 Hello and welcome to NewsClick. Today, we talk about the situation in West Asia following the exchange of fire between Israel and Hezbollah on September 1. To talk more about this, we have with us Prabir Prakash, hello, Prabir. So Prabir, as we know, yesterday there was an exchange of fire. And Hezbollah first fired on Israel, sent anti-tank missiles, and Israel responded with mortar fire. And this, of course, follows an incident on August 25 when Israeli drones entered into Lebanese airspace. So how do you see the significance of this escalation, especially considering that this is probably the first time Hezbollah has responded since the 2006 war? Well, this is the first time we have had an open exchange of fire across the border. After 2006, we had a situation where across the Lebanese border, we haven't seen this kind of exchange. So in that sense, it is a new element in what's happening in the area. And as you have also said, that this follows the drone attacks in Beirut and also the attack in Syria, which seems to have killed a few of the Hezbollah people over there who are working on some kind of workshop or on some support to the Syrian Arab army. So given all this, we had also had the threat that Nasrullah had given Israel that having done this, you're not going to sleep peacefully at night. And Israel had taken precautions, they're not having people go to the borders with drawing some of the more visible targets on the borders. So there was an expectation there will be an exchange. The exchange, it seems from the accounts of both sides, has not led to significant damage or to maybe people getting killed or wounded. We don't know what actually happened because I don't think either side is to be relied upon for views in this case. But it does seem there are some material damage on both sides. So Hezbollah has proved its point that it is going to retaliate if Israel does this kind of action, particularly inside Lebanon. As you can see, the Lebanese people have also largely supported Hezbollah on this. And the president of Lebanon, Ayun, has also come out openly against Israel saying this is an act of war. So in that sense, Lebanon and Hezbollah have the international law on their side. But as we know, international law has really never deterred either Israel or the United States, so that's a good point. The question is that I think what we're beginning to see is Israel's recognition that there is a shift of the strategic balance between Israel and Hezbollah, which is overwhelmingly in favor of Israel before the 2006 war. After 2006 war, and the fact that Israel did not cause, shall we say, significant military damage to Hezbollah, though it had destroyed Lebanon's infrastructure, meant that there was at least recognition that Hezbollah is not an easy foe. But I think what is happening increasingly now is that this strategic balance, which was established in 2006, is also becoming more and more difficult for Israel, because Israel's dominance over Lebanon, till now it has complete dominance over Lebanese airspace, it has used it to attack Syria time and again. I think that's beginning to come into question. And I think, therefore, Hezbollah's ability, both with drones and with missiles, rockets, et cetera, is starting to make Israel think. Whether they need to take out Hezbollah, as I call it, right now, or do they wait till Hezbollah grows even more powerful? What do they do? Or whether this is purely an electoral gimmick by Netanyahu who's fighting at the moment difficult election in Israel. And to come to a related topic. So there's also reports of Hezbollah's military capacity increasing in recent times. And one example is the case of the precision rockets which have been mentioned in a number of reports. So what kind of an impact do you think that would have on the equation currently? Well, Israel has called it the red line. If there is a factory in Lebanon which lets Hezbollah put precision guidance systems on its rockets and missiles. The point is that it seems that already Hezbollah has some rockets or missiles which have precision-guided systems mounted on it. Whether they have been mounted in Iran, whether they have been mounted in Syria, or they have been mounted in Lebanon itself, is something that we do not know or can go into. But it seems that by all accounts that the Hezbollah today has precision weapons also in its arsenal. Apart from the drones, we have seen in the Houthi's case in Yemen that drones have been used to target in a radius of about 15 to 1600 kilometers from Yemen. And it has brought the whole of Saudi Arabia under its, shall we say, range. Similar capabilities must also be expected for Hezbollah, probably more so than less, because they are a battle-hardened force. They are fought in Syria. In Syria, they certainly have the capability to do modifications. And they seem to have drones also in their arsenal. And as we now know, the drones really depend on a few chipsets which are common to say a mobile phone. So therefore, having a drone which can hit inside Israel is not a major technological, shall we say, jump. So given all of this, I would say, Hezbollah has the fundamental, shall we say, today objective, that they should be able to hit Israel and still keep fighting in spite of Israel's attacks on them. If you go by the 2006 war, at that point of time, Israel could not penetrate beyond five to six kilometers in Lebanese territory. Hezbollah really fought them