 Welcome, everybody. Thanks for a lot to be here. I'm going to talk about credit strategies in an uncertain world. We have put uncertain world in the title, in fact, because where we talk a lot to investors, they could be hedge fund managers, they could be asset managers, they could be pension fund or insurance. And clearly what is showing at the beginning of the year is that it's very, very hard right now to build an asset location. There is a lot of challenges. And just to define the scope of today, I am not trying to give you a macro view on how to allocate far from it. What I will try to do is give a bit of background on the credit market, then talk about the different strategies that can be implemented. Not all of them, but some of them, let's say with a few constraints, that will allow you to potentially achieve your objectives. And then I will try to put a little bit of a macro element in the sense that we look at three different scenarios and we'll see all these different strategies can behave in the scenarios. We'll see that unfortunately there's not a single one that works in every scenario, obviously. So we'll start with the landscape. So when we talk about credit, clearly we have to look at the fixed income space first. So the slide is here showing the size of various markets, governments, corporate, quasi sovereign and also structured credit. So clearly you can see that obviously government bonds are a huge part of the system world, but you can also see that the corporate world is quite diverse through high grade, through region, through IEAD, also structures of loans, and that's the darker circles. I can see that there can be also quite large markets. The government bond has a huge impact on the credit market, and I'll put that away by looking at this graph. So we like to look at the performance of the government bonds is this graph where you can see the return and the yield, but the return is decomposed of how much came from the coupon and how much came from the change in rates. And you can see obviously as the yield goes down, the coupon has been going down, and right now as you can see the coupon is offering very, very little, not an expected return, but also buffer in case of rising rates. This environment is creating a huge demand for higher yields, and that's what has driven the flow into credit in general. Here it's a graph which is a simple model that shows effectively all the credit market can be mapped to the earning growth on the S&P 500. So it's USI yield versus S&P 500. You can see that it matched pretty nicely, and you can see that recently the spread, because it's an inverted scale, the spread has tightened a lot. But that's an illustration of flows. I could show you a graph of flow. You will see a huge, huge inflows in high yields. That's been an asset class or a sector that has been very, very high in demand. And indeed you can see it on the performance. The performance has been steady. The coupon has been reducing. And despite the loss due to the duration last year, you had some credit spread tightening that helps. So the price return is close to flat. And effectively, investors last year were able to collect the coupon on the yield market. Another market that has seen a huge amount of inflows is the leverage load market. It didn't see much outflow last year, contrary to other markets, because they are in general floating rates. And in an environment where rates go up, investors like the structure that are floating. Unfortunately for investors, this is also a market that is less liquid. And typically, when you invest in leverage loan, you should expect to hold it till maturity, contrary to an ideal bond or any form of bond where you have more an active market. It's more fungible, so you can trade around. Leverage loan, I would say, it's essentially a loan to poor quality companies. Once an investor enter a loan, he better invests for the long run because trading will be expensive. You can see here the behavior of the leverage loan market. You can see it's been much more steady. There was a huge hiccup in 08. The funny story is that before 08, the investors in leverage loan were all thinking that he could never go below 95. In 08, leverage loan market went to 70 cents on the dollar. So it's been a huge shock. And effectively, you can see the rebound has been quite strong and the people that were able to hold on the paper were fine. The people that were levered on leverage loan lost a lot of money because they could not hold the position. So the leverage loan is an attractive market for its floating rate structure. The coupon is not particularly attractive today. What you sacrifice for this pickup in lead is essentially the liquidity part. So the last traditional market I'd like to talk about is the emerging market. Emerging market debt. This is an interesting market because you can see that on the flowchart, so that's the one on the left hand side, there has been a huge amount of inflows in the emerging market for many, many years. And you can see that last year it came from the favorite market for investors to the most dated market with massive outflows. Emerging market debt is very, very much purchased by, what can I say, foreigners. So US, European investors, we invested in Brazil for