 Section 30 of An Essay Concerning, Human Understanding Book II by John Locke. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Ryan Bassett. Chapter 31 of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas 1. Of our real ideas, some are adequate and some are inadequate. Those I call adequate, which perfectly represent those archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from, which it intends them to stand for and to which it refers them. Inadequate ideas are such which are but a partial or incomplete representation of those archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which account it is plain. 2. First, that all our simple ideas are adequate. Because being nothing but the effects of certain powers and things, fitted and ordained by God to produce such sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those powers. And we are sure they agree to the reality of things. For if sugar produce in us the ideas which we call whiteness and sweetness, we are sure there is a power in sugar to produce those ideas in our minds. Or else they could not have been produced by it. And so, each sensation answering the power that operates on any of our senses, the idea so produced is a real idea, and not a fiction of the mind which has no power to produce any simple idea. And cannot but be adequate since it ought only to answer that power, and so all simple ideas are adequate. It is true, the things producing in us these simple ideas are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the causes of them, but as if those ideas were real beings in them. For though fire be called painful to the touch, whereby is signified the power of producing in us the idea of pain, yet it is denominated also light and hot as if light and heat were really something in the fire more than a power to excite these ideas in us, and therefore are called qualities in or of the fire. But these being nothing in truth but powers to excite such ideas in us, I must in that sense be understood when I speak of secondary qualities as being in things, or of their ideas as being the objects that excite them in us. Such ways of speaking though accommodated to the vulgar notions, without which one cannot be well understood, yet truly signifying nothing but those powers which are in things to excite certain sensations or ideas in us, sense where there are no fit organs to receive the impressions fire makes on the sight and touch, nor a mind joined to those organs to receive the ideas of light and heat by those impressions from the fire or sun. There would yet be no more light or heat in the world than there would be pain if there were no sensible creature to feel it, though the sun should continue just as it is now. And Mount Etna flame higher than ever it did. Solidity and extension and a termination of it, figure, with motion and rest, whereof we have the ideas, would be really in the world as they are, whether there were any sensible being to perceive them or no. And therefore we have reason to look on those as the real modifications of matter. And such are the exciting causes of all our various sensations from bodies. But this being an inquiry not belonging to this place, I shall enter no farther into it, but proceed to show what complex ideas are adequate and whatnot. Three, secondly, our complex ideas of modes being voluntary collections of simple ideas, which the mind puts together without reference to any real archetypes or standing patterns existing anywhere, are and cannot but be adequate ideas. Because they not being intended for copies of things really existing, but for archetypes made by the mind to rank and denominate things by, cannot want anything. They having each of them that combination of ideas and thereby that perfection which the mind intended they should, so that the mind acquiesces in them and can find nothing wanting. Thus by having the idea of a figure with three sides meeting at three angles, I have a complete idea wherein I require nothing else to make it perfect. That the mind is satisfied with the perfection of this, its idea, is plain in that it does not conceive at any understanding hath or can have a more complete or perfect idea of that thing it signifies by the word triangle. Supposing it to exist then itself has in that complex idea of three sides and three angles, in which is contained all that is or can be essential to it or necessary to complete it, wherever or however it exists. But in our ideas of substances that is otherwise, for their desiring to copy things as they really do exist and to present to ourselves that constitution on which all their properties depend, we perceive our ideas attained not that perfection we intend, we find they still want something we should be glad we're in them and so we're all inadequate. But mixed modes and relations being archetypes without patterns and so having nothing to represent but themselves cannot but be adequate, everything being so to itself. He that at first put together the idea of danger perceived, absence of disorder from fear, and sedate consideration of what was justly to be done and executing that without disturbance or being deterred by the danger of it, had certainly in his mind that complex idea made up of that combination and intending it to be nothing else but what is nor to have any other simple ideas but what it hath, it could not also but be an adequate idea. And laying this up in his memory with the name courage annexed to it to signify to others and denominate from thence any action he should observe and agree with it, had thereby a standard to measure and denominate actions by as they agreed to it. This idea thus made and laid up for a pattern must necessarily be adequate being referred to nothing else but itself nor made by any other original but the good liking and will of him that first made this combination. 4. Indeed another coming after and in conversation learning from him the word courage may make an idea to which he gives the name courage different from what the first author applied it to and has in his mind when he uses it. And in this case if he designs that his idea and thinking should become formable to the other's idea, as the name he uses in speaking is conformable and sound to his from whom he learned it, his idea may be very wrong and inadequate. Because in this case making the other man's idea the pattern of his idea and thinking as the other man's word or sound is the pattern of his in speaking, his idea is so far defective and inadequate as it is distant from the archetype and pattern he refers it to and intends to express and signify by the name he uses for it. Which name he would have to be a sign of the other man's idea to which in its proper use it is primarily annexed and of his own as agreeing to it, to which if his own does not exactly correspond it is faulty and inadequate. 5. Therefore these complex ideas of modes when they are referred by the mind and intended to correspond to the ideas in the mind of some other intelligent being expressed by the names we apply to them they may be very deficient, wrong and inadequate. Because they agree not to that which the mind designs to be their archetype and pattern in which respect only any idea of modes can be wrong, imperfect or inadequate. And on this account our ideas of mixed modes are the most liable to be faulty of any other. But this refers more to proper speaking than knowing right. 