 We got two spots down here, maybe three. I need some people hang tight a second We've got I think fire across the road further up the yeah, big time fires crossed and burning fast It's outside It's outside and moving pretty quick Okay, do you guys got any escape route that way because this way it's the block already We have a man there Frank here. We need to get him out What will determine if these firefighters make it through this situation safely Adhering to the fire safety guidelines will be the deciding factor the 10 fire orders the 18 watchouts and the downhill line Construction checklist are the rules of engagement for the wildland firefighter The research and development costs for these guidelines were high Each guideline was paid for with the lives of firefighters like you as someone involved in the business of wildland fire Management there is a safety concept you should understand fires don't kill firefighters firefighter mistakes kill firefighters at the heart of the fire safety guidelines Is a warning and reaction system known as LC ES? lookouts communications escape routes and safety zones Putting lookouts and communications into operation establishes the warning mechanism Advanced identification of escape routes and safety zones Establishes the reaction procedure Lookouts and scouts are the advanced warning component of the system These individuals must find vantage points where they can monitor any threatening fire activity And they must always know the location of the crews working in the area Every situation is different Tactics terrain Fuel type and fire size will determine how many lookouts are needed Normally one lookout is not enough The mistakes of others are an unfortunate part of the learning process in this business The history of fire suppression is full of hard-won lessons on August 21st 1937 15 civilian conservation crew firefighters were killed and 36 more injured on the Blackwater fire in Wyoming The fire had burned for three days spreading to about 200 acres and was contained within a single drainage on the evening of August 20th A wind-driven flare up at midnight through many firebrands over the ridgetop fire line and into the next drainage Crews immediately began to build hand line down into the drainage around an area They thought contained all the spot fires this left unburned fuels inside the fire line and Caused the firefighters to be widely dispersed in an effort to secure that fire line By sunrise the fire was again quiet Creeping in ground and surface fuels The crews were making good progress However, no one was posted to look for additional spot fires at around 2 o'clock that afternoon Several replacement crews arrived on the fire line Soon after their arrival strong winds began to surface in the area as a result an undetected Online spot fire became active By the time the online spot was noticed it had developed into a crown fire and cut off any escape possibilities Trapping the crews in the bottom of the drainage Those crew members working near the ridges survived by moving to a rocky area on one side of the drainage Or into the previous days burn on the other side The failure to assign a lookout was a major factor leading to these fatalities Communications are the second component of the system Information exchange between lookouts and firefighters must be prompt and clear This statement has two important points First a communication process must be put into place in advance that all firefighters understand This may require maintaining a dedicated radio frequency periodic check-ins by the lookouts and Ensuring there are no language barriers Second you as a fire line supervisor must realize that receiving a warning on the radio is only the first stage in the communication process Most firefighters will need to be contacted by word of mouth, which is where most communication systems break down Ensure that there is a reliable form of prompt communication to every firefighter Remember a lot of safe firefighting occurred in the days before each crew carried several radios on July 17th 1976 Three hot-shot crew members were killed and one other was injured on the battleman Creek fire in Colorado That day's assignment was to burn out fire lines that were already in place a Series of miscommunications occurred during the day The first miscommunication occurred when a burnout operation at the bottom of the fire was ignited before the hot-shot crew Above had completed their assignment When the increasing fire activity from the lower firing operation was noticed a second miscommunication occurred The division supervisor talked by radio with the superintendent of the hot-shot crew working the upper fire line He directed the superintendent to move his people to the safety zone and hurry the firing operation At this point the superintendent probably misunderstood the urgency of the situation and Moved only part of his crew to the safety zone while he and three others remained to complete the firing operation The division supervisor assumed that all of the crew had moved to the safety zone when in fact they had not The fire spread rapidly responding to frost-killed brush fuels and steep terrain to overrun the four-person burnout squad Poor communications played a direct role in these fatalities escape routes are probably the most forgotten component of LC ES as Firefighters work through an assignment fatigue and distance separation will increase escape time That critical amount of time needed to reach a safety zone It's important that fire line supervisors always be aware of their current escape time More people and equipment equals more time required to escape Always plan for the slowest individual or piece of equipment Be alert for conditions that might create barriers along an escape route loose soils rocky terrain dense vegetation creek crossings steep slopes and heavy smoke are all conditions that will increase escape time for firefighters Only by having someone scout an escape route. Can you know these problems? Firelines are the most commonly used escape routes They're usually known by the people working that segment of a fire line if the safety zone cannot be reached along a fire line and Escape route must be constructed and marked with flagging where it departs from the fire line and leads to the safety zone This route information must be known to all firefighters in advance There should be more than one available escape route a single route can be cut off and access to the safety zone eliminated When only one escape route is available treat this like a watch-out situation on November 1st 1966 12 hot-shot crew members were killed and another nine were injured on the loop fire in California The crew was building hand line and cold trailing an inactive fire edge Their direct attack took them downhill into a very steep chimney canyon Another hand crew and a dozer were to be working from the bottom up toward them However, the progress of the dozer and lower crew was blocked by an impassable gully