example. And that means that it's very speculative. It's not necessarily for the very long run. And when you have a change in environment, this is one of the first market that suffers. And that's what we've seen last year. So an emerging market debt investor would expect to have a diversification in its allocation. But what he had last year was essentially US duration. You can see it in the return on the right hand side, the bar just there. So this is the emerging market government bond index. Huge loss not only in spread but also in duration. Contrary to credit high yield, for example, that you can see here where you get the spread compression compensated for the duration. So this is a highly speculative market and it has proven quite a poor instrument for, let's say, diversification of portfolios. Now let's go to the alternative credit strategies. What I'm going to try to address here is how can you target specific segment of the credit market to maybe improve your yield or maybe, I would say, protect your portfolio. So the first strategy I'd like to talk about essentially is on the refinancing side. It's very interesting to see that in 2013, you can see on the pie chart that 57% of the issuance were used for refinancing. So a huge, there was a lot of issuance and the huge amount of issuance, most of the issuance, new issuance have been used to refinance and roll the debt forward. That creates a real opportunity because there is huge demand for debt. The credit markets are very open. It's quite easy for a company to issue because there is demand. And you can see on this graph here, the red line is the yield of the new issuance. So if you issue today, you have a 565 and 7.45 will be the average coupon of your current debt. So I'm simplifying, but that's for the sake of the argument. So imagine you are a corporate company, you are a company you have currently a debt that has a coupon of 7.45. You have the opportunity today to roll, to refinance, to issue a debt, to buy back this old debt at 5.65 yield. So to simplify, let's say 5.65 coupon. That's very good from a cash flow standpoint. You save 2% per year. So a lot of companies are induced into refinancing. They are happy to make some, to give up a bit of money upfront for the operation. And effectively, investors that are targeting companies that are going to refinance are going to make an extra, an extra return. So the strategy that has been very common in many H1 has been to target companies that are quite poor quality, that will certainly default in the next few years. But because the credit market is so open, these companies have the opportunity to roll their debt, to extend their debt. So what many investors have done is that they are somewhat arbitraging the probability of default that this company has because this company is very levered in my default in the future. So obviously it has a higher spread than average. But at the same time, on the short term, on the next year, it's very unlikely that it defaults because it will refinance. And it's hard to reflect in the price. So this pickup in it can be captured by this strategy. What you're doing here, when you're doing this strategy effectively, is you are leveraging default risk. So there is many kinds of risk when you're investing credit. You have some duration, some credit spread duration, so the variation in the spread, and some default risk. If you target a very short dated bond, you have no duration, very little credit spread duration. And because it's a poor quality company, you have a high default risk. So by targeting that, you're exchanging the risk that you've seen on this graph here, which was essentially, let's say, first graph is duration. Second graph will be the credit spread change. So imagine this blue line here, reverting back to the model based on S&P earnings. You will have losses in I yield. Well, if you have a one year bond, you'll have much lower losses. I'll come back on scenarios and these strategies. This is a very bullish strategy for the status quo environment. If it stays the same, it's very efficient. If things change, it can be very detrimental. Another strategy that can help investors in the credit market is to focus on this stress situation. So this stress investment is investment in companies that are in trouble and that need restructuring. Essentially, you buy the debt of a good company with too much debt. And the company defaults, you restructure the company, and you exchange the debt into new stock. And you end up with the stock of a good company with no more debt, which is quite a powerful position. Here, you can see the insurance of the market on I yield and leverage loan, again, on the US market. You can see that this year has been spiking again in terms of off insurance. It's been very, very active. And in general, when you have huge demand and huge volume of new debt, you can expect that the debt is getting lower and lower in quality. You have also some statistic here in terms of mortality rate. So how much of the debt is defaulting after certain years? And here, it's interesting to see that if you take a single B bond, on average, after four years, 24% of the bond have defaulted. And if you take a triple C bond after four years, on average, 45% have defaulted. So