6. Thirdly, what ideas we have of substances I have above showed. Now those ideas have in the mind a double reference. One, sometimes they are referred to a supposed real essence of each species of things. Two, sometimes they are only designed to be pictures and representations in the mind of things that do exist by ideas of those qualities that are discoverable in them. In both which ways these copies of those originals and archetypes are imperfect and inadequate. First, it is usual for men to make names of substances stand for things as supposed to have certain real essences whereby they are of this or that species. And names standing for nothing but the ideas that are in men's minds they must constantly refer their ideas to such real essences as to their archetypes. That men, especially such as have been bred up in the learning taught in this part of the world, do suppose certain specific essences of substances which each individual in its several kinds is made conformable to and partakes them. Is so far from needing proof that it will be thought strange if anyone should do otherwise. And thus they ordinarily apply the specific names they rank particular substances under to things as distinguished by such specific real essences. Who is there almost who would not take it amiss if it should be doubted whether he called himself a man with any other meaning than as having the real essence of a man? And yet if you demand what those real essences are it is plain men are ignorant and know them not. From whence it follows that the ideas they have in their minds being referred to real essences as to archetypes which are unknown must be so far from being adequate that they cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all. The complex ideas we have of substances are as it has been shown certain collections of simple ideas that have been observed or supposed constantly to exist together. But such a complex idea cannot be the real essence of any substance for then the properties we discover in that body would depend on that complex idea and be deducible from it. And their necessary connection with it be known as all properties of a triangle depend on and as far as they are discoverable are deducible from the complex idea of three lines including a space. But it is plain that in our complex ideas of substances are not contained such ideas on which all other qualities that are to be found in them do depend. The common idea men have of iron is a body of a certain color weight and hardness and a property that they look on as belonging to it is malleableness. But yet this property has no necessary connection with that complex idea or any part of it. And there is no more reason to think that malleableness depends on that color weight and hardness than that color or that weight depends on its malleableness. And yet though we know nothing of these real essences there is nothing more ordinary than that men should attribute the sorts of things to such essences. The particular parcel of matter which makes the ring I have on my finger is forwardly by most men supposed to have a real essence whereby it is gold. And from whence these qualities flow which I find in it vis its peculiar color weight hardness fusibility fixedness and change of color upon a slight touch of mercury etc. This essence from which all these properties flow when I inquire into and search after it I plainly perceive I cannot discover. The farthest I can go is only to presume that it is being nothing but body its real essence or internal constitution on which these qualities depend. Can be nothing but the figure size and connection of its solid parts. Of neither of which having any distinct perception at all can I have any idea of its essence which is the cause that it has that particular shining yellowness a greater weight than anything I know of the same bulk. And a fitness to have its color changed by the touch of quick silver. If anyone will say that the real essence and internal constitution on which these properties depend is not the figure size and arrangement or connection of its solid parts but something else called its particular form. I am farther from having any idea of its real essence than I was before. For I have an idea of figure size and situation of solid parts in general though I have none of the particular figure size or putting together of parts whereby the qualities above mentioned are produced. Which qualities I find in that particular parcel of matter that is on my finger and not in another parcel of matter with which I cut the pen I write with. But when I am told that something besides the figure size and posture of the solid parts of that body is its essence something called substantial form. Of that I confess I have no idea at all but only of the sound form which is far enough from an idea of its real essence or constitution. The like ignorance is I have of the real essence of this particular substance I have also of the real essence of all other natural ones. Of which essence is I confess I have no distinct ideas at all and I am apt to suppose others when they examine their own knowledge will find in themselves in this one point the same sort of ignorance. 7. Now then, when men apply to this particular parcel of matter on my finger a general name already in use and denominate it gold. Do they not ordinarily or are they not understood to give it that name as belonging to a particular species of bodies having a real internal essence? By having of which essence this particular substance comes to be of that species and to be called by that name? If it be so as it is plain it is the name by which things are marked as having that essence must be referred primarily to that essence. And consequently the idea to which that name is given must be referred also to that essence and be intended to represent it. Which essence since they who so use the names know not their ideas of substances must be all inadequate in that respect. As not containing in them that real essence which the mind intends they should. 8. Secondly, those who neglecting that useless supposition of unknown real essences whereby they are distinguished endeavor to copy the substances that exist in the world by putting together the ideas of those sensible qualities which are found coexisting in them. Though they come much near a likeness of them and those who imagine they know not what real specific essences. Yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate ideas of those substances they would thus copy into their minds. Nor do those copies exactly and fully contain all that is to be found in their archetypes. Because those qualities and powers of substances where off we make their complex ideas are so many and various that no man's complex idea contains them all. That are abstract ideas of substances do not contain in them all the simple ideas that are united in the things themselves it is evident. And that men do rarely put into their complex idea of any substance all the simple ideas they do know to exist in it. Because endeavoring to make the signification of their names as clear and as little cumbersome as they can. They make their specific ideas of the sorts of substance for the most part of a few of those simple ideas which are to be found in them. But these having no original precedency or right to be put in and make the specific idea more than others that are left out. It is plain that both these ways our ideas of substances are deficient and inadequate. The simple ideas where off we make our complex ones of substances are all of them baiting only the figure and bulk of some sorts. Powers