 Chapter 13.5 of the 9-1-1 Commission Report. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to find out how you can volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Elana Jordan. The 9-1-1 Commission Report. Chapter 13.5. Recording America's defenses in the United States. The future role of the FBI. We have considered proposals for a new agency dedicated to an intelligence collection in the United States. Some call this a proposal for an American MI5. Although the analogy is weak, the actual British Security Service is a relatively small worldwide agency that combines duties assigned in the U.S. government to the terrorist threat integration center, the CIA, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security. The concern about the FBI is that it has long favored its criminal justice mission over its national security mission. Part of the reason for this is the demand around the country for FBI help on criminal matters. The FBI was criticized rightly for the overzealous domestic intelligence investigations disclosed during the 1970s. The pendulum swung away from those types of investigations during the 1980s and 1990s, although the FBI maintained an active counterintelligence function and was the lead agency for the investigation of foreign terrorist groups operating inside the United States. We do not recommend the creation of a new domestic intelligence agency. It is not needed if our other recommendations are adopted to establish a strong national intelligence center, part of the NCTC, that will oversee counterterrorism intelligence work, foreign and domestic, and to create a national intelligence director who can set and enforce standards for the collection, processing, and reporting of information. Under the structures we recommend, the FBI's role is focused but still vital. The FBI does need to be able to direct its thousands of agents and other employees to collect intelligence in America's cities and towns, interviewing informants, conducting surveillance and searches, tracking individuals, working collaboratively with local authorities, and doing so with meticulous attention to detail and compliance with the law. The FBI's job in the streets of the United States would thus be a domestic equivalent operating under the U.S. Constitution and quite different laws and rules to the job of the CIA's operations officers abroad. Creating a new domestic intelligence agency has other drawbacks. The FBI is accustomed to carrying out sensitive intelligence collection operations in compliance with the law. If a new domestic intelligence agency were outside of the Department of Justice, the process of legal oversight, never easy, could become even more difficult. Abuses of civil liberties could create a backlash that would impair the collection of needed intelligence. Creating a new domestic intelligence agency would divert attention of the officials most responsible for current counterterrorism efforts while the threat remains high. Putting a new player into the mix of federal agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities would exacerbate existing information sharing problems. A new domestic intelligence agency would need to acquire assets and personnel. The FBI already has 28,000 employees, 56 field offices, 400 satellite offices, and 47 legal attaché offices, a laboratory, operations center, and training facility, an existing network of informants, cooperating defendants, and other sources, and relationships with state and local law enforcement, the CIA, and foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Counterterrorism investigations in the United States very quickly become matters that involve violations of criminal law and possible law enforcement action. Because the FBI can have agents working criminal matters and agents working intelligence investigations concerning the same international terrorism target, the full range of investigative tools against a suspected terrorist can be considered within one agency. The removal of the wall that existed before 9-1-1 between intelligence and law enforcement has opened up new opportunities for cooperative action within the FBI. Counterterrorism investigations often overlap or are queued by other criminal investigations such as money laundering or the smuggling of contraband. In the field, the close connection to criminal work has many benefits. Our recommendation to leave counterterrorism intelligence collection in the United States with the FBI still depends on an assessment that the FBI, if it makes an all-out effort to institutionalize change, can do the job. As we mentioned in Chapter 3, we have been impressed by the determination that agents display in tracking down details, patiently going the extra mile and working the extra month to put facts in the place of speculation. In our report, we have shown how agents in Phoenix, Minneapolis, and New York displayed initiative in pressing their investigations. FBI agents and analysts in the field need to have sustained support and dedicated resources to become stronger intelligence officers. They need to be rewarded for acquiring informants and for gathering and disseminating information differently and more broadly than usual in a traditional criminal investigation. FBI employees need to report and analyze what they have learned in ways the Bureau has never done before. Under Director Robert Mueller, the Bureau has made significant progress in improving its intelligence capabilities. It now has an Office of Intelligence overseen by the top tier of FBI management. Field intelligence groups have been created in all field offices to put FBI priorities and the emphasis on intelligence into practice. FBIs have been made in improving the Bureau's information technology systems and in increasing connectivity and information sharing with intelligence community agencies. Director Mueller has also recognized that the FBI's reforms are far from complete. He has outlined a number of areas where added measures may be necessary. Specifically, he has recognized that the FBI needs to recruit from a broader pool of candidates, that agents and analysts working on national security matters require specialized training, and that agents should specialize within programs after obtaining a generalist foundation. The FBI is developing career tracks for agents to specialize in counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cybercrimes, criminal investigations, or intelligence. It is establishing a program for certifying agents as intelligence officers, a certification that will be a prerequisite for promotion to the senior ranks of the Bureau. New training programs have been instituted for intelligence-related subjects. The Director of the FBI has proposed creating an Intelligence Directorate as a further refinement of the FBI Intelligence Program. This Directorate would include units for intelligence planning and policy, and for the direction of analysts and linguists. We want to ensure that the Bureau's shift to a preventive counterterrorism posture is more fully institutionalized so that it survives beyond Director Mueller's tenure. We have found that in the past the Bureau has announced its willingness to reform and restructure