now, if you go back to that, and you look at the cycle, you can see that we are piling up for some default in the future. What is preventing today default, essentially, is that we have a huge quantitative easing. It makes money plentiful, huge ingredients for yield, and therefore, huge demand for new bonds that come back to the refinancing story. You're a bad company. You can refinance. It's no problem. The market is open. Another indicator in terms of declining quality that is very often looked at is what we call covenant light. So when you issue a bond, I mean, as a creditor, there are covenants, especially in loans that are private by nature, let's say, or more bespoke. As a senior creditor, you will put into the contract of the loan that the company should not overlaver itself. The company should not make crazy acquisitions just to control that your money is safe. And if you are happy to take more risk, you can waive these covenants. You can say, well, no covenant or very light covenant. That's why we call it covenant light. And it's at the peak of the last credit bubble in 2007, there was 25% of new insurance where covenant light. Well, in 2013, we have 51% covenant light. That doesn't bode well in terms of credit quality. So there is no distressed opportunity, really, right now. The default projection is quite low because markets are very open, there's no problem. But coming in the next few years, we can expect that there will be a distressed wave of default, I would say. The first strategy I'd like to mention is lending. The current environment since 2008 has seen the bank retrench dramatically for their core activity, which is lending to corporations. You can see it here. This is a graph that's written on Europe. You can see that every, basically, year, three month period, the lending activity of banks is contracting. That leaves a huge demand for loans that is not fulfilled by the banks, and therefore that leaves a place for private money to fill the gap. And effectively, there are some funds and some large corporations that are setting up this banking activity to lend to a corporation. What's interesting today is that because there is a huge demand and a little supply of uses, the spreads are very attractive on these strategies, and you can pick up a very nice extra yield. You totally sacrifice the notion of liquidity because if you make a loan to the company across the road, and it's a loan just between you and this company, it will be very hard to find investors that will be willing to buy this loan because it doesn't exist in the market. It's not actively traded. So that's really, really liquid, and it's more on the real, I would say, in terms of vehicle, of philosophy of investment, the private equity side rather than, I would say, on the fund H1 side. Another strategy that is interesting to mention in credit, or in our sector, is the structured credit sector. It was booming just before 2008. You can see the issuance on the left side of values categories, especially, as you can see, on RMBS residential mortgages in the US. It collapsed in 2008, obviously. But it restarts. And this sector is essentially driven by the hunger for yield because by structuring existing pool of debt, you can improve the yield just by the way you can structure things. You can put some more leverage into it also. And that's what you see here. So we expect the credit market, the structured credit market to continue to grow and to create opportunities because this is still a market that people dislike a lot. And if it's a market that is disregarded, in general, that leaves some opportunity. I will put a little caveat on this one in the sense that this is still a very dangerous market. And I can tell you that, for example, unigestion, we have very limited exposure to this market. But this is an important market to talk about in this session. All this strategy I mentioned, we're all about improving your yield, so improving the yield pickup. Here, it's a strategy that is reversed. How do you exploit the fact that the yield are very compressed or the spreads are very tight? Can you take advantage of it? Well, yeah, you can short. Shorting is very interesting in credit because first it's very uncommon. Credit investors by definition like to collect coupon, collect carry, and very few like to pay this carry. So very few players have the mindset of shorting credit. Shorting credit is attractive today because there is not only, I would say, in this environment, the opportunities to spot companies that are going to default. But also, you can buy companies, by protection and companies that are very good and you can still make money. Here, it's an example on Heinz. So it's a very strong company. It's a very good brand. It has a strong balance sheet. It's investment grade. It's consumer staples. It's nice and stable sector. The CDS five years was a cost to ensure your debt over a year for five years was 50 bits per year, so 50 basis point per year, sorry. And well, last year there was an LBO on this company. Berkshire Rotterway, I think, purchased the company and the spread exploded because an LBO is a leveled buyout. The level of debt of Heinz has been increased dramatically and the spread moved from 50 to 200. So essentially, if you make 