which being relations to other substances we can never be sure that we know all the powers that are in any one body. Till we have tried what changes it is fitted to give to or receive from other substances in their several ways of application. Which being impossible to be tried upon any one body much less upon all it is impossible we should have adequate ideas of any substance made up of a collection of all its properties. Nine. Whosoever first lighted on a parcel of that sort of substance we denote by the word gold could not rationally take the bulk and figure he observed in that lump to depend on its real essence or internal constitution. Therefore those never went into his idea of that species of body but its peculiar color perhaps and weight were the first he abstracted from it to make the complex idea of that species. Which both are but powers the one to affect our eyes after such a manner and to produce in us that idea we call yellow and the other to force upwards any other body of equal bulk they being put into a pair of equal scales one against another. Another perhaps added to these the ideas of fusibility and fixedness to other passive powers in relation to the operation of fire upon it. Another its ductility and solubility and aqueous regia to other powers relating to the operation of other bodies and changing its outward figure or separation of it into insensible parts. These or part of these put together usually make the complex idea in men's minds of that sort of body we call gold. Ten but no one who has considered the properties of bodies in general or this sort in particular can doubt that this called gold has infinite other properties not contained in that complex idea. Some who have examined this species more accurately could I believe enumerate ten times as many properties in gold all of them as inseparable from its internal constitution as its color or weight. And it is probable if anyone knew all the properties that are by diverse men known of this metal there would be an hundred times as many ideas go to the complex idea of gold as any one man yet has in his and yet perhaps that not be a thousandth part of what is to be discovered in it. The changes which that one body is apt to receive and make in other bodies upon a due application exceeding far not only what we know but what we are apt to imagine. Which will not appear so much a paradox to anyone who will but consider how far men are yet from knowing all the properties of that one no very compound figure a triangle. Though it be no small number that are already by mathematicians discovered of it. Eleven. So that all our complex ideas of substances are imperfect and inadequate. Which would be so also in mathematical figures if we were to have our complex ideas of them only by collecting their properties in reference to other figures. How uncertain and imperfect would our ideas be of an ellipsis if we had no other idea of it but some few of its properties. Whereas having in our plain idea the whole essence of that figure we from thence discover those properties and demonstratively see how they flow and are inseparable from it. Twelve. Thus the mind has three sorts of abstract ideas or nominal essences. First simple ideas which are ectupa or copies but yet certainly adequate. Because being intended to express nothing but the power in things to produce in the mind such a sensation that sensation when it is produced cannot but be the effect of that power. So the paper I write on having the power in the light I speak according to the common notion of light to produce in men the sensation which I call white it cannot but be the effect of such a power in something without the mind. Since the mind has not the power to produce any such idea in itself and being meant for nothing else but the effect of such a power that simple idea is real and adequate. The sensation of white in my mind being the effect of that power which is in the paper to produce it is perfectly adequate to that power or else that power would produce a different idea. Thirteen. Secondly the complex ideas of substances are ectypes copies too but not perfect ones not adequate. Which is very evident to the mind in that it simply perceives that whatever collection of simple ideas it makes of any substance that exists it cannot be sure that it exactly answers all that are in that substance. Since not having tried all the operations of all other substances upon it and found all the alterations it would receive from or cause in other substances it cannot have an exact adequate collection of all its active and passive capacities. And so not have an adequate complex idea of the powers of any substance existing and its relations which is that sort of complex idea of substances we have. And after all if we would have and actually had in our complex idea an exact collection of all the secondary qualities or powers of any substance we should not yet thereby have an idea of the essence of that thing. For since the powers or qualities that are observable by us are not the real essence of that substance but depend on it and flow from it any collection whatsoever of these qualities cannot be the real essence of that thing. Whereby it is plain that our ideas of substances are not adequate are not what the mind intends them to be. Besides a man has no idea of substance in general nor knows what substance is in itself. Fourteen. Thirdly complex ideas of modes and relations are originals and archetypes are not copies nor made after the pattern of any real existence to which the mind intends them to be conformable and exactly to answer. These being such collections of simple ideas that the mind itself puts together and such collections that each of them contains in it precisely all that the mind intends that it should they are archetypes and essences of modes that may exist. And so are designed only for and belong only to such modes as when they do exist have an exact conformity with those complex ideas. The ideas therefore of modes and relations cannot but be adequate. End of section 30. Recording by Ryan Bassett. Section number 30 of an essay concerning human understanding book two by John Locke. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Ryan Bassett. Chapter 32 of true and false ideas. One. Though truth and false would belong in propriety of speech only to propositions yet ideas are often times termed true or false. As what words are there that are not used with great latitude and with some deviation from their strict and proper significations. Though I think that when ideas themselves are termed true or false there is still some secret or tacit proposition which is the foundation of that denomination. As we shall see if we examine the particular occasions wherein they come to be called true or false. In all which we shall find some kind of affirmation or negation which is the reason of that denomination. For our ideas being nothing but bare appearances or perceptions in our minds cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be true or false. No more than a single name of anything can be said to be true or false. Two. Indeed both ideas and words may be said to be true in a metaphysical sense of the word truth as all other things that anyway exist are said to be true. I.e. really to be such as they exist. Though in things called true even in that sense there is perhaps a secret reference to our ideas looked upon as the standards of that truth which amounts to a mental proposition though it be usually not taken notice