabius, king of the Lincestians. The fact that the Macedonian monarch was contributing to the pay of the Peloponnesian army rendered it necessary for Brassidas to cooperate in an enterprise which was of no interest to the Greeks. Arabius was defeated in a battle, but a reinforcement of Illyrians came to his help, and the warlike reputation of Illyria was so great that their approach produced a panic among the Macedonians, and the whole army of Perdicus fled, leaving the small force of Brassidas to retreat as best it could. He was in great jeopardy, but affected his retreat successfully. The incident led to a breach between Brassidas and the Macedonians. Perdicus changed sides once more, and proved his new friendship to Athens by preventing Lacedaemonian troops which had been sent to join Brassidas from crossing Thessaly. Brassidas returned to Tyrone, and found that an Athenian armament of fifty ships under Nicias and Nicaratus had recovered Mende and was besieging Skioni. Everywhere else the truce was observed, and by tacit consent the hostilities in Thrace were not allowed to affect the rest of Greece, but it was inevitable that they should frustrate the purpose for which the truce had been concluded. It was impossible that negotiations with a view to the definitive peace should proceed in exactly the same way as had been originally contemplated. By the end of the year there was a marked change in public feeling at Athens, and the influence of Tyrone was again in the ascendant. If Nicias had played into the hands of Sparta, Brassidas had played into the hands of Cleon, and effectually embarrassed the home government. His conduct first in regard to Skioni and then in regard to Mende was indefensible and entirely governed by personal considerations. The gold crown of Skioni seemed to have acted like a potent spell in arousing his ambition, and he began to play a war-game of his own. His policy was the more unhappy, as he was perfectly aware that it was impossible to protect the cities of Pelini against the fleets of their indignant mistress. He effectually hindered the conclusion of peace, which his city sincerely desired. Brassidas and Cleon, Thucydides said, were the chief opponents of the peace, but while the motives of Brassidas were purely personal, the policy of Cleon, whatever his motives may have been, was statesman-like. He adopted the principle of Pericles that Athens must maintain her empire unimpaired, and he saw that this could not be done without energetic opposition to the progress of Brassidas in Thrace. The charge of Thucydides that Cleon desired war, because he could not so easily conceal his own dishonesty in peace, does not carry the least conviction. When the truth expired, Cleon was able to carry a resolution that an expedition should be made to reconquer Amphipolis. It does not appear whether he was himself anxious for the command, in consequence of his previous success at Pylos, or whether the opposition and the lukewarmness of the strategoi practically forced him into it. But it is certain that all possible difficulties were thrown in his way by Nikias and the peace-party, who in their hearts doubtless hoped for the complete failure of his enterprise. End of Part 14 Part 15 Battle of Amphipolis and Peace of Nikias Cleon set sail with 30 ships bearing 1200 Athenian hoplites, 300 Athenian cavalry, as well as allies. Taking some troops from the force which were still blockading Scyone, he gained a considerable success at the outset by taking Tyrone and capturing the Lacedemonian governor. Bracidas arrived too late to relieve it. Cleon went on to the mouth of the Strymon and made Aion his headquarters, intending to wait there until he had augmented his army by reinforcements from Thrace and Macedonia. Not far from its mouth the stream of the Strymon expands into the lake Kierkinitis. On narrowing again into its proper channel it is forced to bend to the westward in order to skirt a hill, and forms a great loop before it disgorges its water into the sea close to the walls of Aion. In this loop the high city of Amphipolis stood. Watergirt, as its name implies, the river serving as its natural defense, so that it required artificial bulwarks only on the eastern side. On the right bank of the river to the west of the town rose the hill of Cerdillion. On the east were the heights of Pangius. A ridge joined Pangius with the hill of Amphipolis, and the wall of the city crossed the ridge. The Strymon bridge was outside the southwestern extremity of the wall, but since the place had passed into the hands of Bracidas, a palisade had been built connecting the wall with the