 How do we create the conditions so that the solutions actually become real? So one issue that has been raised in this is that we are moving from the globalization to de-globalization, or some form of re-globalization. And as Jean-Marie Pogambure, the WTO, you've been looking at these issues. You're right in the center of it. Can you give us a little bit of your sense of what's actually been happening in this phase? All the facts we're telling us, and how do you see the process moving forward? Well, thank you, Masoudan. Good morning, everyone. I think your microphone is not yet on, but hopefully it will be. Can you hear me? I was saying thank you, Masoudan. Good morning, everyone. On your first question, what do we see? We don't really see de-globalization in the figures, at least in the trade figures. I'm leaving aside investment or finance. Of course, there are trends which have been observed like an apparent slowdown of the rate of openness that is trade over GDP, but it can be explained by many statistical phenomena such as variations in commodity prices or also the compositions of the GDP, which is more led by services, why trade is more led by goods. So there is not really the feeling that there is a structural ebbing of globalization as far as trade is concerned. There is also a slowing down of trade in the second half of the decade, which probably has to do with some maturity of the value chains development. There is a sort of plateau, but here again we don't see that moving back toward a reduction of the contribution of world trade to GDP. What is happening is that there are new forces which are going to shape this globalization and make it probably more complex and generate more transaction costs for businesses and also for government. There are three of those which are really clear. The first one is of course the return of what we may call generically strategic trade policies, which has to do with industrial policy, and this is very documented. Now we see a lot of increasing of the intervention of the states to create comparative advantages. This has to do with the Cheap and Science Act in the US or the Inflation Reduction Act, the projects of common European interest in Europe, of course China 2025 and also in Japan there are some of these. So it's quite documented that the OECD, you see at least for instance the level of subsidies, government subsidies increasing, that's one. The second one is what I may call quite naturally decoupling policies which involve a vast array of policies from the worst, which is war and sanctions, to the least, just the second one, trade war. Basically the one which has been unleashed by President Trump against China or the softer concept of open strategic autonomy. You don't know exactly what is lying there. But there is this idea that you will have a world-shaped, a world market will be shaped by a lot of politics. And if you take for instance sanctions, it was not really a systemic issue when it was dealing with small economies, if I may call them like that. But when you are dealing with the eleventh world economy like Russia, then you see that there is the beginning of a global impact. And also recently in Brussels there was a forum on export control and the figures were astonishing because for instance for the UK it's minus 97% of export towards Russia and closely the same for the EU. So this decoupling is quite a new trend. We have been modeling that in the WTO, imagining a world just like in the old days, separated in two blocks and that would mean according to our economists a reduction of GDP of overall GDP in the long term of 5%. And the third trend of course is decarbonisation. And we know that when it comes to net zero strategies different countries and players are adopting different strategies. For instance to put a price on carbon the EU has been choosing a market exchange of emission permit, other are choosing taxes, other are moving towards regulations like the US. So you do not have an equivalence of that and it's even worse when you try to start measuring carbon. Just take the steel sector which is representing more or less 8% of the global emissions. You already have more than 20 standards measurement in the world. So these are trends which are going to make it more complex. Are our institution for international cooperation capable of dealing with that? Well, we in the WTO have been buried so many times that I think even this morning I heard that we were already dead but I don't think so. We have quite a mixed situation. The first one is that there is a quite a reasonably strong capital about the core principle which are articulating the world trading system. These are transparency, good face and non-discrimination. And you do not see radical contestations or radical dispute over those principles even in a worse situation like the one with the Trump administration. Nobody has been walking out of the WTO. So you don't see really disagreement on the fact that we can cooperate on this basis. And in fact we even had some successes this year. I may come back to it. What we face and we are confronted with is several trends which all the institutions are dealing with. The first one is obviously the divergences in values and government systems which translate into difficulties in the negotiation. The second one has to do with how do we manage commons and the legacy for commons. This is the very big debate over climate change but in the WTO we faced it also in the negotiation on fisheries about the prohibition of subsidies which were contributing to overfishing and then you have developing countries saying, guys, why should I restrain the development of my fisheries? You have been taking all the fish historically. So this is really complicated. These legacies issues are complicating the negotiation and they are very hard to cope. And of course there is a difference in capacities to tackle with new trends of decarbonisation and digitalisation. So I think we will do some stop and go. We will have some successes in emergency circumstances. For instance, regarding how to cope with the food crisis today, I think that if I look at the half-empty glass, the response of global institutions is quite reasonable to a certain extent effective. I'm not saying that we are off the hook. It's a very difficult situation but there is an answer. And in many cases we will just face tail-mates on core issues. So we'll have to deal with that but do not throw the baby with the bath water. Thank you very much. Thank you for talking about the trends. Also raising this question, which I think we will come back to maybe even in the next panel, which is, are the institutions that were created, many of them going back 75, 80 years now, up to the job of dealing with the trends and issues that they are now being forced to deal with, and also do the main shareholders, members of these institutions have confidence in them? Because what I find quite interesting to look at is that all the heads of institutions are busy defending themselves against their own shareholders more and more who are busy criticizing what they are doing and that's a difficult situation in which to find yourself.