of. Three. But it is not in that metaphysical sense of truth which we inquire here when we examine whether our ideas are capable of being true or false. But in the more ordinary acceptation of those words and so I say that the ideas in our minds being only so many perceptions or appearances there none of them are false. The idea of a centaur having no more falsehood in it when it appears in our minds than a name centaur has falsehood in it when it is pronounced by our mouths or written on paper. For truth or falsehood lying always in some affirmation or negation mental or verbal our ideas are not capable any of them of being false till the mind passes some judgment on them that is affirms or denies something of them. Four. Whenever the mind refers any of its ideas to anything extraneous to them they are then capable to be called true or false. Because the mind in such a reference makes a tacit supposition of their conformity to that thing which supposition as it happens to be true or false so the ideas themselves come to be denominated. The most usual cases wherein this happens are these following. Five. First when the mind supposes any idea it has conformable to that in other men's minds called by the same common name VG when the mind intends or judges its ideas of justice temperance religion to be the same with that other men give those names to. Secondly when the mind supposes any idea it has in itself to be conformable to some real existence. Thus the two ideas of a man and a centaur supposed to be the ideas of real substances are the one true and the other false the one having a conformity to what has really existed the other not. Thirdly when the mind refers any of its ideas to that real constitution and essence of anything where on all its properties depend and thus the greatest part if not all our ideas of substances are false. Six. These suppositions the mind is very apt tacitly to make concerning its own ideas but yet if we will examine it we shall find it as chiefly if not only concerning its abstract complex ideas. For the natural tendency of the mind being towards knowledge and finding that if it should proceed by and dwell upon only particular things its progress would be very slow and its work endless therefore to shorten its way to knowledge and make each perception more comprehensive. The first thing it does as the foundation of the easier enlarging its knowledge either by contemplation of the things themselves that it would know or conference with others about them is to bind them into bundles and rank them so into sorts that what knowledge it gets of any of them it may thereby with assurance extend to all of that sort and so advance by larger steps in that which is its great business knowledge. This as I have elsewhere shown is the reason why we collect things under comprehensive ideas with names and next to them into genera and species i.e. into kinds and sorts. Seven. If therefore we will warily attend to the motions of the mind and observe what course it usually takes in its way to knowledge we shall I think find that the mind having gotten idea which it thinks it may have use of either in contemplation or discourse. The first thing it does is to abstract it and then get a name to it and so lay it up in its storehouse the memory as containing the essence of a sort of things of which that name is always to be the mark. Hence it is that we may often observe that when anyone sees a new thing of a kind that he knows not he presently asks what it is meaning by that inquiry nothing but the name. As if the name carried with it the knowledge of the species or the essence of it where of it is indeed used as the mark and is generally supposed and next to it. Eight. But this abstract idea being something in the mind between the thing that exists and the name that is given to it. It is in our ideas that both the rightness of our knowledge and the propriety or intelligibleness of our speaking consists. And hence it is that men are so forward to suppose that the abstract ideas they have in their minds are such as agree to the things existing without them to which they are referred. And are the same also to which the names they give them do by the use and propriety of that language belong. For without this double conformity of their ideas they find they should both think amiss of things in themselves and talk of them unintelligibly to others. Nine. First then I say that when the truth of our ideas is judged of by the conformity they have to the ideas which other men have and commonly signified by the same name they may be by any of them faults. But yet simple ideas are least of all liable to be so mistaken because a man by his senses and every day's observation may easily satisfy himself what the simple ideas are which there several names are in common use stand for. They being but few in number and such as if he doubts or mistakes in he may easily rectify by the objects they are to be found in. Therefore it is seldom that anyone mistakes in his names of simple ideas or applies the name red to the idea green or the name sweet to the idea bitter. Much less are men apt to confound the names of ideas belonging to different senses and call a color by the name of a taste etc. Whereby it is evident that the simple ideas they call by any name are commonly the same that others have and mean when they use the same names. Ten. Complex ideas are much more liable to be faults in this respect and the complex ideas of mixed modes much more than those of substances. Because in substances especially those which the common and unborrowed names of any language are applied to some remarkable sensible qualities serving ordinarily to distinguish one sort from another. Easily preserve those who take any care in the use of their words from applying them to sorts of substances to which they do not at all belong. But in mixed modes we are much more uncertain it being not so easy to determine of several actions whether they are to be called justice or cruelty liberality or prodigality. And so in referring our ideas to those of other men called by the same names ours may be faults and the idea in our minds which we express by the word justice may perhaps be that which ought to have another name. Eleven. But whether or no our ideas of mixed modes are more liable than any sort to be different than those of other men which are marked by the same names. This at least is certain that this sort of falsehood is much more familiarly attributed to our ideas of mixed modes than to any other. When a man is thought to have a false idea of justice or gratitude or glory it is for no other reason but that his agrees not with the ideas which each of those names are the signs of in other men. Twelve. The reason where of seems to me to be this that the abstract ideas of mixed modes being men's voluntary combinations of such a precise collection of simple ideas. And so the essence of each species being made by men alone where we have no other sensible standard existing anywhere but the name itself or the definition of that name. We have nothing else to refer these our ideas of mixed modes to as a standard to which we would conform them. But the ideas of those who are thought to use those names in their most proper significations. And so as our ideas conform or differ from them they pass for true or false and thus much concerning the truth and falsehood of our ideas in reference to their names. Thirteen. Secondly as to the truth and falsehood of our ideas in reference to the real