itself, to address transnational security threats, but has fallen short, failing to affect the necessary institutional and cultural changes organization-wide. We want to ensure that this does not happen again, despite having found acceptance of the Director's clear message that counterterrorism is now the FBI's top priority. Two years after 9-1-1, we also found gaps between some of the announced reforms and the reality in the field. We are concerned that management in the field offices still can allocate people and resources to local concerns that diverge from the national security mission. This system could revert to a focus on lower priority criminal justice cases over national security requirements. A specialized and integrated national security workforce should be established at the FBI, consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security. The President, by executive order or directive, should direct the FBI to develop this intelligence cadre. Recognizing that cross-fertilization between the criminal justice and national security disciplines is vital to the success of both missions, all new agents should receive basic training in both areas. Furthermore, new agents should begin their careers with meaningful assignments in both areas. Intelligence and analysts should then specialize in one of these disciplines and have the option to work such matters for their entire career with the Bureau. Certain advanced training courses and assignments to other intelligence agencies should be required to advance within the national security discipline. In the interest of cross-fertilization, all senior FBI managers, including those working on law enforcement matters, should be certified intelligence officers. The FBI should fully implement a recruiting, hiring, and selection process for agents and analysts that enhances its ability to target and attract individuals with educational and professional backgrounds in intelligence, international relations, language, technology, and other relevant skills. The FBI should institute the integration of analysts, agents, linguists, and surveillance personnel in the field so that a dedicated team approach is brought to bear on national security intelligence operations. Each field office should have an official at the field office's deputy level for national security matters. This individual would have management oversight and ensure that the national priorities are carried out in the field. The FBI should align its budget structure according to its foreign main programs, intelligence, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence, criminal and criminal justice services, to ensure better transparency on program costs, management of resources, and protection of the intelligence program. The FBI should report regularly to Congress in its semiannual program reviews, designed to identify whether each field office is appropriately addressing FBI and national program priorities. The FBI should report regularly to Congress in detail on the qualifications, status, and roles of analysts in the field and at headquarters. The FBI should ensure that analysts are afforded training and career opportunities on a par with those offered analysts in other intelligence community agencies. The Congress should make sure funding is available to accelerate the expansion of secure facilities in FBI field offices so as to increase their ability to use secure email systems and classified intelligent product exchanges. The Congress should monitor whether the FBI's information-sharing principles are implemented in practice. The FBI is just a small fraction of the national law enforcement community in the United States, a community comprised mainly of state and local agencies. The network designed for sharing information and the work of the FBI through local joint terrorism task forces should build a reciprocal relationship in which state and local agents understand what information they are looking for and, in return, receive some of the information being developed about what is happening or may happen in their communities. In this relationship, the Department of Homeland Security also will play an important part. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave the Undersecretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Broad Responsibilities. In practice, this directorate has the job to map terrorist threats to the homeland against RSS vulnerabilities in order to drive our efforts to protect against terrorist threats. These capabilities are still embryonic. The directorate has not yet developed the capacity to perform one of its assigned jobs, which is to assimilate and analyze information from Homeland Security's own component agencies, such as the Coast Guard, Secret Service, Transportation Security Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Customs and Border Protection. The Secretary of Homeland Security must ensure that these components work with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate so that this office can perform its mission. Homeland Defense At several points in our inquiry, we asked who is responsible for defending us at home. Our national defense at home is the responsibility first of the Department of Defense and second of the Department of Homeland Security. They must have clear delineations of responsibility and authority. We found that NORAD, which had been given the responsibility for defending U.S. airspace, had construed that mission to focus on threats coming from outside America's borders. It did not adjust its focus even though the intelligence community had gathered intelligence on the possibility that terrorists might turn to hijacking and even use of planes as missiles. We have been assured that NORAD has now embraced the full mission. Northern Command has been established to assume responsibility for the defense of the domestic United States. Recommendation The Department of Defense and its oversight committees should regularly assess the adequacy of Northern Command strategies and planning to defend the United States against military threats to the homeland. The Department of Homeland Security was established to consolidate all of the domestic agencies responsible for securing America's borders and national infrastructure, most of which is in private hands. It should identify those elements of our transportation, energy, communications, financial, and other institutions that need to be protected, develop plans to protect that infrastructure, and exercise the mechanisms to enhance preparedness. This means going well beyond the pre-existing jobs of the agencies that have been brought together inside the Department. The Department of Homeland Security and its oversight committees should regularly assess the types of threats the country faces to determine, a, the adequacy of the government's plans and the progress against those plans to protect America's critical infrastructure, and b, the readiness of the government to respond to the threats that the United States might face. We look forward to a national debate on the merits of what we have recommended, and we will participate vigorously in that debate. End of Chapter 13.5 End of the 9-1-1 Commission Report