bridge. Bracidas, with some of his forces, took up a commanding position on the hill of Cerdillion, from which he had a wide view of the surrounding country, while other troops remained in Amphipolis, under the command of Clearedas, whom he had appointed governor. Their hoplites numbered about two thousand. The discontent and murmurs of his troops forced Cleon to move prematurely. The soldiers had grumbled at leaving Athens under an utterly inexperienced commander to face a general like Bracidas, and they were now displeased at his inaction. In order to do something, Cleon led his army to the top of the ridge near the city wall, where he could obtain a view of the country beyond, and as he saw Bracidas on Cerdillion, he had no fear of being attacked. But Bracidas was resolved to attack before reinforcements should arrive, and seeing the Athenians move, he descended from Cerdillion and entered Amphipolis. The Athenians who had reached the ridge could observe the whole army gathered within the city, and Bracidas himself offering sacrifice at the temple of Athena, and Cleon was presently informed that the feet of men and horses ready to sally forth could be seen under one of the gates. Having verified this fact for himself, Cleon gave the signal to wheel to the left and retreat to Aeon. It was the only possible line of retreat and necessarily exposed the unshielded side to an enemy issuing from the city. But he made the fatal mistake of not preparing his men for action in case they should be forced to fight. He rashly calculated that he would have time to get away. Hence, when Bracidas, with 150 hoplites, came forth from one of the gates, ran up the road, and charged the Athenian centre, the left wing, which was in advance, was struck with terror and took to flight. At the same time, the rest of the garrison of Amphipolis, led by Clearidas, had issued from a more northerly gate and attacked the Athenian right. Here a stand was made, though Cleon, unused to the dangers of warfare, proved himself no better than many of his hoplites, who were said to be the flower of the army. He fled and was shot down by a targetier. But the bravery of Bracidas was doomed, as well as the cowardice of Cleon, by the equal decree of death. As he was turning to assist Clearidas, he received a mortal wound and was carried into the city. He lived long enough to be assured of the utter rout of the foe, but his death had practically converted the victory into a defeat. The people of Amphipolis gave him the honors of a hero. They made him their founder and removed all the memorials of the true founder of their colony, the Athenian Hagnon. Sacrifices were offered to Bracidas and yearly games celebrated in his honor. The death of Bracidas removed the chief obstacle to peace, for no man was competent or disposed to resume his large designs in Thrace. The defeat and death of Cleon gave a free hand to Nikias and the peace-party. The peace-party were in truth far more responsible for the disaster than Cleon, whom they had plated in a false position. Thus the battle of Amphipolis led immediately to the conclusion of peace, and the comic poet could rejoice in the distraction of the pestle and mortar, Cleon and Bracidas, with which the spirits of war and tumult had pounded the cities of Greece. But the desire of peace seems to have been even stronger at Sparta than at Athens, where there was a certain feeling, in spite of the longing for rest from warfare, that the lustre of the city was tarnished, and something strenuous should be done. Menaces of invading Attica were required to apply the necessary pressure, though they could hardly have been seriously contemplated as long as the captives were in an Athenian prison. Negotiations were protracted during autumn and winter, and the peace was definitely concluded about the end of March. The peace, of which Nikias and Plays to Anax were the chief authors, was fixed for a term of fifty years. Athens undertook to restore all the posts which she had occupied during the war against the Peloponnesians, Pylos, Kithura, Methodi, Atalanta, and Teleion in Thessaly, but she insisted upon retaining Solion and Anatorion, and the port of Nisaya. The Lassidimonians engaged to restore Amphipolis and to relinquish Argyllus Stagira, Acanthus, Scolus, Olinthus, Spartulus, which cities remaining independent were to pay a tribute to Athens according to the assessment of Aristides. Moreover, the fortress of Panacton in Mount Kithaeron, which the Beotians had recently occupied, was to be restored to Athens. Certain towns in the possession of Athens, such as Turoni, were to be dealt with at the discretion of