existence of things. When that is made the standard of their truth none of them can be termed false but only our complex ideas of substances. Fourteen. First our simple ideas being barely such perceptions as God has fitted us to receive. And given power and external objects to produce in us by established laws and ways suitable to his wisdom and goodness. Though incomprehensible to us their truth consists in nothing else but in such appearances as are produced in us and must be suitable to those powers. He is placed in external objects or else they could not be produced in us. And thus answering those powers they are what they should be true ideas. Nor do they become liable to any imputation of falsehood if the mind as in most men I believe it does judges these ideas to be in the things themselves. For God in his wisdom having set them as marks of distinction in things whereby we may be able to discern one thing from another and so choose any of them for our uses as we have occasion. It alters not the nature of our simple idea whether we think that the idea of blue be in the violet itself or in our mind only. And only the power of producing it by the texture of its parts reflecting the particles of light after a certain manner to be in the violet itself. For that texture in the object by a regular and constant operation producing the same idea of blue in us it serves us to distinguish by our eyes that from any other thing whether that distinguishing mark as it is really in the violet be only a peculiar texture of parts or else that very color the idea whereof which is in us is the exact resemblance. And it is equally from that appearance to be denominated blue whether it be that real color or only a peculiar texture in it that causes in us that idea. Since the name blue notes properly nothing but that mark of distinction that is in a violet discernible only by our eyes whatever it consists in that being beyond our capacities distinctly to know and perhaps would be of less use to us if we had faculties to discern. 15 neither would it carry any imputation of falsehood to our simple ideas if by the different structure of our organs it were so ordered that the same objects should produce in several men's minds different ideas at the same time. VG if the idea that a violet produced in one man's mind by his eyes were the same that a marigold produced in another man's and vice versa. For census could never be known because one man's mind could not pass into another man's body to perceive what appearances were produced by those organs. Neither the ideas hereby nor the names would be at all confounded or any faults would be in either. For all things that had the texture of a violet producing constantly the idea that he called blue and those which had the texture of a marigold producing constantly the idea which he as constantly called yellow. Whatever those appearances were in his mind he would be able as regularly to distinguish things for his use by those appearances and understand and signify those distinctions marked by the names blue and yellow as if the appearances or ideas in his mind received from those two flowers were exactly the same with the ideas in other men's minds. I am nevertheless very apt to think that the sensible ideas produced by any object in different men's minds are most commonly very near and undissernably alike. For which opinion I think there might be many reasons offered but that being besides my present business I shall not trouble my reader with them but only mind him that the contrary supposition if it could be proved is of little use. Either for the improvement of our knowledge or convenience of life and so we need not trouble ourselves to examine it. 16. From what has been said concerning our simple ideas I think it evident that our simple ideas can none of them be faults and respective things existing without us. For the truth of these appearances or perceptions in our minds consisting as has been said only in their being answerable to the powers and external objects to produce by our senses such appearances in us. And each of them being in the mind such as it is suitable to the power that produced it and which alone it represents I cannot upon that account or is referred to such a pattern be faults. Blue and yellow bitter or sweet can never be false ideas these perceptions in the mind are just as they are there answering the powers appointed by God to produce them and so are truly what they are and are intended to be. Indeed the names may be misapplied but that in this respect makes no falsehood in the ideas as if a man ignorant in the English tongue should call purple scarlet. 17. Secondly neither can our complex ideas of modes and reference to the essence of anything really existing be faults. Because whatever complex idea I have of any mode it has no reference to any pattern existing and made by nature. It is not supposed to contain in it any other ideas than what it has nor to represent anything but such a complication of ideas as it does. Thus when I have the idea of such an action of a man who for bears to afford himself such meat drink and clothing and other conveniences of life as his riches in a state will be sufficient to supply and his station requires I have no faults idea. But such and one as represents an action either as I find or imagine it and so is capable of neither truth or falsehood. But when I give the name frugality or virtue to this action then it may be called a false idea if thereby it be supposed to agree with that idea to which in propriety of speech the name of frugality does belong or to be conformable to that law which is the standard of virtue and vice. 18. Thirdly our complex ideas of substances being all referred to patterns and things themselves may be faults that they are all faults when looked upon as the representations of the unknown essences of things is evident that there needs nothing to be said of it. I shall therefore pass over that chimerical supposition and consider them as collections of simple ideas in the mind taken from combinations of simple ideas existing together constantly in things of which patterns they are the supposed copies. And in this reference of them to the existence of things they are false ideas. One when they put together simple ideas which in the real existence of things have no union. As when to the shape and size that exists together in a horse is joined in the same complex idea the power of barking like a dog. Which three ideas however put together into one in the mind were never united in nature. And this therefore may be called a false idea of an horse. Two ideas of substances are in this respect also faults when from any collection of simple ideas that do always exist together. There is separated by a direct negation any other simple idea which is constantly joined with them. Thus if to extension, solidity, fusibility, the peculiar weightiness and yellow color of gold anyone joined in his thoughts the negation of a greater degree of fixedness than is in lead or copper. He may be said to have a false complex idea as well as when he joins to those other simple ones the idea of a perfect absolute fixedness. For either way the complex idea of gold being made up of such simple ones as have no union in nature may be termed false. But if we leave out of this his complex idea that of fixedness quite without either actually joining to or separating of it from the rest in his mind it is I think. To be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect idea rather than a false one. Since though it contains not all the simple ideas that are united in nature yet it puts none together but what do really exist together. 