 Good afternoon and welcome to the second event of the IIEA's Global Europe Project, which is supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs. This project seeks to address, analyze and communicate to a wider public issues relating to the EU's global role and also to Ireland's engagement with multilateral issues, especially in the context of Ireland's forthcoming membership of the UN Security Council, which begins on the 1st of January 2021 for a two-year term. We are very, very lucky today to have as our speaker the UN High Representative and Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu. Let me first of all take care of a few housekeeping issues. The High Commissioner will address us for 20 minutes and this will be followed by a question and answer session. Both the presentation and the Q&A are on the record. We would encourage you to use the button on your screen to send in questions and we'll take them up then during the presentation. You might also indicate which organization that you represent or are a member of when you put in a question. You might also like to join the discussion on Twitter using the handle at IIEA. It is a great pleasure for me to introduce the High Commissioner. Izumi Nakamitsu assumed her position as High Representative and Under-Secretary General on the 1st of May 2017 and in that capacity she has already addressed the IIEA, I think it was in June 2019. She's had an extensive career both within the UN system and outside the UN system. She has worked in the UNDP and also in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN in New York. We look very much forward to hearing what you have to say and to hearing your assessment of what is the state of global multilateral disarmament efforts. Over to you. Thank you very much Mary for that introduction. Indeed I was there in 2019 and ladies and gentlemen it is a genuine pleasure to be invited to speak today. I know because I was there the IIEA epitomizes the proud Irish tradition of active engagement with the cutting edge issues of foreign policy. I am also particularly grateful for the opportunity to participate in this project which seeks to navigate the jack rocks of increasingly complex international environment. From the eponymous Irish resolution the famous one that led to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to its central role in negotiating the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons Ireland has always been an upspoken advocate for nuclear disarmament and also a very good friend to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Ireland remains an example of how the so-called middle power can advance its ideas and goals in the international system. I remain especially grateful for its leadership to achieve gender equality also in international security diplomacy and this is not only the right thing to do but as you know it's also a smart thing to do. Peace processes involving women are demonstrably more successful. Ireland's principled approach to diplomacy and its willingness to work with others will serve it well on the Security Council next year and I look forward to our collaboration there as well. I have been asked to speak today about the disarmament regime in the context of the ongoing COVID crisis and the prospects for multinational nuclear disarmament in the coming years. Such reflection is timely as 2020 has been a year of milestones. Since their twin birth if you will three quarters of a century ago nuclear weapons and the United Nations have represented both the perils and the promise of international security that arose out of the ashes of the Second World War. With its entry into force 50 years ago the MPT heralded that the creation of the current nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Consequently this year has been an opportune moment to reflect on how far we've come in the pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons but also obviously how much further we have to go. In serving the current landscape I am reminded of the words of former Secretary General Doug Hammershield. Nuclear disarmament remains what he called a hardy perennial at the UN. That is to say despite some good progress we are still living with unacceptable nuclear risks. Broadly speaking a nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime is comprised of plurivital, bilateral, even unilateral elements but it is the multinational agreements that give the regime its backbone. Unfortunately the regime and in particular its multinational elements are coming under increasing strain. As the world shifts to an increasing and multi-polar order the international security environment is characterized by a complex combination of at least the following phenomena. Corrosive relationships between nuclear power, lack of leadership from the great powers coupled with no genuine efforts or even attempts to understand legitimate security concerns of each other, historic levels of military spending, the emergence of disruptive technologies and potential new domains of conflict and the growing threat to civilians from increasingly powerful weapons and of course the entrenchment of regional conflicts with nuclear overtones. We are suffering from what Secretary General Gutierrez has called a trust deficit disorder that is the steady erosion of trust between not only states but also between governments and their peoples. This has precipitated a broader crisis in multilateralism. It has fed political trends towards populism and exclusionism given rise to inward-looking unilateralist and nationalist foreign policies eroding multilateral institutions. Specific to the topic today the UN disarmament machinery is paralyzed. The global arms control regimes hangs by a threat. The Security Council is increasingly dysfunctional, stymied with preventing the potential erosion of global norms. In parallel all nuclear arms states are engaged in what has been termed a qualitative nuclear arms race based on the speed, accuracy and stealth of the weapons. Illusioned rhetoric is on the rise coupled with return of outmoded concepts such as nuclear war fighting and the more prominent law accorded to nuclear weapons in security doctrines. The nexus between emerging technologies and nuclear weapons has exposed new vulnerabilities and heightened prospects of miscommunication and miscalculation. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated this strain and catalyzed several of the negative security trends that have been brewing for some time, most obviously the deteriorating relations between major arms. The pandemic should have also taught us several lessons, not least that seemingly low probability threats can occur with catastrophic global consequences and for the urgent need to prevent such a situation when it comes to nuclear weapons. Given the collective objective of preventing the use of nuclear weapons and achieving their elimination I do believe that the opportunity to cause correct exists. 2020 has been a year of my songs but the next 12 months is also full of symbolic and practical occasions to blunt the current nuclear dangers and get back to the path to the elimination of nuclear weapons. For example, early in the new year we will commemorate the 75th anniversary of the very first resolution of the General Assembly which in Trialia called for the means to eliminate atomic weapons. All states should use this milestone to reaffirm their commitment to the norm against nuclear use, to nuclear disarmament and to the obligations they have undertaken to achieve that goal. By the end of February the new START Treaty will hopefully have been extended. I encourage the United States and the Russian Federation to use the moment to commit to negotiations on further reductions in the world's largest nuclear arsenals. 29th of August is the 30th anniversary of the closure of the semi-palatins nuclear test site. International Day Against Nuclear Test commemorated on that day is the perfect occasion to show up the norm against nuclear testing through the reaffirmation of unilateral moratoriums and renewed push to bring the CTBG into force. Later next year states parties to the TPNW will hold their first meeting of states parties. The TPNW's entry into force is evidence of many states' concern at the nuclear weapons status quo. It is a strong demonstration of support for multinational approaches to nuclear disarmament. Finally, next August is expected to see the convening of the twice postponed 10th NPT review conference. The review conference will be a locus for all the challenges facing the regime as a whole. Divisions amongst nuclear weapons, differences over the pace and scale of disarmament, regional proliferation crisis, and the need to strengthen the safeguards regime. I am confident that despite diversions, states parties continue to prize the tangible security benefits the NPT provides and will therefore endeavor to find a way to common ground and a successful outcome. It is worth remembering that no successful review conference outcome has been identical. It is in the hands of states parties as to what any outcomes they look like. I also believe there are several key steps the review conference can take to strengthen the norms against nuclear use and kickstart new efforts on disarmament. First, a reaffirmation of support to the treaty and to all commitments and obligations undertaken, including to the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. Second, a recommitment to the norm against the use of nuclear weapons. We should return to the logic of President Reagan and General Secretary Golbachev. A nuclear war cannot be won, must not be fought. Third, the nuclear weapon states should agree on a package of practical risk reduction measures to lessen the potential for miscalculation or accident. Fourth, a commitment to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Challenges to the safeguard system are evolving and so the system must evolve too. Fifth, the review conference can be a springboard for thinking about what Secretary General Gutierrez has described as a new vision for disarmament, how to build on the great gains made to date, but also address the realities of the present. I want to expand on this last point and because obviously it goes beyond the review conference and speaks to the entire future of disarmament. Various factors I outlined earlier but especially the evolution of the multiplicity in the context of technological advancements mean that the world is a very different place than it was even 10 years ago. The fluid context requires new ways of thinking when it comes to the elimination of WMT and the regulation of conventional weapons. The pandemic has only underscored this need to adapt. Any new approach or thinking should include at least dialogue about how to include all nuclear weapons in negotiations, how to include other nuclear arms states in the arms control processes, how to address the long overdue issue of controls on missiles, how to prevent the deployment of particularly destabilizing weapon systems, what new transparency and confidence building measures are required and how to make emerging technologies work for us to create a safer and more secure world in areas such as verification and safeguards. The new thinking must also be broader than the technical issues. Let me suggest three fundamental approaches. I believe are critical in our collective new thinking. To begin with, a shifting focus is required to approach that places humans at the center of security, one that is firmly anchored in prevention and mediation. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, armed conflicts continued to rage in many parts of the world. In March, as we know, Secretary General Gutierrez called for an immediate global ceasefire, so aid workers could reach people in areas affected by conflict. And while 170 states, several regional organizations, 200 civil society groups, and more than a dozen non-state armed groups, have publicly endorsed this call, rhetorical commitments has not really translated into action. Fragile healthcare systems have been further crippled by the use of heavy explosive weapons, hindering emergency response to the COVID-19 pandemic and underscoring the need to prevent the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. I congratulate Ireland for initiating the informal consultative process in Geneva on the political declaration and reiterate the UN's continued support to efforts to address this issue. A human-centered approach must also seek to foster new cooperation partnerships and inclusivity. The Secretary General's agenda for disarmament places a firm emphasis on the principle of cooperation and partnership to ensure a diversity of voices from civil society to women to youth. This means deepening the linkages between disarmament and the youth and women, peace and security agendas, and their respective communities to accelerate progress across all. On women's participation, we need to push for parity in delegations and for women to be actively engaged in disarmament and arms control efforts. At the same time, understanding of gendered impacts of arms flows and associated challenges should inform the design of adequate responses in all policy and decision-making frameworks. UNODA's contribution to gender equality and gender mainstreaming includes, among others, flagship projects funded by the European Union in support of gender mainstreaming, mainstream policies, programmes and actions, in the fight against small arms trafficking and misuse in line with the women, peace and security agenda. Secondly, the pandemic has underscored the need for a strengthened and renewed multilateralism. We must send a clear message explaining the historical success of multilateralism and why cooperation is needed now more than ever. Few issues reflect this need more than nuclear disarmament. After all, any use of nuclear weapons would likely have global ramifications. Therefore, the entire international community has the responsibility to prevent it. The UN disarmament machinery needs to be reinforced and refurbished. In short, it needs to get back to work by focusing on priority issues. The dysfunction in the Security Council is proof of the need for creative middle-power diplomacy. In recent years, non-permanent members have endeavored to keep the existential issue of nuclear weapons on the Council's agenda, and I hope this will remain the case. As the arbiter of international peace and security, it is the responsibility of the Council to prevent the erosion of norms against the use of WMDs and a human carnage caused by weapons in conflict. This will require deft diplomacy and commitment from all Council members. Accelerated progress in disarmament in the 21st century will require not only instruments such as treaties, but agreements in arrangements such as political decorations and voluntary codes of conduct, especially to address the versioning impacts of rapid technological change on international security. This requires new creative multilateral diplomacy based on the contributions of more inclusive multi-stakeholder processes as well as traditional multilateral negotiations. Dr. Hamsholt was a wise man. He understood that disarmament could not be viewed in a vacuum, that it was instrumental in creating peaceful solutions. As I have said time and again, arms control and disarmament are not utopian ideals. History shows that they are useful, effective and indeed indispensable instruments for security. This is my final point. More reflection needs to be undertaken on how to better integrate disarmament processes into broader peace and security processes. What I have outlined today is only a snapshot of the steps needed to reorient the world away from nuclear dangers and back towards nuclear elimination. But the many opportunities to make progress that arise in the coming months can only be taken advantage of if states show the necessary political will and initiative. I am sure we can count on Ireland in this regard and I look forward to working with Ireland in pursuing a shared goal of a safer and more secure world. I thank you very much for listening and for your attention and I'm looking forward to the exchanges. Back to you, Mary. Hello. I think you can hear me now. Thank you very much for that very substantive statement. It was amazing in the sense that it was both sober and ambitious and very, very practical as to what could be done but very realistic at the same time. Your ambitions for the NPT on one level are not great but in the current environment they are enormous and we wish you and Ireland will work very closely with you on that. Could I ask you on that issue of the NPT, how do you evaluate the possibility of keeping alive the joint comprehensive plan of action with Iran? It is very much relevant, I think, to the future of the NPT and relevant to international cooperation on the issue of dealing with nuclear threats. Should we be hopeful? Indeed, I hope we can be hopeful. As you know we and also the Secretary General has consistently stated that we would like to try and protect JCPOA and remaining states will be able to remain in that agreement. He expressed disappointment in the decision that has been taken by the United States and also he has repeatedly called for Iran to return to full commitment