150 basis point times the duration of the CDS five, you're going to make 7.5%. So it's a very asymmetric trade. You risk 50 basis point to make 7.5. So on the shorting side, you can effectively short companies that are going to, you think they're going to default. You're fighting, effectively, the willingness of the easy or easy history finance. But you can also short companies that might be LBO because a lot of the talk of this year is about activism and that all equity investors are going to be more activists. And so a lot of LBO are expected to let's say level the equity market. So that's an attractive strategy if you want to edge your portfolio. The cost is quite low and a lot of value added can be provided with the right credit picking. If we look at environments, again on a session like that, it's very difficult to make all the scenarios possible. So we're going to look at three main scenarios. And the graph I like to use for that is a graph that I borrow from a website called ShadowStats because they continue to try to publish M3. So M3 is a monetary mass in the US in the broadest sense, counting everything. And it's nice to compare it versus the M1, which is, I would say, the tightest monetary mass measure, which is more like just at the treasury level. So what is interesting with this graph, and we look a little bit at the history, I mean 0405, you can see the growth of the monetary mass on a measure as M1 and M3 is roughly the same, around 5%. Then you enter in 0607 and during this period there is a huge amount of leverage deployed by the industry, by banks. So velocity of money, the bank multiplier is massive and you can see that the M3 is exploding, the central bank is trying to control it by effectively reducing the growth in M1. So there is some even some rising rate during this period. Obviously it collapsed in weight. There is a huge retrenchment on the financial market. You have the M3 is collapsing and the central bank intervenes by putting a lot of money in the system through quantitative easing. There is a stabilization and now you can see the direction that is taking. The M3 has stabilized a bit but it's still because there is a huge M1 and clearly one way to look at what the target is, the Fed is targeting is they would like certainly to land the M1 and the M3 towards 5%. So it's like a convergence of these two curves. They are going to withdraw money or reduce their quantitative easing and at the same time they expect the bank and the financial system to increase the velocity of money and the multiplier. So it's really a difficult landing. We were talking about trillions of dollars but that needs to match but that's possible. So the three scenarios are the following. The first scenario is that they are not able to make it happen and we stay in this scenario where we have high M1, way higher than the M3, the velocity is not restarting, the banks are not re-landing, the financial market remain kind of broken and they continue to use quantitative easing to maintain the economy. It's a statuco scenario. Second scenario, they lose control either because economy restart too strong and they are not able to put the break fast enough or they put the break too fast and they break it but just they lose control. And the third scenario is that they manage to effectively make the M1 land on the M3. So all of the strategy reacting to these three scenarios. Refinancing first. So refinancing in the statuco scenario, so as of today, well it's great. You have ample liquidity, you can target the worst company ever, they will refinance so you will pick up this extra spread by buying the soon to be refinanced debt of poor companies. That might be the most attractive strategy on this scenario. So to credit, well because there is such an hunger for yield, the growth is going to be massive, the demand is going to be massive and there would be a lot of, let's say, re-leveraging of this structure and we should expect good performance from structure credit again. Lending, lending is good. The bank are still staying away, if not the M3, that would mean that the M3 would have gone up. So there is not no competition from the bank. We can expect that over investors are supporting the same opportunity and are setting themselves up. So the risk effectively on lending is that at some point it will be crowded out and the spread that you can make of, let's say, 8% for lending to a good company or 6%, 8% are going to go down to 5, 6, 4, 5, 5. It will be arbitrage just because an opportunity like that will be arbitrage. This test, little to do, there is no default. There is not much to do. What we can expect on a status cost scenario and this test, the bright spot is that during all the years since 2008, the bank have not sold the bad debt. They have reinsured it. They have used innovative way, let's say, to reduce their visual leverage, but they have not physically sold the bad assets. With the good performance of financial market, the provision have been made and now the bad assets can be sold because the losses have been provisioned. So these assets that are poor and need to be restructured will drip progressively to these stress players and that will maintain a little bit of return. So there is a bit of return, a bit of money to