Athens. All captives on both sides were to be liberated. The details of this treaty and of the truce of 423 B.C. have been given fully by Thucydides and are of great importance for the study of the diplomatic methods of the Greek states. Other clauses of the Peace of Nicaea are as follows. The common temples of Greece are to be free to all. The autonomy of the Delphians and their temple is insured. Controversies between contracting parties are to be settled by legal means. The inhabitants of any city handed over to the Athenians are allowed to leave it and take their property with them. Argyllus, Olinthus, etc. may become allies of Athens if they voluntarily consent, and Mechiberna, Sarnae, and Shingae are to be independent. If any matter is forgotten in this contract, the Athenians and Lacedimonians may make alterations by mutual agreement. The oaths to the Peace are to be renewed every year, and the terms are to be inscribed on pillars at Olympia, Delphi, Ismus, and on the Acropolis of Athens, and in the Temple of Apollo at Amichlis. It appeared immediately that the situation was not favourable to a durable peace, for when the terms were considered at Sparta by a meeting of deputies of the Peloponnesian allies, they were emphatically denounced as unjust by three important states, Corinth, Biosha, and Megara. Corinth was indignant at the surrender of Solion and Anactaurion. Megara was furious that Nessiah should be abandoned to the enemy, and Biosha was unwilling to hand over Panacton. Yet Athens could hardly have demanded less. The consequence was that the peace was only partial. Those allies which were politically of most consequence refused to accept it, and they were joined by Elis. The diplomacy of Nicaea was a complete failure, so far as it aimed at compassing an abiding peace. But since the deepest cause of the war lay in the commercial competition between Athens and Corinth, and since the interests of Sparta were not at stake, the treaty might seem at least to have the merit of simplifying the situation. But if we admit the justification of the imperial policy of Pericles, then the policy of vigorous action advocated by Cleon was abundantly justified. It may safely be said that if the conduct of the state had rested entirely with Cleon, and if the military talents of the city had been lawfully placed at his disposal, the interests of Athens, as Pericles understood them, would have been far better served, than if Nicaea and his party had been allowed to manage all things as they willed without the restraint of Cleon's opposition. Few statesmen of the merit of Cleon have come before posterity for judgment at such a great disadvantage, condemned by Thucydides, held up to eternal ridicule by Aristophanes. If we allow for the personal prejudice of Thucydides, whose testimonies only show that Cleon was a coarse, noisy, ill-bred, audacious man, offensive to noblemen, and formidable to officials, the watchful dog of the people. Nothing is proved against his political insight or his political honesty. The portrait of Aristophanes in the Nights carries no more historical value than nowadays a caricature in a comic paper. He too had suffered from the assaults of Cleon, who had dragged him to the Senate House, and trodden him down and bellowed over him, and mauled him till he scarce escaped alive. The piece of Nicaea's was celebrated by a play of Aristophanes which admirably expresses the exuberant joy then felt at Athens, but carefully avoids the suggestion of any noble sentiment that may have quickened the poet's delight in the accomplishment of the policy he had advocated. So, Cleon's friends might have said, but we judge Aristophanes unfairly if we misapprehend the comic poet's function. Comedy did not guide public opinion, but rather echoed it. Comedy set up no exalted ideal or high standard of action. The best hits were those which tickled the man in the marketplace, and more or less responded to his thoughts. Aristophanes had his own political prejudices and predilections, but as the son of Athens he was assuredly proud of the great place which her democracy had won for her in the world. It was the nature and the business of his muse to distort in the mirror of comedy the form and feature of the age. But the poet who was inspired to write the verse, O rich and renowned and with violets crowned, O Athens the envid of nations, cannot have been altogether out of sympathy with those who strove to maintain the imperial position of his country. End of Part 15. End of Chapter 10. End of A History of Greece to the death of Alexander the Great, Volume 1. This recording is in the public domain.