19. Though in compliance with the ordinary way of speaking I have showed in what sense and upon what ground our ideas may be sometimes called true or false. Yet if we will look a little nearer into the matter in all cases where any idea is called true or false it is from some judgment that the mind makes or is supposed to make that is true or false. For truth or falsehood being never without some affirmation or negation express or tacit it is not to be found but where signs are joined and separated according to the agreement or disagreement of the things they stand for. The signs we chiefly use are either ideas or words wherewith we make either mental or verbal propositions. Truth lies in so joining or separating these representatives as the things they stand for do in themselves agree or disagree and falsehood in the contrary as shall be more fully shown hereafter. 20. Any idea then which we have in our minds whether conformable or not to the existence of things or to any idea in the minds of other men cannot properly for this alone be called false. For these representations if they have nothing in them but what is really existing in things without cannot be thought false being exact representations of something. Nor yet if they have anything in them differing from the reality of things can they properly be said to be false representations or ideas of things they do not represent but the mistake in falsehood is. 21. First when the mind having any idea it judges and concludes it is the same that is in other men's minds signified by the same name. Or that it is conformable to the ordinary received signification or definition of that word when indeed it is not which is the most usual mistake in mixed modes though other ideas also to it. 22. Secondly when it having a complex idea made up of such a collection of simple ones as nature never puts together it judges it to agree to a species of creatures really existing as when it joins the weight of 10 to the color fusibility and fixedness of gold. 23. Thirdly when in its complex idea it has united a certain number of simple ideas that do really exist together in some sort of creatures but has also left out others as much inseparable it judges this to be a perfect complete idea of a sort of things which really it is not. VG having joined the ideas of substance yellow malleable most heavy infusible it takes that complex idea to be the complete idea of gold. When yet it's peculiar fixedness and solubility and aqueoregia are as inseparable from those other ideas or qualities of that body as they are from one another. 24. Fourthly the mistake is yet greater when I judge that this complex idea contains in it the real essence of anybody existing when at least it contains but some few of those properties which flow from its real essence and constitution. I say only some few of those properties for those properties consisting mostly in the active and passive powers that has in reference to other things all that are vulgarly known of any one body of which the complex idea of that kind of things is usually made. Are but a very few in comparison of what a man that has several ways tried and examined it knows of that one sort of things and all that the most expert man knows are but a few in comparison of what are really in that body and depend on its internal or essential constitution. The essence of a triangle lies in a very little compass consists in a very few ideas three lines including a space make up that essence. But the properties that flow from this essence are more than can be easily known or enumerated. So I imagine it is in substances their real essence lie in a little compass though the properties flowing from that internal constitution are endless. 25. To conclude a man having no notion of anything without him but by the idea he has of it in his mind which idea he has a power to call by what name he pleases. He may indeed make an idea neither answering the reason of things nor agreeing to the idea commonly signified by other people's words but cannot make a wrong or false idea of a thing which is no otherwise known to him but by the idea he has of it. Fiji when I frame an idea of the legs arms and body of a man and join to this a horse's head and neck I do not make a false idea of anything because it represents nothing without me. But when I call it a man or tartar and imagine it to represent some real being without me or to be the same idea that others call by the same name in either of these cases I may air. And upon this account it is that it comes to be termed a false idea though indeed the falsehood lies not in the idea but in that tacit mental proposition wherein a conformity and resemblance is attributed to it which it has not. But yet if having framed such an idea in my mind without thinking either that existence or the name man or tartar belongs to it I will call it man or tartar. I may be justly thought fantastical in the naming but not erroneous in my judgment nor the idea anyway false. 26. Upon the whole matter I think that our ideas as they are considered by the mind either in reference to the proper signification of their names or in reference to the reality of things may very fitly be called right or wrong ideas according as they agree or disagree to those patterns to which they are referred. But if anyone had rather call them true or false it is fit he uses a liberty which everyone has to call things by those names he thinks best. Though in propriety of speech truth or falsehood will I think scarce agree to them but as they some way or other virtually contain in them some mental proposition. The ideas that are in a man's mind simply considered cannot be wrong unless complex ones wherein inconsistent parts are jumbled together. All other ideas are in themselves right in the knowledge about them right and true knowledge but when we come to refer them to any thing as to their patterns and archetypes then they are capable of being wrong as far as they disagree with such archetypes. End of Section 31. Recording by Ryan Bassett I cannot observe something that seems odd to him and is in itself really extravagant in the opinions, reasonings and actions of other men. The least flaw of this kind if at all different from his own everyone is quick-sighted enough to spy in another and will by the authority of reason forwardly condemn though he be guilty of much greater unreasonable in his own tenets and conduct which he never perceives and will very hardly if at all be convinced of. Section 2. This proceeds not wholly from self-love though that has often a great hand in it. Men of fair minds and not given up to over-weening of self-flattery are frequently guilty of it and in many cases one with amazement hears the arguing and is astonished at the obscenity of a worthy man who yields not to the evidence of reason though laid before him as clear as daylight. Section 3. This sort of unreasonableness is usually imputed to education and prejudice and for the most part truly enough though that reaches not the bottom of the disease nor shows distinctly enough whence it rises or wherein it lies. Education is often rightly assigned for the cause and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itself but yet I think he ought to look a little further who would trace this sort of madness to the root it springs from and so explain it as to