make in distress, but it's not a huge opportunity. Shorting, it will be almost impossible to make money shorting credit because no defaults, the only hope is to pick the LBO example. It's possible, but it's still difficult. So small losses are to be expected from shorting in such an environment. On the second scenario, which is the central bank are losing control and we trigger the Fincest income exodus, you will have a sell-off in most markets. The first market that will suffer a lot is refinancing. If the first strategy is to suffer is refinancing because credit market will just stop to operate. This huge ability to refinance will disappear and companies that should default will default and all the companies that have pushed back this event will certainly default at the same time. So we'll have a huge, huge stress on the corporate world. Not necessarily on the investment grade, but there's a lot of small companies that will not survive. So to credit, again, credit markets are seizing. The risk premium link to complexity is going to be priced massively and very, very heavy losses will be generated. The interesting difference between refinancing and social credit is that in the refinancing strategy, it's an actual default, but going to cost money. So the money is lost. It's no hope of recovery. The loss is realized. In the social credit, it's more like a market to market situation. So the loss will be big, but will not be realized. It will be unrealized. And if things get better, the loss will be recovered. In the lending strategy, that's where the beauty of lending is, is that because it's outside the market, there is no market to market. So in fact, this financial crisis that I'm describing in this scenario will not affect necessarily the company across the road. So if you've done your work on their ability to repay the debt, you'll be unaffected and even better. Given that the financial situation gets worse, your position will be stronger to lend to even more companies at an even more attractive rate because of just supply demand. So demand will be as strong and the supply will have collapse. On the distress side, there will be initial market to market losses because this trust manager typically will take advantage of this situation to purchase assets from the weakest end. And therefore, there will be losses as the potential return of the strategy increase. So it will be the strategy that becomes the most attractive post-crisis. It's hard to time the bottom. So it will be a strategy that has a significant drawdown but then a very, very, very strong rebound. Shorting, obviously, that's the best scenario. That's where the strategy is going to make very, very large gains. On the third scenario, control tapering. While refinancing, we'll have mediocre performance because slowly but surely there will be default. The rationalization means that some companies, that the worst companies will stop being able to refinance. And these small defaults will eat up the extra performance that you were able to pick up. So slowly, the strategy will go away with mediocre performance. On the strategic credit, it should be benign. There is absolutely no reason that there is a boom or a bust on this sector. The return will be average. And we should expect that if the normal cycle happens, there will be excess leverage building up to try to maintain returns by, I would say, too aggressive managers. On the lending side, that's the worst scenario because banks will be back in business and will crowd out the private sector and banks are much more efficient to lend. That's their business. So they will do it cheaper than you and therefore you'll be priced out. On the distress side, that's quite interesting because this scenario doesn't have a huge sell-off before recovery. It's more like a, let's say, a Goldilocks scenario. That's what we could expect. The best scenario we can imagine. But the market will not collapse by 40%, 20% on a stress. But what will happen is that a company that should have defaulted will default and default will drip over the next three to five years. So distress cycle in general, you have a big shock with a huge amount of default. In this scenario, you will have a regular amount of default every year for a couple of years. So instead of making 30%, 40% in a good year for distress, you might make 15 but instead of for three years. So instead of making, let's say 45 in one year, you'll do 15 for three years. So it's still a decent scenario. On the shorting side will be negative carry that you have should be offset by some gains, but it's not particularly attractive in this scenario. So you can see every strategy has pros and cons. And what we find interesting in fact is that when you look at what our strategy perform and how you can understand his behavior in various environments, it's particularly attractive to see how you can mix and match them. So the thing about distress was a very nice strategy in terms of how it will behave in the third scenario, control tapering, which is let's say you trust the central bank will do the right thing. It's also not such a bad strategy in the first scenario because there will be a bit of return. So the only problem is that in the second scenario when there is a sell-off, it suffers