to all the provisions and performing its nuclear related commitments. Now President-elect Biden has stated his readiness to return if Iran returns to full commitments. So there is at least that possibility and I think it is very, very important for the entire community. Of course, as you say, it's also important for the success of the NPT review conference, but I think it is quite important for the region. It was indeed one of the, if you will, positive outcome of disarmament and non-proliferation through negotiation and diplomacy. And so it will be important on several different levels and we hope therefore that Iran will stop destabilized actions in return to full commitment and with the new administration coming up, we'll be able to return to the JCPOA commitments as a whole. So let us hope and let us work on those issues as we approach NPT review conference now as you know rescheduled again for the month of August. So let us hope. Yes, definitely. The question here in relating from Claudic Wayne relating to an address that we had at the Institute last year from the Executive Director of ICANN who spoke particularly on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Now I understand that it's coming into force in January. How do you see that contributing to bringing this issue forward, the debate forward and how can it contribute to the review conference? Yes, TPNW, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, will enter into force on 22nd of January 2021 next year. So it's almost a month. As we have said many times, when it enters into force, it will be a new killer of nuclear disarmament regime. Now I don't need to explain to this crowd or audience that disarmament regime, nuclear disarmament regime in particular, is actually a web of various instruments, as I mentioned, multinational agreements and treaties of different kinds, but also they are regional level arrangements and agreements creating nuclear weapon free zones around the world. They are bilateral agreements, treaties and policy and political commitments by a range of countries in particular, even in weapon states. So collectively this regime functions and they will now be a new pillar added to that regime. There are a couple of things that is important. We think it is a welcome development that a norm against nuclear weapons will be again strengthened. It will be binding on states, parties and ratifying states, but as time goes, they will be a renewed awareness that nuclear weapons really should not be used first and foremost, but also should not exist. So generally speaking, strengthening the norm against nuclear weapons is a contribution that this new TP&W will make. Now in the context of MPTs or in relations to MPTs in particular, Ireland and other core groups, core countries negotiated or that led the negotiation of the TP&W and repeatedly said that it is something, it is a treaty that will complement and reinforce MPT, in particular the Article 6 obligations. So we are very much looking forward to supporting TP&W ratifying states in the context of their conference on states parties, meeting of states parties to start looking at and start discussing the further developments of this new treaty that will work in harmony with and in compact complementary with the MPT. They are very strong views as you know expressed from some of MPT states parties and other UN member states in general against this TP&W. Our advice has always been that let us try to make sure that the two treaties will work in complementarity with each other and do not create a situation where these two treaties will exist in contradiction with each other, that divides different groups, different countries in the context of a review conference. And I believe it is entirely possible. What we need to do is to find, if you will, modus vivendi between those different groups. And I know that many efforts are being taken to that end. And some of the countries have said that they would like to try to be a bridge builder to that end are very actively working on this. And I am very, very grateful for those efforts. And I think it is entirely possible. Thank you. There's a question here from Orla FitzMaurice, who's the director for disarmament and nonproliferation in the Department of Foreign Affairs here in Dublin. She says many thanks for the excellent thought provoking presentation. She refers to the fact that you spoke about the need for the nuclear weapon states to agree a risk reduction package as part of the MPT review conference. Could you say some more about what you see as the most promising possible elements in such a package? What would be the most challenging dimensions and how can nonnuclear weapon states ensure that the level of ambition is sufficient? Yes, that's a very important question. It's a very difficult question. First of all, I do understand that even with the difficulties that we have seen in recent years, in particular last year and this year, the P5 or N5 in this context, in the nuclear weapon states in the context of MPTs, they have continued the P5 gatherings and discussions. And in that context, I understand that they have also brought up the issues of risk reduction related matters. For example, what are the doctrines that they have? What are the possible further transparency measures that they could have? And I think these efforts, even though they all say separately, the N5 countries, they all report to us that it's been a very difficult conversations. Those conversations have continued and it is continued and it will continue further all the way up to August. And with the stated policy of the President-elect in the United States, once a new START treaty, as I mentioned in my remarks, will have been extended soon. I think, hopefully, I hope there will be a