show whence this flaw has its original in very somber and rational minds and wherein it consists. Section 4. I shall be pardoned for calling it by so harsh a name as madness when it is considered that opposition to reason deserves that name and is really madness and there is scarce a man so free from it but that if he should always on all occasions argue or do as in some cases he constantly does would not be thought fitter for bedlam than civil conversation. I do not here mean when he is under the power of any unruly passion but in the steady calm course of his life that which will yet more apologise for this harsh name and ungrateful imputation on the greatest part of mankind is that inquiring a little by the by into the nature of madness. Section 13. I find it to spring from the very same root and to depend on the very same cause we are here speaking off. This consideration of the thing itself at a time when I thought not the least on the subject which I am now trading off suggest it to me and if this be a weakness to which all men are so liable if this be a taint which so universally infects mankind the greater care should be taken to lay it open under its due name thereby to excite the greater care in its prevention and cure. Section 5. Some of our ideas have a natural correspondence and connection one with another. It is the office and exhumacy of our reason to trace these and hold them together in that union and correspondence which is founded in their peculiar beings. Besides this there is another connection of ideas wholly owing to chance or custom. Ideas that in themselves are not all of kin come to be so united in some men's minds that it is very hard to separate them. They always keep in company and the one no sooner at any time comes into the understanding but its associate appears with it and if they are more than two which are thus united the whole gang always inseparable show themselves together. Section 6. This strong combination of ideas not allied by nature the mind makes in itself either voluntarily or by chance and hence it comes in different men to be very different according to their different inclinations, education, interests etc. Custom settles habits of thinking in the understanding as well as of determining in the will and of motions in the body all which seems to be but trains of motion in the animal spirits which once set a going continue in the same steps they have been used to which by often trending are worn into a smooth path and the motion in it becomes easy and as it were natural as far as we can comprehend thinking thus ideas seem to be produced in our minds or if they are not this may serve to explain their following one another in an habitual train when once they are put into their track as well as it does to explain such motions of the body. A musician used to any tune will find that let it but once begin in his head the ideas of the several notes of it will follow one another orderly in his understanding without any care or attention as regularly as his fingers move orderly over the keys of the organ to play out the intention he has begun though his unattentive thoughts be elsewhere wondering whether the natural cause of these ideas as well as of that regular dancing of his fingers be the motion of his animal spirits I will not determine how probable so ever by this instance it appears to be so but this may help us a little to conceive of intellectual habits and of the tying together of ideas section 7 that there are such associations of them made by custom in the minds of most men I think nobody will question who has well considered himself or others and to this perhaps might be justly attributed most of the sympathies and antipathy observable in men which work as strongly and produce as regular effects as if they were natural and are therefore called so though they at first had no other original but the accidental connection of two ideas which either the strength of the first impression or future indulgence so united that they always afterwards keep company together in that man's mind as if they were but one idea I say most of the antipathies I do not say all for some of them are truly natural depend upon our original constitution and are born with us but a great part of those which are kind of natural would have been known to be from unheeded though perhaps early impressions or wanting fancies at first which would have been acknowledged the original of them if they have been morally observed a grown person surfiting with honey no sinner hears the name of it but his fancy immediately carries sickness and qualms to his stomach and he cannot bear the very idea of it other ideas of dislike and sickness and vomiting presently accompanying it and he is disturbed but he knows from whence to date this weakness and can tell how he got this in disposition but this happened to him by an overdose of honey when a child all the same effects would have followed but the cause would have been mistaken and the antipathy counted natural section 8 I mentioned this not out of any great necessity there is in this present argument to distinguish nicely between natural unacquired antipathies but I take notice of it for another purpose namely that those who have children or the charge of their education would think it worth their while diligently to watch and carefully to prevent the undue connection of ideas in the minds of young people this is the time most susceptible of lasting impressions and though those relating to the health of the body are by discrete people minded and fenced against yet I am apt to doubt that those which relate more peculiarly to the mind and terminate in the understanding or passions have been much less heated than the thing deserves nay those relating purely to the understanding have as I suspect been by most men wholly overlooked section 9 this wrong connection in our minds of ideas in themselves loose and independent of one another has such an influence and is of so great force to set us awry in our actions as well as moral as natural passions, reasonings and notions themselves perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after section 10 the ideas of goblins and sprites really no more to do with darkness and light yet lit but a foolish maid inculcate these often on the mind of a child and raise them there together possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives but darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas and they shall be so joined that he can no more bear the one than the other section 11 a man receives a sensible injury from another thinks on the man and that action over and over and by ruminating on them strongly or much in his mind so cements those two ideas together that he makes them almost one never thinks on the man but the pain and his pleasure he suffered comes into his mind with it so that he scarce distinguishes them but has as much an aversion for the one as the other thus hatreds are often begotten from slight and innocent occasions and quarrels propagated and continued in the world section 12 a man has suffered pain or sickness in any place he saw his friend die in such a room though these have in nature nothing to do with one another yet when the idea of the place occurs to his mind it brings the impression being once made that of the pain and his pleasure with it he confines them in his mind and can as little bear the one as the other section 13 when this combination is settled and while it lasts it is not in the power of reason to help