a lot before recovering the restaurant. If you can take off a little bit of the drawdown during the sell-off, it will be a great strategy. Shorting only works during the sell-off. So in fact, when you match both, you have a very nice portfolio, distressed investment on the long side, shorting very tight spread. And effectively that's a strategy that many hedge funders are doing on the long short credit side. They are picking stocks or bonds, sorry, that are particularly undervalued and not really crowded. Last year, for example, the best trade you could do on the credit side was effectively to purchase the preferred shares of anime and Freddie Mac. It's clearly a distressed situation. And shorting basically edge all the risk on, let's say, the tightest credit you can find to edge a systemic risk. On the other hand, lending is another strategy that matches very well with structured credit because on the lending side, the problem is, it's a nice strategy, but the problem is there is a high risk of being crowded out. So there is a risk of disappointing returns if things get too tight. Structured credit allow you effectively to secure financing to put some leverage on it. And for example, the best example I can give as an illustration is that if a bank today doesn't want to lend to a company, it's because it costs too much on its balance sheet in terms of ratio. So they try to optimize their balance sheet and that's basically what prevents them to lend more to companies. As a private investor, you can lend to the company. And in fact, for the bank, lending to you as a private investor costs less on their ratio than lending to the company. So they can lend to you so that you lend to the company. In fact, the bank ended up lending to the company but through you as an intermediary. When I say you, I'm talking about a private investor, through a fund. And we can put two turns of leverage on very good quality loans and to have a pick-up of a field that would be attractive, the leverage being secured for the duration of the loan. So that's also things that can be very, very interesting to max. On this point, I would like to hand it over to you and see if you have any question. I have a hard time believing that the central banks don't know what they're doing because that's something we hear sometimes they are not. And I think they know what they're doing and I do not bet against them. So I think the, and we have to be optimistic. I think the scenario three is the most likely but there is a definite risk of them to fail. That's a, but if you have to make a most probable, I would say that these very intelligent people that have a huge, huge army of economists and scientists should be able to pull it off. Where is the big risk in unworked scenario? So for instance, I don't know, China going to the gold standard doesn't be like that. Okay. Yeah, that's an excellent scenario but that's, you'll end up in this. I mean, I mean, such a huge event. If you go World War or this, I mean, obviously, that's a crisis scenario. Very small probability. It's hard to do anything with it. The best thing you can do is make sure that your your risk management is tight enough to, you will lose money in this kind of scenario. So is it all bearable? Can it be? European distress supply driven by asset quality review. Yeah, that's what will happen. The trick is that already in the late in the early 90s, there was a everybody was expecting a boon from the German banks that had a lot of that depth. And as a as a hedge fund investor and talking to the hedge fund market, I never really saw it coming. And it never really materialized because in fact, it's done beyond closed door. In two years ago, there was the idea that the banks had so much bad assets, they needed to get rid of it. And everybody was expecting what we could be weak. So bid wanted in competition, which is like a public auction. But this is crazy. This will never happen. What happened is they go to people they trust that they are used to work with, they show their book, they discuss and they try to they try to offload the assets discreetly with people they have confidence with. So that will not be a huge opportunity where everybody that would be very public. But there will be an offload of this debt progressively as they have built the provision and they need to offload the bad debt to be able to re-operate properly. What's very interesting is that the last few years, really on the banks, regular territory capital operation. So in our jargon, we call it RECAP. Essentially the banks invite someone to come. They open the book and so the external professional will effectively act as a reinsurer. He will select a part of the book and he will take the first loss on this book that will tremendously improve the ratio of the bank without really removing the ultimate risk of the paper. And the trick is that the person that pick the names, pick good names. So the ratio are a bit blind. I mean they don't make fundamental analysis. I mean it's based on ratings and automatic things. So this optimization, they are optimizing the ratio using the insurance techniques. That's what happened in the last few years. I hope that they have done it as much as they could. Now they need to offload the assets. And amongst