better atmosphere conducive to making progress on some of those issues related to risk reductions. And, of course, non-nuclear weapon states can definitely contribute. I think there have been quite a lot of very active discussions and conversations taking place. And I know Ireland also has been deeply involved in those conversations on what might be, in fact, a new, you know, in the context of a new international security environment that we spoke of, what are the types of risk reduction measures, communication methods, communication channels that existed during the previous Cold War that can be updated to fit to a new context. And I think this is something that between nuclear weapon states, non-nuclear weapon states, and also even the members of the TPNW can find a common ground. This is one of the reasons why we think it will form a part of a likely successful outcome and risk reduction measures from that point of view will be a very positive contribution for August review conference. Thank you. Thank you for that. Again, I'm very struck by how practical but ambitious you are at the same time. There's a question from Hiroaki Nakanishi. And he asks, this is a perennial problem, I think, in the disarmament side. How can the United Nations bridge the gap between the nuclear weapon states, the non-nuclear weapon states, and civil society, specifically encouraging and facilitating dialogues on issues? The UN, we hope we are still regarded as an impartial actor here. We don't lean towards particular positions except that we protect and defend the shared common objective of making progress towards the nuclear free world. And there are actually quite a lot of activities that we undertake from, for example, behind the scene, passing of messages, speaking bilaterally to various governments, and trying to better understand where they are coming from. I mentioned in my remarks that there seem to be a really shortage of genuine efforts to understand each other's legitimate security concerns. Now, it is difficult because it is sensitive to its national security, etc., but understanding the security concerns that is, in our view, will be the first step towards a real genuine dialogue. So we facilitate analysis, which is impartial and objective. We provide those analyses so that it can be utilised in their conversations as well. We reach out to various countries as a group, all by naturally, to make sure that their conversations with each other will be done in a sincere and civilised manner. And then we try to also provide expertise, substantive expertise in all of those efforts. And finally, of course, we are a platform. I think something like national security, hardcore national security, some of the aspects will obviously have to be negotiated in bilateral context between concerned states. But at the same time, at the multilateral level, we provide a secure environment where those countries can come and discuss their matters of concern and try to find a common ground, and we help those countries to try to find a common ground. So the role that we play as the United Nations is a difficult one in the current context as a convener, as a facilitator. And if I may add one more, which I am also very keen, we would like to strive to become one, is a thought leader. Together with some of the world's great thinkers, member states, and think tanks like yours, civil society actors, we try to generate new perspectives and new approaches in the hope that these new thinkings will contribute to a creation of a new vision at the international level. So we play slightly different roles, and all of them are very difficult ones. But finally, what I need to say is that the United Nations is an instrument created by its member states, and we would like to be a useful and effective instrument in the service of what we all strive to achieve that are enshrined in the UN Charter. Thank you very much for that answer. Two questions that have now come up. One from Francis Collins, a deputy director at the Department of Foreign Affairs, who asks, why in your view is there such reluctance by some states to recommit to past obligations under the NPT? And how can countries like Ireland ensure that we do not end up with an outcome of the lowest common denominator at the RevCon? That's the first question. And the second question, another subject very near our hearts and yours, women, peace and security. You did speak about that in your presentation. What are the main challenges now to the full implementation of this Security Council resolution? There's been a lot of talk about mainstreaming the issue. Why is it taking so long? Okay. So the first question, why reluctance to past commitments? I mean, they say very openly why? Because the security environment has changed dramatically. The world that we are in now are different from the time that those commitments were made. And so a lot of many countries are looking at the changes in the international security environment and starting from there and therefore looking at the previous commitments. That is something that would not serve their security but the other way around. So the arguments that we make is that no, in fact, those agreements and commitments, you know, norms, et cetera, they are actually very important to, you know, try to make sure that the security environment will not further deteriorate. And so, you know, for us, it is an important part of the norms that we have collectively created. As I said, it's a combination of, you know, a gamut of various different types of arrangements that we have in the European Disarmament Regime and past commitments is one of important elements of such a package. And so we hope that countries will return to, you know, commitments, reaffirm their commitments and try to, in fact, create