us and relieve us from the effects of it ideas in our minds when they are there will operate according to their natures and circumstances and here we see the cause why time cures certain affections which reason though in the right and allowed to be so has not power over nor is able against them to prevail with those who are apt to harken to it in other cases the death of a child that was the daily delight of his mother's eyes and joy of her soul rents from her heart the whole comfort of her life and gives her all the torment imaginable use the constellations of reason in this case and you were as good preach ease to one on the rag and hope to allow by rational discourses the pain of his joints tearing asunder till time has by disuse separated the sense of that enjoyment and its loss from the idea of the child returning to her memory all representations though ever so reasonable are in vain and therefore some in whom the union between these ideas is never dissolved spend their lives in mourning and carry an incurable sorrow to their graves section 14 a friend of mine knew one perfectly cured of badness by a very harsh and offensive operation the gentleman who was thus recovered with great sense of gratitude and acknowledgement owned the cure all his life after as the greatest obligation he could have received but whatever gratitude and reason suggested to him he could never bear the sight of the operator that image brought back with it the idea of that agony which he suffered from his hands which was too mighty and intolerable and intolerable for him to endure section 15 many children imputing the pain they endured at school to their books they were corrected for so join those ideas together that a book becomes their aversion and they are never reconciled to the study and use of them all their lives after and thus reading becomes a torment to them which otherwise possibly they might have made the great pleasure of their lives there are rooms convenient enough that some men cannot study in and fashions of vessels which though ever so clean and they cannot drink out of and that by reason of some accidental ideas which are annexed to them and make them offensive and who is there that has not observed some man to flag at the appearance or in the company of some certain person not otherwise superior to him because having once on some occasion got the ascendant the idea of authority and distance goes along with that of the person and he that has been thus subjected is not able to separate them section 16 instances of this kind are so plentiful everywhere that if I add one more it is only for the pleasant oddness of it it is of a young gentleman who having learned to dance and that to great perfection there happened to stand an old trunk in the room where he learned the idea of this remarkable piece of household stuff had so mixed itself with the turns and steps of all his dances that though in that chamber he could dance excellently well yet it was only whilst that trunk was there nor could he perform well in any other place unless that or some such other trunk had its due position in the room if the story shall be suspected to be dressed up with some chemical circumstances a little beyond precise nature I answer for myself that I had it some years since from a very somber and worthy man upon his own knowledge as I report it and I dare say there are very few inquisitive persons who read this who have not met with the kinds if not examples of this nature that may parallel or at least justify this section 17 intellectual habits and defects this way contract it are not less frequent and powerful though less observed let the ideas of being and matter be strongly joined either by education or much thought whilst these are still combined in the mind what notions what reasonings will there be about separate spirits let custom from the very childhood have joined figure and shape to the idea of God and what absurdities will that mind be liable to about the deity that the idea of infallibility be inseparably joined to any person and these two constantly together possess the mind and then one body in two places at once shall unexamined be swallowed for a certain truth by an implicit faith whenever that imagined infallible person dictates and demands a scent without inquiry section 18 some such wrong and unnatural combinations of ideas will be found to establish the irreconcilable opposition between different sex of philosophy and religion for we cannot imagine every one of their followers to impose willfully on himself and knowingly refused truth offered by plain reason interest though it does a great deal in the case yet cannot be thought to work whole societies of men to so universal a perversionist as that every one of them to a man should knowingly maintain falsehood some at least must be allowed to do what all pretend to i.e. to pursue truth sincerely and therefore there must be something that blinds their understandings and makes them not see the falsehood of what they embrace for real truth that which thus captivates their reasons and leads men of sincerity blindfolded from common sense will when examined be found to be what we are speaking of some independent ideas of no alliance to one another are by education custom and the constant din of their party so coupled in their minds that they always appear there together and they can no more separate them in their thoughts than if there were but one idea and they operate as if they were so this gives sense to jargon demonstration to absurdities and consistencies to nonsense and is the foundation of the greatest I had almost said all the errors in the world or if it does not read so far it is at least the most dangerous one since so far as it obtains it hinders men from seeing and examining when two things in themselves disjoined appear to the site constantly united if the eye sees these things riveted which are less where will you begin to rectify the mistakes that follow into ideas that they have been accustomed so to join in their minds as to substitute one for the other and as I am apt to think often without perceiving it themselves this whilst they are under the deceit of it makes them incapable of conviction and they applaud themselves as zealous champions for truth when indeed they are contending for error and the confusion of two different ideas which a customary connection of them in their minds hath to them made in effect but one fills their heads with false views and their reasonings with false consequences section 19 having thus given an account of the original sorts an extent of our ideas with several other considerations about these I know not whether I may say instruments or materials of our knowledge the method I at first propose to myself would now require that I should immediately proceed to show what use the understanding makes of them and what knowledge we have by them this was that which in the first general view I had of this subject was all that I thought I should have to do but upon a nearer approach I find that there is so close a connection between ideas and words that our abstract ideas and general words have so constant a relation one to another that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our knowledge which all consists in propositions without considering first the nature use and signification of language which therefore must be the business of the next book end of section 32 recording by Chad Horner end of an essay concerning human understanding book 2 by John Locke