the stress funds, there was a lot of asset raising but the opportunities didn't materialize. Is there a lot of dry powder in the stress funds? There is a lot of dry powder but we didn't see so much. We saw asset raising on more effectively on a private equity structure for the two years ago. People were creating funds that were going to target specifically the offload from the bank. Which I don't know what they did with the money effectively because there was very little. But more the traditional stress funds and to give you an idea of what we think. A distress fund today has two choices. It can either fund the market. The market is expensive so it can either recognize it and say, well, I will reduce my exposure and I have only 50% of my portfolio invested but it will invest in, I would say, very high octane securities. Or it can say, well, I don't know what to do with my money and therefore I'm going to the next level of my expertise and I will be lending. So I will enter in illiquid loans. The second category is disaster. Because the value of a distressed investor is effectively to have this value approach when the market gets expensive, he builds dry powder and when the market collapses, he will be buying when everybody else is saying. The distressed investors that lock himself in illiquid loans will go bankrupt when the market goes down. And that's what happened in 0708. Very, very large distressed funds which were very famous, that one was called Plainfield. Basically they will not accept that the return was not there so they needed to engineer it. So they levered the book with more illiquid strategies. Unfortunately they were not the only one and all these ones have disappeared essentially. So it's very important for us when we look at all the behave to see that they are behaving in the right way which is race cash. That's normal to race cash right now. Please. I'm trying to get my hand around your scenario again. What happens when we actually see a differentiation of the central bank's strategies like between the U.S. where we will probably sooner but it's isn't a break in the ECB which we'll have to carry on for a long while to test the bank. Yeah, the U.S. have already tapered by 20 billion per month versus injecting 65 billion per month so it's not like they have removed liquidity really. But yes, macro anticipation is that the U.S. is more on a recovery side when Europe has still a lot to do. But it's the same scenario for every country. I mean the one which is maybe the most advanced is Japan that is on a ultimate QE and trying to get the velocity of money to go up. The history of Japan is interpreted as that every time they had a start of recovery they tighten too fast. And our opinion is that the Fed right now they are tapering a bit but if they have bad numbers economically I will not be surprised. We go back from 65 to 75. I mean they will be very reactive. That's why for me the first scenario will be the they will do whatever it takes. I don't think they are dogmatic in the sense that they apply a school of thought and they apply it and then whatever happens. They want to pilot things. Not exactly my question. I was wondering, you're really looking at the U.S. market that leads from all the charts. Yeah, because it's a bigger one, yeah. Of course, but is there a differential breaking up with those differential monitoring regimes? Financial markets are international nowadays. So if you have a demand on the credit side in Europe the money can come from the U.S. So it's quite fluid. What I mean, you can look at it as when we look at QE, we should look at QE worldwide. So we need to U.S., Europe, Japan, China, U.K. to a lesser extent. And C basically is the world continue to print money. China wants to remove shadow banking so that's tightening the effect. So yes, right now we have an interesting situation where not everybody is in the same direction. I don't think there is that much impact for credit in itself because money is moving around the world. Much more impact on the currencies, so on the macro side. So it's another subject, but for macro investors that would be a great news to see different cycle across the world. Capital flow controls. From? As an instrument. In what sense? But if there were, if some company introduced capital flow controls, obviously the big ones would be very difficult. Yeah, I'm not qualified to, let's be on my competency, this kind of reflection. The only one I know about is Iceland because there is a deal on the liquidation of their bank. And actually the problem is that a lot of private investors, a lot of hedge funds are owning, let's call it debt of lands banking and copting, so the different Icelandic bank. They are going to recover money, the problem is they are going to recover Icelandic corona. If they pull it back, they're gonna destroy the currency. So the government is very scared of basically settling with these foreign investors that will suddenly eat the currency. So that's a little bit of control on the currency side. But it's very unclear what's going to happen here. Last question, or if you still have a question that you would not like to have on the video, you can ask it now, then we will take it out. Okay, well, I would say let's give a hand. Thank you.