an environment that is conducive to talking about, okay, so the context, the environment has changed. What else do we need to do? What are the new things that we need to do to look at the reality and tackle the reality of the security environment rather than, you know, sort of demolishing and forgetting and going away from the norms and the commitments that have made before. So let us hope that that could be done at the review conference. And we will definitely work with countries like Ireland. What can you do? I think it is, they are majority of countries that speak to the importance of past commitments. And therefore, I think those voices consistently heard in diplomacy definitely is a very important reminder to all of us. And so, you know, we would very much like to work with you in that regard. Women, peace and security agenda, why has it been so slow? That's a good question. I think it is probably a combination of various answers. One, it's, you know, unfortunately, they are different, you know, status of progress in, you know, looking at different parts of the world. And I would also need to say that the current COVID-19 pandemic has set this issue related to, for example, violence against women. Set us back in the reverse direction. So they are still a long way to go. The good news is that they are now clear data that this is not just the right thing to do, but it is an, you know, important operation necessity, as the Secretary General say, it's a smart thing to do. So if we want to achieve sustainable development, if we want to sustain peace, if we want to resolve conflicts, all of those objectives I hope the international community shares very strongly, if that is the case, then achieving women, peace and security agenda will help achieve that overall objective. So I think we need to continue to emphasize that smart thing to do part of it. And of course, we need, you know, when we are tackling with those issues, setting of a very concrete numerical, in many instances, targets and objectives, creating a clear implementation framework together with monitoring mechanisms and evaluation mechanisms. In other words, to be driven by the data on progress, et cetera, and consistently adjusting policy frameworks to making sure that the progress will not slow. I think those are the efforts that we need to take all simultaneously. This is one of those priority agenda for myself, but also for the entire UN system. And it is encouraging that many member states actually come around this WPS agenda and continuously helping us to implement this. Thank you for that. Two more questions. I'm trying to get in as many as possible, because I know our time is running out. The first one is from Peter Gunning, who is a member of the IIEA. And to ask for your views on the extent that China may engage in disarmament discussions, is it more likely to do so in a UN framework or in an expanded US-Russia-China framework? And the second question is from Pamela Moraga from the Permanent Mission of Chile to the UN Office in Geneva. And she thanks you for your presentation. And she asks about the MPT in the Middle East. The UN convened a conference in this regard and it was considered successful. Nevertheless, for some countries from that region, this conference does not exclude the responsibilities imposed in the 1995 resolution. What are your views on this and how can it be handled in a manner that it does not impact on the review conference in too negative a manner? Yes, thank you for these questions. Again, very important but difficult ones. Let me first tackle the first question related to China. Our messages have been actually quite clear on this. Number one, in view of the fact that still some 90% of nuclear arsenals belong to the two nuclear superpowers, that is the United States and the Russian Federation, we ask the two countries to engage and extend new start treaty, which is very, very important. Not just for the two countries, but it's for the entire world security. However, we did say that, and I hope you noticed in my remarks, going forward, we think it will be really important to explore the ways to include all nuclear weapons, not just strategic weapons, strategic nuclear arsenals, all kinds of nuclear weapons, and also all kinds of nuclear weapon states to be involved in arms control negotiation processes. So we hope that this will feature part of the reflections that we all need to take. I say to China, and our clear positions on this, as I just stated, China has obviously heard us many times, but I also say to my Chinese friends and colleagues that the call for China to be involved in those conversations is simply a reflection that China is now considered to be a global power, not just from an economic point of view, but also from a military point of view. So, you know, world power, superpower also has a responsibility, and that includes those negotiations and dialogues together with others. And I hope that either in the context of a UN or perhaps other multilateral platforms or between the countries themselves, we don't know which ways or maybe there are some other options as well. But we do hope that all nuclear weapons states will be able to discuss their responsibilities for further reductions and also different kinds of nuclear weapons to be looked at in the future. And if there is anything that the UN could do to support them, of course, we will be quite keen to do so. But in the first instance, I think it's those nuclear weapon states that are fully aware of their responsibilities. I go back to the and five or key five dialogue mechanisms. That is just one example of their realization that they do have a special responsibility that they need to fulfill. And they are continuing with that. The Middle East Conference. As you know, we