to a standstill. So that is one element. And throughout the 34-day war, they continuously sent rockets, 100, 150 rockets into Israel. And they seem to have, at that point of time, an arsenal of 10,000 to 15,000 rockets. Today, they not only have the Khattushas, which are the ones they used extensively earlier, but they have also a lot more. And if you take the total missile rocket strength that they have, it would mean they have probably have something from 130,000 to 150,000 such missiles, apart from the drones we are talking about. So they have the ability to have a prolonged, shall we say, attacks on a rocket barrage, missile barrage on Israel. And the range, if we take Yemen as anything to go by, the range would cover virtually all of Israel. So given this, the ability to Israel today to destroy Hezbollah on the ground doesn't seem to be there. So I would say that they have reached a strategic balance, that, yes, they are far more powerful. Israeli forces are far more powerful than Hezbollah is. But nevertheless, its ability not to lose and keep fighting and send rockets, missiles, drones into Israel gives it a strategic balance. And the last thing that we need to think of, there is a lot of talk about the iron dome system and the arrow system and so on. These are essentially three independent anti-missile systems. They don't operate like the S-300, S-400 of Russia, which have actually interlocking anti-missile capabilities. That each one sort of works in conjunction with the other. These three are essentially independent systems. Now we all know that any of the systems, A, are expensive and B, that if sufficient number of missiles or rockets are sent to into it, some will get through. They are porous. Now the question is, can Israel take a hit on Tel Aviv on its power plants, on its chemical plants, or even its nuclear reactor? That if sufficient number of rockets are sent, will they intercept all? And can really Israel take that risk? So I think increasingly, as I was arguing, the strategic balance is being established that Israel has to come to terms, that in days of the ability to get into any Arab country, beat them up, damage them beyond what could be considered acceptable, that balance of terror has shifted and Israel does not have that kind of, shall we say, dominance over the region. It doesn't mean it is a lesser military force. It's still by far the strongest military force in the region. But it also means its ability to take out his bullet alone is just not there today. And it wasn't there in 2006 either. The question is, will it get the United States to fight on its sides to destroy Hezbollah, which is there? The United States calls it a terrorist force. It's, of course, an open question. But if that happens, then we do expect the whole region to go up in flames. And that's not an easy task. And how far Mr. Trump will go to, shall we say, be with his brother-in-arms, shall we say, Netanyahu? It's an open question. Yes, support to Israel, yes. Endorsing Israel's position, yes. But risking all of U.S. strategic assets in the area, I think that's a difficult question. And what you described also seems to be a region-wide phenomenon, because like you said, with regard to the Houthis and the Saudi Arabia, it's very much the same situation. The Houthis are not stronger, but they still have the ability to create sufficient damage. Bleeds, Saudi Arabia. So do we see a realignment in the sense that Israel's Saudi axis is now kind of having to contend with the new reality, so to speak? I think it's an even larger issue that this also pertains to the United States. That the United States is certainly militarily far more powerful than Iran. But as Iran has said, all it needs to do is to control the states of Houthis. And if it does that, it bottles up Persian Gulf and all the oil activities there. So it's not that the countries have to win a battle. All that countries have to do is to continue fighting and inflict damage. As long as that is there, then how long will the other side fight is really the question. So can you take damage and still stand up is really the question? And I think in that, I will say, there is a shifting of the strategic calculus that we see the drones, the ballistic missiles, the rockets, all these things that we are talking about. Evening up in some sense, the strategic balance, though it is not in any sense strategic parity. So it is not that they are able to, they're as strong as the United States or Israel, certainly not. They are much weaker than any of these two. But at the same time, the ability to keep on fighting and achieve limited goals. Is it enough for them to have shifted the strategic balance? Really the question. I think Iran in that sense has also shown that it is not as weak as people would have thought. And I think the tanker wars have shown that it is difficult for the United States to rally support to say, we will control the states of arms with our allies. So I think those are the kind of shifts that are taking place. And I do think that the missile technologies and the rocket technologies, the drone technologies, which were in any case, favoring earlier United States and Israel. I think that has started to work in a different way at the moment. And cheap, shall we say, guidance systems coupled with short-range missiles, I think I'll make a difference to the scenario. Thank you so much, Pramir. That's all we have time for today. Keep watching NewsClean.