 Classification of ethical theories that Cicero makes in three different places throughout this work on moral ends. So he makes it for the first time here in book two, sections 33 to 43. It rears its head again in book four, that is in the criticism of Stoic theories in sections 49 to 50. And then it occurs finally in book five, section 16 to 22. Now, this classification breaks theories of the highest good into three major groups. Group one, non-moral theories, that is theories that take the highest good to be something other than morality and virtue. Second, combine theories that take the highest good to be a combination of non-moral goods and morality. And then third, theories that make morality only the highest good. So the third group we're gonna be dealing with next week because it's identified with Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic school. So we'll come to understand why they believe that only morality constitutes the highest good. But let's review just briefly what he says about these other theories. So beginning with the non-moral theories, he distinguishes three kinds of non-moral theories. So beginning with Aristipus, what does Aristipus take the highest good to be? Pleasure. Pleasure, thanks. That's not a tough question. He takes pleasure and only pleasure. It's essentially the only good, really, for him. Now, two other people are specified as having theories about non-moral goods being the highest good. And this is a bit more tricky, but does anybody know what Cicero takes Heronimus's view to be? Yeah. Yes, absence of pain. Yes, absence of pain. So while Aristipus takes pleasure, Heronimus takes absence of pain to be the highest good. And then the third non-moral theory he mentions is Carnetides. But Carnetides is actually an academic skeptic who doesn't take any positive position on what the overall moral good is. He just advances an idea for the sake of argument. And what that argument amounts to is that what are called the primary natural goods are the highest goods. And these include external goods like wealth and having a good upbringing and living in a good country and also bodily goods like health and fitness and beauty. And also things like intelligence, virtue, and so forth. Essentially, this view should be attributed to Aristotle's because as we saw, Aristotle thinks he has this common sense view that you basically need everything in order to get the highest good, that is eudaimonia or happiness. But Aristotle was an ancient philosopher by the time that Cicero is writing and there are more contemporary exponents of that idea. And for reasons that we'll discuss as we look at other invocations of this distinction later in on-moral works, he associates that view with Carnetides. Now, the combined theories combine these non-moral elements with morality and they're attributed to three very obscure figures that we don't have any writing from. At best we have some testimony or fragments, but let's go through each of them. The first one is Caliphot. So what does Cicero say his account of the highest good is? Yes, so he says, Caliphot says that the highest good is being a moral person, morality, plus having pleasure. And Deodorus's view? Yes, well, say what the complete view is. It's not just freedom from pain because that would be Hieronymus's view. And it's not just pleasure because that would be Aristipus's view. These are combined theories that combine morality with a non-moral factor. So Caliphot combines morality with pleasure. Deodorus combines freedom from pain and virtue or morality. And then Polomo? By a process of elimination you should be able just to say what this is. Yes, the primary natural goods and morality. So things like health, wealth, security, security and virtue or being a moral person. So that is Cicero's famous but contentious classification of theories of the highest good to which we will eventually return. But keep it in mind because one of his criticisms of Epicurus has to do with the fact that Epicurus essentially has an incoherent theory. It's not clear where it can be located on this clear breakdown. And just one more thing to say, after he lays out this classification, he says, oh, and by the way, I'm eliminating from consideration Puro, Aristotle and Arilis because they don't really have a concept of the highest good or even if they do they obliterate all the differences between other things and it's not really a coherent theory as such. Yeah. Wouldn't it be better to say Polomo should be attributed to Aristotle and not Parniades because Aristotle has a moralistic approach like Polomo does. It's like a solidism between natural goods morality whereas Parniades is just natural goods. Yes, actually, you're exactly correct and I should make that correction. We should not compare Parniades and Aristotle because Parniades, this hypothetical view that he would endorse, only takes the primary natural goods that doesn't integrate a concept of morality whereas Aristotle holds not only that those external and bodily goods but also virtues and both moral virtues and intellectual virtues are constitute the highest good. And that, as you say, is the view attributed to Polomo. So therefore, the view depended by Polomo is the one I should have compared to Aristotle and the one that in fact, Cicero compares to Aristotle. So thank you for that correction. Okay, any other questions about this scheme? That would be a good one to count as a useful contribution to the discussion on the evaluation form. Go ahead. Where does Cicero stand himself as Cicero? Well, he's an academic skeptic so he doesn't put forth his own theory about the highest good but to the extent that he has one, it ends up being something like Polomo or Parniades versions ultimately. So as a skeptic, he ends up saying none of these people have proven their case with certainty and anyway, nothing can be done with certainty but the thing that seems most likely to him is that it's some combination of morality and highest goods, yeah. What does Polomo mean by, I guess, natural good? Like, does he believe that humans are naturally inclined to do certain good things? He believes that certain things are naturally good for humans. Good for us or like good to do in general? No, good for us, like health. Health, fitness, beauty. Relief to morality, though. It doesn't. That's why they're just called, that's why one version of this is a non-moral theory. It's only when Polomo combines those goods with morality that you have this mixed view. That was the upshot of my reiteration of the thing in response to that query. So the moral aspect is that Polomo says yes, virtue is actually important to the highest good. It constitutes part of the highest good along with these non-moral considerations like health, beauty, fitness, wealth, family, things like that. Is that clear? So the combined theories are basically just the non-moral theories plus virtue. Essentially, yes. Okay. And so they exactly recapitulate the highest goods of the non-moral theories but then they add that morality is also part of this. So what a position like Zeno has to do is somehow eliminate these non-moral goods and show that these non-moral goods are not relevant to the highest good. And that would then do away with all of the non-moral theories, of course, but then it would do away with the combined theories. And you would be left with the idea that the highest good is morality only.