had one conference. But that was last year, 2019, that was able to adopt a quite good political declaration, which made very clear that it is open and inclusive process. It is not exclusive one only with existing, you know, participating states, but it's open to all countries of the region. And unfortunately, I mean, we were supposed to have the second conference in November, obviously, because of the COVID, it was postponed, and it will take place next year. We hope that, you know, the current sort of political declaration that makes it very clear, the, you know, inclusive and open nature of the process will be fully understood by others. And we hope that, you know, perhaps not immediately, but in the future, there will be opportunities for others to be, you know, engaged in this process of, you know, identifying the way forward on this issue. There are, you know, informal works that are, you know, continuing, you know, we have done together with a couple of countries, lessons learned from other nuclear weapon free zones from other parts of the world, etc. So they, you know, obviously, this is a complicated issue. So there are many more things to be studied and discussed. But as the UN secretariat, we are fully committed to supporting this process. Now, in the context of the MPT, we hope that now that there is a UN process, you know, this Middle East conference is now within the UN. MPT is not a UN process. So there is now another platform to discuss this issue of a prison in the Middle East elsewhere, not in the context of the MPT. So if you will, that achievement that there is now a process separately from the MPT is a positive contribution in the context of MPT, in that they don't have to discuss this, bring this issue back to the MPT, that has, you know, support the process that is taking place in the UN context. Obviously, the progress of, you know, from that process, the UN process will be reported and fed back into the MPT discussions. But now that has recognized that there is a separate process going on. And that's all I hope give that process a chance in the UN. It has only started a year ago, and there has only been one conference. And so what we need to do is to give a chance to that new process that is still taking place in the UN context. Thank you very much. A very, very last question, and another small question. None of these questions have been small questions. They've been all major issues as befitting the topic. And this is from Andrew Gilmour in the AIIEA, and he asks, how am I placing nuclear weapons and the disarmament agenda at the intersection with climate change and public health heighten the relevance of the non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear weapon states? Thank you. That's a very important question. I mean, first of all, the COVID impact. I recently gave a speech at another platform on how the COVID has impacted the overall, not just nuclear, but overall disarmament work. And it's, you know, they are obviously quite a lot of impacts. But at the sort of high level, at the strategic level, I think there are some quite important lessons that we need to apply from COVID, and then look at the intermincages. I mentioned one. I mean, seemingly unlikely events can actually cause this. So let's apply that to nuclear disarmament. You know, it's an urgency issue. But it's also, as I mentioned, you know, really made us realize, I hope made everyone realize that nuclear weapons alone cannot make us safe. Invisible virus has actually put the entire world into this situation really means that we have to really rethink our approaches to security overall and put humans more at the center and renew or reinvigorate our efforts to reduce weaponry. We also think that because of the fiscal pressure that we will all have to recover from COVID, et cetera, you know, there will be limited opportunity, I hope, for countries to continue with the current path of the unlimited military expenditure. There are some experts, you know, Cypri, for example, who would argue that there will be a small window of opportunity because of COVID for countries to really realize that this is a time to actually try to secure national security through negotiation and diplomacy rather than continuing to increase military budgets. So there are, you know, many sort of entry points and linkages that we can build. And I hope that this will become a new sort of a trend in our multilateral discussions as well. This was noted. We noted this as me went through the first committee this year. Part of it was a virtual format that many countries in fact made a reference to this issue. So we hope that this will become one of the trends that we could we could also create, if you will, as we come out of the COVID crisis. The same goes for climate change. I mean, climate change and nuclear weapons are two existential threats that we still have. And as the Secretary General made his remarks, policy speech just last week at Columbia University, you know, he would like to make sure that next year 2021 will be a year of quantum leap when it comes to tackling climate change issues. And we hope that that will be the same for nuclear disarmament because we have many opportunities, as I illustrated in my remarks, throughout 2021. So let us use those opportunities to the better and more secure world that we can have. Well, thank you so much, High Representative, Under Secretary General. Thank you so much for your time, your enthusiasm. You have a very big job and you do it with such energy and with such kindness and sharing your thoughts with us. Thank you and good luck for 2021 and the review conference. Thank you so much again for this meeting. And it was really nice to see you again. I hope you will all stay well and have a nice, holy day season.