As the hot-shot crew became fully committed in the chimney canyon the winds shifted and the fire edge became more active The fire then crossed the canyon below them It then swept up the half-mile long chimney canyon in less than a minute The steepness of the terrain prevented any of the crew members from being able to move away from the fire edge and Get into the burn to use as a safety zone The lack of an effective escape route was the primary cause of these fatalities Safety zones are the final component to complete the LCES system The idea of a safety zone is often misunderstood Safety zones are pre-planned locations where firefighters can find refuge from expected danger Fire shelter deployment sites have been incorrectly called safety zones. There is a huge difference The use of a fire shelter is only a survival alternative Tactics must never be developed around the use of deployment sites a Safety zone is an area where fire shelters are not needed for firefighters to be safe from expected fire behavior Simply stated the effectiveness of a safety zone is determined by how far the firefighters can be removed from the heat source However, there are some basic considerations that will help you evaluate the suitability of a safety zone Every good safety zone has three elements First allow for the flaming front distance This will be determined by what type of fuels are burning and the actual flame lengths that you're observing Second assess the heat impact distance This is more difficult because it's not observable You're trying to anticipate the potential heat output of the fire and how far it will be transferred into your safety zone Last you must determine the actual safe area This is where everyone will be when the fire passes around your safety zone You must think carefully about how many people and pieces of equipment you can really stuff into that area and still maintain your flaming front and heat impact distances as The fire passes around your safety zone the direction of heat impact may change first hitting the front then the side and Finally the rear of the safety zone When you look at your safety zone visualize yourself there without your fire shelter and other personal protective equipment if You would feel safe with the fire burning around your selected location Then you have a true safety zone Let's go back and examine the heat impact distance This is very important because the inhalation of superheated air and gases are Responsible for many more firefighter fatalities than burn injuries Heat transfer into a safety zone will come from three sources Radiant heat from the combustion of fuels is the first heat source to evaluate in Flat terrain with no wind the heat impact distance would be determined solely by the radiant heat generated from the fuels that are burning The radiation intensity drops as the distance from the fire increases Of course the problem of heat transfer into safety zones is made more complex by convective heat transfer So the second heat source to consider is convection due to wind a Strong wind can blow lethal heat several hundred feet into a safety zone a Safety zone that's located downwind of the fire We'll need to allow for a much larger heat impact distance than one located upwind or on the flank of that same fire The third heat source is convection due to slope a Safety zone that's located mid-slope above the fire will be subject to the rising movement of hot air In addition to slope other topographic features can increase heat impact Saddles tend to increase wind speed Not only can superheated air be blown into a poorly located safety zone But fire intensity may increase significantly in areas adjacent to a saddle Shoots or chimneys can cause extremely rapid rates of spread due to preheating of fuels and channeling of winds Consider all fire suppression operations in the vicinity of a chute or chimney to be dangerous As you can see it's important to consider both size and location when selecting a safety zone a Safety zone in a good location may reduce the size requirements Significantly in comparison to one in a poor location At the end of this video segment you'll discuss safety zone sites in more detail But there's one other item we should talk about here The burned area of a fire is considered the primary safety zone in many situations This is a major advantage of using direct attack strategies However, you must ensure the burned area you are calling a safety zone is a clean burn with very little flammable vegetation remaining Do not use areas that have only partially burned as safety zones Likewise look at the fuels when attempting to carry your safety zone with you by firing out This tactic works extremely well in light grass fuels but residual heat in timber and heavy brush fuel types can remain lethal for several hours after ignition on August 5th 1949 12 smoke jumpers and one local firefighter were killed on the man Gulch fire in Montana The group was attempting initial attack and were working their way down from the head of the canyon where they had Landed in order to get below the fire burning on the ridge top to the south The route of travel took the group into a large unburned drainage with continuous cured tall grass and stringers of pine trees as They worked farther down the drainage the fire activity increased in response to late afternoon conditions and turbulent River Canyon winds The fire then spotted into the bottom of the drainage below them Upon seeing the rapidly building spot fires below them The group turned and attempted to run back up canyon and over the crest of the ridge to the north in The flashy grass fuels the fire spread quickly Overrunning most of the group before they could reach the ridge to the north Three individuals did survive It took about 30 minutes for the entire drainage to burn out There was no place identified as a safety zone in that drainage And the result was another of our expensive lessons learned This is all old history to be sure look at the dates. We should know better today But we continue to make the same mistakes The summer of 1994 leaves us with 14 fatalities on a hill in Colorado not far from the Battleman Creek fire 14 that were considered our most elite and knowledgeable firefighters Helitack hot shot and smoke jumper repeating these same mistakes unsafe downhill line construction tactics inadequate lookouts and No safety zones Can we make firefighting perfectly safe? Well, not a hundred percent. We can't do much about topography weather and in the foreseeable future at least fuels But we do have control over one final element in the equation. That is the human element We must review our perceptions of what fire is and is not Fires even when they get big are rarely a disaster The only time one becomes a disaster is when it manages to catch and kill someone Think about how you conduct your tactics in the fire environment and be sure to establish lookouts Communications escape routes and safety zones every time you attack a fire